Alka Pahuja vs The Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi & Ors

$~19, 21 & 22
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
nd
Date of Decision: 22 July, 2026
+ W.P.(C) 5885/2013
ALKA PAHUJA .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Gurpreet Kaur, Mr. Atif, Mr.
Keshav Maheshwari and Mr. Sachin
Yadav, Advocates.

versus

DELHI SIKH GURUDWARA MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
.....Respondent

Through: Ms. Avni Singh, Panel Counsel
(GNCTD) with Mr. Vaibhav Sharma,
Advocate.
21
+ W.P.(C) 465/2017
ALKA PAHUJA .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Gurpreet Kaur, Mr. Atif, Mr.
Keshav Maheshwari and Mr. Sachin
Yadav, Advocates.

versus

THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Gaurav Kumar Pandey, Advocate
for R-1.
22
+ W.P.(C) 8091/2017
ALKA PAHUJA .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Gurpreet Kaur, Mr. Atif, Mr.
Keshav Maheshwari and Mr. Sachin
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Signing Date:27.07.2026
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Yadav, Advocates.
versus

THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR. .....Respondents

Through: Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, SC, GNCTD
with Mr. N. K. Singh, Ms. Aliza
Alam and Mr. Mohnish Sehrawat,
Advocates for R-1.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral):
1. These petitions, filed by the same Petitioner, arise from a common
factual matrix. They raise inter-related questions concerning the minority
status of Sukho Khalsa Senior Secondary School [“ the School ”], the
selection of its Principal, and the scope of authority of the Directorate of
Education [“ DoE ”] in relation to that process. They are, therefore, being
decided by this common judgment.
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2. In W.P.(C) 5885/2013, the Petitioner assails the order dated 29 May,
2013, passed by the National Commission for Minority Educational
Institutions [“ NCMEI ”], declaring the School to be a minority educational
institution within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the National Commission
for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004 [“ the NCMEI Act ”].
3. W.P.(C) 465/2017 challenges the proceedings of the Departmental
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Promotion Committee [“ DPC ”] held on 5 March, 2016, and the
consequential appointment of Ms. Gurbachan Kaur Thapar as Principal of
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the School. The Petitioner also seeks implementation of the order dated 6
September, 2016 passed by the DoE, whereby Ms. Thapar’s selection was
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not accepted and the School was advised to convene a fresh DPC.
4. In W.P.(C) 8091/2017, the Petitioner challenges the subsequent
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communication dated 1 August, 2017, whereby the DoE approved the
appointment of Ms. Thapar as Principal, while permitting the School to
forward the file for fixation of her salary.
Factual background
5. The record indicates that the School traces its origin to the Khalsa
School established at Sukho, in the erstwhile Rawalpindi District. Following
Partition, persons associated with that institution resolved in 1955-56 to
revive it in Delhi as Sukho Khalsa School. The School was recognised and
brought within the grant-in-aid regime in 1956. Owing to financial
difficulties, its management was subsequently taken over by the Gurdwara
Prabandhak Committee in 1962. The School has since remained under the
administration of bodies representing the Sikh community and is presently
managed by the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee [“ DSGMC ”].
6. The Petitioner joined the School as TGT in 1992 and was promoted as
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PGT (English) with effect from 24 May, 2001. She was subsequently
promoted as Vice Principal. Ms. Thapar joined the School as PGT (Hindi) in
2003. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner was senior to Ms. Thapar.
7. The post of Principal remained vacant for a considerable period. In
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that regard, a DPC was convened on 5 March, 2016. Six representatives of
the Management and two nominees of the DoE attended that meeting. The
Petitioner was placed at Serial No. 1 in the seniority list, her husband at
Serial No. 2, and Ms. Thapar at Serial No. 3.
8. During the DPC proceedings, the nominees of the DoE noticed that
the self-assessment portions of the Annual Confidential Reports [“ ACRs ”] of
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the first two candidates had not been completed for certain years. The
Petitioner maintained that the relevant forms had not been supplied to her,
whereas the Management asserted that she had declined to complete them.
The DoE nominees considered that the rival versions required verification
and suggested that the meeting be deferred. The representatives of the
Management, however, proceeded with the assessment and recommended
Ms. Thapar by a majority of six to two. The Managing Committee accepted
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that recommendation on 7 March, 2016, and resolved to issue an
appointment letter to Ms. Thapar for the post of Principal of the School.
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9. However, by its communication dated 17 March, 2016, the DoE
directed the School to await the approval of the competent authority. It
further directed that, until such approval was granted, no official
correspondence be issued under the signature of Ms. Thapar. The School
challenged the said communication in W.P.(C) 3235/2016.
10. During pendency of W.P.(C) 3235/2016, the DoE, by an order dated
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6 September, 2016, declined to accept the appointment of Ms. Thapar. The
order proceeded principally on the ground that the Petitioner was the senior-
most eligible candidate, the DoE nominees had advised deferment of the
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DPC, and an Office Memorandum dated 8 February, 2002 did not permit
supersession in matters of promotion. The School was, accordingly, advised
convening a fresh DPC.
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11. By order dated 8 September, 2016, W.P.(C) 3235/2016 came to be
allowed by this Court. It was held that the DoE nominees did not possess a
veto over the recommendation of the Selection Committee and that, once
Ms. Thapar had been selected by a majority and the recommendation had
been accepted by the Managing Committee, nothing remained for the DoE
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to do except process the consequential fixation of her pay.
12. The Petitioner’s application for impleadment in the aforesaid
proceedings was declined. She thereafter preferred LPA 557/2016. By an
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order dated 11 November, 2016, the Division Bench of this Court disposed
of the appeal, leaving it open to the Petitioner to work out the appropriate
remedy available under law for redressal of her grievance. It further directed
that any such proceedings be considered and decided without being
influenced by any of the findings recorded or observations made in the order
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dated 8 September, 2016.
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13. Separately, the School also challenged the DoE’s order dated 6
September, 2016 by filing W.P.(C) 1214/2017. During the pendency of that
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petition, the DoE issued the communication dated 1 August, 2017,
approving the appointment of Ms. Thapar. In those circumstances, the
petition was disposed of as infructuous.
Submissions
14. Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the School was established by
an independent educational society and not by the DSGMC. It is stated that
the subsequent takeover of its management could not confer minority
character upon an institution which was not established by the minority
community. It is further contended that the minority status was sought only
to defeat the Petitioner’s legitimate promotional rights. Further, the
DSGMC, not being the society which established the School, was not
competent to seek minority status in its own name, and the declaration was
obtained by misrepresentation before the NCMEI. The rejection of the
Petitioner’s application for impleadment before the NCMEI is also assailed.
15. On the selection of the Principal, it is submitted that the Petitioner
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was the senior-most eligible candidate and had served as Vice Principal of
the School. It is contended that Ms. Thapar did not fulfil the prescribed
eligibility requirements for promotion and that the DPC ought not to have
proceeded when the DoE nominees had advised deferment for verification
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of the ACRs. Reliance is placed upon the Office Memorandum dated 8
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February, 2002, as well as the order dated 6 September, 2016 passed by the
DoE declining to accept the selection and advising the School to convene a
fresh DPC. Further, the said order was not brought to the notice of this Court
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when W.P.(C) 3235/2016 was decided on 8 September, 2016. The past
disputes between the Petitioner and the Management, including the
complaint made by her against the then Chairman of the School, are relied
upon to contend that her supersession was actuated by mala fides .
16. Counsel for the School and the DSGMC submit that the School is a
minority educational institution established and administered by members of
the Sikh community and has rightly been granted minority status by the
NCMEI. The subsequent takeover of the management of the School by the
DSGMC did not alter its minority character, but merely ensured continuity
of its administration by members of the same minority community. Reliance
is placed upon Article 30 of the Constitution to contend that minority
educational institutions are entitled to establish and administer institutions of
their choice. The Petitioner, having no legal right affected by the declaration
of minority status, lacked locus to challenge the order of the NCMEI and
was rightly denied impleadment before the Commission.
17. On the appointment of the Principal, it is submitted that the post is a
selection post and not one governed solely by seniority. Seniority merely
confers eligibility for consideration and does not create an enforceable right
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to promotion. It is contended that the DPC was duly constituted in
accordance with Rule 96 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 [“ DSE
Rules ”] and that the DoE nominees participated in the proceedings only in
an advisory capacity, without possessing any veto over the decision of the
Selection Committee. It is further submitted that, being an aided minority
educational institution, the School was not required to obtain DoE’s prior
approval under Rule 98 of the DSE Rules before appointing its Principal.
The recommendation of the DPC having been approved by the Managing
Committee by majority, the appointment of Ms. Thapar stood concluded. It
is further contended that Ms. Thapar was selected on account of her merit,
administrative experience and suitability to head a minority educational
institution, and not merely because she belonged to the Sikh community.
The allegations of mala fides and victimisation are denied.
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18. On behalf of the DoE, it is submitted that the communication dated 1
August, 2017, which approved the promotion of Ms. Thapar, was issued in
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compliance with this Court’s order dated 8 September, 2016. Further, upon
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issuance of that communication, the earlier order dated 6 September, 2016
no longer survived and stood superseded, with the result that no independent
relief could be founded upon that order thereafter.
Issues for Determination
19. The following issues arise for determination:
a. Whether any ground is made out for interference with the order dated
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29 May, 2013, passed by the NCMEI, declaring the School to be a minority
educational institution.
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b. Whether the DPC proceedings held on 5 March, 2016 and the
appointment of Ms. Thapar as Principal are liable to be interfered with on
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the ground that the selection was contrary to the applicable statutory
framework, or was otherwise arbitrary, unfair or vitiated by mala fides .
c. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to enforcement of the DoE’s order
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dated 6 September, 2016, or to quashing of the subsequent communication
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dated 1 August, 2017.
Analysis
Minority Status of the School
20. Before examining the challenge on merits, it is necessary to consider
whether the Petitioner ought to have pursued a remedy under the NCMEI
Act. Section 11(f) of the Act vests NCMEI with the power to decide all
questions relating to the minority status of an educational institution and to
declare such status. Sections 12A and 12B provide appeals to NCMEI
against specified orders passed by the competent authority, i.e., refusal of a
no objection certificate and rejection of an application for grant of minority
status. Neither provision, however, creates an appeal against an order by
which NCMEI itself has granted minority status. The NCMEI Act also does
not confer upon NCMEI a general power to review its final determination.
21. Section 12C of the NCMEI Act empowers the Commission to cancel
minority status granted either by an authority or by NCMEI. That power is
attracted where the constitution, aims and objects of the institution have
subsequently been altered so as to efface its minority character, or where the
institution has failed to admit students belonging to the minority community
in the prescribed proportion. The Petitioner’s challenge rests on a different
foundation. Her case is that the School was not established by the Sikh
minority and was, therefore, ineligible to be declared a minority educational
institution at its inception. Such a challenge is not founded on either of the
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circumstances contemplated by Section 12C. This position also finds
support in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Harshpal
1
Singh Negi v. St Marys School Safdarjung Enclave & Ors. .
22. Section 12F of the NCMEI Act, while excluding the jurisdiction of
other courts in respect of orders passed under Chapter IV thereof, expressly
preserves the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Viewed in the context of the
statutory scheme discussed above, the present petition cannot be declined on
the ground that an appellate or other equally efficacious statutory remedy
was available to the Petitioner. The order passed by the NCMEI is amenable
to judicial review.
23. The scope of such review must, nevertheless, remain within settled
limits. This Court does not sit in appeal over NCMEI’s determination or
undertake a fresh adjudication of the minority character of the institution.
Interference would be warranted only where NCMEI has acted without
jurisdiction, disregarded material bearing upon the statutory requirements,
proceeded upon an erroneous understanding of law, violated the
requirements of procedural fairness, or reached a conclusion unsupported by
the record.
24. The application before NCMEI was instituted on behalf of the School
by the DSGMC on the assertion that the institution had been established and
was being administered by members of the Sikh community. In support of
that claim, affidavits of the Chairman of the School and another office
bearer were placed on record. NCMEI also verified the original certificate of
affiliation issued by the Central Board of Secondary Education and the

1 nd
LPA 49/2025, decided on 22 January, 2025.
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certificate of registration of the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. Upon
noting that the record so produced remained unrebutted, NCMEI, vide order
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dated 29 May, 2013, declared the School to be a minority educational
institution within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the NCMEI Act.
25. The record placed before this Court provides a fuller context and
supports the conclusion reached by NCMEI. This is not a case where an
institution of unrelated or indeterminate origin was subsequently taken over
by a minority body. The School established in Delhi traces its lineage to the
Khalsa School at Sukho, in the erstwhile Rawalpindi District. The School
magazine records that, following Partition, former members and persons
closely associated with that institution met in Delhi in 1955-56 and resolved
to revive it under the name “ Sukho Khalsa School ”. The choice of that name
was deliberate and preserved its association with the earlier Khalsa
institution. The School was recognised and admitted to grant-in-aid with
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effect from 1 May, 1956.
26. The record further shows that, when the School encountered serious
financial constraints, its management approached the Gurdwara Prabandhak
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Committee. By a resolution dated 17 December, 1962, the Committee
assumed management of the School and responsibility for its expenditure.
The transfer of management did not impart a new or unrelated character to
the institution. Rather, the administration of an existing Sikh educational
institution passed to another body representing the same community.
27. Article 30(1) of the Constitution protects the right of a religious or
linguistic minority to “ establish and administer educational institutions of
their choice ”. The constitutional inquiry is one of substance. The Court must
ascertain whether the institution owes its establishment to the minority
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community and continues to be administered by that community. Article
30(1) does not make the perpetual continuance of the original managing
society, in the same juridical form, an indispensable condition for retaining
minority character. A change in the agency through which the community
administers the institution does not, by itself, efface its origin or institutional
identity.
28. Nor do the receipt of governmental aid or the admission of students
belonging to other communities detract from that character. Receipt of aid
subjects the institution to permissible regulatory measures concerning
educational standards, qualifications, service conditions and the proper
utilisation of public funds. It does not divest the minority community of its
2
constitutional right to administer the institution. Equally, the certificate
issued by the NCMEI does not create minority status from the date of its
issuance; it merely recognises a status which inheres in the establishment
and administration of the institution. The declaration is only a recognition of
an existing factual and legal position, which necessarily existed antecedent
3
to such declaration.
29. The objection founded upon the earlier application filed by DSGMC
in 2008 also does not persuade this Court to interfere. The earlier
proceedings had been adjourned sine die in view of the pendency of
connected proceedings before this Court. NCMEI, later, noted that the
earlier petition, registered as Case No. 874/2008, was not in the format
prescribed by it, whereas the subsequent petition, registered as Case No.
2008/2011, was in the prescribed format. The earlier proceedings did not

2
See: Secy., Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 386.
3
See also: N. Ammad v. Manager, Emjay High School & Ors. (1998) 6 SCC 674.
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culminate in any final adjudication on the School’s claim for minority status.
NCMEI expressly directed that the record of Case No. 874/2008 be tagged
with the record of the later proceedings. The subsequent consideration was,
therefore, neither a review of a concluded adjudication nor an attempt to
reopen an issue that had attained finality.
30. The rejection of the Petitioner’s application for impleadment likewise
calls for no interference. The Petitioner’s interest arose from the possible
effect of the declaration of minority status upon her service and promotional
claims. That interest, though sufficient to explain her concern, did not make
her a necessary party to the adjudication of the constitutional character of
the institution. The question before NCMEI could be effectively determined
between the School and the concerned governmental authority. In any event,
the Petitioner has been heard at length in the present proceedings, and the
record relied upon by her has been duly considered. No prejudice, therefore,
survives on account of her non-impleadment before NCMEI.
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31. For the foregoing reasons, the order dated 29 May, 2013 passed by
NCMEI does not disclose any jurisdictional error, perversity or failure to
consider a material circumstance warranting interference under Article 226
of the Constitution.
Selection and Appointment of the Principal
32. The Recruitment Rules governing the post of Principal unequivocally
classify it as a “ selection ” post. While promotion is prescribed as the
primary mode of appointment, with direct recruitment contemplated only in
its absence, the feeder cadre comprises Vice Principals and PGTs possessing
the requisite qualifications and experience. The identification of a feeder
cadre merely delineates the pool from which eligible candidates may be
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considered; it does not dilute the character of the post as one to be filled on
the basis of selection, nor does it render seniority the determinative criterion.
33. Seniority entitled the Petitioner to be considered for promotion; it did
not vest her with a right to appointment. In a selection post, the appointing
authority is entitled to assess the comparative merit and suitability of the
eligible candidates. Factors such as administrative competence, leadership
qualities, institutional vision and the ability to advance the educational
objectives of the School constitute legitimate and relevant considerations in
determining the most suitable candidate to occupy the position of Principal.
34. As explained by the Supreme Court in Secy., Malankara Syrian
4
Catholic College v. T. Jose & Ors. , the freedom of a minority educational
institution to choose the person to be appointed as its Principal has always
been recognised as a vital facet of its right to administer the institution.
While the State may prescribe the qualifications and conditions of service
for the post, and regulate service conditions to ensure educational standards
and prevent maladministration, it cannot interfere with the management’s
choice of the person to head the institution, so long as the prescribed
qualifications are satisfied.
35. This autonomy is, however, not inconsistent with the requirement of
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fairness in the selection process. In Ivy C. da Conceicao v. State of Goa ,
the Supreme Court held that while a minority educational institution is free
to select and appoint a Principal without being bound by seniority alone, its
exercise of choice must be fair, non-discriminatory and rational. The power
of judicial review extends to examining whether the appointment has been

4
(2007) 1 SCC 386.
5
(2017) 3 SCC 619.
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made fairly and reasonably, and whether an eligible candidate has been
denied a fair procedure.
36. Thus, comparative assessment for the post of Principal is not a
mechanical exercise. Administrative ability, leadership, discipline,
institutional vision and suitability to further the School’s educational
character cannot be reduced to arithmetical measurement. The Selection
Committee must, therefore, enjoy a legitimate area of evaluative judgment.
That discretion, however, must be structured by relevant record, criteria
rationally connected with the office, and fair consideration of every eligible
candidate. Judicial review under Article 226 is confined to examining the
legality of the procedure, the relevance of the considerations taken into
account, the existence of record supporting the decision, and the absence of
arbitrariness, discrimination or mala fides . It does not extend to re-weighing
the comparative merit of competing candidates.
37. Tested on these principles, the selection cannot be invalidated merely
because the Petitioner was senior to Ms. Thapar. Seniority entitled the
Petitioner to fair consideration; it did not entitle her to appointment as of
right. The record shows that she fell within the zone of consideration, was
called before the Selection Committee when the endorsement in the
seniority list became contentious, and was afforded an opportunity to record
her objection. The dispute regarding the incomplete ACRs, together with the
rival explanations advanced by the Petitioner and the Management, was also
noted in the proceedings.
38. The DoE nominees considered verification of those facts necessary
and advised deferment of the meeting. Their advice deserved due
consideration, particularly because responsibility for the incomplete ACRs
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was disputed, but it was not binding upon the Management. Rule 96(3A) of
the DSE Rules provides that the Director’s nominees in the Selection
Committee of an aided minority school act only as “advisers ” and neither
possess the power to vote nor actually control the selection. Rule 96(3B)
further permits the Managing Committee to nominate additional members to
the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee was, therefore, not
precluded from proceeding merely because the DoE nominees favoured
deferment.
39. The proceedings do not show that the Petitioner was declared
ineligible or excluded from consideration because of the controversy
surrounding the incomplete ACRs. The Selection Committee considered all
eligible candidates and recorded reasons for preferring Ms. Thapar,
including her administrative experience, handling of discipline and school
affairs, service record, academic record and overall suitability to lead the
institution.
40. Some of the reasons recorded by the Selection Committee, viewed in
isolation, may carry limited comparative value. Ms. Thapar’s belonging to
the Sikh community could not distinguish her from the Petitioner, who also
belongs to that community. Nor would broad observations regarding
academic record or compatibility with the institution, without supporting
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material, suffice by themselves. The minutes of the DPC meeting dated 5
March, 2026, however, show that the seniority list, ACRs, work and conduct
reports, academic records, performance and track record of all eligible
candidates were placed before the Selection Committee. The Committee
regarded Ms. Thapar’s administrative experience and her handling of school
affairs and discipline as particularly relevant to the office of Principal. These
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were germane considerations. Since the Recruitment Rules prescribe no
marks, comparative chart or fixed criteria for assessing suitability, the
absence of such tabulation does not, by itself, render the selection arbitrary.
41. The Court cannot determine whether the Petitioner’s seniority,
experience or academic record deserved greater weight than the
considerations which commended Ms. Thapar to the Selection Committee;
that would amount to undertaking the selection afresh. Judicial review is
confined to examining whether the decision rested on relevant record,
followed a fair procedure, and was free from illegality, irrationality,
discrimination or mala fides .
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42. The Office Memorandum dated 8 February, 2002, relied upon by the
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Petitioner and in the DoE’s order dated 6 September, 2016, does not alter
this position. It cannot be construed as eliminating the element of
comparative assessment or as making seniority alone determinative of
appointment to every selection post. Even if applicable to the School, it
cannot override the Recruitment Rules, Rule 96 of the DSE Rules governing
aided minority schools, or the protection afforded by Article 30(1) of the
Constitution in relation to the choice of the Head of the institution.
43. The Petitioner has also relied upon her earlier disputes with the
Management, the complaint made against the then Chairman of the School,
and the disciplinary proceedings, to contend that the impugned selection was
actuated by mala fides . These circumstances warranted careful scrutiny, but
do not, by themselves, vitiate the selection. Allegations of mala fides must
be supported by clear, cogent and specific material. The decision was taken
by a Selection Committee comprising several members, and the allegations
concerning the former Chairman or earlier decisions of the Management do
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not establish that those who supported the recommendation of Ms. Thapar
acted in concert for an extraneous purpose. A history of strained relations
cannot substitute proof that the impugned decision was taken for a collateral
or oblique purpose.
44. On the overall record, the Petitioner received fair consideration. Her
candidature was not ignored, nor was she excluded because of the
controversy regarding the incomplete ACRs. The Selection Committee
preferred another eligible candidate on considerations relevant to the office
of Principal. The Petitioner has failed to establish that the selection was a
pretence, rested on demonstrably irrelevant or false considerations, or was
otherwise arbitrary, discriminatory or vitiated by mala fides . No ground is,
therefore, made out to interfere with the impugned selection.
Validity and Effect of the Orders passed by the DoE
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45. The order dated 6 September, 2016 proceeded on two principal
assumptions: first, that the senior-most eligible candidate could not be
superseded; and secondly, that the objection raised by the DoE nominees
entitled it to withhold acceptance of the selection. Neither assumption
accords with the applicable legal position.
46. The second proviso to Rule 98(2) of the DSE Rules excludes an aided
minority school from the requirement of obtaining the Director’s approval
for an appointment. Read together with Rule 96(3A), these provisions make
it clear that the Director’s nominees act only in an advisory capacity and
neither possess the power to vote nor actually control the selection. The
Director cannot, therefore, exercise a veto over the Selection Committee’s
assessment of the comparative suitability of eligible candidates.
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47. The communication dated 1 August, 2017 represents the final
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Digitally Signed
By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
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decision of the DoE in relation to the selection. By that communication, the
DoE approved the appointment of Ms. Thapar and permitted the
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consequential fixation of her pay. The earlier order dated 6 September,
2016 consequently stood superseded and ceased to have operative effect. A
writ of mandamus cannot be issued to enforce an administrative decision
which has itself been withdrawn or superseded by the competent authority
upon reconsideration of the governing legal position.
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48. The order dated 11 November, 2016, passed by the Division Bench
of this Court in LPA 557/2016, does not lead to a different conclusion. It
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neither set aside the order dated 8 September, 2016 passed in W.P.(C)
3235/2016 nor suspended its operation inter se the School and the DoE. It
merely left it open to the Petitioner to work out the appropriate remedy
available under law for redressal of her grievance and directed that any such
proceedings be considered and decided without being influenced by any of
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the findings recorded or observations made in the order dated 8 September,
2016. That exercise has now been undertaken in the present proceedings.
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49. The Petitioner’s contention that the order dated 6 September, 2016
was not brought to the notice of this Court when W.P.(C) 3235/2016 was
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decided on 8 September, 2016 likewise does not warrant further
examination in these proceedings. The legality of the selection has been
independently examined on the entire record before this Court, including the
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order dated 6 September, 2016, the proceedings of the DPC, and the
Petitioner’s objections.
Conclusion
50. For the reasons recorded above, no ground is made out to interfere
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with the order dated 29 May, 2013 passed by the NCMEI, the proceedings
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Digitally Signed
By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
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of the Selection Committee held on 5 March, 2016 and the consequential
st
appointment of Ms. Thapar as Principal, or with the communication dated 1
August, 2017 issued by the DoE.
51. Consequently, W.P.(C) 5885/2013, W.P.(C) 465/2017 and W.P.(C)
8091/2017 are dismissed. Any pending applications also stand disposed of.




SANJEEV NARULA, J
JULY 22, 2026
hc
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W.P.(C) 5885/2013 & other connected matters Page 19 of 19
Digitally Signed
By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
19:53:24