THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE vs THE COMMISSIONER
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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HC-KAR
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WP No. 25706 of 2026
®
CNR: KAHC010570732026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 13 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
WRIT PETITION NO. 25706 OF 2026 (GM-R/C)
BETWEEN
THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
SHREE CHELUVANARAYANASWAMY TEMPLE AND
SHREE YOGANARASIMHASWAMY TEMPLE,
MELUKOTE, PANDAVAPURA TALUK,
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 431,
REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE,
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. K.N. PHANINDRA., SR. COUNSEL FOR
SRI. ABHINAG S. ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE COMMISSIONER
HINDU RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND
CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS DEPARTMENT,
TH
4 FLOOR, SRI MINTO ANJANEYA BHAVANA,
ALURU VENKATA RAO ROAD, CHAMARAJPET,
BENGALURU 560018
2. SRI S. NARAYANA BHATTAR,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
S/O LATE SAMPATH KUMAR BHATTAR,
NO.21, AKKA THANGI KOLADA STREET,
MELUKOTE, PANDAVAPURA TALUK,
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 431.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
HINDU RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND
CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS DEPARTMENT,
MANDYA DISTRICT,
MANDYA 571 401.
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
15/10/2026, 13:39, Bengaluru
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4. THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
SHREE CHELUVANARAYANASWAMY TEMPLE
AND
SHREE YOGANARASIMHASWAMY TEMPLE,
MELUKOTE, PANDAVAPURA TALUK,
MANDYA DISTRICT 571 431.
…. RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ABHINAV.R., ADVOCATE FOR C/R2 )
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI QUASHING THE ORDER DATED 12/08/2026 PASSED BY
THE RESPONDENT NO.1 ON THE INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION
FILED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 IN REVISION PETITION NO.
3/2026-27 AT ANNEXURE-A AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING
BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 17.08.2026, THIS DAY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
CAV ORDER
1. The Petitioner, the Management Committee of Shree
Cheluvanarayanaswamy Temple and Shree
Yoganarasimhaswamy Temple, Melukote, is before
this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
a. Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order
dated 12.08.2026 passed by the Respondent No.1
on the Interlocutory Application filed by the
Respondent No.2 in Revision Petition No.3/2026-
27 at Annexure-A;
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
15/10/2026, 13:39, Bengaluru
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b. Consequently, direct the Respondent No.2 to
not disrupt the day-to-day functioning of the
duties at Sri. Yoga Narasimha Swamy Temple and
co-operate with the enquiry to be conducted by
the Petitioner.
c. Grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble
Court deems fit to grant in the facts and
circumstances of the case, in the interests of
justice and equity.
2. In Revision Petition No.3/2026-27 filed by
Respondent No.2, an interlocutory application under
Section 65 of Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions
and Charitable Endowments Act, 1997 read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has
been filed seeking stay of certain orders. Respondent
No.1, vide the impugned order dated 12.08.2026,
stayed the operation and effect of the order of the
Executive Officer of the temple dated 17.06.2026
and the official Memorandum dated 18.06.2026.
Aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioner is before
this Court seeking for the aforesaid reliefs.
3. Sri. K.N.Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Petitioner, would submit that:
3.1. Shree Yoganarasimhaswamy Temple, Melukote
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘ Temple’ for
brevity) is a notified religious institution
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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governed by the Karnataka Hindu Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act,
1997 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ Act’ for
brevity). The Petitioner is the Management
Committee of the Temple, constituted on
05.01.2026, entrusted with safeguarding the
administration of the Temple, preserving
Temple properties and maintaining discipline
amongst Temple servants, etc.
3.2. Respondent No.2 had been appointed as
Archaka of the Temple on a temporary basis
vide Order dated 20.04.1989 in the place of
one Sri Srinivasa Gopala. The said temporary
arrangement was extended from time to time
vide orders dated 17.05.1990 and 14.05.1991.
Subsequently, Respondent No.2 was appointed
as an Archaka vide Official Memorandum dated
14.05.1992. Thus, he submits that the
appointment of Respondent No.2 is not as a
hereditary Archaka, but the said appointment
was made by the competent Authority.
3.3. He submits that the Temple premises were
fitted with a CCTV system, some of which were
visible to the naked eye, and some of which
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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were hidden spy cameras. Insofar as the hidden
spy cameras are concerned, the location was
known only to 6 members of the Temple staff,
including Respondent No.2.
3.4. He submits that on 11.01.2026, at about 02.00
p.m., the surveillance system of the Temple was
tampered with. The wiring of the hidden
camera was cut, and the said hidden camera,
along with its memory card, was stolen. The
digital video recorder installed in the seva
counter was also burnt due to an incorrect
connection, which came to light when the
person working in the seva counter returned at
about 05.15 p.m. and reported it to the
officials. It is thereafter that Respondent No. 4,
the Executive Officer, visited the temple on
12.01.2026, along with the technical staff.
3.5. When the above came to light, and a suspicion
also arose regarding the theft of hundi
collection, the Executive Officer issued a show
cause notice on 13.01.2026 to the entire
Temple staff, including Respondent No.2,
categorically stating that if no suitable reply
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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were to be received, appropriate action would
be initiated against them.
3.6. Respondent No.2 gave an evasive one-line reply
on 26.01.2026 stating that he was not
concerned with the above-mentioned incident,
being an Archaka of the Temple.
3.7. Two of the watchmen of the Temple to whom
notices had been issued, instead of responding
to the notices, preferred WP.No.7056/2026
seeking for quashing of the show cause notices,
which came to be disposed by this Court on
06.03.2026, granting liberty to them to submit
their replies within six weeks and directing that
no precipitative steps be taken in the
meanwhile.
3.8. He submits that since a common show cause
notice had been issued as regards a common
event, during the pendency of the proceedings
before this Court and in view of the directions
issued by this Court, the Petitioner did not
proceed with the enquiry. By way of abundant
caution, another show cause notice came to be
issued on 12.05.2026 after the disposal of
WP.No.7056/2026 to the said
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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watchmen/security guards, one of whom gave
an evasive reply.
3.9. He submits that in view of the theft of Temple
property, the Executive Officer lodged a
complaint with the Melukote Police Station on
09.06.2026, which came to be registered as
Crime No.0085/2026 for the offence punishable
under Section 306 of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘ BNS’ for brevity), wherein Respondent No.2
has been arraigned as accused No.2, and the
investigation is under progress.
3.10. The Management of the Temple, taking note of
the said circumstances and of the fact that only
six members of the Temple staff knew of the
existence and location of the hidden spy
camera, passed a resolution on 16.06.2026
placing all the six members, including
Respondent No.2, under suspension in exercise
of the powers under Section 16 of the Act read
with Rule 17 of the Karnataka Hindu Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Rules,
2002 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ Rules’ for
brevity).
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
15/10/2026, 13:39, Bengaluru
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3.11. By way of the very same resolution, it was
decided to pay subsistence allowance at 50% of
the last salary drawn in accordance with Rule
17(5) of the Rules.
3.12. In view of the suspension of Respondent No.2,
to ensure the smooth continuation of the daily
pujas and rituals at the Temple, an Official
Memorandum dated 18.06.2026 came to be
issued, making temporary arrangements for the
discharge of the various duties at the Temple.
The persons who were so temporarily engaged
were not working in the Temple when the
alleged incident occurred and, on that ground,
he submits that the Management Committee
has chosen persons who could not have been
involved in the said act of theft on the
concerned date.
3.13. Challenging the resolution dated 16.06.2026,
Respondent No.2 preferred a revision petition
under Section 63(1) read with Section 16(2) of
the Act for challenging the suspension order
vide Official Memorandum dated 17.06.2026
and the order of making temporary
arrangement dated 18.06.2026, as also seeking
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
15/10/2026, 13:39, Bengaluru
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for his reinstatement as an Archaka. It is in the
said proceedings that the aforesaid application
under Section 65 of the Act read with Section
151 of CPC was filed, seeking for stay of the
operation of the Official Memorandum dated
18.06.2026.
3.14. He submits that when an appellate mechanism
had been provided under Sub-Section (2) of
Section 16, revision proceedings could not
have been initiated under Section 63.
3.15. In this regard, he relies upon Sub-Section (2)
of Section 16 of the Karnataka Hindu Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act,
1997, which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
16(2) An appeal shall lie to the Commissioner
against every order imposing penalty under this
section. Such appeal shall be made within thirty
days from the date of the order imposing the
penalty
3.16. By relying on Sub-Section (2) of Section 16 of
the Act, he submits that the Management
Committee may initiate action or an enquiry for
misconduct, either suo motu or upon receiving
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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a complaint against an Archaka, including
Agamikas, Tanthris or Pradhana Archakas, or
against temple servants. He further submits
that an appeal shall lie to the Commissioner
against every order imposing a penalty, and
that such appeal must be filed within 30 days.
3.17. His submission is that enquiry is still going on,
the principles of natural justice have been
complied with by the Respondents and the final
order is yet to be passed. Hence, the question
of challenging the same would not arise.
3.18. He relies upon Section 63 of the Act which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
63. Revisional Powers of Commissioner - (1) The
Commissioner may call for and examine the records and
proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner or
Deputy Commissioner the Committee of management or
the executive officer]2 for the purpose of satisfying
himself as to the correctness of the finding or order
recorded or passed by the Assistant Commissioner or
Deputy Commissioner the Committee of management or
the executive officer and may either annul, reverse,
modify or confirm the said finding or order or may direct
the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner
the Committee of management or the executive officer
to make further enquiry or take such additional evidence
as he may think necessary or he may himself take the
additional evidence :
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
15/10/2026, 13:39, Bengaluru
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Provided that the Commissioner shall not record or pass
any order without giving the party affected thereby an
opportunity of being heard.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall entitle the
commissioner to call for and examine the record of any
case during the period in which an appeal can lie or
after an order has been passed by him on such appeal.
3.19. By relying on Section 63 of the Act, his
submission is that the revisional powers of the
Commissioner is virtually suo motu . Inasmuch
as the Commissioner may call for and examine
the records and proceedings before the
Assistant Commissioner or Deputy
Commissioner, the Committee of Management
or the Executive Officer for the purpose of
satisfying himself as to the correctness of the
finding or order recorded or passed by the
Assistant Commissioner or Deputy
Commissioner, the Committee of Management
or the Executive Officer; and may either annul,
reverse, modify or confirm the said findings or
order or direct further enquiry or to take such
additional evidence as he may think necessary.
3.20. His submission is that the revisional powers
cannot be exercised on the basis of an
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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application filed by an aggrieved party. In the
present case, the order passed is merely a
suspension order, passed under Section 16 of
the Act.
3.21. In that background, he submits that the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Commissioner
under Section 63 of the Act is an improper
exercise of jurisdiction and as such, this Court
in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction is
required to intervene and set aside the said
order.
3.22. Rule 17 of the Karnataka Hindu Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Rules,
2002, is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
17. Disciplinary action against Archakas and
temple servants.- The following penalties may be
imposed on Archakas and other temple servants by the
Committee of management for any dis-obedience,
misconduct, breach of trust, in-capacity, neglect of
duties [for any disqualification specified in Section 10-A]
or other sufficient causes.-
(a) censure;
(b) fine;
(c) withholding of increments;
(d) reduction of pay;
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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(e) recovery from pay of any loss caused to the
institution;
(f) removal from service or dismissal from service.
(2) No order imposing any penalty under these rules on
any Archaka or temple servant shall be passed unless
he has been informed in writing of the ground himself
has been afforded to him. The proceedings shall contain
a summary on which it is proposed to take action and
an adequate opportunity of defending record of
evidence and a statement of findings and the grounds
thereof.
(3) Enquiry may be conducted either by the Committee
of management or it may entrust the enquiry to any
other officer. Where an inquiry authority is appointed it
shall hold the enquiry and submit its report to the
committee.
(4) An Archaka or a temple servant may be placed
under suspension pending enquiry of the charges where
such suspension is necessary in the interest of the
institution concerned.
(5) The suspended Archaka or temple servant is entitled
for a subsistence allowance of fifty per cent of the salary
drawn by him at the time of suspension. The order of
suspension may be continued for not more than six
months within which the enquiry has to be concluded:
Provided that for any reason if the enquiry is not
completed within the period of six months the
Committee of management may with the permission of
the Commissioner continue the period of suspension
beyond six months.
3.23. By relying on Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 17 of the
Rules, he submits that the penalties described
thereunder could be levied in a disciplinary
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
15/10/2026, 13:39, Bengaluru
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action against Archaka and Temple servants. In
terms of Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 17, an Archaka or
a Temple servant may be placed under
suspension pending enquiry of charges, where
such suspension is necessary in the interest of
the institution concerned, as regards which,
under Sub-Rule (5) of Rule 17, subsistence
allowance of 50% of the salary drawn by him at
the time of suspension is required to be paid.
3.24. By relying on Rule 17, his submission is that
there being serious charges of theft of Temple
property against Respondent No.2, the enquiry
is ongoing and, if Respondent No.2 were
permitted to continue to discharge his duties,
there is a possibility of Respondent No.2 taking
such action as may impinge upon the enquiry
and it is for that reason that the suspension
order had been passed.
3.25. He submits that apart from filing the revision
petition, Respondent No.2 simultaneously filed
a writ petition before this Court in
WP.No.19336/2026 seeking for the very same
reliefs as sought for in the revision petition.
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
15/10/2026, 13:39, Bengaluru
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3.26. This Court, vide order dated 29.06.2026,
adjourned the said matter, recording that the
pendency of the writ petition would not come in
the way of the Commissioner taking up the
revision petition.
3.27. He submits that when the revision petition was
taken up, the Management Committee filed a
statement of objections on 03.07.2026 and
adopted the same as objections to the stay
application. The Commissioner heard the
matter on 03.07.2026, 08.07.2026 and
16.07.2026 and called upon the Management
Committee to furnish clarification. The
Commissioner conducted an independent probe
into the details of the type of CCTV installed, at
what time it was stolen, till when the footage
was available, the staff that were present on
the said date, the attendance register
maintained, the formal duties of an Archaka
and even called upon Respondent No.2 to place
on record his whereabouts on the date of the
incident. This, he submits, amounts to the
Commissioner conducting an enquiry that could
not be undertaken under Section 63 of the Act.
Affidavits were filed by the Management
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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Committee stating the material presently
available pending enquiry, which prima facie
established the involvement of Respondent
No.2.
3.28. The affidavit filed by Respondent No.2
categorically indicated that he was present and
performed his duties on the said date and left
the premises around 01.30 p.m., which, even if
accepted to be true, would indicate that
Respondent No.2 was present at the time when
the incident occurred.
3.29. His submission is that the Archaka is not only to
be present for the performance of the poojas,
but also has to generally oversee the activities
in the temple. As aside, he submits that after
the suspension of Respondent No.2, the hundi
collections in the temple have increased, thus,
again indicating that Respondent No.2 was
indulging himself in nefarious activities, which
he submits would also be enquired into during
the course of enquiry.
3.30. He submits that the Archaka occupies a very
important position in a Temple. If the Archaka
himself were to be accused in a criminal
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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proceeding, the trust of the devotees would be
lost, and it is for that reason that he was
suspended. The possibility of the Archaka
influencing the other witnesses was another
reason necessitating his suspension.
3.31. On that ground, he submits that the action
taken by the Management Committee being
proper, the Commissioner ought not to have, by
the impugned order, stayed the suspension
order dated 17.06.2026 and the official
memorandum dated 18.06.2026. The effect of
the said order is that Respondent No.2 would
stand restored to the office of Archaka of the
Temple during the pendency of the revision
petition as also the pendency of the enquiry
and the criminal investigation in Crime
No.0085/2026.
3.32. He submits that any decision of the
Management Committee is appealable under
Section 16 of the Act. Section 63 provides only
revision jurisdiction. After an order is passed,
the revision power cannot be exercised by the
Commissioner during the period in which an
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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appeal can lie in terms of Sub-Section (2) of
Section 63 of the Act.
3.33. The decision of the Management Committee
being one which is appealable, Respondent
No.2 has filed a revision petition without filing
an appeal, which strikes at the root of the
jurisdiction of the Commissioner under Section
63 of the Act. On that ground, he submits that
the Commissioner could not have exercised
revision power without the Petitioner having
filed an appeal.
3.34. The Commissioner has conflated the provisions
of Section 16 and Section 63 of the Act,
resulting in a wrong exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 63 of the Act. Even during the
revision, the Commissioner has virtually
conducted an enquiry which could not have
been conducted by the Commissioner but ought
to have been conducted by the Enquiry Officer
so appointed.
3.35. He submits that the impugned order only
narrates the rival contentions of the Petitioner
and Respondent No.2 and, without considering
these contentions, has come to an unreasoned
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SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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conclusion that the suspension order is not
justified and that the interim application is
required to be allowed. None of the contentions
having been considered, his submission is that
the order passed by the Commissioner is purely
mechanical without application of mind.
3.36. He submits that even if the application were to
be considered to be one filed under the Civil
Procedure Code, any order of stay can only be
predicated on the applicant establishing a
strong prima facie case, a balance of
convenience in favour of the applicant and
irreparable injury being caused if the interim
order were not to be so passed.
3.37. None of these aspects have been adverted to
by the Commissioner. The order passed by the
Commissioner is laconic by only stating that the
order does not appear justified or that the
interim stay is deserved. The Commissioner has
wrongly held that the temple manual does not
specifically state anywhere that it was the duty
of the Archaka to be present when the door was
open and closed and that the Archaka is not
concerned with the CCTV or theft of hundi
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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collections. The Archaka is the senior-most
person in the Temple and during the
performance of the pooja and during the day, it
is under his supervision that all actions are
required to be taken up.
3.38. By way of the impugned interim order, he
submits that the appeal has virtually been
allowed by reinstating Respondent No.2 as the
Archaka and removing the Archaka appointed
by the Management Committee. There are no
conditions which have been imposed by way of
such reinstatement. The Archaka will continue
to discharge his functions, which according to
him, will come in the way of an independent
enquiry to be conducted by the Enquiry Officer.
The Commissioner having expressed his
opinion, by reinstating Respondent No.2,
virtually has given a finding on the enquiry,
reducing the enquiry to an empty formality.
Respondent No.2, on account of having
approached the Commissioner, has been
treated differently, in that the other five
suspected staff members continued to be under
suspension, and if the same logic were to be
applied to them, they would also be restored to
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
15/10/2026, 13:39, Bengaluru
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their offices, which would negate the entire
enquiry.
3.39. If the police investigating the offence were to
arrest Respondent No.2 while discharging
duties as an Archaka, the reputation of the
Temple and the Management of the Temple
would be adversely and detrimentally affected,
which has not been considered by the
Commissioner. Apart from not having
considered the possibility of Respondent No.2
tampering with the evidence related to the
matter, he therefore submits that the impugned
order suffers from lack of jurisdiction and
Respondent No.1- The Commissioner has
exceeded jurisdiction by conducting a mini
enquiry under Section 63 of the Act, which is
not permissible. There is complete non-
application of mind by the Commissioner of the
relevant material which has been placed before
him.
3.40. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Ashok
1
Kumar Aggarwal , more particularly para 26
1
(2013) 16 SCC 147
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and 27 thereof, which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
26. The scope of interference by the Court with the
order of suspension has been examined by the Court in
a large number of cases, particularly in State of M.P. v.
Shardul Singh, P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller &
Auditor General , ESI v. T. Abdul Razak , Kusheshwar
Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., Delhi Cloth & General
Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan
Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan, State of Rajasthan v.
B.K. Meena, Prohibition and Excise Deptt. v. L.
Srinivasan and Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola ,
wherein it has been observed that even if a criminal trial
or enquiry takes a long time, it is ordinarily not open to
the court to interfere in case of suspension as it is in the
exclusive domain of the competent authority who can
always review its order of suspension being an inherent
power conferred upon them by the provisions of Article
21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and while
exercising such a power, the authority can consider the
case of an employee for revoking the suspension order,
if satisfied that the criminal case pending would be
concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the
employee concerned. Where the charges are baseless,
mala fide or vindictive and are framed only to keep the
delinquent employee out of job, a case for judicial
review is made out. But in a case where no conclusion
can be arrived at without examining the entire record in
question and in order that the disciplinary proceedings
may continue unhindered the court may not interfere. In
case the court comes to the conclusion that the
authority is not proceeding expeditiously as it ought to
have been and it results in prolongation of sufferings for
the delinquent employee, the court may issue
directions. The court may, in case the authority fails to
furnish proper explanation for delay in conclusion of the
enquiry, direct to complete the enquiry within a
stipulated period. However, mere delay in
conclusion of enquiry or trial cannot be a ground
for quashing the suspension order, if the charges
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are grave in nature. But, whether the employee
should or should not continue in his office during
the period of enquiry is a matter to be assessed by
the disciplinary authority concerned and ordinarily
the court should not interfere with the orders of
suspension unless they are passed in mala fide
and without there being even a prima facie
evidence on record connecting the employee with
the misconduct in question.
27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent
out of the mischief range. The purpose is to
complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension
is an interim measure in the aid of disciplinary
proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain
custody or control of papers or take any
advantage of his position. More so, at this stage, it
is not desirable that the court may find out as to
which version is true when there are claims and
counterclaims on factual issues. The court cannot
act as if it is an appellate forum de hors the
powers of judicial review.
3.41. By relying on Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , his
submission is that when serious allegations
exist against Respondent No.2, his continuation
in service and discharging of his duties would
cause a risk to the enquiry and investigation.
3.42. He reiterates that the grant of interim order in
this case amounts to a grant of substantive
relief without any proper reasons being
recorded by the Commissioner.
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3.43. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
2
Radhakrishnan , more particularly paragraphs
7 and 8 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder
for easy reference:
7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction
of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under
Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this
Court and the true legal position in that behalf is
no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be
issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or tribunals;
these are cases where orders are passed by
inferior courts or tribunals without
jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of
failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can
similarly be issued where in exercise of
jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or
Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for
instance, it decides a question without giving
an opportunity to be heard to the party
affected by the order, or where the procedure
adopted in dealing with the dispute is
opposed to principles of natural justice. There
is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory
jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not
entitled to act as an appellate Court. This
limitation necessarily means that findings of
fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal
as a result of the appreciation of evidence
cannot be reopened or questioned in writ
proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record can be corrected by a writ,
but not an error of tact, however grave it may
2
AIR 1964 SC 477
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appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be
issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the. Tribunal had. erroneously refused to
admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if
a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which
can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In
dealing with this category of cases, however, we
must always bear in mind that a finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in
proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground
that the relevant and material evidence adduced
before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate
to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the
inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be
agitated before a writ court. It is within these
limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High
Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari
can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu
Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque ( 1), Nagendra Nath
Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and
Appeals, Assam, and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar
Singh.
3.44. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
3
Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath ,
more particularly para 25 thereof, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
3
(2015) 5 SCC 423
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25 . It is true that this Court has laid down that
technicalities associated with the prerogative writs
in England have no role to play under our
constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system
of King's Court in India and of all the other courts
having limited jurisdiction subject to the supervision
of the King's Court. Courts are set up under the
Constitution or the laws. All the courts in the
jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and
subject to its control and supervision under Article
227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on
all the High Courts. Broad principles of writ
jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to
India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently
erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of tribunals
or authorities or courts other than judicial courts.
There are no precedents in India for the High Courts
to issue writs to the subordinate courts. Control of
working of the subordinate courts in dealing with
their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate
or revisional powers or power of superintendence
under Article 227. Orders of the civil court stand on
different footing from the orders of authorities or
tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts.
While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is
regulated by the statutes, power of
superintendence under Article 227 is
constitutional. The expression “inferior court” is
not referable to the judicial courts, as rightly
observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27
quoted above.
3.45 On all the above grounds, he submits that this
Court is required to exercise its powers under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, set
aside the order passed by the Commissioner
under Section 63 of the Act and continue
Respondent No.2 under suspension as also
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permit the temporarily appointed Archaka to
discharge his duties.
4. Sri Abhinav Ramanand, learned counsel for
Respondent No.2 would submit that:
4.1. The order passed by the Commissioner is an
interlocutory order and not a final order and as
such a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution is not maintainable.
4.2. He relies upon the decision in Syed Yakoob v.
K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others , more
particularly, paras 7 and 8 thereof, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of
High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226
has been frequently considered by this Court and the
true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt.
A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts
or tribunals; these are cases where orders are
passed by inferior courts or tribunals without
jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of
failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can
similarly be issued where in exercise of
jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal
acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it
decides a question without giving an opportunity
to be heard to the party affected by the order, or
where the procedure adopted in dealing with the
dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice.
There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory
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jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not
entitled to act as an appellate Court. This
limitation necessarily means that findings of fact
reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a
result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be
reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An
error of law which is apparent on the face of the record
can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact,
however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of
certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording
the said finding, the. Tribunal had. erroneously refused
to admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has
influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which can
be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with
this category of cases, however, we must always bear
in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of
certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material
evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient
or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point
and the inference of fact to be drawn from the
said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be
agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits
that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under
Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately
exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed
Ishaque ( 1), Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner
of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and Kaushalya
Devi v. Bachittar Singh.
8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately
describe what an error of law apparent on the face of
the record means. What can be corrected by a writ
has to be an error of law; but it must be such an
error of law as can be regarded as one which is
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apparent on the face of the record. Where it is
manliest or clear that the conclusion of law
recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based
on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant
statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of
it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is
expressly rounded on reasons which are wrong in
law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a
writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned
conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the
relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is
experienced by the High Court in holding that the said
error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It
may also be that in some cases. the impugned error of
law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the
record as such and the Court may need an argument to
discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that
what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error
of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of
such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an
error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a
statutory provision is reasonably capable of two
constructions and one construction has been
adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its
conclusion may not necessarily or always be open
to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion,
it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to
define or to describe adequately all cases of errors
which can be appropriately described as errors of law
apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an
impugned error is an error of law and an error of law
which is apparent on the face of the record, must
always depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal
provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued
or contravened.
4.3. By relying on Syed Yakoob , his submission is
that a writ of certiorari lies only where the
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Authority has acted without jurisdiction, in
excess of jurisdiction or has committed an error
apparent on the face of the record. The
Commissioner, having revision jurisdiction, has
passed the order which cannot be said to be an
error apparent on the face of the record.
4.4. He relies upon the decision in Radhey Shyam
v. Chhabi Nath , more particularly, paragraphs
24 to 29 thereof, which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
24. It is the above holding, correctness of which was
doubted in the referring order already mentioned above.
25. It is true that this Court has laid down that
technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in
England have no role to play under our constitutional
scheme. There is no parallel system of King's Court in
India and of all the other courts having limited
jurisdiction subject to the supervision of the King's Court.
Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All
the courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are
subordinate to it and subject to its control and
supervision under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is
constitutionally conferred on all the High Courts. Broad
principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England
are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies
against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction
orders of tribunals or authorities or courts other
than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India
for the High Courts to issue writs to the subordinate
courts. Control of working of the subordinate courts in
dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of
appellate or revisional powers or power of
superintendence under Article 227. Orders of the civil
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court stand on different footing from the orders of
authorities or tribunals or courts other than
judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional
jurisdiction is regulated by the statutes, power of
superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The
expression “inferior court” is not referable to the judicial
courts, as rightly observed in the referring order [Radhey
Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616] in paras 26
and 27 quoted above.
26. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v. Ram
Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675] also observed in para
25 of its judgment that distinction between Articles 226
and 227 stood almost obliterated. In para 24 of the said
judgment distinction in the two articles has been noted.
In view thereof, observation that scope of Articles
226 and 227 was obliterated was not correct as
rightly observed [Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath,
(2009) 5 SCC 616] by the referring Bench in para
32 quoted above. We make it clear that though
despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction
under Section 115 CPC by Act 46 of 1999,
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227
remains unaffected , it has been wrongly assumed in
certain quarters that the said jurisdiction has been
expanded. Scope of Article 227 has been explained in
several decisions including Waryam Singh v. Amarnath
[(1954) 1 SCC 51 : AIR 1954 SC 215 : 1954 SCR 565] ,
Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir [(2002) 1 SCC 319] ,
Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010)
8 SCC 329 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 338] and Sameer
Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal [(2013) 9 SCC
374 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 345] . In Shalini Shyam Shetty
[(2010) 8 SCC 329 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 338] this Court
observed : (SCC p. 352, paras 64-67)
“64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of
late there is a growing trend amongst several High
Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property
disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters
relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute
between landlord and tenant and also in a case of money
decree and in various other cases where disputed
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questions of property are involved, writ courts are
entertaining such disputes. In some cases the High
Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petitions under
Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are
treated as writ petitions.
65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law
referred to above in cases of property rights and in
disputes between private individuals writ court should
not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it
can be shown that a private individual is acting in
collusion with a statutory authority.
66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there
is a tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227
of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions.
This is sought to be justified on an erroneous
appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev [Surya Dev Rai v.
Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675] and in view of the
recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure
Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act,
1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment,
scope of Section 115 CPC has been curtailed. In our
view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed
that has not resulted in expanding the High Court's
power of superintendence. It is too well known to be
reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court
must follow the regime of law.
67. As a result of frequent interference by the
Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227
of the Constitution with pending civil and at times
criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil
and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus
causing serious problems in the administration of
justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its
power either under Article 226 or 227, the Hon'ble High
Court will follow the time-honoured principles discussed
above. Those principles have been formulated by this
Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the
highest courts of justice within their jurisdiction will
adhere to them strictly.”
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(emphasis supplied)
27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of
civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari
under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the
view [Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616]
of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not
lie against a private person not discharging any public
duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article
226.
28. We may also deal with the submission made on
behalf of the Respondent that the view in Surya Dev Rai
[Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675]
stands approved by larger Benches in Shail [Shail v.
Manoj Kumar, (2004) 4 SCC 785 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1401]
, Mahendra Saree Emporium (2) [Mahendra Saree
Emporium (2) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy, (2005) 1 SCC
481] and Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) [Salem Advocate
Bar Assn. (2) v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344] and
on that ground correctness of the said view cannot be
gone into by this Bench. In Shail [Shail v. Manoj Kumar,
(2004) 4 SCC 785 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1401] , though
reference has been made to Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev
Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675] , the same
is only for the purpose of scope of power under Article
227 as is clear from para 3 of the said judgment. There
is no discussion on the issue of maintainability of a
petition under Article 226. In Mahendra Saree Emporium
(2) [Mahendra Saree Emporium (2) v. G.V. Srinivasa
Murthy, (2005) 1 SCC 481] , reference to Surya Dev Rai
[Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675]
is made in para 9 of the judgment only for the
proposition that no subordinate legislation can whittle
down the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution.
Similarly, in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) [Salem
Advocate Bar Assn. (2) v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC
344] in para 40, reference to Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev
Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675] is for the
same purpose. We are, thus, unable to accept the
submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent.
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29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as
follows:
4.5. By relying on Radhey Shyam , he submits that
the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is
distinct in nature and scope, and that the power
of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be
treated as an extension of the writ jurisdiction
under Article 226. He further submits that
judicial orders passed by civil courts are not
amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article
226 and that the exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 227 is circumscribed by well-settled
principles governing the Court's power of
superintendence.
4.6. He contends that the jurisdiction under Article
227 is supervisory and not appellate, and that
the High Court ought not to interfere merely
because another view of the matter is possible.
Reliance is placed on the caution expressed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court against routine
interference with pending proceedings,
particularly where such interference would
impede the progress of proceedings before the
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subordinate court and thereby affect the
administration of justice.
4.7. Accordingly, it is submitted that the impugned
order, being a judicial order passed by the
quasi-judicial authority, cannot be assailed by
invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 as
though the Court were exercising appellate
jurisdiction. The scope of interference under
Article 227, it is contended, remains limited to
ensuring that the quasi-judicial authority acts
within the bounds of its jurisdiction and in
accordance with the settled parameters
governing the exercise of the power of
superintendence.
4.8. He relies upon the decision in Surya Dev Rai
4
v. Ram Chander Rai , more particularly para
38 and 39, which are reproduced hereunder for
easy reference:
38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High
Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at
the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder:
(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-
2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot
and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the
High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
4
(2003) 6 SCC 675
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(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts
subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy
of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act
46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and
continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court.
(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is
issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e.
when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i)
without jurisdiction — by assuming jurisdiction where
there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction
— by overstepping or crossing the limits of
jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law
or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of
principles of natural justice where there is no
procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure
of justice.
(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate
courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a
subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it
does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction
which it does have or the jurisdiction though
available is being exercised by the court in a manner
not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave
injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may
step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct
mere errors of fact or of law unless the following
requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest
and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as
when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard
of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or
gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e.
which can be perceived or demonstrated without
involving into any lengthy or complicated argument
or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two
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inferences are reasonably possible and the
subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the
error cannot be called gross or patent.
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the
supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly
and only in appropriate cases where the judicial
conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a
gross failure of justice or grave injustice should
occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be
exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is
sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or
proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though
calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the
conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision
preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking
certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would
obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or
proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene
where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that
very moment, may become incapable of correction at
a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in
travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would
result in prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a
court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or
evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing
inferences or correct errors of mere formal or
technical character.
(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of
jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike
English courts has almost obliterated the distinction
between the two jurisdictions. While exercising
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High
Court may annul or set aside the act, order or
proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot
substitute its own decision in place thereof. In
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court
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may not only give suitable directions so as to guide
the subordinate court as to the manner in which it
would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High
Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order
in supersession or substitution of the order of the
subordinate court as the court should have made in
the facts and circumstances of the case.
39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and
working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for
exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the
Constitution cannot be tied down in a strait-jacket formula
or rigid rules. Not less than often, the High Court would be
faced with a dilemma. If it intervenes in pending
proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination of
proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the
moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and
circumstances of a given case may make it more
appropriate for the High Court to exercise self-restraint and
not to intervene because the error of jurisdiction though
committed is yet capable of being taken care of and
corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if any, would
be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or
revision preferred at the conclusion of the proceedings. But
there may be cases where “a stitch in time would save
nine”. At the end, we may sum up by saying that the
power is there but the exercise is discretionary which
will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial
conscience enriched by judicial experience and
practical wisdom of the judge.
4.9. By relying on Surya Dev Rai , his submission is
that the Commissioner has jurisdiction under
Section 63 of the Act. He has exercised his
jurisdiction in proper manner. The orders
passed by the Commissioner are within his
jurisdiction, cannot be said to be passed in
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excess of his jurisdiction. The Commissioner
has protected the interest of Respondent No. 2,
which cannot be said to be perverse, let alone
patently perverse. The Petitioner having been
heard by the Commissioner, the principles of
natural justice have been complied with and
according to him there is no error apparent on
record requiring this Court to exercise
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution.
4.10. He submits that the incident took place on
11.01.2026, suspension order was passed only
on 16.06.2026 and was implemented on
17.06.2026. Thus, from 11.01.2026 to
17.06.2026, Respondent No.2 continued to
discharge his duties as Archaka for more than 5
months. During this period, there was no
apprehension on the part of the Petitioner that
he would tamper with any evidence or influence
any witness. Their apprehension is completely
ill-founded, inasmuch as there is no allegation
that from 11.01.2026 to 17.06.2026,
Respondent No.2 ever obstructed the enquiry or
interfered with the Temple administration. The
Petitioner having permitted Respondent No.2 to
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discharge such duties over a period of five
months, cannot now contend that there is a
danger of Respondent No.2 tampering with
evidence. His submission is that Respondent
No.2 being the Pradhana Archaka has no role in
the security or watch and guard of the Temple
which comes under the Executive Officer.
4.11. He submits that the Executive Officer is seeking
to blame the Respondent No.2- Pradhana
Archaka for defaults on the part of the former.
He submits that post the order passed by the
Commissioner, an Official Memorandum has
been issued on 18.08.2026 permitting
Respondent No.2 to resume his duties and he
has been discharging such duties from that
date without any complaint by the Management
Committee or the other officers.
4.12. He relies upon the decision in Union of India
& Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , more
particularly, paragraphs 21 to 23 thereof, which
are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
21. The power of suspension should not be exercised in an
arbitrary manner and without any reasonable ground or as
vindictive misuse of power. Suspension should be made
only in a case where there is a strong prima facie
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case against the delinquent employee and the
allegations involving moral turpitude, grave
misconduct or indiscipline or refusal to carry out the
orders of superior authority are there, or there is a
strong prima facie case against him, if proved, would
ordinarily result in reduction in rank, removal or
dismissal from service. The authority should also take
into account all the available material as to whether
in a given case, it is advisable to allow the delinquent
to continue to perform his duties in the office or his
retention in office is likely to hamper or frustrate the
inquiry.
22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that suspension order can
be passed by the competent authority considering the
gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of
omission or commission and the nature of evidence
available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide,
arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public
interest due to the employee's continuation in office
is also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of
each case have to be taken into consideration as no
formula of universal application can be laid down in
this regard. However, suspension order should be passed
only where there is a strong prima facie case against the
delinquent, and if the charges stand proved, would
ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment i.e.
removal or dismissal from service, or reduction in rank, etc.
23. In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. Anilbhai Nathubhai
Patel [(2006) 8 SCC 200] this Court explained : (SCC p.
209, para 18)
“18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of
judicial review may not be exercised unless the
administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural
impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the
sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but
no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases,
can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own
facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the
power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the
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indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or
affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint,
albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an
administrative decision or action which is based on wholly
irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from
consideration the relevant material ; or it is so absurd
that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the
given material, may be struck down. In other words, when
a court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of
power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the
court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the
scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in
the decision-making process and not the decision. ”
4.13. By relying on Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , he
submits that even if the power of suspension
could be available with the Authority, such
power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or as a
vindictive measure. It can be resorted to only
where there exists a strong prima facie case
involving grave misconduct, moral turpitude or
serious indiscipline, and, if the allegations are
ultimately proved, they would ordinarily
warrant a major penalty such as dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank.
4.14. By referring to Resolution dated 16.06.2026,
his submission is that the Management
Committee itself found serious lapses and
negligence on the part of the security personnel
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entrusted with the security of the Temple
premises. Thus, the lapses being on the part of
the security personnel, Respondent No.2-
Archaka could not be held responsible for their
actions.
4.15. His submission is that the entire action taken
by Respondent is only on the basis of
conjecture and suspicion. There is nothing
which has been placed on record indicating that
Respondent No.2- Pradhana Archaka was part
of the removal of the CCTV or wrongly
connecting with DVR; nor is anything placed on
record indicating that he has stolen any item
from the Temple. Therefore, he submits that
the entire action taken by the Respondent being
misconceived, the Commissioner in order to
render justice has exercised his powers under
Section 63 of the Act by staying those orders
and permitting Respondent No.2 to discharge
his duties.
4.16. He therefore submits that the Commissioner’s
order was passed in exercise of the statutory
jurisdiction under Section 63 of the Act and that
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no ground is made out for interference with the
impugned interim order.
4.17. The said order of suspension and appointment
of temporary Archaka has been rectified by the
Commissioner, which cannot be found fault
with.
4.18. On these grounds, he submits that the writ
petition is required to be dismissed.
5. Learned Additional Government Advocate would
submit that the investigation is going on, and the
Investigating Officer has called upon the
Management Committee to furnish the DVR for the
purpose of retrieval of the recordings made therein.
On enquiry being completed, the necessary enquiry
report would be submitted.
6. Heard Sri K.N.Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioner, Sri Abhinav Ramanand, learned
counsel for Respondent No.2, and learned AGA for
Respondents No.1, 3 and 4. Perused papers.
7. The points that would arise for determination are:
(i) Whether the writ petition challenging the
interlocutory order passed by the
Commissioner in exercise of the powers
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under Section 63 of the Karnataka Hindu
Religious Institutions and Charitable
Endowments Act, 1997, is maintainable
under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India?
(ii) Whether the Commissioner was justified in
exercising revisional jurisdiction under
Section 63 of the Act in respect of the
order of suspension dated 17.06.2026
passed against Respondent No.2 under
Section 16 of the Act read with Rule 17(4)
of the Karnataka Hindu Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments
Rules, 2002?
(iii) Whether the impugned interim order
passed by the Commissioner staying the
order of suspension dated 17.06.2026 and
the consequential Official Memorandum
dated 18.06.2026 suffers from any
jurisdictional error, error of law apparent
on the face of the record, or non-
application of mind warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India?
(iv) Whether the Commissioner, while
considering the application for interim
relief, was justified in examining the
factual aspects relating to the alleged
incident and the alleged involvement and
duties of Respondent No.2, or whether
such an exercise amounted to conducting
an enquiry into the allegations which were
pending consideration before the
disciplinary authority/Enquiry Officer?
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(v) Whether, having regard to the pendency of
the disciplinary enquiry and criminal
investigation, the order permitting
Respondent No.2 to resume his duties as
Archaka during the pendency of such
proceedings is sustainable in law?
(vi) What order?
8. This Court answers the above points as follows:
9. Answer to Point No. (i): Whether the writ
petition challenging the interlocutory order
passed by the Commissioner in exercise of the
powers under Section 63 of the Karnataka
Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable
Endowments Act, 1997, is maintainable under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India?
9.1. Sri K.N. Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioner, submits that the Commissioner
acted beyond the power conferred by Section
63 of the Act or, in any event, exercised the
said power improperly and that this Court is
therefore required to interfere in exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction.
9.2. He relies upon Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
Radhakrishnan & Others [AIR 1964 SC 477],
particularly paragraph 7 thereof. His
submission, based on the said decision, is that
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certiorari may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction, including orders passed without
jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or upon
failure to exercise jurisdiction. It may also be
issued where the authority acts illegally or
improperly, including in breach of the principles
of natural justice. A finding of fact based on no
evidence may also be corrected. At the same
time, the writ Court does not exercise appellate
jurisdiction and cannot reopen findings of fact
merely on reappreciation of evidence.
9.3. He relies upon Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi
Nath [(2015) 5 SCC 423], particularly
paragraph 25 thereof, to distinguish the
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227. His
submission is that a writ of certiorari under
Article 226 is an exercise of original jurisdiction,
whereas the power under Article 227 is
supervisory in nature and enables the High
Court, in an appropriate case, not only to set
aside the impugned order but also to issue
consequential directions. On this basis, he
submits that this Court may exercise its power
under Article 227, set aside the order passed by
the Commissioner, continue Respondent No.2
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under suspension and permit the temporarily
appointed Archaka to discharge his duties.
9.4. His submission, in substance, is that the interim
order has granted Respondent No.2 the very
relief sought in the revision petition and has
done so without adequate reasons.
9.5. Sri Abhinav Ramanand, learned counsel for
Respondent No.2, submits that the order
passed by the Commissioner is interlocutory
and not final. Therefore, a writ petition under
Articles 226 and 227 challenging such an order
is not maintainable.
9.6. He also relies upon Syed Yakoob (paragraphs
7 and 8), and submits that certiorari can be
issued only where the authority has acted
without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or
has committed an error of law apparent on the
face of the record. According to him, the
Commissioner possesses revisional jurisdiction
under Section 63 of the Act and the impugned
order does not disclose any such error.
9.7. Relying upon Radhey Shyam (paragraphs 24
to 29), he submits that the jurisdiction under
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Article 226 and the power of superintendence
under Article 227 are distinct. Article 227
cannot be treated as an extension of Article
226. He further submits that judicial orders of
civil courts are not amenable to a writ of
certiorari under Article 226 and that the
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 is
subject to well-settled limitations.
9.8. He submits that the jurisdiction under Article
227 is supervisory and not appellate. This
Court, therefore, ought not to interfere merely
because another view is possible. He places
reliance on the caution expressed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court against routine
interference with pending proceedings, as such
interference may impede their progress and
affect the administration of justice.
9.9. According to him, the impugned order is a
judicial order passed by a quasi-judicial
authority and cannot be examined as though
this Court were exercising appellate jurisdiction.
Under Article 227, interference is confined to
ensuring that the authority acts within the
bounds of its jurisdiction.
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9.10. Relying upon Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander
Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], particularly
paragraphs 38 and 39, he submits that the
Commissioner has jurisdiction under Section 63
of the Act and has exercised that jurisdiction
within its permissible limits. According to him,
the order is not perverse, the Petitioner was
afforded an opportunity of hearing, the
principles of natural justice were followed and
no error apparent on the face of the record is
made out.
9.11. The objection to maintainability is founded
principally on two grounds: first, that the
impugned order is interlocutory; and second,
that this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction
under Articles 226 and 227 as an appellate
Court. These objections require consideration in
the context of the nature of the order under
challenge and the principles governing the
exercise of writ and supervisory jurisdiction.
9.12. The order under challenge is the order dated
12.08.2026 passed by the Commissioner on the
interlocutory application filed by Respondent
No.2 in Revision Petition No.3/2026-27. By that
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order, the Commissioner stayed the operation
of the suspension order dated 17.06.2026 and
the Official Memorandum dated 18.06.2026
during the pendency of the revision petition.
The revision petition itself has not yet been
finally decided.
9.13. The Act and the Rules do not contain any
provision barring the exercise of writ
jurisdiction against an interlocutory order
passed by the Commissioner. Respondent No.2
has also not placed before this Court any
statutory provision which renders such an order
immune from judicial review.
9.14. The reliance placed by Shri Abhinav Ramanand
Learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 on Surya
Dev Rai does not support an absolute bar. In
paragraph 38(2), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held:
“Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts
subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy
of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment
Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in,
and continue to be subject to, certiorari and
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.”
9.15. The said observation makes it clear that the
interlocutory nature of an order, by itself, does
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not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court.
Though the observation in Surya Dev Rai
concerns orders of subordinate Courts in the
context of the Code of Civil Procedure, no
submission has been made before this Court as
to why an interlocutory order passed by a
statutory authority should, merely on that
account, be placed beyond judicial review.
9.16. At the same time, the power is to be exercised
sparingly. In paragraph 38(7) of Surya Dev
Rai , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed
that the power of certiorari and supervisory
jurisdiction should be exercised only in
appropriate cases and with care and caution,
particularly when the proceedings before the
subordinate authority are still pending. The
Court may intervene where an error, if not
corrected immediately, may become incapable
of correction at a later stage or where refusal to
intervene would result in grave injustice or
prolong the proceedings.
9.17. Thus, the fact that the impugned order is
interlocutory does not by itself render the writ
petition non-maintainable. It is, however, a
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relevant consideration while deciding whether
interference is warranted at the interlocutory
stage. The question whether the present case
warrants such interference will be considered
while dealing with the subsequent Points.
9.18. The next submission of Shri Abhinav Ramanand
Learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 is
founded on Radhey Shyam . It is necessary to
notice the precise scope of the decision. In
paragraph 27, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil
courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under
Article 226.”
9.19. The reason for this distinction is explained in
paragraph 25, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed:
“Orders of the civil court stand on different footing
from the orders of authorities or tribunals or courts
other than judicial/civil courts.”
9.20. The same paragraph further states that a writ
of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or
jurisdictionally defective orders of tribunals,
authorities or courts other than judicial courts.
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9.21. The Commissioner in the present case is not a
civil Court. He is a statutory authority
exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section
63 of the Act. Therefore, the principle in
Radhey Shyam which excludes a writ of
certiorari against judicial orders of civil Courts
does not render the present petition non-
maintainable.
9.22. The distinction between Articles 226 and 227,
however, must be kept in view. As held in
Radhey Shyam , the scope of Article 227 is
different from that of Article 226. The power
under Article 227 is supervisory and cannot be
exercised as an appellate jurisdiction. The same
principle is also reflected in Syed Yakoob and
Surya Dev Rai .
9.23. The Petitioner has invoked both Articles 226
and 227 and seeks a writ of certiorari. Since the
impugned order has been passed by a statutory
authority and not by a civil Court, the challenge
is capable of being examined under Article 226.
The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is
also invoked. The precise extent of
interference, however, will depend upon
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whether the impugned order discloses a
jurisdictional error, a patent error of law or such
other infirmity as would justify interference.
9.24. The principles governing the exercise of
certiorari jurisdiction are well settled. In Syed
Yakoob (paragraph 7), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that certiorari may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction, including where an
inferior Court or tribunal acts without
jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction or fails to
exercise jurisdiction. The writ Court, however,
does not exercise appellate jurisdiction and
cannot reopen findings of fact merely by
reappreciating the evidence.
9.25. Similarly, Surya Dev Rai cautions that neither
certiorari nor supervisory jurisdiction is
intended to correct every error of fact or law.
Interference is warranted where the error is
manifest and apparent on the face of the record
and has resulted in grave injustice. The High
Court cannot convert itself into a Court of
appeal or reappreciate evidence.
9.26. Consequently, the submission of Shri Abhinav
Ramanand learned counsel for Respondent No.2
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that this Court cannot sit in appeal over the
Commissioner's order is correct as a statement
of law. It does not, however, render the present
petition non-maintainable. Where a Petitioner
alleges that the statutory authority has acted
without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction or
in a manner disclosing a patent error of law or
failure to exercise jurisdiction, such allegations
fall within the permissible field of writ and
supervisory jurisdiction. Whether those grounds
are established on the facts of the present case
is a matter to be considered while deciding the
subsequent Points.
9.27. The present case concerns an order passed by
a statutory authority and not by a civil Court.
On that issue, there is no difficulty in applying
the principles governing judicial review.
9.28. The principles emerging from the decisions
relied upon by the parties may thus be
summarised. Syed Yakoob sets out the limits
of certiorari jurisdiction. Surya Dev Rai
recognises that an interlocutory order is not,
merely because it is interlocutory, beyond the
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, while
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emphasising that such jurisdiction must be
exercised sparingly. Radhey Shyam
distinguishes the jurisdiction under Articles 226
and 227 and makes it clear that a writ of
certiorari does not lie against a judicial order of
a civil Court, while permitting such jurisdiction
against orders of statutory authorities and
tribunals in appropriate cases.
9.29. In the present case, the Petitioner alleges want
of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction and non-
application of mind on the part of the
Commissioner. These are matters which can be
examined in exercise of the jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227, subject to the limitations
noticed above.
9.30. This Court answers Point No. (i) by holding that
a writ petition challenging the interlocutory
order dated 12.08.2026 passed by the
Commissioner under Section 63 of the Act is
maintainable under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India.
9.31. The interlocutory nature of the impugned order
does not, by itself, bar the exercise of writ
jurisdiction. The Commissioner is a statutory
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authority and not a civil Court; therefore, the
bar recognised in Radhey Shyam against
issuance of certiorari in respect of judicial
orders of civil Courts does not apply. However,
interference at the interlocutory stage remains
subject to the well-settled limitations governing
the exercise of certiorari and supervisory
jurisdiction. The question whether those
limitations are satisfied in the present case will
be considered while deciding the subsequent
Points.
10. Answer to Point No. (ii): Whether the
Commissioner was justified in exercising
revisional jurisdiction under Section 63 of the
Act in respect of the order of suspension dated
17.06.2026 passed against Respondent No.2
under Section 16 of the Act read with Rule
17(4) of the Karnataka Hindu Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Rules,
2002?
10.1. Sri K.N. Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioner, submitted that the Commissioner
had no jurisdiction to entertain a revision
against the suspension of Respondent No.2.
10.2. Section 16(2) provides an appeal to the
Commissioner against every order imposing a
penalty, to be filed within thirty days. According
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to the learned Senior Counsel, the provision
covers every disciplinary decision of the
Committee against an Archaka or temple
servant. Therefore, a revision under Section 63
could not be maintained.
10.3. The learned Senior Counsel referred to the
appointment of Respondent No.2. He was
appointed as an Archaka on a temporary basis
by order dated 20.04.1989 in place of Sri
Srinivasa Gopala. The arrangement was
extended by orders dated 17.05.1990 and
14.05.1991, and he was appointed as an
Archaka by Official Memorandum dated
14.05.1992. According to the Petitioner,
Respondent No.2 is not a hereditary Archaka
but was appointed by the competent authority.
10.4. The disciplinary enquiry is still pending, natural
justice has been followed and no final order has
been passed. According to the learned Senior
Counsel, there was, therefore, no final order
which could be challenged before the
Commissioner.
10.5. Section 63, according to the learned Senior
Counsel, confers a power substantially in the
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nature of a suo motu power to call for records
and examine the correctness of an order. It
cannot, according to him, be invoked on an
application by an aggrieved person. The order
of suspension being one passed under Section
16 read with Rule 17, resort to Section 63 was
therefore impermissible.
10.6. Reliance was also placed on Section 63(2),
which prohibits the Commissioner from calling
for and examining the record during the period
in which an appeal can lie. Respondent No.2
had filed a revision and not an appeal.
According to the learned Senior Counsel, this
went to the root of the Commissioner’s
jurisdiction.
10.7. It was further submitted that the Commissioner
had conflated Sections 16 and 63.
10.8. On the power of suspension, Sri K.N. Phanindra
relied upon Rule 17. Sub-rule (1) specifies the
penalties; sub-rule (4) permits suspension
pending enquiry where it is necessary in the
interest of the institution; and sub-rule (5)
provides for subsistence allowance at fifty per
cent. He submitted that, by its resolution dated
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16.06.2026, the Committee suspended
Respondent No.2 under Section 16 read with
Rule 17 and provided for payment of fifty per
cent subsistence allowance.
10.9. He also relied upon Union of India & Anr. v.
Ashok Kumar Aggarwal [(2013) 16 SCC
147], Paragraph 27, regarding the nature of
suspension, and Syed Yakoob , Paragraph 7,
regarding the scope of certiorari, as considered
under Point No. (i).
10.10. Sri Abhinav Ramanand, learned counsel for
Respondent No.2, submitted that the
Commissioner had jurisdiction under Section 63
and had properly exercised it. Relying upon
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai ,
Paragraphs 38 and 39, he submitted that the
order was within the Commissioner’s
jurisdiction. Relying upon Syed Yakoob ,
Paragraphs 7 and 8, he submitted that there
was no error apparent on the face of the
record. He further submitted that the
Commissioner had the power to examine the
suspension and was not required to await an
appeal.
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10.11. The submission that the power was “inherent”
is not technically correct, since the power is
statutory and arises from Section 63. The
substance of the submission is, however,
understood to be that the Commissioner was
not required to await an appeal before
exercising the power conferred by Section 63.
10.12. The issue is whether the Commissioner could
exercise jurisdiction under Section 63 in respect
of the order of suspension dated 17.06.2026.
The challenge of the Petitioner raises three
questions:
10.12.1. Whether an appeal lies against the order
of suspension under Section 16(2),
thereby attracting the bar under Section
63(2);
10.12.2. Whether the power under Section 63 can
be exercised only suo motu and not on
the application of an aggrieved person;
and
10.12.3. Whether the Commissioner conflated
Sections 16 and 63.
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10.13. Whether an appeal lies against the order
of suspension
10.14. Section 16 of the Act reads:
“ 16. Mis-conduct and Penalty.- (1) The
Committee of management shall be competent to
initiate action and hold enquiry for misconduct,
either suo-moto or on complaint received against an
archaka, including an Agamika, Tanthri or Pradhana
Archaka and against the temple servants and to
impose appropriate penalty for proven misconduct.
No order imposing any penalty under this section
shall be made except after giving such person a
reasonable opportunity of being heard against the
charge.
(2) An appeal shall lie to the Commissioner against
every order imposing penalty under this section.
Such appeal shall be made within thirty days from
the date of the order imposing the penalty.”
10.15. The provision is clear. The Committee may
enquire into misconduct by an Archaka or
temple servant and impose an appropriate
penalty for proved misconduct after giving a
reasonable opportunity of hearing. Section
16(2) provides an appeal against an order
imposing penalty. It does not provide an appeal
against every order or decision made by the
Committee.
10.16. The status of Respondent No.2 as an Archaka
also requires no determination for deciding this
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Point. The Petitioner contends that he is not a
hereditary Archaka. In Annexure-A, Paragraph
7(a), Respondent No.2 stated that his family
had served the deity for generations and that
he held hereditary archakatva and an Agama
certificate. This Court need not decide that
dispute. Section 16(1) expressly covers “an
archaka, including an Agamika, Tanthri or
Pradhana Archaka”, and Rule 17 applies to
Archakas and temple servants. Whether
Respondent No.2 is described as an Archaka or
Pradhana Archaka or Hereditary Archaka does
not affect the present issue. Annexure-A,
Paragraph 7(b), records his reply dated
26.01.2026 as that of the Pradhana Archaka.
10.17. The nature of suspension must next be
considered. Rule 17 specifies the penalties that
may be imposed by the Committee:
“ 17. Disciplinary action against Archakas and
temple servants.— The following penalties may be
imposed on Archakas and other temple servants by
the Committee of management for any dis-
obedience, misconduct, breach of trust, in-capacity,
neglect of duties [for any disqualification specified in
Section 10-A] or other sufficient causes.— (a)
censure; (b) fine; (c) withholding of increments; (d)
reduction of pay; (e) recovery from pay of any loss
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caused to the institution; (f) removal from service or
dismissal from service.”
10.18. Suspension does not form part of the above
list. It is separately dealt with in Rule 17(4) and
(5):
“(4) An Archaka or a temple servant may be placed
under suspension pending enquiry of the charges
where such suspension is necessary in the interest of
the institution concerned.
(5) The suspended Archaka or temple servant is
entitled for a subsistence allowance of fifty per cent
of the salary drawn by him at the time of suspension.
The order of suspension may be continued for not
more than six months within which the enquiry has
to be concluded:
Provided that for any reason if the enquiry is not
completed within the period of six months the
Committee of management may with the permission
of the Commissioner continue the period of
suspension beyond six months.”
10.19. The statutory scheme is therefore clear. The
penalties are specified separately. Suspension
under Rule 17(4) is a temporary measure
pending enquiry, permissible where it is
necessary in the interest of the institution. It
carries a subsistence allowance and is subject
to a time limit. It is not itself a penalty imposed
for proved misconduct.
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10.20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained the
nature of suspension in Union of India & Anr.
v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , Paragraph 27:
“Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of
the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the
proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim
measure in the aid of disciplinary proceedings so that
the delinquent may not gain custody or control of
papers or take any advantage of his position.”
10.21. Thus, suspension pending enquiry is distinct
from punishment for proved misconduct.
Section 16(2) provides an appeal against an
order “imposing penalty”. A suspension under
Rule 17(4) is not such an order. Therefore, no
appeal under Section 16(2) lies against the
order of suspension dated 17.06.2026.
10.22. This conclusion is also consistent with the
Petitioner’s own submission that the enquiry is
pending and no final order has yet been
passed. The absence of a final order imposing
penalty means that there is, at this stage, no
order against which an appeal under Section
16(2) can be filed. The submission that every
disciplinary decision of the Committee is
appealable cannot be accepted, as it would add
words to Section 16(2). The legislature has
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confined the appeal to an order imposing
penalty.
10.23. Whether Section 63(2) bars the revision
10.24. Section 63 provides:
“63. Revisional Powers of Commissioner.- (1)
The Commissioner may call for and examine the
records and proceedings before the Assistant
Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner the
Committee of management or the executive officer
for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the
correctness of the finding or order recorded or
passed by the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy
Commissioner the Committee of management or the
executive officer and may either annul, reverse,
modify or confirm the said finding or order or may
direct the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy
Commissioner the Committee of management or the
executive officer to make further enquiry or take
such additional evidence as he may think necessary
or he may himself take the additional evidence:
Provided that the Commissioner shall not record or
pass any order without giving the party affected
thereby an opportunity of being heard.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall entitle the
commissioner to call for and examine the record of
any case during the period in which an appeal can lie
or after an order has been passed by him on such
appeal.”
10.25. Section 63(1) expressly empowers the
Commissioner to examine the records and
proceedings before the Committee of
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management or the Executive Officer and to
examine the correctness of the finding or order
passed by them. Section 63(2) creates a
specific limitation: the Commissioner cannot
call for the record during the period in which an
appeal can lie or after an order has been
passed by him on such appeal.
10.26. Since no appeal lies against an order of
suspension under Section 16(2), there is no
period during which such an appeal can lie.
Consequently, the bar under Section 63(2) is
not attracted to the suspension order dated
17.06.2026.
10.27. The submission that the entire disciplinary
proceeding is a matter in which an appeal may
arise at a later stage also cannot be accepted.
Section 63(2) refers to the period during which
an appeal can lie against the particular order. It
does not say that the Commissioner is barred
from examining every interim or interlocutory
order merely because an appeal may lie against
a subsequent final penalty order.
10.28. Such an interpretation would substantially
restrict the express power under Section 63(1)
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to examine an order passed by the Committee
or Executive Officer. It would also leave an
Archaka without a statutory remedy against a
suspension pending enquiry, even though the
Act does not expressly impose such a
restriction.
10.29. Rule 17(5) also requires the Committee to
obtain the Commissioner’s permission if
suspension is to continue beyond six months.
This provision does not create the revisional
jurisdiction under Section 63; that jurisdiction
is statutory. It nevertheless shows that the
statutory scheme contemplates the
Commissioner having a role in relation to
continuing suspension.
10.30. Whether revision can be initiated on the
application of an aggrieved person
10.31. The next submission is that Section 63 confers
only a suo motu power and cannot be invoked
by an aggrieved person.
10.32. Section 63(1) does not use the expression “suo
motu”. It provides that the Commissioner “may
call for and examine” the records for the
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purpose of satisfying himself as to the
correctness of the finding or order. The
provision does not prescribe that the
Commissioner must obtain knowledge of the
order only on his own initiative, nor does it
prohibit an aggrieved person from bringing the
order to his notice.
10.33. The proviso to Section 63(1) requires the
Commissioner to hear “the party affected”
before passing an order. This is consistent with
a proceeding in which an affected party
approaches the Commissioner and the
Commissioner thereafter decides whether the
record should be called for and examined.
10.34. Section 64, occurring in the same Chapter,
refers to the period of limitation for “an appeal
or revision under this Act”. Rule 41 further
provides for a court fee of fifty rupees for
“revisions filed under Section 63” under sub-
rule (2), separately from the fee applicable to
an appeal under Section 16(2) under the
proviso to sub-rule (1). These provisions
indicate that a revision under Section 63 can be
presented by a party.
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10.35. The Act and Rules placed before this Court do
not prescribe a separate procedure requiring
the Commissioner to act only suo motu. The
Petitioner has also not relied upon any
provision which prohibits an aggrieved person
from bringing an order to the Commissioner’s
notice.
10.36. Once an order is brought before the
Commissioner, the decision whether to call for
and examine the record remains his statutory
function. The fact that the matter is brought to
his notice by an aggrieved person does not
convert the statutory revisional power into an
appellate power.
10.37. The revision petition refers to both Section
16(2) and Section 63(1), as recorded in
Annexure-A, Paragraph 2. The reference to
Section 16(2) does not invalidate the
proceeding because the power actually
exercised by the Commissioner to examine the
suspension order arises from Section 63(1). A
mistaken or unnecessary reference to an
inapplicable provision does not extinguish a
jurisdiction otherwise conferred by statute.
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10.38. Sri Abhinav Ramanand described the power as
“inherent”. That description is not accurate. The
power is not inherent; it is expressly conferred
by Section 63. The substance of his submission,
however, is correct to the extent that the
Commissioner was not required to await an
appeal before exercising the statutory power
under Section 63.
10.39. Whether the Commissioner conflated
Sections 16 and 63
10.40. The third contention is that the Commissioner
conflated Sections 16 and 63. Annexure-A does
not establish such a jurisdictional error.
10.41. Paragraph 1 of Annexure-A records the
proceeding as a revision under Section 63. The
Commissioner heard the parties between
03.07.2026 and 16.07.2026, as recorded in
Paragraph 5, and thereafter passed an order on
the stay application. The order does not purport
to decide an appeal under Section 16(2).
10.42. It is true that Paragraph 10 of Annexure-A
refers to Respondent No.2 as the “appellant”.
That is imprecise terminology. However, the
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same order describes the proceeding as a
revision and the application as an interim
application. The use of the word “appellant”, by
itself, does not establish that the Commissioner
exercised appellate jurisdiction under Section
16(2).
10.43. If the grievance is that the Commissioner, while
deciding the interim application, went beyond
examining the correctness of the suspension
and entered into the merits of the allegations,
that is a separate issue. It concerns the manner
in which the jurisdiction was exercised and not
the existence of jurisdiction.
10.44. Interim relief in the revision
10.45. The interim application was stated to have been
filed under Section 65 of the Act read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 65 provides:
“65. Civil Procedure Code to apply to Proceedings
under the Act.- Save in so far as they are inconsistent
with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall apply to all
proceedings under this Act.”
10.46. Thus, subject to inconsistency with the Act, the
Code applies to proceedings under the Act. A
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revision under Section 63 is a proceeding under
the Act.
10.47. The Petitioner does not contend that the
Commissioner had no power to entertain an
interim application in a pending revision. His
contention is that the power was wrongly
exercised and that the principles governing
interim relief were not properly applied. Those
questions arise under the subsequent Points.
10.48. Annexure-A records that both parties were
heard, as seen from Paragraphs 5, 6 and 18.
Therefore, no violation of the proviso to Section
63(1) is established at the stage of entertaining
the revision or the interim application.
10.49. Effect of the authorities relied upon
10.50. The authorities relied upon by the parties do
not alter the above conclusion. In Syed
Yakoob , Paragraph 7, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court recognised that certiorari may correct an
order passed “without jurisdiction, or in excess
of it”. In Surya Dev Rai , Paragraph 38(3),
acting “without jurisdiction — by assuming
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jurisdiction where there exists none” is
recognised as a ground for interference.
10.51. In the present case, the Commissioner did not
assume a jurisdiction which the statute does
not confer. Section 63(1) expressly confers
jurisdiction over orders passed by the
Committee of management and the Executive
Officer. Section 63(2) does not bar its exercise
in respect of a suspension against which no
appeal lies under Section 16(2).
10.52. Syed Yakoob , Paragraph 8, also recognises
interference where a conclusion rests on an
“obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant
statutory provision”, while cautioning:
“If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two
constructions and one construction has been adopted
by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may
not necessarily or always be open to correction by a
writ of certiorari.”
10.53. The interpretation adopted above follows the
plain language of Sections 16(2) and 63. Even
if the Petitioner’s interpretation is regarded as
arguable, it is not sufficient to establish an
error of law apparent on the face of the record.
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10.54. Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath does not
have any bearing on the issue under this Point.
10.55. The statutory scheme leads to the following
conclusions:
10.55.1. Suspension under Rule 17(4) is not a
penalty. It is an interim measure pending
enquiry and is distinct from the penalties
specified in Rule 17(1).
10.55.2. No appeal lies against the suspension
under Section 16(2). The appeal
provided by that provision is confined to
an order imposing penalty.
10.55.3. Section 63(2) therefore does not bar
revision. The prohibition operates only
during the period in which an appeal can
lie. Since no appeal lies against the
suspension, that condition is not
satisfied.
10.55.4. Section 63(1) extends to orders of both
the Committee of management and the
Executive Officer. Therefore, it makes no
difference whether the suspension order
dated 17.06.2026 is treated as the order
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of the Committee or as an order issued
by the Executive Officer pursuant to the
Committee’s resolution dated
16.06.2026.
10.55.5. Section 63 does not restrict the
Commissioner to suo motu action. The
Act and Rules do not prohibit an
aggrieved person from bringing an order
to the Commissioner’s notice. Rule 41, in
particular, refers to “revisions filed under
Section 63”.
10.55.6. The reference to Section 16(2) in
Annexure-A does not invalidate the
revision. The jurisdiction to examine the
suspension order flows from Section
63(1).
10.56. Accordingly, this Court answers point No. (ii) by
holding that the Commissioner had jurisdiction
under Section 63 of the Act to entertain the
revision against the order of suspension dated
17.06.2026 and the connected application for
interim relief. The bar under Section 63(2) is
not attracted, since no appeal lies against the
suspension under Section 16(2).
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11. Answer to Point No. (iii): Whether the
impugned interim order passed by the
Commissioner staying the order of suspension
dated 17.06.2026 and the consequential Official
Memorandum dated 18.06.2026 suffers from
any jurisdictional error, error of law apparent
on the face of the record, or non-application of
mind warranting interference by this Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India?
11.1. Sri K.N. Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioner, submitted that the impugned
order merely records the submissions of the
parties and then reaches a conclusion without
applying the settled principles governing
interim relief. According to him, an application
for stay requires consideration of a strong
prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable injury. None of these factors, he
submitted, has been considered.
11.2. He further submitted that the order is brief and
mechanical and, without imposing any
condition, grants Respondent No.2 substantially
the relief sought in the revision at the interim
stage. He relied upon Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
Radhakrishnan & Others , Paragraph 7, and
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Union of India & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar
Aggarwal , Paragraphs 26 and 27.
11.3. Sri Abhinav Ramanand, learned counsel for
Respondent No.2, submitted that the
Commissioner had jurisdiction under Section
63, that the Petitioner was heard, and that no
perversity or error apparent on the face of the
record is established. He relied upon Surya
Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai , Paragraphs 38
and 39, and Syed Yakoob , Paragraphs 7 and
8.
11.4. Learned counsel submitted that the
Commissioner had only corrected the order of
suspension and the consequential temporary
arrangement. Relying upon Ashok Kumar
Aggarwal , Paragraphs 21 to 23, he submitted
that suspension must be supported by a strong
prima facie case and cannot be arbitrary or
vindictive.
11.5. The limited question under this point is whether
the impugned interim order suffers from a legal
defect warranting interference under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The
principles governing the exercise of such
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jurisdiction have already been considered under
Point No. (i). This Court does not reappreciate
the evidence or substitute its own view for that
of the statutory authority. Interference is
warranted where there is want or excess of
jurisdiction, a clear error of law, or failure to
apply the mind to relevant considerations.
11.6. The contents of the impugned order
11.7. This Court has examined Annexure-A itself. The
order discloses the following:
11.7.1. Paragraphs 1 to 6: The proceeding is a
revision under Section 63. The interim
application seeks stay of the Executive
Officer’s order dated 17.06.2026 and the
Official Memorandum dated 18.06.2026.
Hearings were held between 03.07.2026
and 16.07.2026, and counsel for
Respondent No.2 and the Management
Committee were heard.
11.7.2. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 12: The respective
submissions of the parties are recorded.
11.7.3. Paragraph 9: The Commissioner records
that he considered the written arguments
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and documents filed on behalf of
Respondent No.2. The order does not
similarly record consideration of the
objections or documents of the
Management Committee.
11.7.4. Paragraph 10: The Commissioner holds
that the Committee of Management, and
not the Executive Officer, is competent to
take disciplinary action. Since the
Executive Officer acted pursuant to the
Committee’s resolution, the order is
treated as having been passed by the
competent authority.
11.7.5. Paragraphs 11 and 12: Records the
incident dated 11.01.2026 and the
allegations concerning the theft of the
CCTV cameras. Paragraph 12 refers to the
FIR registered in connection with the
incident, the suspension of the six temple
staff members, and the grounds advanced
for opposing the resumption of duties by
Respondent No.2.
11.7.6. Paragraphs 13 and 14: The Commissioner
considers an extract from the temple
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manual concerning the morning opening
and performance of temple duties.
Discusses the sequence of duties
described in the manual, observes that it
does not require the temple lock or seal to
be opened in the presence of the Archaka,
and refers to an attendance entry dated
16.01.2026.
11.7.7. Paragraphs 15 and 16: Records the rival
submissions concerning the alleged
delegation of pooja duties by Respondent
No.2 and the performance of pooja by
relatives of the temporary Archaka, Sri
Ananda Alvar. Paragraph 16 states that an
authorised Archaka is required to perform
his duties personally and that an
alternative arrangement may be made
only in unavoidable circumstances, with
an eligible Archaka and prior permission
from the Executive Officer. It also refers to
the responsibility of authorised Archakas
in cases involving misappropriation or
missing jewellery.
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11.7.8. Paragraph 17: For the “above reasons”,
the Commissioner concludes that the
suspension does not, at first sight, appear
justified and that the interim application
deserves to be considered.
11.7.9. Operative portion: The interim application
is allowed and the two orders are stayed
“as regards the appellant” until further
orders. The matter is posted to
27.08.2026. No condition is imposed.
11.8. Whether the order contains reasons
11.9. Under Point No. (ii), this Court has held that
the Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain
the revision and the interim application. The
impugned order does not specify the provision
under which the interim stay was granted.
However, the Petitioner itself states that the
application was filed under Section 65 of the
Act read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Petitioner does not contend that
the Commissioner had no power to grant
interim relief. Therefore, absence of a specific
reference to the provision conferring such
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power is not, by itself, a ground for
interference.
11.10. The Petitioner was heard on several dates and
does not allege denial of an opportunity of
hearing. The question is not whether there was
a hearing, but whether the material
submissions and relevant circumstances placed
before the Commissioner were considered.
11.11. The submission that the impugned order is
wholly without reasons cannot be accepted.
Paragraph 10 deals with the competence of the
authority which passed the suspension order.
Paragraphs 13 and 14 deal with the temple
manual, the sequence of duties and the
attendance entry. Paragraph 15 records the
rival submissions concerning the delegation of
pooja duties and the temporary Archaka, while
Paragraph 16 contains observations relating to
the Archaka’s personal performance of duties
and the conditions for arranging a substitute.
Paragraph 17 records a prima facie conclusion.
The order is brief, but it is not merely a
reproduction of the rival submissions followed
by an unexplained conclusion.
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11.12. Whether the reasons address the relevant
considerations
11.13. The real question is whether the reasons
recorded address the considerations relevant to
staying an order of suspension.
11.14. The Petitioner submitted that prima facie case,
balance of convenience and irreparable injury
had to be considered. Respondent No.2 does
not dispute the relevance of these
considerations. In addition, Rule 17(4) requires
consideration of whether suspension pending
enquiry is “necessary in the interest of the
institution concerned.”
11.15. Union of India & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar
Aggarwal , Paragraph 21, further requires
consideration of whether permitting the
delinquent to continue in office is likely to
hamper or frustrate the enquiry. Since Section
63(1) empowers the Commissioner to examine
the correctness of the order under revision, the
reasons for the suspension also required
consideration while deciding whether it should
be stayed.
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11.16. On this test, the reasons in Annexure-A address
essentially two matters: the competence of the
Executive Officer/Committee and the contents
of the temple manual regarding the Archaka’s
presence when the lock-seal was removed. The
order does not disclose consideration of several
material matters which were placed before the
Commissioner.
11.17. First, the Management Committee’s stated
basis for its resolution dated 16.06.2026 is not
considered. The Committee had stated that
only six persons, including Respondent No.2,
knew the location of the hidden cameras. It
relied upon his reply dated 26.01.2026, which,
according to the Committee, did not deny such
knowledge and did not provide information
regarding the cameras. The Committee treated
this as raising suspicion of fraud, theft and
dereliction of duty, as recorded in Paragraphs
8(iii) and 8(iv).
11.18. Secondly, the impugned order does not
consider First Information Report
No.0085/2026, in which Respondent No.2 is
named as an accused. The Committee had
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contended that his presence in the temple
could affect the investigation, the witnesses
and public confidence in the administration of
the temple. This submission is recorded in
Paragraph 8, last sub-paragraph, and Paragraph
12, but is not addressed in the reasoning.
11.19. Thirdly, the Committee alleged that, on the
date of the incident, Respondent No.2 signed
the attendance register, while CCTV footage
showed his brother performing the duties
without prior permission from the Executive
Officer, as recorded in Paragraphs 8(i) and 12.
Paragraph 16 refers to the requirement relating
to substitutes, but does not consider whether
the alleged conduct violated that requirement
or whether it had any bearing on the necessity
for suspension.
11.20. Fourthly, the impugned order does not deal
with the principal submissions of Respondent
No.2, including the alleged delay of about six
months before the complaint was filed, the fact
that the post is his livelihood, the contention
that no enquiry or opportunity to reply was
given before the suspension, and the challenge
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to the appointment of Sri Anand Alwar in his
place, as recorded in Paragraph 7(c), 7(d) and
7(f).
11.21. The order also does not consider the balance
between the alleged prejudice to Respondent
No.2 and the subsistence allowance of fifty per
cent payable under Rule 17(5). Nor does it
consider whether any condition could have
adequately addressed the Committee’s
apprehension while granting interim relief.
11.22. Finally, the order does not explain why the
interim relief was granted only to Respondent
No.2 when the same resolution had suspended
five other persons who continued to remain
under suspension.
11.23. This Court is not expressing any view as to how
these matters ought to have been weighed.
That exercise was for the Commissioner. The
defect is that the impugned order does not
disclose that they were considered at all.
11.24. Effect of the hearing and the interim order
11.25. The Commissioner heard the parties on several
dates. That demonstrates that an opportunity
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of hearing was afforded. However, a hearing
and a reasoned decision are distinct. The
principal grounds of the Management
Committee are recorded in Paragraphs 8 and
12, but they do not find consideration in the
reasons which follow. The order therefore does
not disclose whether those grounds were
accepted, rejected, or overlooked.
11.26. The effect of the interim order makes this
omission significant. By staying the suspension
and the consequential Official Memorandum,
Respondent No.2 was restored to the post and
the temporary arrangement was displaced. This
substantially grants the relief sought in the
revision.
11.27. The submission of Sri K.N. Phanindra that the
revision had “virtually been allowed” describes
the practical effect of the order, though the
revision itself was not finally disposed of. Where
an interim order grants substantially the relief
sought in the main proceeding, the reasons for
granting such relief at the interim stage must
be particularly clear. The impugned order does
not disclose such consideration.
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11.28. Scope of judicial review
11.29. Sri Abhinav Ramanand relied upon Surya Dev
Rai , Paragraph 38(6), which states that where
two inferences are reasonably possible and the
subordinate authority has chosen one, the error
cannot be treated as gross or patent.
11.30. That principle does not assist Respondent No.2
in the present case. This Court is not rejecting
a view taken by the Commissioner after
consideration of competing material. The
complaint is that the order does not disclose
consideration of the principal grounds
supporting continuation of the suspension and
the factors relevant to interim relief. The
omission is apparent from the order itself and
does not require reappreciation of evidence.
11.31. Nor does this Court reopen the Commissioner’s
interpretation of the temple manual as a finding
of fact. Syed Yakoob , Paragraph 7, cautions
against reappreciation of evidence in certiorari
proceedings. The present defect is different.
Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , Paragraph 23,
recognises that judicial review may be attracted
where the decision-maker “excludes from
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consideration the relevant material”. The
present case falls within that principle.
11.32. Paragraph 38(5) of Surya Dev Rai requires the
error to be manifest and apparent on the face
of the proceedings and further requires grave
injustice or gross failure of justice. The first
requirement is satisfied because the omission
to consider the principal grounds for suspension
and the essential factors governing interim
relief is evident from the impugned order itself.
11.33. The second requirement also assumes
importance. Paragraph 38(7) of Surya Dev Rai
recognises that interference may be warranted
where an error, if not corrected at that stage,
may become incapable of effective correction
later. The impugned order restores Respondent
No.2 to office while the disciplinary enquiry and
criminal investigation are pending.
11.34. Rule 17(5) provides that suspension may
ordinarily continue for six months, within which
the enquiry is to be completed, subject to
permission of the Commissioner for
continuation beyond that period. The
suspension commenced on 17.06.2026 and
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would ordinarily run until 17.12.2026, unless
extended in accordance with Rule 17(5). If the
period is reckoned from the Committee’s
resolution dated 16.06.2026, it would expire
one day earlier. The revision may not be finally
decided before that period expires.
11.35. The caution in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi
Nath , against interference in pending
proceedings is kept in view. The present
interference is not based on a disagreement
with the Commissioner’s prima facie view on
the merits. It is based on the failure to disclose
consideration of the material and factors
relevant to the interim relief.
11.36. This Court answers point No. (iii) by holding
that the impugned order does not suffer from
any error in assuming jurisdiction or from
violation of natural justice. It is also not wholly
without reasons. However, the reasons
recorded do not disclose consideration of the
principal grounds on which the suspension was
ordered, the pending First Information Report
No.0085/2026, the necessity of suspension in
the interest of the institution under Rule 17(4),
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the likelihood of interference with the enquiry,
the balance of convenience, or irreparable
injury. The order also grants Respondent No.2
substantially the relief sought in the revision
without imposing any condition or explaining
why such relief was warranted at the interim
stage.
11.37. The omission is apparent on the face of the
record and amounts to non-application of mind
and an error of law warranting interference
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
of India.
11.38. Though the Commissioner had jurisdiction to
entertain the revision and the principles of
natural justice were complied with, the
impugned interim order suffers from non-
application of mind and an error of law
apparent on the face of the record and is liable
to be interfered with.
12. Answer to Point No. (iv): Whether the
Commissioner, while considering the
application for interim relief, was justified in
examining the factual aspects relating to the
alleged incident and the alleged involvement
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and duties of Respondent No.2, or whether
such an exercise amounted to conducting an
enquiry into the allegations which were
pending consideration before the disciplinary
authority/Enquiry Officer?
12.1. Sri K.N. Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioner, submitted that the Commissioner
conducted an independent enquiry while
considering the interim application. He referred
to the Commissioner’s alleged examination of
the type of CCTV installed, the time of the
theft, the period for which the footage was
available, the persons on duty, the attendance
register and the duties of the Archaka. He also
submitted that the Commissioner called upon
Respondent No.2 to state where he was at the
relevant time. According to the learned Senior
Counsel, this amounted to a mini-enquiry,
which was beyond the scope of Section 63 and
was a matter for the Enquiry Officer.
12.2. He further submitted that the Commissioner
wrongly held that the temple manual did not
require the Archaka to be present when the
doors were opened and closed and that the
Archaka was not concerned with the CCTV or
the hundi. According to him, the Archaka, being
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the senior-most person in the temple during
the day, supervises its activities. The
Commissioner, by expressing such views, had,
according to the learned Senior Counsel, pre-
judged the disciplinary enquiry. He also referred
to the increase in hundi collections after the
suspension.
12.3. Sri K.N. Phanindra relied upon Union of India
& Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal ,
Paragraphs 26 and 27, and submitted that
where facts are disputed, a reviewing authority
should not determine which version is correct.
12.4. Sri Abhinav Ramanand, learned counsel for
Respondent No.2, submitted that Respondent
No.2 continued to work for more than five
months after the incident dated 11.01.2026
and was suspended only on 16.06.2026. During
this period, there was no allegation that he had
interfered with the enquiry or influenced any
witness.
12.5. He submitted that the Pradhana Archaka has no
responsibility for temple security, which is the
responsibility of the Executive Officer. The
Management Committee’s own resolution
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recorded lapses on the part of the security
staff. According to the learned counsel, the
action against Respondent No.2 is based only
on suspicion.
12.6. He also relied upon the reply of Respondent
No.2 dated 26.01.2026, recorded in Paragraph
7(b) of Annexure-A, wherein Respondent No.2
stated that his duty was confined to performing
pooja in the sanctum and that the cameras
outside the sanctum were not his responsibility.
12.7. Two questions arise for consideration:
12.7.1. Whether the Commissioner was entitled
to examine the factual material while
considering the interim application; and
12.7.2. Whether, in doing so, he entered into the
merits of the allegations which were
required to be decided in the disciplinary
enquiry.
12.8. Extent of the Commissioner's power to
examine factual material
12.9. Section 63(1) empowers the Commissioner to
examine the record and proceedings before the
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Committee of Management or the Executive
Officer for the purpose of satisfying himself as
to the correctness of the finding or order. He
may direct a further enquiry, require additional
evidence, or take additional evidence himself.
12.10. Section 65 applies the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure to proceedings under the Act,
subject to inconsistency with the Act. Section
66 also confers certain powers of a civil court
upon an officer conducting an enquiry under
the Act. Whether a revision proceeding under
Section 63 is itself an “enquiry” for the purpose
of Section 66 was not argued and need not be
decided. Section 63(1) itself is sufficient.
12.11. Therefore, the submission that the
Commissioner could not examine any factual
material cannot be accepted. He was entitled to
call for particulars and documents and seek
clarification from Respondent No.2, to the
extent necessary for determining the
correctness of the suspension order and the
interim application.
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12.12. The purpose and limits of that power
12.13. The power under Section 63 is not unrestricted.
The material may be examined only for the
purpose for which the power is conferred. The
order under revision is the suspension order
dated 17.06.2026 passed under Rule 17(4).
The relevant question is whether suspension
pending enquiry was “necessary in the interest
of the institution concerned.”
12.14. At the interim stage, the question before the
Commissioner was whether, on the material
available, the suspension should remain stayed
until the revision was decided. It was not
whether Respondent No.2 was guilty of the
alleged misconduct.
12.15. The determination of misconduct belongs to the
disciplinary process. Section 16(1) empowers
the Committee to initiate action and hold an
enquiry for misconduct and to impose an
appropriate penalty for proved misconduct.
Rule 17(2) requires the delinquent to be
informed in writing of the grounds on which
action is proposed and to be given an adequate
opportunity to defend himself. Rule 17(3)
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provides for the enquiry to be conducted by the
Committee or by an Enquiry Officer appointed
for that purpose.
12.16. Rule 33-B(6) also places Archakas under the
immediate control of the Executive Officer and
contemplates the Executive Officer placing
lapses before the Committee for action under
Section 16. The Commissioner is not part of
this disciplinary chain at this stage.
12.17. What the impugned order actually records
12.18. The allegation that the Commissioner
conducted an independent enquiry is not borne
out by Annexure-A. The order does not record
any independent investigation, any separate
clarification or affidavit obtained by the
Commissioner, or any direction to Respondent
No.2 to explain his whereabouts.
12.19. The impugned order also does not record a
finding that the Archaka was “not concerned”
with the CCTV or the hundi. That statement
appears in the reply of Respondent No.2 dated
26.01.2026 and in his submissions recorded in
Paragraph 7(b) of Annexure-A. The
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Commissioner does not record such a finding in
Paragraphs 13 to 17. The submission that the
Commissioner expressly pre-judged the enquiry
on that basis cannot, therefore, be accepted.
12.20. The observations regarding the temple
manual and duties of the Archaka
12.21. Paragraph 14 of Annexure-A states that the
temple manual does not show that the lock-seal
was removed in the presence of the Archaka
and refers to the Archaka’s attendance.
Paragraph 16 states that the authorised
Archaka must perform his duties personally and
that a substitute may be arranged only in
compelling circumstances and with the prior
permission of the Executive Officer. It further
refers to the Archaka being answerable for
misuse or loss of jewellery.
12.22. These observations, by themselves, do not
amount to a finding as to who removed the
cameras or whether Respondent No.2
participated in the incident. The Commissioner
did not record a finding of guilt. Therefore, the
contention that the disciplinary enquiry was
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conclusively decided against the Management
Committee cannot be accepted.
12.23. However, the above observations required
greater caution. The extract of the temple
manual referred to in Paragraph 13 concerns
the morning opening. The Committee’s case,
recorded in Paragraph 8(iii), is that the Archaka
was required to be present when the sanctum
and the navaranga were locked, unlocked and
sealed. The cameras were stated to have been
installed in the navaranga mantapa, as
recorded in Paragraph 7(b). The impugned
order does not address the evening closing, the
navaranga, or whether the practice followed in
the temple extended beyond what was
contained in the extracted portion of the
manual.
12.24. Further, the temple manual is not necessarily
the only source governing the duties of an
Archaka. Section 9(2) provides for the duties of
the Pradhana Archaka and Archakas as
specified by the Committee. Rule 14(1) refers
to the usage, custom and tradition of the
temple. Rule 14(2) requires Archakas to follow
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the directions of the Executive Officer and the
Chairman. Rule 14(5) permits the
Commissioner, after consultation with an
Agama Pandit, to add duties. Rule 33-B(6)
places Archakas under the immediate control of
the Executive Officer.
12.25. At the same time, the Rules assign specific
responsibilities to the Executive Officer,
including responsibility for the movable
properties including jewels under Rule 33-B(5),
receiving money under Rule 33-B(4), and the
smooth conduct of daily poojas under Rule 33-
B(1). These provisions form part of the
respective cases of the parties. This Court
cannot, at this stage, prefer one interpretation
over the other.
12.26. The attendance entry and alleged
substitution
12.27. Paragraph 14 refers to an attendance entry
dated 16.01.2026. The incident is stated to
have occurred on 11.01.2026, as recorded in
Paragraphs 11 and 12. The attendance entry,
as it presently appears, therefore does not
provide a basis for drawing any conclusion
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regarding the presence of Respondent No.2 on
11.01.2026. Whether the date is a
typographical or other error is a matter which
requires clarification.
12.28. Paragraph 16 also refers to the requirement
relating to substitution. Rule 15(3) provides
that an Archaka proceeding on leave must
arrange for a substitute and obtain the approval
of the Executive Officer or the Chairman. The
Committee had alleged that Respondent No.2
signed the attendance register while his brother
performed the duties, as recorded in
Paragraphs 8(i) and 12. Respondent No.2, on
the other hand, is stated to have contended
that he was present and left at about 1.30 p.m.
The versions are therefore disputed.
12.29. This Court does not determine which version is
correct. The issue whether there was an
unauthorised substitution and, if so, its
relevance to the disciplinary proceedings is for
the competent authority to determine after
following the prescribed procedure.
12.30. From the above it is clear that the
Commissioner was entitled under Section 63(1)
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to examine the factual material to the extent
necessary for deciding the correctness of the
suspension order and the application for interim
relief. The mere examination of such material
does not amount to conducting a disciplinary
enquiry.
12.31. The material placed before this Court does not
establish that the Commissioner conducted an
independent mini-enquiry or recorded a finding
that Respondent No.2 was not concerned with
the CCTV or the alleged theft. The contention
that the disciplinary enquiry was thereby pre-
judged is, to that extent, not made out from
Annexure-A.
12.32. However, the observations in Paragraphs 14
and 16 concerning the temple manual, the
Archaka’s duties and substitution were made
without considering the full statutory and
regulatory framework governing those duties,
including Section 9(2), Rules 14, 15(3) and 33-
B, and without adequately addressing the
Committee’s case. Such observations cannot
form the basis for a final conclusion on the
disputed allegations.
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12.33. Accordingly, this court answers point No. (iv) by
holding that the Commissioner was entitled to
examine the factual material for the limited
purpose of deciding the interim application, but
he was required to confine that exercise to a
prima facie assessment of whether suspension
was necessary in the interest of the institution
under Rule 17(4). He cannot, at the interim
stage, record findings on whether Respondent
No.2 violated any duty or participated in the
alleged incident. The disputed questions of fact
were to remain open for determination in the
disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law.
13. Answer to Point No. (v): Whether, having
regard to the pendency of the disciplinary
enquiry and criminal investigation, the order
permitting Respondent No.2 to resume his
duties as Archaka during the pendency of such
proceedings is sustainable in law?
13.1. Sri K.N. Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioner, submitted that Rule 17(4)
permits suspension pending enquiry where it is
necessary in the interest of the institution,
while Rule 17(5) provides for payment of fifty
per cent subsistence allowance. The allegations
against Respondent No.2 concern theft of
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temple property and are serious. His
continuation in office, according to the learned
Senior Counsel, may enable him to interfere
with the enquiry or influence witnesses. An
Archaka occupies a position of trust and
permitting a person facing such allegations to
perform pooja may also affect the confidence of
devotees.
13.2. It was further submitted that the impugned
order restores Respondent No.2 to duty while
the revision, disciplinary enquiry and Crime
No.0085/2026 are pending. It also sets aside
the temporary arrangement made under the
Official Memorandum dated 18.06.2026 without
imposing any condition. The persons appointed
under that Memorandum were not working in
the temple on the date of the incident, while
the other five persons suspended pursuant to
the same proceedings continue to remain under
suspension. The learned Senior Counsel further
submitted that if Respondent No.2 is arrested
while on duty, it may affect the reputation of
the temple. None of these aspects, according to
him, was considered by the Commissioner.
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13.3. Sri K.N. Phanindra relied upon Union of India
& Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal ,
Paragraphs 26 and 27, and submitted that the
question whether an employee should continue
in office during an enquiry is primarily for the
disciplinary authority. He contended that the
impugned order grants substantial relief
without adequate reasons and sought its
setting aside, continuation of the suspension
and continuation of the temporary
arrangement.
13.4. Sri Abhinav Ramanand, learned counsel for
Respondent No.2, submitted that, since the
Official Memorandum dated 18.08.2026,
Respondent No.2 has resumed duty and has
worked without any complaint. Relying upon
Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , Paragraphs 21 to
23, he submitted that suspension cannot be
arbitrary or vindictive and must be supported
by a strong prima facie case of grave
misconduct. According to him, the
Commissioner rightly corrected the action of
the Committee.
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13.5. The learned Additional Government Advocate
submitted that the criminal investigation is
continuing. The Investigating Officer has called
upon the Management Committee to produce
the DVR so that the recording may be
retrieved, and a report will be submitted upon
completion of the investigation.
13.6. Applicable legal position
13.7. Two distinct questions arise. First, whether the
mere pendency of a disciplinary enquiry or
criminal investigation requires an Archaka to
remain under suspension or, conversely,
permits him to resume duty. Secondly, whether
the particular order passed by the
Commissioner permitting Respondent No.2 to
resume duty is sustainable.
13.8. There is no provision in the Act or the Rules,
and no decision cited before this Court, which
creates an automatic rule either way.
13.9. Rule 17(4) provides the governing test:
suspension pending enquiry is permissible
where it is “necessary in the interest of the
institution concerned.” Therefore, the mere
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pendency of an enquiry or criminal
investigation does not, by itself, make
suspension necessary. Equally, such pendency
does not, by itself, establish that reinstatement
is safe.
13.10. Rule 17(5) is also relevant. It provides that
suspension may ordinarily continue for not
more than six months, within which the enquiry
is to be concluded, and permits continuation
beyond six months only with the permission of
the Commissioner. Thus, the Rules contemplate
both the need to avoid unnecessary
continuation of suspension and the need to
complete the enquiry within the prescribed
period.
13.11. The suspension commenced on 17.06.2026. Six
months from that date would expire on
17.12.2026, subject to Rule 17(5). Whether the
period during which the stay operated is to be
counted towards the said period was not
argued and is left open.
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13.12. Principles governing continuation of
suspension
13.13. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , Paragraph 21,
recognises that suspension should be
considered in the context of the seriousness of
the misconduct and the effect of the employee’s
continuance in office. The authority is required
to consider whether permitting the employee to
continue in office is likely to hamper or
frustrate the enquiry.
13.14. Paragraph 22 of the said decision also requires
consideration of the relevant circumstances,
including the effect of continuance in office.
Paragraph 23 recognises that the decision-
making process must take relevant material
into account.
13.15. These principles are relevant here. The
allegation against Respondent No.2 concerns
theft of temple property. Section 10-A(c) of the
Act, including its Explanation, treats theft as a
circumstance relevant to disqualification from
holding office as an Archaka. This indicates the
seriousness with which such conduct is
regarded under the statutory scheme. At the
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same time, the allegation remains an allegation
and no finding of guilt can be recorded at this
stage.
13.16. Paragraph 26 of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal
states that whether an employee should
continue in office during an enquiry is primarily
a matter for the disciplinary authority and that
courts ordinarily should not interfere with an
order of suspension unless the circumstances
warrant such interference.
13.17. The Commissioner is not a Court and, as held
under Point No. (ii), Section 63 confers
revisional jurisdiction upon him. Nevertheless,
the principle remains relevant: the initial
decision regarding the necessity of suspension
lies with the competent authority, and
interference with that decision requires reasons
based on the material before the Commissioner.
13.18. Application to the impugned order
13.19. The impugned order does not disclose a
reasoned consideration of the matters relevant
to continuation of suspension. For the reasons
already recorded under Point No. (iii), the
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Commissioner did not adequately consider the
principles governing interim relief or the
grounds on which the Committee had ordered
suspension.
13.20. For the reasons recorded under Point No. (iv),
the observations in Paragraphs 14 and 16 of
Annexure-A do not adequately address the
statutory and regulatory provisions governing
the duties of an Archaka.
13.21. In addition, the following matters were relevant
to the question whether Respondent No.2
should resume duty pending the disciplinary
enquiry and criminal investigation:
13.21.1. Pending criminal case: Respondent
No.2 is named as an accused in Crime
No.0085/2026 concerning the same
general set of events. This was a
relevant circumstance placed before the
Commissioner and is referred to in
Paragraph 8, last sub-paragraph, of
Annexure-A.
13.21.2. Continuing investigation: The
investigation had not concluded. The
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learned Additional Government Advocate
has stated that the Investigating Officer
had called upon the Management
Committee to produce the DVR so that
the recording could be retrieved. Thus,
an important piece of material remained
to be examined.
13.21.3. Risk to the enquiry: The Committee
had relied upon the fact that only six
persons, including Respondent No.2,
knew the location of the hidden cameras
and had alleged unauthorised
substitution of Respondent No.2 by his
brother. These matters were relevant to
the Committee’s apprehension regarding
continuation in office.
13.21.4. Absence of safeguards: The impugned
order restores Respondent No.2 to duty
but does not consider whether any
condition could adequately address the
apprehension of interference with the
disciplinary enquiry or criminal
investigation. This Court is not
prescribing what such condition should
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be. The omission is that the possibility of
safeguards was not considered.
13.21.5. Effect on the temporary
arrangement: The persons appointed
under the Official Memorandum dated
18.06.2026 were not working in the
temple on the date of the incident. This
was relevant to deciding whether the
temporary arrangement should continue
pending the revision. The impugned
order does not consider this aspect.
13.21.6. Respondent No.2’s own objection:
Paragraph 7(c) of Annexure-A records
his objection to the appointment of Sri
Anand Alwar on the ground that it was
contrary to the temple manual and
principles of natural justice. Paragraph
15 also records his grievance concerning
relatives performing pooja in his place.
These submissions also required
consideration before the temporary
arrangement was displaced.
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13.22. Subsequent conduct and different
treatment
13.23. Respondent No.2 is stated to have resumed
duty pursuant to the Official Memorandum
dated 18.08.2026 and to have worked without
complaint thereafter. This subsequent conduct,
by itself, cannot validate the impugned order.
The Memorandum was issued pursuant to the
interim order, and the principal concern raised
by the Petitioner is the possibility of
interference with the pending enquiry and
investigation. The absence of an intervening
incident for a short period does not, by itself,
answer that concern.
13.24. The fact that the other five persons continue
under suspension also does not, by itself,
establish illegality. Their individual roles may be
different and they are not stated to have
challenged their suspension. However, since the
same resolution suspended all six persons, the
Commissioner ought to have disclosed why the
circumstances of Respondent No.2 warranted a
different interim treatment.
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13.25. The question, therefore, is not merely whether
Respondent No.2 could be permitted to resume
duty during the pendency of the proceedings,
but whether such resumption was consistent
with the requirement under Rule 17(4) that
suspension may be continued where it is
necessary in the interest of the institution. On
the facts of the present case, that requirement
stood satisfied.
13.26. There is a serious allegation of theft of temple
property, including the theft of CCTV cameras.
It is also not clear, at this stage, whether any
other articles or property of the temple were
stolen. The allegation, therefore, cannot be
treated as an ordinary service lapse. It
concerns the security of the temple premises
and the protection of property belonging to the
temple and the Deity. The fact that the criminal
investigation was still pending and the relevant
CCTV material was yet to be examined made
the matter more serious. The disciplinary
enquiry arising from the same circumstances
was also pending.
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13.27. In these circumstances, permitting Respondent
No.2 to resume his duties before the
disciplinary enquiry and criminal investigation
had progressed to a meaningful stage was
fraught with institutional risks. His continued
presence in the temple could potentially affect
the preservation of relevant material, access to
the temple premises and records, the conduct
of the enquiry, or persons connected with the
proceedings. These considerations were
required to be assessed, particularly having
regard to the nature of the allegation and the
fact that the alleged theft itself concerned the
security apparatus of the temple. The pendency
of the proceedings could not, therefore, be
considered in isolation from the circumstances
in which the suspension was ordered.
13.28. The interest of the temple and the Deity is
paramount. A temple is not merely an ordinary
place of employment. Its property, premises,
records, rituals and administration are required
to be protected in a manner consistent with the
faith and trust reposed in the institution by
devotees. That faith and trust cannot be
compromised where an employee entrusted
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with duties in the temple is facing serious
allegations involving theft of temple property.
The Court is conscious that the allegations are
yet to be established and that no finding of
guilt can be recorded at this stage. However,
the absence of a finding of guilt does not mean
that the seriousness of the allegations can be
disregarded while deciding whether the
employee should continue to have access to
and perform duties within the temple during
the pendency of the proceedings.
13.29. The competing interest of Respondent No.2 also
requires consideration. However, that interest
does not outweigh the immediate institutional
necessity of protecting the temple, its property
and the integrity of the pending proceedings.
Rule 17(5) provides for payment of subsistence
allowance during suspension. Thus, the
hardship occasioned by suspension is not left
entirely unaddressed. In the present
circumstances, such hardship cannot justify
permitting Respondent No.2 to resume duties
when his continued exclusion from the temple
is necessary in the interest of the institution.
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13.30. There was, therefore, a clear and immediate
institutional necessity to continue the
suspension rather than permit Respondent No.2
to resume duty. The appropriate course was to
maintain the suspension and ensure that the
revision proceedings, disciplinary enquiry and
criminal investigation were proceeded with and
brought to their appropriate stage at the
earliest, without avoidable delay. Suspension is
not intended to become a punishment by itself,
and the disciplinary process must consequently
be pursued expeditiously. At the same time, the
institution cannot be required to compromise its
security, administration, property or the
confidence of its devotees merely because the
proceedings have not yet concluded.
13.31. The Commissioner was, therefore, not justified
in permitting Respondent No.2 to resume duty
in the circumstances prevailing at the relevant
time. The order permitting such resumption of
duty cannot be sustained. Respondent No.2
was required remain under suspension pending
the disciplinary enquiry and criminal
investigation, subject to any subsequent review
in accordance with law upon a material change
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in circumstances or upon the proceedings
reaching a stage where his resumption of duty
would no longer prejudice the interests of the
institution.
13.32. This conclusion is confined to the necessity of
continued suspension under Rule 17(4). It does
not amount to a finding that Respondent No.2
is guilty of theft or of any other misconduct.
The merits of the disciplinary allegations and
the criminal case shall be determined by the
competent authorities in accordance with law.
The limited conclusion is that, having regard to
the seriousness of the allegations, the theft of
CCTV equipment, the uncertainty regarding the
extent of the alleged loss of temple property,
the continuing criminal investigation and
disciplinary proceedings, the need to preserve
the integrity of those proceedings, and the
paramount interest of the temple and the Deity,
Respondent No.2 was required to remain under
suspension and ought not to have been
permitted to resume his duties at that stage.
13.33. This Court answers point No. (v) in favour of
the Petitioner-Management Committee of the
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temple. Having regard to the serious allegation
of theft of temple property, including the theft
of CCTV cameras, the fact that it is not clear
whether any other temple property was also
stolen, the pendency of the disciplinary enquiry
and criminal investigation, and the need to
protect the temple, its property and the
integrity of the pending proceedings,
Respondent No.2 was required to remain under
suspension in the interest of the institution
under Rule 17(4). The interest of the temple
and the Deity, as well as the faith and trust of
the devotees, could not be compromised by
permitting Respondent No.2 to resume his
duties while such serious allegations remained
under investigation. The order permitting
Respondent No.2 to resume duty is, therefore,
unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. The
disciplinary enquiry and criminal investigation
shall be proceeded with and brought to their
appropriate stage at the earliest, without
avoidable delay.
13.34. This finding is confined to the necessity of
continuing the suspension under Rule 17(4) at
the relevant stage. It shall not be construed as
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a finding of guilt against Respondent No.2 in
respect of the disciplinary allegations or the
criminal case, which shall be determined by the
competent authorities in accordance with law.
14. Answer to Point No. (vi): What order?
14.1. In view of the above findings on points No. (i)
to (v), this Court passes the following order:
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is allowed .
(ii) The order dated 12.08.2026 passed by
Respondent No.1 on the interlocutory
application in Revision Petition No.3/2026-27 is
quashed .
(iii) Consequently, the suspension order dated
17.06.2026 and the Official Memorandum dated
18.06.2026, insofar as they relate to
Respondent No.2, shall stand restored .
(iv) Respondent No.2 shall remain under suspension
pending disposal of Revision Petition
No.3/2026-27. The Official Memorandum dated
18.08.2026 permitting Respondent No.2 to
resume duty shall cease to operate.
(v) Respondent No.1 shall proceed to hear and
decide Revision Petition No.3/2026-27 on its
merits, after affording the Petitioner and
Respondent No.2 an opportunity of being
heard. The revision shall be decided in
accordance with law and by a reasoned order,
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uninfluenced by any observations in this
judgment concerning the merits of the
disciplinary allegations or Crime No.0085/2026.
(vi) Respondent No.1 may, while deciding the
revision petition, call for and consider such
further material as may be permissible under
Section 63(1) of the Act.
(vii) During the period of suspension, Respondent
No.2 shall be entitled to subsistence allowance
in accordance with Rule 17(5) of the Karnataka
Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable
Endowments Rules, 2002. He shall not interfere
with the day-to-day functioning or
administration of the temple and shall
cooperate with any enquiry conducted in
accordance with law.
(viii) All contentions of the parties on the merits of
Revision Petition No.3/2026-27, the validity of
the suspension, and the allegations against
Respondent No.2 are left open. The
observations made in this judgment are
confined to the adjudication of the present writ
petition.
(ix) The General Directions issued by this Court in
Rajesh Nayak v. The Commissioner [W.P
No. 6653 of 2025 dated 29.08.2026], insofar as
they are applicable to the affairs and
administration of the Temple(s) in the present
case, shall be complied with by the
Commissioner of the Hindu Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments
Department, Principal Secretary to
Government, Revenue Department, and the
Principal Secretary to Government, e-
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Governance Department, within 4 weeks from
the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
(x) For the limited purpose of monitoring
compliance with the General Directions in
respect of the temples concerned in the present
matter, the matter shall be relisted on
24.11.2026 .
(xi) The Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate a
copy of this order, along with a copy of W.P No.
6653 of 2025, to the Commissioner of the
Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable
Endowments Department, Principal Secretary to
Government, Revenue Department and the
Principal Secretary to Government, e-
Governance Department, for information and
compliance. Learned AGA is also directed to
inform them about this Order.
(xii) All pending interlocutory applications, if any,
stand disposed of.
(xiii) After the order was pronounced, learned
counsel for Respondent No.2 submits that there
is no sitting which has been held of the
Commissioner of Hindu Religious Institutions
and Charitable Endowments Department for
almost six months and only matters where
directions have been issued by the Court are
taken up and the regular matters are not taken
up for hearing. The same is of grave
importance inasmuch as the aspects relating to
the administration of temples and religious
institutions are required to be considered in an
expeditious manner so that the administration
is not unnecessarily or unduly affected or
prolonged.
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(xiv) The Principal Secretary, Revenue Department,
as also the Commissioner of Hindu Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments
Department, are directed to look into this
aspect and set up an appropriate system
designating a particular day in a particular week
for the purpose of considering all quasi-judicial
matters.
(xv) Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits
that neither the daily cause list nor the orders
are web-hosted. The Principal Secretary,
Revenue Department is requested to look into
the same and implement the same system as
that implemented in RCCMS by him for the
Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable
Endowments Department.
This Court has been assisted by Ms. Harshada R.B, Law
Clerk, in reviewing this judgement.
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
15/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru
Verified
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE
KTY
List No.: 3 Sl No.: 2