Naresh vs State Of Haryana

Court
Supreme Court

2026 INSC 1220
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1137-1138 OF 2014

NARESH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS


STATE OF HARYANA …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.
1. The present appeals have been preferred by the
accused/appellant assailing the correctness of the common
judgment dated 08.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana at Chandigarh ( hereinafter referred to as “ High
Court ”) in Murder Reference No. 02 of 2013 and CRA No.
D-205-DB of 2013 ( hereinafter referred to as “ Impugned
Signature Not Verified
Judgment ”), whereby the conviction of the Appellant under
Digitally signed by
RAHUL KUMAR
Date: 2026.11.16
18:14:31 IST
Reason:

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Sections 302, 449, 297 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
( hereinafter referred to as “ IPC ”), for the murder of Suman and
Shakuntla has been upheld, while his co-accused, Subhash @
Tinku, has been acquitted of all charges. Insofar as the
Appellant is concerned, the High Court declined to confirm the
sentence of death, commuted it to imprisonment for life with a
fine of Rs.10,000/- on each count of murder, and maintained the
remaining sentences under Sections 201, 297 and 449 IPC.
Furthermore, the High Court directed him to pay compensation
of Rs.1,56,000/- and Rs.1,44,000/- under Section 357 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( hereinafter referred to as
“ CrPC ”) to the legal representatives of Suman and Shakuntla,
respectively. The Appellant preferred the appeals through the
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, and leave was
granted on 05.05.2014.

BRIEF FACTS
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the prosecution
is that on the night of 17.04.2011, two widows of village Ranila,
District Bhiwani, Haryana, namely Suman, aged about 35 years,
and Shakuntla, aged about 40 years, were found dead at their
respective houses, which lay along the Post Office chowk of the
village. Suman lived alone, her husband Ramesh having passed
away some years earlier and her son Nakul staying in a hostel.

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Shakuntla was the widow of Bahadur, a paternal uncle of the
Appellant. As per the prosecution, the two women were
attacked in the chowk, and their bodies were thereafter dragged
into their houses.
3. On receiving telephonic information regarding the
incident, SI Japan Singh (PW-17), In-charge, Police Post
Achina Tal, reached the spot along with his team on the
intervening night of 17/18.04.2011. There, Kailash Chander
(PW-7), a panch of the village, got his statement (Ex.PE)
recorded, based on which FIR No. 23 dated 18.04.2011 was
registered at Police Station Baund Kalan under Section 302
IPC, naming the Appellant alone. The material part of Ex.PE
reads as under:
“…I came to know later on that Suman and
Shakuntla were murdered by Naresh son of
Jagdish after inflicting injuries with danda. Naresh
used to say that Suman and Shakuntla were
indulging in the prostitution. Because of this
reason, Naresh had committed murder of Suman
and Shakuntla. Legal action be taken against
Naresh…”

4. Notably, PW-7 did not claim to have witnessed the
occurrence. As per Ex.PE, he was present at his house at about
9:30/10:00 PM when he received information that the bodies
were lying at the Post Office chowk, whereupon he went there
along with one Parveen (PW-8). Ex.PE does not disclose the

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source from which PW-7 “came to know” of the involvement of
the Appellant.
5. The inquest reports were prepared on 18.04.2011 and
recorded the apparent cause of death in both cases as injuries
caused with lathi and danda . Both reports recorded that no
article was found near the body. The sketch appended to the
inquest report of Suman separately marked the place where a
1
wooden thapi was lying. Samples of blood were lifted from the
places where the two women were said to have been killed, and
the thapi , which was stained with blood, was lifted from near
the house of Suman, vide recovery memo. On the same day, the
statements of Hukam Singh (PW-9), Jai Singh (PW-10),
Raghbir Singh (PW-15) and Nakul (PW-19) were recorded.
Hukam Singh, the father of Subhash, claimed to have seen the
Appellant beating the two women with a danda . Jai Singh and
Raghbir Singh spoke of having come to know that the Appellant
had killed both of them. Nakul, the son of Suman, then aged
about 8/9 years, claimed in his statement (Ex.PGG) that he was
at home with his mother when the Appellant entered the house
by jumping over the wall and opened the door, whereupon
Subhash also came inside. According to him, both of them,
armed with dandas , beat his mother, who struck the Appellant
on his left foot with a thapi . They then took her to the chowk

1
a bat used for washing clothes

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and continued to beat her, and killed her as well as Shakuntla,
who had come to her rescue. Thereafter, they dragged the
bodies into the respective houses, and Subhash took him to his
grandmother’s house.
6. The post-mortem examinations were conducted on
18.04.2011 by Dr. Sandeep (PW-16) along with Dr. Subhash
Yadav (PW-18). Suman had sustained three incised wounds on
the left side of the face, the middle of the forehead and the
upper lip, each cutting through the underlying bone, besides a
bruise on the outer aspect of the left thigh. Shakuntla had
sustained multiple incised wounds on the forehead with fracture
of the frontal bone, four further bone-deep incised wounds on
the face and skull, and abrasions with bruising on the left
shoulder. In both cases, the cause of death was neuro-
haemorrhagic shock due to brain injury.
7. Dr. Ravinder Pal (PW-22), Senior Scientific Officer,
visited the spot on 18.04.2011 and prepared a crime scene
report. He recorded that the bodies had already been lifted
before his team arrived, and that the Investigating Officer had
reported that the two women had been beaten brutally to death
allegedly by a youth.
8. The Appellant and Subhash were arrested from the bus
stand of village Ranila on 18.04.2011 and are stated to have
made disclosure statements (Ex.PS and Ex.PT respectively) on

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the same day. In Ex.PS, the Appellant is recorded to have stated
that he and Subhash had caused injuries to the two women with
Dandas, and that he had concealed the danda and his clothes
under the earth at the eastern corner of his house. On
19.04.2011, the accused were remanded to police custody for
two days and were medically examined. The investigation was
taken over by Inspector Jaibir Singh (PW-20) on 20.04.2011.
9. The disclosures and the recoveries which followed may
be noted as under:
a. On 20.04.2011, pursuant to Ex.PS, the Appellant
got recovered a bamboo danda measuring about
2’4½”, along with a white T-shirt and a black
lower, from near the eastern wall of his house. On
the same day, Subhash got his clothes recovered
pursuant to Ex.PT. Both the recovery memos were
attested only by police officials.
b. On 20.04.2011, Subhash made a further disclosure
(Ex.PAA) and got recovered a piece of danda
measuring about 6½” from under a bed in the
house of Suman.
c. On 21.04.2011, both the accused made fresh
disclosures. In Ex.PBB, the Appellant is recorded
to have stated that he had caused injuries to the two
women with a gandasi , which he had concealed

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near the western wall of a room in his field. In
Ex.PCC, Subhash is recorded to have spoken of a
kulhari (axe) and the shirt and brassiere of Suman.
d. On 22.04.2011, pursuant to Ex.PBB, the Appellant
got recovered a gandasi / rapri from near the
western wall of the room in his field, and pursuant
to Ex.PCC, Subhash got recovered a kulhari (axe)
and the shirt and brassiere of Suman from near the
western wall of his house. Both the recovery
memos were attested by police officials and by
Narender (PW-21), a nephew of Shakuntla. On the
same day, a statement attributed to PW-8, Parveen
(Ex.PF), was also recorded, which names both the
accused and speaks of danda , kulhari and gandasi .
10. On 05.05.2011, the weapons were produced before Dr.
Sandeep (PW-16) for his opinion. As regards the weapons
recovered at the instance of the Appellant, he opined that the
possibility of injury nos. 1 to 3 on Suman and injury nos. 1 to 5
on Shakuntla being caused by the gandasi cannot be ruled out,
and that these injuries could not have been caused by a blunt
weapon such as the danda . Only injury no. 4 on Suman and
injury no. 6 on Shakuntla were attributed to a blunt weapon.
Interestingly, as regards the axe recovered at the instance of
Subhash, he opined in materially identical terms that the

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possibility of the very same injuries being caused by the axe
could not be ruled out.
11. The case property was sent to the Forensic Science
Laboratory, Madhuban on 25.04.2011 and 10.05.2011. Vide its
report and serological analysis, the Laboratory detected blood
on the clothes of both the deceased and both the accused, on the
danda , the piece of danda , the axe and the gandasi . Wherever
the origin could be determined, the blood was human, but its
group was ‘inconclusive’ in every instance. On the gandasi , as
also on the sample described as blood lifted from the spot, the
material had disintegrated, and neither the origin nor the group
of the blood could be determined. Pertinently, the wooden thapi
lifted from the spot was never sent to the Laboratory.
12. Upon completion of the investigation, the final report
under Section 173 CrPC was filed against both the accused on
11.06.2011. The case was tried by the Ld. Additional Sessions
Judge, Bhiwani ( hereinafter referred to as “ Trial Court ”) as
Sessions Case No. 64 of 2011, which on 25.07.2011 framed
charges against both the accused under Sections 302, 449, 297
and 201 read with Section 34 IPC. Both the accused pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial.

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B EFORE T HE T RIAL C OURT
13. The prosecution examined as many as 22 witnesses. Each
of the private witnesses who could have spoken to the
occurrence, or to the involvement of the accused, turned hostile.
These were PW-7 (Kailash Chander, the informant), PW-8
(Parveen, who is said to have accompanied him to the spot),
PW-9 (Hukam Singh, the only adult said to have witnessed the
occurrence), PW-10 (Jai Singh, the Lambardar of the village),
PW-15 (Raghbir Singh, a relative of Suman) and PW-19
(Nakul, the son of Suman), all of whom were declared hostile
and cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor. Rajender, the
father of Suman, was given up as having been won over. The
remaining witnesses were police officials, the doctors, the
photographer, the draftsman, the scientific officer and Narendra
(PW-21), who attested the recoveries of 22.04.2011.
14. In their statements under Section 313 CrPC, both the
accused denied the incriminating circumstances and stated that
they had been falsely implicated merely on the basis of
suspicion. No evidence was led in defence.
15. The Trial Court noted that the private witnesses had not
supported their earlier statements in court. Nonetheless, it held
that the motive of both the accused had to be worked out from
the initial statements of witnesses of the prosecution, and
proceeded to rely upon the previous statements of PW-7, PW-9,

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PW-10 and PW-19. Placing reliance upon Trimukh Maroti
2
Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra , it reasoned that the witnesses
had recanted because they were relatives or neighbours of the
accused. Placing reliance upon Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of
3
Delhi ) , it held that the previous statements could be taken into
consideration in view of the proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC.
Reliance was also placed upon State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad
4 5
Misra & Anr. , Sheikh Zakir v. State of Bihar and Himanshu
6
alias Chintu v. State (NCT of Delhi ) on the evidentiary value
of the testimony of hostile witnesses. As regards Nakul, the
7
Trial Court drew upon State of U.P. v. Krishna Master & Ors. ,
where this Court had accepted the testimony of a child who had
witnessed the killing of members of his family, observing that
such a child is unlikely to forget the occurrence. Reasoning that
Nakul, too, could not have forgotten what he had seen, and that
his silence in the face of specific questions showed that he had
been made not to depose against the accused, the Trial Court
held that his previous statement was to be believed as per
provisions of Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C.
16. Turning to the circumstantial evidence, the Trial Court
found that, pursuant to their disclosure statements, the

2
(2006) 10 SCC 681
3
(2011) 6 SCC 396
4
(1996) 10 SCC 360
5
(1983) 4 SCC 10
6
(2011) 2 SCC 36
7
(2010) 12 SCC 324

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 10 of 55

Appellant had got recovered the danda , his own blood-stained
clothes and the gandasi , while Subhash had got recovered his
clothes, a piece of danda , the axe, and the shirt and brassiere of
Suman. It reasoned that Subhash could not have come to
possess the clothes of the deceased unless he had participated in
the crime. It further observed that the recovered clothes and
weapons were stained with human blood, and that PW-16 had
opined that the incised injuries could have been caused by the
gandasi and the axe, and the remaining injuries by the danda .
The Trial Court characterised the crime as an “honour killing”,
holding that the Appellant believed the two women to be
indulging in prostitution, while Subhash believed that Suman
was having illicit relations with his younger brother, Sudhir, and
that Shakuntla was helping her. The latter motive was drawn
from the disclosure statement of Subhash (Ex.PT), though, as
the Trial Court itself noted, it had not come in the statement of
any other witness. Vide judgment dated 20.02.2013 and order
on sentence dated 28.02.2013, the Trial Court convicted both
the accused on all charges, sentenced each of them to death with
fine, and made a reference under Section 366 CrPC for
confirmation of the sentence of death. The reference was heard
by the High Court along with the appeal preferred by both the
accused, and was decided by the Impugned Judgment.


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I MPUGNED J UDGMENT
17. While deciding the reference and the appeal, the High
Court drew a distinction between the two accused. As regards
the co-accused Subhash, it noted that he was not named in the
FIR, that the clothes recovered at his instance could not connect
him with the crime, and that the piece of danda had been
recovered from the house of the deceased and not from his
exclusive possession. On his disclosure leading to the recovery
of the axe, the High Court observed as under:
“ The injuries on the corpses of Suman and
Shakuntla were incised wounds, which could not be
caused with ‘danda’. When the Investigating
Officer realised that the injuries were with sharp
edged weapon, then the third disclosure statement
Ex.PCC was ascribed to Subhash (appellant) , that
resulted into recovery of an axe and rapri. This
disclosure statement Ex.PCC being contradictory
to his earlier disclosure statements Ex.PT and
Ex.PAA cannot be relied upon.”

18. The High Court also held the statement of Nakul,
insofar as it named Subhash, to be repugnant to the FIR, and
found the testimony of PW-21 to be inconsequential, as he
had neither witnessed the occurrence nor disclosed the source
of his knowledge. Subhash was accordingly acquitted of all
charges.

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19. The conviction of the Appellant, however, was upheld.
The decisive consideration, in the opinion of the High Court,
was that his name figured in the FIR. As regards the FIR, it
held as under:
“So far as the FIR Ex.PD is concerned, the same is
based on statement Ex.PE, which bears the
signature of Kailash Chander (PW-7), that became
binding document, as he identified his signatures
at point ‘A’, thereon and that reveals only the
complicity of Naresh (appellant).”

Applying Bhagwan Dass (supra), the High Court then held as
regards the statement of Nakul:
“So far as, the testimony of Nakul (PW-19) is
concerned, that may be believed only qua Naresh
(appellant), as his name figures in the FIR Ex.PD.
Even specific question was asked to him, as to
whether he had disclosed to the investigating
officer that Naresh and Subhash (appellants) had
started beating his mother with ‘danda’ and his
mother had started beating Naresh with thapi. To
both the questions, Nakul (PW-19) stated that he
did not remember. So, the statement of this witness
as per proviso to Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C can be
applied qua the complicity of Naresh (appellant).”

20. As regards the conflict between the danda named in
the FIR and the incised wounds found at the post-mortem, the
High Court read the opinion of PW-16 as indicating that
injury nos. 1 to 3 on Suman could have been caused by the

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gandasi as well as by a danda , and concluded that possibly
both the blunt as well as sharp edged weapons were used by
Naresh. It observed that in a case based on circumstantial
evidence, such an error about the nature of the injuries could
take place. In its view, the accusing finger still pointed
towards the Appellant, as he could not swallow the
prostitution being carried out by both the deceased ladies.
21. Holding that the case did not fall within the category of
the rarest of rare cases, the High Court declined to confirm
the sentence of death, commuted it to imprisonment for life,
and directed the Appellant to pay compensation to the legal
representatives of the deceased.

T HE C HALLENGE
22. Taking exception to the Impugned Judgment, Ld.
Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the conviction rests on
no legally admissible evidence. It is submitted that the case of
the prosecution rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and
that every vital link in the chain is missing.
23. First and foremost, it is submitted that every private
witness, including the informant and the only persons said to
have witnessed the occurrence, disowned the case of the
prosecution in court. Despite this, both the courts below treated
the FIR and the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC as

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substantive evidence of the guilt and the motive of the
Appellant, which Section 162 CrPC expressly forbids. Ld.
Counsel submitted that the FIR itself is hearsay, as the
informant admittedly did not witness the occurrence and did not
disclose the source of his information.
24. The next limb of submission relates to the recoveries. It is
submitted that the danda , which the prosecution projected as the
weapon of offence until the post-mortem, could not have caused
any of the fatal injuries. It is further submitted that the gandasi
was discovered only by way of a second disclosure recorded
after the post-mortem had revealed incised wounds, and that the
recoveries were witnessed either by police officials alone or by
a relative of the deceased (PW-21) whose version is at variance
with that of the police. Ld. Counsel also submitted that the
forensic evidence does not connect any article with the
deceased, the blood group being inconclusive throughout and
the blood on the gandasi being of undetermined origin.
25. Lastly, it is submitted that the reasons which weighed
with the High Court for acquitting Subhash apply with equal
force to the Appellant, and that the Appellant has been in
custody since 18.04.2011.
26. Opposing the appeal, Ld. Counsel for the State supported
the concurrent findings of the courts below. It is submitted that
the witnesses' statements were recorded within hours of the

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occurrence and consistently named the Appellant, and that the
witnesses resiled in court only because they were the
Appellant's relatives or neighbours, as rightly found by the
courts below. The State relies on Bhagwan Dass (supra) to
contend that the previous statement of a hostile witness may be
considered.
27. Ld. Counsel for the State further submitted that the
disclosure statements of the Appellant led to the recovery of his
blood-stained clothes, the danda and the gandasi , and that the
medical opinion connects the gandasi with the injuries. It is also
submitted that the motive, namely the belief of the Appellant
that the two women were of bad character, stands established.
Hence, the concurrent findings of fact ought not to be interfered
with in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

D ISCUSSION
28. We have heard Ld. Counsel for both the parties and
perused the original record. The principal issue for
consideration is whether the prosecution has proved, beyond
reasonable doubt, a complete chain of circumstances pointing
only to the guilt of the Appellant. As a corollary, the following
questions arise for consideration:
a. Whether the FIR and the statements recorded under
Section 161 CrPC could be relied upon to establish

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 16 of 55

the involvement and motive of the Appellant, when
every private witness who could have spoken to the
occurrence turned hostile?
b. Whether the disclosures made by the Appellant and
the recoveries of the danda and the gandasi stand
proved in accordance with Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 ( hereinafter referred to as
“ Evidence Act ”), and whether they constitute
incriminating circumstances?
c. Whether the medical and forensic evidence
connects the Appellant with the death of Suman
and Shakuntla?
d. Whether there is any admissible evidence to
sustain the charges under Sections 449, 297 and
201 IPC?
e. Whether the Appellant could have been convicted
on evidence of the same kind as that on which the
High Court acquitted Subhash?
29. Answering the first question requires us, at the outset, to
place what each private witness is recorded to have told the
police alongside what he stated on oath. The most glaring
feature of the present case is that not a single witness deposed in
court to having seen the Appellant assault either of the

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deceased, or to any fact from which his involvement could be
inferred. The previous statements and the depositions of these
witnesses may be noted as under:
a. PW-7, Kailash Chander: In Ex.PE, he stated that he
came to know later on that the Appellant had killed
both the women with a danda and that the
Appellant used to say they were indulging in
prostitution. However, in court, he deposed that he
had received information through Parveen, had
gone to the spot with the police, and had not named
the accused. He denied the portions of Ex.PE put to
him, and added that he had only heard about the
activities of the two women but had never seen
them indulging in any immoral activity.
b. PW-8, Parveen: The statement attributed to him
(Ex.PF), bearing the date 22.04.2011, names both
the accused and speaks of danda , kulhari and
gandasi . However, in court, he deposed that he had
seen the body of Shakuntla lying in the chowk, but
did not know who had committed the murder, and
had not noticed any immoral activities on the part
of the two women.
c. PW-9, Hukam Singh, the father of co-accused
Subhash: In Ex.PG, he claimed to have seen the

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 18 of 55

Appellant beating both the women with a danda
and to have been pushed away when he intervened.
However, in court, he stated that he came to know
about the bodies only later, and denied Ex.PG
altogether stating that “ no such statement was
made by me to the police”.
d. PW-10, Jai Singh, the Lambardar of the village: In
Ex.PH, he stated that he had come to know that the
Appellant had killed both the women with a danda
and that the Appellant used to call them
characterless. However, in court, he stated that he
had not seen the occurrence, and denied having
made Ex.PH.
e. PW-15, Raghbir Singh: In Ex.PU, he stated that a
telephonic message had been received that Suman
had been murdered by the Appellant “etc.”.
However, in court, he stated that he did not know
who had committed the murder, and that he had
only identified the body.
f. PW-19, Nakul, the son of Suman: In Ex.PGG, he
claimed to have seen the Appellant and Subhash
beat his mother with dandas , drag her to the chowk
and kill her and Shakuntla. However, in court, aged
about 11 years, he deposed that “ I was staying with

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my grandmother. I did not see anybody to cause
hurt to my mother”. When confronted, he stated
that he did not remember having made the
statement, and gave no reply to some of the
questions put to him repeatedly.
30. Thus, Hukam Singh and Nakul, the only two persons who
claimed before the police to have witnessed the occurrence, did
not support the prosecution in court, nor did any other private
witness. The only material against the Appellant emanating
from these witnesses is to be found in their previous statements.
The courts below nonetheless held the complicity and the
motive of the Appellant proved on the strength of these
statements and of the FIR. We shall examine the statements
recorded under Section 161 CrPC first, the FIR next, and
thereafter the statement of Nakul and the finding on motive. As
regards the first, the question is what use, if any, the law permits
of such statements. Section 162(1) CrPC reads as under:
“ 162. Statements to police not to be signed: Use of
statements in evidence. —(1) No statement made by
any person to a police officer in the course of an
investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced
to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor
shall any such statement or any record thereof,
whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part
of such statement or record, be used for any
purpose, save as hereinafter provided , at any
inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under

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investigation at the time when such statement was
made:
Provided that when any witness is called for the
prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose
statement has been reduced into writing as
aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved,
may be used by the accused, and with the
permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to
contradict such witness in the manner provided
by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(1 of 1872); and when any part of such statement is
so used, any part thereof may also be used in the
re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose
only of explaining any matter referred to in his
cross-examination.”

31. The prohibition contained in Section 162 CrPC is
couched in the widest terms. A statement made to a police
officer in the course of investigation shall not be used “ for any
purpose ”, save as provided therein. The proviso permits but one
use, namely, to contradict the witness in the manner provided
by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The Constitution Bench of
8
this Court in Tahsildar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P .
explained that the provision is designed to protect the accused at
the trial against the use of statements made by witnesses to the
police during investigation, which are recorded without the
safeguards that attend testimony in court.

8
AIR 1959 SC 1012

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 21 of 55

32. Following Tahsildar Singh (supra) , a three-Judge Bench
of this Court in V.K. Mishra & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand &
9
Anr. summarised the position of law thus:
“ 16. Section 162 CrPC bars use of statement of
witnesses recorded by the police except for the
limited purpose of contradiction of such witnesses
as indicated there. The statement made by a
witness before the police under Section 161(1)
CrPC can be used only for the purpose of
contradicting such witness on what he has stated at
the trial as laid down in the proviso to Section
162(1) CrPC. The statements under Section 161
CrPC recorded during the investigation are not
substantive pieces of evidence but can be used
primarily for the limited purpose: (i) of
contradicting such witness by an accused under
Section 145 of the Evidence Act; (ii) the
contradiction of such witness also by the
prosecution but with the leave of the Court; and
(iii) the re-examination of the witness if
necessary.”

33. This Court in Alauddin & Ors. v. State of Assam &
10
Anr. has held that where a witness denies the portion of his
previous statement put to him, that portion must be proved
through the officer who recorded it, for it is only then that the
contradiction stands proved. Pertinently, even a proved
contradiction serves only to impeach the credit of the witness
under Section 155(3) of the Evidence Act. It may lead the Court

9
(2015) 9 SCC 588
10
2024 INSC 376

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 22 of 55

to view what he has said in court with caution, or to reject his
testimony altogether. It does not, however, make his previous
statement evidence of the facts narrated therein. In other words,
a proved contradiction may show that the witness is unreliable,
but it cannot show that what he told the police is true.
34. The distinction between a statement recorded by the
police and one recorded by a Judicial Magistrate is well
11
recognised. In Vijaya Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand ,
this Court, while dealing with statements recorded under
Section 164 CrPC from which the witnesses had resiled,
observed that the vigour of Section 162 CrPC does not apply to
a statement under Section 164 CrPC and that such a statement
must be considered on a better footing. It was further observed
that to permit retraction from a statement recorded before the
Magistrate on flimsy grounds would effectively negate the
difference between a statement recorded by the police officer
and that recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. If even a statement
recorded by a Magistrate is not substantive evidence, a
statement made to the police, which carries none of these
safeguards, cannot be. Where a witness departs in court from
what he had told the police, the Court cannot prefer the police
version over his testimony on oath. In the present case, the
record does not indicate that any of the witnesses was produced

11
2024 INSC 905

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 23 of 55

before a Magistrate for recording a statement under Section 164
CrPC. Every statement relied upon by the courts below is a
statement recorded by the police and falls squarely within the
vigour of Section 162 CrPC.
35. Tested on the anvil of these principles, the approach of
the courts below cannot be countenanced. The Trial Court held
that the motive has to be worked out from the initial statements
of witnesses of the prosecution and that the statement of Nakul
is being believed as per provisions of Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C.
The High Court held that the statement of Nakul as per proviso
to Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. can be applied qua the complicity of
the Appellant. In each instance, the previous statement was used
as proof of its contents. This is an error of law which strikes at
the root of the conviction.
36. Even the limited use permitted by the proviso was not
properly laid. The witnesses were confronted with portions of
their previous statements and denied having made them. The
record does not indicate that the Investigating Officers, PW-17
and PW-20, were called upon to prove those portions. PW-17
deposed no more than that he had recorded the statements of the
witnesses. The contradictions, therefore, were not even proved
in the manner known to law.
37. There is a further difficulty with the statement attributed
to PW-8 (Ex.PF). PW-8 was admittedly present at the spot

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 24 of 55

when the police arrived on the night of the occurrence, and the
inquest proceedings record his presence. He stated in his cross-
examination that he helped the police shift the bodies on
18.04.2011, and that “ I did not meet the police thereafter ”. Yet
the only statement attributed to him is dated 22.04.2011, five
days after the occurrence, and is signed by the Station House
Officer. It names Subhash, and speaks of the kulhari and the
gandasi , neither of which had surfaced until the disclosures of
21.04.2011 and the recoveries of 22.04.2011. Such a statement
cannot be a record of what PW-8 told the police on the night of
the occurrence. It reflects, instead, the case of the prosecution as
it stood on 22.04.2011.
38. The courts below sought to justify the use of these
statements on the strength of Bhagwan Dass (supra) , the
decisions on hostile witnesses, and Trimukh Maroti Kirkan
(supra) , but none of them bears it out. To begin with, the
reliance upon Bhagwan Dass (supra) is misplaced. In that case,
the mother of the accused had told the police that her son had
confessed to killing his daughter, and she resiled at the trial.
This Court observed that her statement could be taken into
consideration in view of the proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC
and, disbelieving her denial, accepted her statement to the
police. However, the conviction in that case rested upon a series
of independently proved circumstances. The deceased had spent

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 25 of 55

the night in the house of the accused, and the medical evidence
established death by ligature strangulation. The accused had not
informed the police for about ten hours, and the family was
preparing for the last rites when the police arrived. The signed
statement of the accused before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate
stood proved and unchallenged, and the electric wire was
recovered at his instance. The observation must be read in that
context. Moreover, the decision of the Constitution Bench in
Tahsildar Singh (supra ), which held that Section 162 CrPC
enacts an absolute bar against the statement made before a
police officer being used for any purpose whatsoever, was not
brought to the notice of the Court. Bhagwan Dass (supra)
cannot, therefore, be read as laying down that where a witness
turns hostile, his statement to the police may be treated as
substantive evidence of its contents.
39. Equally misplaced is the reliance upon Ramesh Prasad
Misra (supra) , Sk. Zakir (supra) and Himanshu (supra) . The
decisions in Ramesh Prasad Misra (supra) and Himanshu
(supra) hold that the evidence of a witness is not to be rejected
in toto merely because he has been declared hostile, and that the
Court may rely upon such part of his testimony as is found to be
dependable and, as Himanshu (supra) adds, duly corroborated
by other reliable evidence on record. Sk. Zakir (supra) holds
that the hostility of some witnesses does not, by itself, prevent a

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 26 of 55

conviction where there is otherwise acceptable evidence in
support of the prosecution. None of these decisions treats what a
hostile witness had told the police as substantive evidence. In
Ramesh Prasad Misra (supra) , this Court used the previous
statements of the hostile witnesses only to show that the version
introduced by them in cross-examination was an afterthought,
and noted that what they had spoken of to the police is not on
record as substantive evidence. The High Court nonetheless
applied all three decisions against the Appellant on the footing
that his name figured in the FIR. In the present case, it is true
that the statements recorded by the police from the hostile
witnesses named the Appellant. Not one of these witnesses,
however, implicated him in court, either before or after being
declared hostile. Whatever incriminates the Appellant is to be
found only in those statements, which the witnesses disowned
and which Section 162 CrPC does not permit to be used as
evidence. There is, in effect, no grain to be separated from the
chaff.
40. Nor does Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra) come to the
aid of the prosecution. The courts below relied upon its
observation that neighbours are generally reluctant to depose in
court, as they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonise
a neighbourhood family. On that basis, they explained why PW-
7 and PW-8 had resiled, and then fell back upon what these

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 27 of 55

witnesses had told the police. Such an observation may explain
why evidence is scarce, but it cannot supply the evidence. A
reason why a witness may have resiled, even if accepted, is not
proof of the fact which he declined to prove. Moreover,
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra) concerned the death of a
woman in her matrimonial home. As explained by this Court in
Uma & Anr. v. The State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent
12
of Police , the decision deals with the consequences that follow
when an offence is said to have taken place in the privacy of a
house where the accused is said to have been present. In such a
case, the standard of proof expected of the prosecution is lesser,
and the accused comes under a duty to explain the
circumstances which led to the death. The present case is not of
that kind. The Appellant was not an inmate of the house of
either of the deceased, and the fatal assault is alleged to have
taken place in the open chowk of the village.
41. In any event, the explanation offered by the courts below
does not fit the facts. According to the courts below, the
witnesses had turned hostile out of loyalty to the accused, either
as relatives or as neighbours. This explanation fails for two
reasons. Firstly, PW-9 and PW-10 were related to the deceased
Shakuntla as much as to the Appellant. Shakuntla was the
widow of their nephew Bahadur, and the Appellant is the son of

12
2024 INSC 809

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 28 of 55

their nephew Jagdish. Their kinship, therefore, cannot explain
why they would side with the Appellant against the deceased.
Secondly, two of the hostile witnesses came from the family of
the deceased Suman. PW-15 was her relative and had come to
the village with her father, and PW-19, Nakul, is her son.
Neither of them had any apparent reason to protect the accused.
The High Court nonetheless grouped Nakul with the
neighbours, and observed as under:
“PW-7 (Kailash Chander), PW-8 (Parveen) and
PW-19 (Nakul) being neighbourers did not support
the case of the prosecution. So, simply on the basis
of their deposition, the case against Naresh
(appellant) could not be held to be doubtful.”

It further observed that Nakul “ did not want to antagonize
Naresh (appellant) ”. There is no material on record to suggest
that Nakul was won over, and the Public Prosecutor did not
even put such a suggestion to him. Nor is it self-evident why the
son of the deceased would shield those who, as per the
prosecution, killed his mother in his presence.
42. It is also not without significance that the occurrence is
alleged to have taken place in the evening at the Post Office
chowk of the village, where, as the Trial Court itself noted,
several shops are situated. The Trial Court went so far as to
observe that the whole of the locality must have seen the
occurrence, and treated the fact that nobody came to the rescue

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 29 of 55

of the two women as an aggravating circumstance while
awarding the sentence of death. Yet, the only persons said to
have witnessed the occurrence were PW-9, a relative of the
Appellant as well as of the deceased Shakuntla, and Nakul, the
son of the deceased Suman. PW-7 and PW-8, the only witnesses
from the locality who were not related to either side, did not
claim, even before the police, to have seen the occurrence. The
Trial Court did not consider what follows from its own finding.
An occurrence which the whole of the locality must have seen
produced no independent account at all, and the case of the
prosecution as to the occurrence rested entirely on police
statements which their makers disowned.
43. We now turn to the FIR, which was registered on the
statement of PW-7 (Ex.PE). It is trite that an FIR is not
substantive evidence, and that it can be used only to corroborate
or contradict its maker. In the present case, PW-7 did not
support it. More importantly, Ex.PE is not, on its own terms, an
account of anything which PW-7 had witnessed. It records only
that he came to know later that the Appellant had committed the
murders, without disclosing from whom. PW-17, the
Investigating Officer, candidly admitted in his cross-
examination that, as per Ex.PE, PW-7 was not an eyewitness
and had come to the spot later. Thus, even if PW-7 had affirmed

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 30 of 55

the contents of Ex.PE in the witness box, the assertion that the
Appellant was the assailant would have remained hearsay.
44. The High Court treated Ex.PE as a binding document
since PW-7 had admitted his signature thereon. With respect,
we are unable to agree. Section 154 CrPC itself requires the
information to be signed by the person giving it. The signature
proves only that PW-7 made the statement to the police. It does
not prove the truth of what unnamed persons had told him. An
FIR which names an accused on hearsay cannot supply the
proof which the witnesses failed to furnish at the trial.
Interestingly, the High Court then used the FIR as a touchstone
for the statements under Section 161 CrPC, accepting the
statement of Nakul against the Appellant because his name
figured in the FIR, and rejecting the very same statement
against Subhash because his name did not. A statement which is
not substantive evidence cannot become evidence against one
accused and remain something less against another. The
statement of Nakul was not substantive evidence against either
of them.
45. There is yet another difficulty with the statement of
Nakul. In court, he deposed that he was staying with his
grandmother and did not see anyone hurting his mother.
Although his statement to the police bears the date 18.04.2011,
PW-17 admitted that the application for police remand

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 31 of 55

(Ex.DX), filed on the very next day and setting out the case
against both the accused, did not mention that Nakul was an
eyewitness. The Trial Court treated the silence of the child in
the face of repeated questions by the Public Prosecutor, and his
answer that he did not remember, as if they confirmed his
previous statement, but they do not. The Trial Court relied upon
Krishna Master (supra) to hold that the memory of a child does
not fade with time, and attributed the silence of Nakul to his
having been “ made not to depose ”. In that case, however, the
child witness had narrated in court what he had seen and
withstood a lengthy cross-examination, and it was that
testimony which this Court accepted. The difficulty in the
present case is not whether Nakul could remember the
occurrence, but that he gave no evidence of it at all. A previous
statement made to the police does not become evidence merely
because the memory of its maker is presumed to be intact.
46. The finding on motive rests entirely upon the same
inadmissible material. No witness stated in court that the
Appellant held, or had ever expressed, the belief attributed to
him. PW-7 stated that he had heard of the activities of the two
women but had seen nothing, and PW-8 stated that he had not
noticed any such activities. The case of the prosecution on
motive was not even consistent. The disclosure statement
attributed to Subhash (Ex.PT) ascribed an altogether different

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 32 of 55

reason for the crime, namely an alleged relationship between
Suman and his younger brother. The Trial Court noted that this
version found no support in the statement of any other witness,
yet characterised the crime as an “honour killing” committed by
both the accused. That portion of a disclosure statement is, in
any case, a confession made to a police officer and is
inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. The
same holds good for the reason recorded in the Appellant’s own
disclosure statement (Ex.PS), that the two women were of bad
character. That characterisation thus rests on no admissible
evidence.
47. In a nutshell, the FIR and the statements recorded under
Section 161 CrPC could not have been used to prove either the
complicity of the Appellant or his motive. Once that material is
excluded, as it must be, there remains no oral evidence
connecting the Appellant with the death of Suman and
Shakuntla. The first question is, therefore, answered in the
negative.
48. Moving on to the second question, what remains against
the Appellant are the recoveries said to have been effected
pursuant to his disclosure statements. Section 27 of the
Evidence Act carves out a limited exception to Sections 25 and
26 thereof. It permits proof of only so much of the information
given by an accused in police custody as relates distinctly to the

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 33 of 55

fact thereby discovered. The scope of the provision was
explained by the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya & Ors. v.
13
King-Emperor in the following words:
“It is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within
the section as equivalent to the object produced;
the fact discovered embraces the place from which
the object is produced and the knowledge of the
accused as to this, and the information given must
relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past
user, or the past history, of the object produced is
not related to its discovery in the setting in which it
is discovered. Information supplied by a person in
custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in
the roof of my house’ does not lead to the discovery
of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago.
It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is
concealed in the house of the informant to his
knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been
used in the commission of the offence, the fact
discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement
the words be added ‘with which I stabbed A’ these
words are inadmissible since they do not relate to
the discovery of the knife in the house of the
informant.”

49. It follows that a recovery, even where admissible, proves
no more than that the accused knew of the place where the
object was found. Whether that knowledge points towards guilt
depends upon whether the recovery is credibly proved, and
whether the object is shown to be connected with the crime. As

13
1946 SCC OnLine PC 47

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 34 of 55

regards the first, the manner of proving a disclosure statement
was explained by this Court in Ramanand alias Nandlal Bharti
14
v. State of U.P. as under:
“ 59 . The requirement of law that needs to be
fulfilled before accepting the evidence of discovery
is that by proving the contents of the panchnama.
The investigating officer in his deposition is
obliged in law to prove the contents of the
panchnama and it is only if the investigating officer
has successfully proved the contents of the
discovery panchnama in accordance with law, then
in that case the prosecution may be justified in
relying upon such evidence and the trial court may
also accept the evidence. In the present case, what
we have noticed from the oral evidence of the
investigating officer, PW 7 Yogendra Singh, is that
he has not proved the contents of the discovery
panchnama and all that he has deposed is that, as
the accused expressed his willingness to point out
the weapon of offence, the same was discovered
under a panchnama. We have minutely gone
through this part of the evidence of the
investigating officer and are convinced that by no
stretch of imagination it could be said that the
investigating officer has proved the contents of the
discovery panchnama (Ext. 5). There is a reason
why we are laying emphasis on proving the
contents of the panchnama at the end of the
investigating officer, more particularly when the
independent panch witnesses though examined yet
have not said a word about such discovery or
turned hostile and have not supported the
prosecution . In order to enable the Court to safely

14
(2023) 16 SCC 510

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 35 of 55

rely upon the evidence of the investigating officer,
it is necessary that the exact words attributed to
an accused, as statement made by him, be
brought on record and, for this purpose the
investigating officer is obliged to depose in his
evidence the exact statement and not by merely
saying that a discovery panchnama of weapon of
offence was drawn as the accused was willing to
take it out from a particular place .”

50. In the present case, neither PW-17 nor PW-20 deposed to
the words actually used by the Appellant. PW-17 stated that the
accused “ suffered their disclosure statements which are Ex.PS
and Ex.PT”, and that the disclosure statement of the Appellant,
Ex.PBB, was “regarding the concealment of gandasi in his
fields ”. PW-20 likewise deposed that the Appellant suffered
disclosure statement Ex.PBB “ regarding concealment of
rapri/gandasi in a room situated in his field ”. The information
said to have been furnished by the Appellant was thus never
narrated in evidence. Only the memoranda were exhibited. The
disclosure statements of the Appellant, therefore, do not stand
proved in the manner known to law.
51. As regards the second, it is trite that the recovery of a
weapon, even one stained with blood, cannot by itself form the
basis of a conviction unless the weapon is shown to be
connected with the crime. Indeed, this Court in Manoj Kumar

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 36 of 55

15
Soni v. State of Madhya Pradesh has held that a disclosure
statement, without more, is not sufficient to sustain a
conviction, in the following words:
“ 20 . A doubt looms: Can disclosure statements per
se, unaccompanied by any supporting evidence, be
deemed adequate to secure a conviction? We find it
implausible. Although disclosure statements hold
significance as a contributing factor in unriddling
a case, in our opinion, they are not so strong a
piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without
anything more to bring home the charges beyond
reasonable doubt.”

52. Turning to the first recovery, the danda and the clothes of
the Appellant (Ex.PM) were recovered on 20.04.2011 from near
the eastern wall of his house, on the outside. The memo was
attested only by police officials. PW-13, Constable Sushil
Kumar, admitted that no public witness was called, while PW-
17 stated that although many persons were present at the time of
recovery, none was joined as they showed their helplessness. In
16
Nazim & Ors. v. State of Uttarakhand where the investigating
officer likewise admitted that villagers were present but none
was called, this Court held that such lapses diminish the
credibility of the recovery. The same holds good here.

15
(2024) 17 SCC 401
16
(2025) SCC OnLine SC 2117

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 37 of 55

53. The more fundamental difficulty, however, is that the
danda is not shown to have any connection with the injuries
which caused death. Every fatal injury on both the women was
an incised, bone-deep wound. PW-16 categorically opined that
these injuries cannot be caused by blunt weapon i.e. ‘danda’.
The only injuries attributed to a blunt weapon were a bruise on
the thigh of Suman and an abrasion with bruising on the
shoulder of Shakuntla. In his cross-examination, PW-16
accepted that the injury No.4 is possible by dragging and that
Injury No.6 is possible by blunt as well as dragging. It is the
case of the prosecution itself that both the bodies were dragged.
The recovery of the danda , therefore, proves nothing as to how
the two women were killed.
54. Interestingly, until the post-mortem, the danda was the
weapon in every version put forth by the prosecution. The FIR,
both the inquest reports, the application for post-mortem and the
first disclosure statement of the Appellant (Ex.PS) all attributed
the injuries to a danda , and the crime scene report prepared on
the same day recorded that the women had been beaten to death.
55. The post-mortem examinations conducted on the
afternoon of 18.04.2011 revealed incised wounds. On
21.04.2011, while the Appellant had remained in continuous
police custody since 18.04.2011, a second disclosure statement
(Ex.PBB) came to be recorded, wherein he is stated to have

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 38 of 55

disclosed that it was with a gandasi that he had caused the
injuries. This is in direct contradiction to his first disclosure
which, as per the prosecution itself, had already identified the
weapon and had been acted upon. No explanation is
forthcoming as to why the Appellant, having disclosed one
weapon on the day of his arrest, would disclose a different
weapon three days later.
56. Significantly, the High Court rejected the corresponding
disclosure of Subhash (Ex.PCC) for precisely this reason,
holding that it was ascribed to him once the Investigating
Officer realised that the injuries were with a sharp-edged
weapon. The said reasoning applies with equal, if not greater,
force to Ex.PBB. Both the second-round disclosures were
recorded on the same day, by the same officers, after the same
post-mortem, and each supplied a sharp-edged weapon which
the first round of disclosures had not. The Impugned Judgment
does not explain as to why the reasoning which discredited
Ex.PCC left Ex.PBB untouched. The only answer offered was
that “ possibly both the blunt as well as sharp edged weapons
were used by Naresh ”. That is a conjecture and not a finding on
evidence. No witness ever stated that the Appellant had used
two weapons, and that was never the case of the prosecution.
57. Furthermore, the said conjecture proceeds on a
misreading of the medical evidence. The High Court recorded

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 39 of 55

that, as per PW-16, injury nos. 1 to 3 on Suman could be caused
by a blunt weapon, i.e ‘danda’. The opinion of PW-16
(Ex.PHH/1), as proved in his deposition, is to the contrary.
Those injuries cannot be caused by a blunt weapon. The
premise upon which the High Court reconciled the danda with
the incised wounds, therefore, does not exist.
58. The recovery of the gandasi on 22.04.2011 (Ex.PDD)
was effected from near the western wall of a room situated in
the field of the Appellant, an open place. Apart from police
officials, the memo was attested by PW-21, Narender, a nephew
of Shakuntla. Upon closer scrutiny, his evidence suffers from
serious infirmities and is at variance with that of the police:
a. PW-21 deposed that he came from Narnaul on
22.04.2011 and then came to know that both the
accused had murdered the two women with a
kulhari and a rapri , without disclosing the source
of such knowledge. PW-20 admitted that Narender
had not been summoned by the police and had
come of his own.
b. PW-21 deposed that SI Japan Singh met him at the
house of Shakuntla and that the accused were with
him. He further stated that the kulhara and
brassiers were recovered from the back side of the

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 40 of 55

house of my Mosi Shakuntla. These articles were
recovered at about 10.00 or 11.00 am.
c. On the other hand, the memo Ex.PEE records the
recovery of the axe and the clothes of Suman from
near the western wall of the house of Subhash, and
not of Shakuntla. PW-17 deposed that the
Appellant got recovered ‘rapri’ at about 6.30 pm
and that Subhash got recovered ‘kulhari’ at about
5.30 pm, while PW-20 stated that the recoveries
were effected in the evening time of 22.04.2011.
59. Thus, the only witness to these recoveries who was not a
police official placed them in the morning instead of the
evening, and placed the recovery of the axe and the clothes of
Suman at the house of one of the deceased instead of the house
of the accused. These are not minor discrepancies of detail.
They go to the very question of whether the recoveries took
place as recorded. Notably, the High Court itself found the
testimony of PW-21 to be inconsequential qua Subhash, as he
had not witnessed the occurrence and had not disclosed the
source of his knowledge. The same holds good qua the
Appellant. It is also not without significance that the scaled site
plan of the place of occurrence (Ex.PA) came to be prepared on
the demarcation of the very same witness, who admittedly

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 41 of 55

arrived in the village only on 22.04.2011 and had no personal
knowledge of the occurrence.
60. The investigation into the weapon was deficient in
another respect as well. PW-5, the photographer, admitted in his
cross-examination that a knife was lying near the dead body as
shown in Ex.P-6, which is one of the photographs of the body
of Suman. The inquest report of Suman, however, records that
nothing was found near the body. The knife was neither seized
nor examined. We say nothing as to what the knife may or may
not signify. We only note that in a case where every fatal injury
was caused by a sharp-edged weapon, the investigation left
unexplained a knife lying beside one of the bodies.
61. We are, therefore, of the view that the disclosure
statements of the Appellant were not proved in accordance with
law, that the recovery of the danda bears no connection with the
fatal injuries, and that the recovery of the gandasi follows a
disclosure which the High Court’s own reasoning renders
unreliable and is sought to be supported by internally
inconsistent evidence. Neither recovery can be treated as a fully
established circumstance pointing towards the guilt of the
Appellant. The second question is, accordingly, answered in the
negative.
62. Coming to the third question, PW-16 opined that the
possibility of the incised injuries having been caused by the

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 42 of 55

gandasi cannot be ruled out. He rendered an opinion in
materially identical terms qua the axe recovered at the instance
of Subhash. An opinion that the same injuries could have been
caused by either of two different weapons, recovered from two
different persons, at best establishes that each weapon was
capable of causing such injuries. It cannot establish that either
of them was in fact used. Having discarded the axe, the High
Court could not have relied upon the very same opinion to
single out the gandasi .
63. The forensic evidence fares no better. The report of the
Forensic Science Laboratory detected human blood on the T-
shirt and the lower of the Appellant and on the danda , but the
blood group was “inconclusive” in each case. On the gandasi ,
the material had disintegrated, and it could not even be
determined whether the blood was human. The sample of blood
lifted from the spot had likewise disintegrated, and the blood
group on the clothes of both the deceased was inconclusive.
There was, therefore, nothing against which the blood on the
articles of the Appellant could be compared, and nothing to
indicate that it was the blood of either of the deceased.
64. It is true that the prosecution need not, in every case,
prove that the blood group on a recovered article matches with
that of the deceased. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 43 of 55

17
Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. summarised
the position as under:
“ 23. From the aforementioned discussion, we can
summarise that if the recovery of bloodstained
articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution, and if the investigation was not found
to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the
prosecution shows that the blood found on the
articles is of human origin though, even though the
blood group is not proved because of
disintegration of blood. The court will have to
come to the conclusion based on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and there cannot be
any fixed formula that the prosecution has to
prove, or need not prove, that the blood groups
match.”

The Court also cautioned that the non-confirmation of the blood
group or origin may assume importance where the accused
alleges that the evidence has been fabricated to implicate him,
which is precisely the defence of the Appellant. Neither
condition laid down in Balwan Singh (supra) is met in the
present case. The recoveries are doubtful for the reasons
recorded hereinabove, and the investigation altered its account
of the weapon after the post-mortem. In any event, the blood on
the gandasi was not even shown to be human, and the danda is
not connected with the fatal injuries. That leaves the clothes of
the Appellant, which bore human blood of an inconclusive

17
(2019) 7 SCC 781

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 44 of 55

group. The lower recovered from Subhash bore blood of the
same description, and the High Court held that the clothes
recovered from him could not connect him with the commission
of murder. They can do no more against the Appellant.
65. Nor does the medical examination of the Appellant
advance the case of the prosecution. The report of his
examination on 19.04.2011 records a bruise on the back of his
left knee and the upper part of his left leg, of a duration of two
to three days. Neither of the courts below relied upon it. PW-18,
who proved the report, was not asked how the bruise could have
been caused, and the circumstance was not put to the Appellant
under Section 313 CrPC. The wooden thapi , with which Suman
is said to have struck the Appellant as per the statement of
Nakul, was lifted from the spot but never sent for forensic
examination. The bruise could be of relevance only as
corroboration of the statement of Nakul, which is not
substantive evidence. The Trial Court nonetheless observed
that, if the statement of Nakul was not true, it was not apparent
on the record or explained by the accused as to how thapi came
on the spot. This reasoning seeks to corroborate a statement
which is not evidence, and casts upon the accused a burden
which the law does not place upon him. A bruise on the leg of
an agriculturist, which no witness explains, cannot by itself
become a circumstance pointing towards guilt.

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66. Moreover, several circumstances relied upon by the
courts below were never put to the Appellant in his examination
under Section 313 CrPC. He was not questioned regarding the
findings of the Forensic Science Laboratory on his clothes and
on the weapons, regarding the motive attributed to him,
regarding the statement of Nakul, or regarding the assertion of
PW-21 that he had come to know of the involvement of the
Appellant. As held by this Court in Raj Kumar alias Suman v.
18
State (NCT of Delhi) , material circumstances not put to the
accused must ordinarily be eschewed from consideration. The
prejudice in the present case is evident as both the courts below
treated the presence of blood on the clothes of the Appellant as
incriminating, yet he was never called upon to explain it. The
third question is, therefore, also answered in the negative.
67. Having answered the first three questions, it would be
apposite to recall the principles which govern a case resting on
circumstantial evidence before drawing the strands together. In
19
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , this
Court held as under:
“ 153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled
before a case against an accused can be said to be
fully established:

18
(2023) 17 SCC 95
19
(1984) 4 SCC 116

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 46 of 55

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and
not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may
be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’ as
was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade
v. State of Maharashtra where the observations
were made:
‘Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental distance
between “may be” and “must be” is long and
divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.’
(2) the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused,
that is to say, they should not be explainable on
any other hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the
accused.”

68. These five golden principles constitute the panchsheel of
proof in a case based on circumstantial evidence. Drawing the
strands together, the position which emerges is as follows. The

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death of the two women was homicidal, which is undisputed but
points to no one. The danda recovered at the instance of the
Appellant is unconnected with the fatal injuries. His clothes
bore human blood of an undetermined group, which was never
put to him. The gandasi was produced pursuant to a second
disclosure which the High Court’s own reasoning renders
unreliable, through evidence which is inconsistent as to the time
and place of recovery, and it was not shown to bear human
blood. The medical opinion on the gandasi is no stronger than
the identical opinion on the axe, which the High Court
discarded. There is no admissible evidence of motive. There is
no evidence that the Appellant was seen with either of the
deceased, or at or near the place of occurrence, on the fateful
night, and no evidence of any conduct on his part pointing
towards his guilt.
69. Tested against the panchsheel, none of these
circumstances is fully established as an incriminating
circumstance. Taken together, they can in no fathomable
manner complete a chain which excludes every hypothesis other
than the guilt of the Appellant. At best, they give rise to
suspicion. It is trite that suspicion, however grave, cannot take
the place of proof. Furthermore, as held by this Court in
20
Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra , the complete absence of

20
(2025) 8 SCC 315

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 48 of 55

motive is a circumstance which weighs in favour of the accused.
It is well settled that where the evidence admits of two
possibilities, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted.
70. As regards the fourth question, the charges under
Sections 449, 297 and 201 IPC stand on no firmer footing. The
finding under Section 449 IPC rested on the statement of Nakul
and a general observation in the crime scene report that a
“reshuffling” might have taken place prior to the crime. The
charges under Sections 297 and 201 IPC rested on the premise
that the bodies had been dragged from the chowk into the
houses. However, PW-22, the Senior Scientific Officer,
admitted in his cross-examination that he had prepared no site
plan showing the marks of dragging, and PW-8 stated that he
had not seen any drag marks from the chowk to the houses. In
any event, there is no admissible evidence as to who entered the
house of Suman, or who moved the bodies from the chowk. The
fourth question is, therefore, answered in the negative, and these
charges must fall along with the charge of murder.
71. Finally, we turn to the fifth question, namely parity. The
High Court acquitted Subhash because he was not named in the
FIR, because the clothes recovered at his instance did not
connect him with the crime, because his disclosure leading to
the axe came to be recorded only after the post-mortem had
revealed incised wounds, because the statement of Nakul

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 49 of 55

naming him could not be relied upon, and because PW-21 had
not witnessed the occurrence. The only feature which, in the
opinion of the High Court, distinguished the case of the
Appellant was that his name figured in the FIR and in the
statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC.
72. The principle of parity was explained by this Court in
21
Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat in the
following terms:
“ 15. When there is similar or identical evidence of
eyewitnesses against two accused by ascribing
them the same or similar role, the Court cannot
convict one accused and acquit the other. In such a
case, the cases of both the accused will be
governed by the principle of parity. This principle
means that the Criminal Court should decide like
cases alike, and in such cases, the Court cannot
make a distinction between the two accused, which
will amount to discrimination.”

73. We have held that neither the FIR nor the said statements
constitute substantive evidence of the complicity of the
Appellant. Once this distinction falls away, the evidence against
both the accused is of the same kind and quality. Each made a
first disclosure leading to his own clothes bearing human blood
of an undetermined group. Each made a further disclosure on
21.04.2011, after the same post-mortem, leading to a sharp-

21
(2023) 9 SCC 164

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 50 of 55

edged weapon, qua which the doctor rendered the same “cannot
be ruled out” opinion. Both were named together in the
statement of Nakul, who did not support it. PW-21 attested the
recoveries of 22.04.2011 against both, and his evidence suffers
from the same infirmities qua each.
74. The reasons which weighed with the High Court in
finding the evidence insufficient against Subhash apply with
equal force to the Appellant. The High Court distinguished the
two cases solely on the strength of material which the law did
not permit it to use. The fifth question, too, is answered in the
negative.

C ONCLUSION
75. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answers to the
questions formulated in paragraph 28 hereinabove are as
follows:
a. The FIR, which records hearsay and was not
supported by its maker, and the statements
recorded under Section 161 CrPC, which were
disowned by every witness and were not even
proved as contradictions, could not have been used
to establish either the involvement or the motive of
the Appellant. Their use as substantive evidence by
the courts below is contrary to Section 162 CrPC.

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b. The disclosure statements of the Appellant were
not proved in accordance with Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, the words used by him having never
been narrated in evidence. The recovery of the
danda bears no connection with the fatal injuries,
and the recovery of the gandasi is unworthy of
reliance. Neither recovery constitutes an
incriminating circumstance.
c. The medical opinion establishes, at best, that the
gandasi was capable of causing the injuries, as was
the axe recovered from Subhash. The forensic
evidence, being inconclusive as to the blood group
throughout and indeterminate as to the origin of the
blood on the gandasi , does not connect the
Appellant with the death of either of the deceased.
d. There is no admissible evidence to sustain the
charges under Sections 449, 297 and 201 IPC.
e. Once the FIR and the statements recorded under
Section 161 CrPC are excluded, the evidence
against the Appellant is of the same kind and
quality as the evidence which the High Court found
insufficient against Subhash. The conviction of the
Appellant cannot, therefore, be sustained on the
principle of parity as well.

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 52 of 55

76. Ld. Counsel for the State urged that the concurrent
findings of the courts below ought not to be interfered with in
an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This
Court is, no doubt, slow to interfere with concurrent findings of
fact. Where, however, such findings rest on material which the
law does not permit to be used, and cannot survive once that
material is excluded, interference is not only warranted but
necessary.
77. Before parting, we are conscious of the gravity of what
transpired in village Ranila on the fateful night of 17.04.2011.
Two women lost their lives in a brutal manner, and their
families have waited for more than fifteen years for these
proceedings to attain finality. However, a conviction for murder
must rest on evidence which the law admits and which proves
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, every
witness who could have spoken to the occurrence disowned the
case of the prosecution, and the investigation altered its account
of the weapon after the post-mortem. The gaps so created were
filled by the courts below with statements which the law does
not permit to be used as evidence.
78. Accordingly, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt
of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and he is entitled to
the benefit of doubt. His conviction and sentence under Sections

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 53 of 55

302, 449, 297 and 201 IPC cannot be sustained. The appeals are
accordingly allowed.
79. In view thereof, the Impugned Judgment dated
08.10.2013 passed by the High Court in Murder Reference No.
02 of 2013 and CRA No. D-205-DB of 2013, insofar as it
upholds the conviction and sentence of the Appellant, and the
judgment of conviction dated 20.02.2013 and the order on
sentence dated 28.02.2013 passed by the Trial Court in Sessions
Case No. 64 of 2011, insofar as they relate to the Appellant, are
set aside. The Appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled
against him. He shall be released forthwith, if in custody, unless
required in connection with any other case. If on bail, his bail
bonds and sureties shall stand discharged.
80. Consequently, the direction to the Appellant to pay
compensation under Section 357 CrPC also stands set aside, and
the fine, if deposited, shall be refunded to him.
81. Section 357A(3) CrPC contemplates compensation to a
victim where a case ends in acquittal. Our conclusion does not
diminish the loss suffered by the families of the deceased. We,
therefore, recommend that the District Legal Services
Authority, Bhiwani, consider the grant of compensation to the
legal representatives of Suman and Shakuntla under the
applicable Victim Compensation Scheme (now under Section

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1137-38 of 2014 Page 54 of 55

396 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), after
such inquiry as it deems appropriate.
82. Registry to communicate this judgment forthwith to the
Trial Court and to the Superintendent of the jail concerned for
compliance.
83. The captioned appeals stand disposed of in the aforesaid
terms. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed
of. No costs.


..…………….…………………………………J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]


...………………………………………………J.
[NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH]

New Delhi
November 16, 2026

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