STATE OF HP vs HARISH KUMAR

Court
High Court of Himachal Pradesh

( 2026:HHC:50191 )
High Court of H.P.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Appeal No. : 4100 of 2013
Reserved on : 16.10.2026
Decided on : 20.11.2026
Uploaded on : 20.11.2026
State of Himachal Pradesh
.…Appellant.

Versus

Harish Kumar
…Respondent.

Coram

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhupesh Sharma, Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes


For the appellant : Mr. Raj Negi, Deputy Advocate
General.

For the respondent : Mr. Devender K. Sharma,
Advocate.


Bhupesh Sharma, Judge
The State of Himachal Pradesh is in appeal
against the judgment of acquittal dated 28.03.2013,
passed by the learned Special Judge, Mandi, District
Mandi, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 47 of 2009, titled as
‘State of H.P. vs. Harish Kumar’ , whereby respondent

1
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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(hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’) has been
acquitted for the commission of the offences punishable
under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (for short
‘IPC’), Section 3(1)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and
Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
2. The accused was sent to face trial for the
commission of offences punishable under Section 376 of
the IPC, Section 3(1)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989 and
Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, by
SHO Police Station Balh, District Mandi, H.P., in case
FIR No. 310 of 2008, dated 16.09.2008, under Section
376 of the IPC, Section 3(2) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and
Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The
accused was prosecuted for the said offences and was
subsequently acquitted by learned Special Judge,
Mandi, H.P., vide impugned judgment
of acquittal dated 28.03.2013, passed in Sessions Trial
No. 47 of 2009, titled as ‘State of H.P. Vs. Harish Kumar’.
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3. The case of the prosecution as set out against
the accused, in brief, is as under:
3(a). The accused during the years from 2004 to
2006 forcibly and repeatedly established physical
relations with Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ at his house
situated in village Dadour, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi,
H.P. and also in Room No. 204 of Hotel Shringar at
Sauli-Khad Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. The accused
clandestinely recorded the intimate acts without the
consent and permission of the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’
during the intervening period and later circulated the
same in electronic form. The accused indulged in the
aforesaid acts deliberately and knowingly that the
Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ belonged to the Scheduled Caste
(Lohar).
3(b). As per allegations, Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ runs
a ‘Manyari Shop’ (Variety Store) at Kummi Chowk.
During the period 2004-2006, the accused was posted as
Teacher (JBT) at Govt. Primary School, Kummi, District
Mandi, H.P. They met each other in the year 2004, and
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later developed acquaintance. The accused during the
years 2004-2006 repeatedly established physical
relations with Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ without her consent
and against her wishes. He violated her privacy on
various occasions at various places and also
clandestinely recorded the intimate acts without her
consent and permission and later circulated the same in
electronic form.
3(c). In the year 2008, the accused circulated and
transmitted video recording containing sexual explicit
acts in electronic form by way of MMS. The
Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ came to know about this fact and
on 16.09.2008, she reported the matter to the police and
case FIR No. 310 of 2008, dated 16.09.2008, under
Section 376 of the IPC, Section 3(2) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act,1989, was registered against the accused at Police
Station Balh, District Mandi, H.P. Pursuant to the filing
of a complaint and registration of case FIR No. 310 of
2008, dated 16.09.2008, the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ was
sent for medical examination at CHC Ratti (Balh),
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District Mandi, H.P. The accused was arrested on
20.09.2008.
3(d). The accused during the course of investigation
on the basis of his disclosure statement under Section
27 of the Evidence Act got the various places identified
where the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ was subjected to
forcible sexual intercourse during the intervening period
w.e.f. 2004 to 2006. The Investigating Officer during the
course of investigation took into possession the caste
certificate of Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’.
3(e). The police on the basis of detailed investigation
found the accused for being involved in sexually abusing
and violating privacy of Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ during the
period w.e.f. 2004 to 2006 at various places knowingly
that she is a member of Scheduled Caste (Lohar). It was
also found that the accused had clandestinely recorded
the intimate acts without the consent and permission of
Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ and later circulated the same in
General Public by electronic means. Accordingly, he was
challaned for the commission of the offences punishable
under Section 376 of the IPC, Section 3(2) of the
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Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act,1989 and Section 67 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000.
4. Learned Special Judge, Mandi, District Mandi,
H.P. after considering oral and documentary evidence
led by the prosecution acquitted the accused for the
commission of the offences punishable under Section
376 of the IPC, Section 3(i)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act,
2000, vide judgment of acquittal dated 28.03.2013,
passed in Sessions Trial No. 47 of 2009, tilted as ‘ State of
H.P. Vs. Harish Kumar’.
5 . Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the
judgment of acquittal dated 28.03.2013, passed in
Sessions Trial No. 47 of 2009, titled as ‘ State of Himachal
Pradesh vs. Harish Kumar’ , the State of Himachal
Pradesh is in appeal before this Court.
6. GROUNDS OF APPEAL
(i) The impugned judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court is wrong on facts as
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well as on law, hence liable to be set aside.


(ii) The impugned judgment is based on
hypothetical reasoning surmises and
conjectures, hence liable to be set aside.

(iii) The Trial Court has appreciated the
evidence on record in a slip-shod and
perfunctory manner and has acquitted the
accused person on the flimsy grounds.
.
(iv) The Trial Court has not only failed to
view the prosecution evidence in its proper
perspective but at the same time has set
unrealistic standards to evaluate the direct
and cogent prosecution evidence. The
reasoning of the Trial Court is manifestly
unreasonable and unsustainable as there
was warrant at all for the Trial court to
discard the well reasoned and consistent
testimony of prosecution witnesses on
material point.


(v) The Trial Court has discarded the
testimony of prosecution witnesses for
untenable reasons in the absence of any
proof of enmity no reasons what so ever
have been assigned for discarding the
version of official witnesses. The acquittal
in this case is in disregard of material
evidence on record and as such, the same
is unreasonable, therefore, the impugned
judgment is liable to be set aside.


(vi) That in this case Vitim (prosecutrix) has
corroborated each and every facts of the
case categorically but the ld. Trial Court
had not believed her testimony.


(vii) The prosecutrix have proved all the
ingredients of Section 376 of IPC in a
natural, systematic manner but the learned
Court have not believed her testimony and
acquitted the accused with appreciating the
circumstance under which the prosecutrix
was subjected to sexual assault and rape.

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(viii) The Trial Court have mentioned in para 16
of the judgment regarding the evidence of
discrimination and sexual assault upon
the prosecutrix. This statement qua the
caste based on persons and sexual assault
had not questioned. The learned Defence
counsel during the cross examination of the
prosecutrix when she appeared as PW-2
qua acquitting the accused on the charges
of rape and Section 3(ii) of SC and SC Act
are baseless.

(ix) That delay in lodging the report and
subsequent investigation qua the provision
of I.T. and rape have been categorically
explained by the prosecutrix and I.O.
Gurdev Sharma, who has appeared as
PW-11. The Investigating Officers namely
Dy. S.P. Raj Kumar PW-10 and Dy. S.P.
Gurdev Sharma, PW-11 have clearly and
categorically explained the investigations
and corroborated the factum of rape with
prosecutrix but the ld. Trial Court has not
believed and appreciated their statement in
accordance with law and procedure.

(x) No other appeal or revision against the
impugned judgment has been filed before
the High Court or the Supreme Court.

(xi) The present appeal has been filed within
the prescribed period of limitation.


7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties
and carefully gone through the material on record and
the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court while
passing the impugned judgment of acquittal dated
28.03.2013. .
8. Mr. Raj Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General
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has strenuously argued that the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court are not legally sustainable since the
testimony of Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) has been
disbelieved and discarded without any cogent reasons.
The findings of the learned Trial Court are in disregard
of material evidence, as such, the same is liable to be
set-aside.
,
9. Per contra Mr. Devender K. Sharma, learned
counsel for the respondent/accused defended the
judgment of the acquittal dated 28.03.2013, passed by
the learned Trial Court having been passed after
appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led
by the prosecution. Learned counsel highlighted that
there is inordinate delay in reporting the matter to the
police, which is completely unexplained. T here is no
medical or forensic evidence on record to lend credence
to the prosecution version that the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’
(PW-1) was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse
during the intervening period w.e.f. 2004 to 2006, as
alleged. Learned counsel further argued that the physical
relations, inter se , if any, were with the consent and
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violation of the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1), who was
major at the relevant time and cannot be said to be
forceful and against her consent. Therefore, sexual
relationship, inter se , cannot be said to be a ‘Rape’
within the meaning of Clause-Secondly of Section 375
read with Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Furthermore, there is no evidence whatsoever to infer
that the accused committed the alleged offence on the
basis of caste identity of the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’
(PW-1). The factum of recording of the intimate acts and
further circulating and transmitting the same by
electronic means is not established on record since there
is no evidence whatsoever.
10. The perusal of the record evidently shows that
the learned Trial Court, on considering and evaluating
the material and evidence, did not find force in the
prosecution case, resulting in acquittal of the accused
vide judgment dated 28.03.2013.
11. The present appeal has been filed against the
judgment of acquittal, therefore, the scope of powers of
the Appellate Court in the case of an appeal against
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acquittal needs to be considered before embarking upon
the factual matrix.
12. The Privy Council of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC
42 has observed that the High Court should and will
always give proper weight and consideration to such
matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the
credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption
certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been
acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the
benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an Appellate
Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge
who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
13. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently
been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tulsiram
Kanu v. State, 1954 Cri.LJ 225, Balbir Singh v. State
of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216, M.G. Agarwal v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200.
14. Furthermore, the scope of the powers of the
Appellate Court in case of an appeal against acquittal
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were again reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Muralidhar alias Gidda & another vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730 ; Rajesh
Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another reported in (2022)
3 SCC 471 ; H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2023) 9 SCC 581; Jafarudheen
and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8
SCC 440; Geeta Devi vs State of U.P. reported in
(2023) 12 SCC 741 and Surendra Singh v. State of
Uttarakhand reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176:
(2025) 5 SCC 433 .
15. Having considered the ratio of law laid down
by Hon’ble Apex Court in judgments referred supra, it is
now well settled that powers of Appellate Court while
hearing the appeals against the acquittal are not
unbridled. There is a clear caveat that in case the view
arrived at by the trial Court is a possible one borne from
the material on record, the same cannot be viewed
differently, even if, there is a possibility of any other view.
16. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized
to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are
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compelling circumstances and the judgment under
appeal is found to be perverse, the Appellate Court can
interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views
were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the
Appellant Court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the
Appellate Court could have arrived at a different
conclusion than that of the Trial Court.
17. The burden of proof in a criminal trial never
shifts and it is always the burden of the prosecution to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of
acceptable evidence. In fact, it is a settled principle of
criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence,
the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher
degree of assurance is required to convict the accused.
18. This Court has to look into whether the
accused with malafide motives established sexual
relationship with the Victim Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1)
against her will and without her consent and whether the
said sexual relationship amounts to ‘Rape’ within the
meaning of Clause-Secondly of Section 375 read with
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Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
19. In order to have better appreciation to the
submissions made by learned counsel for the parties
and the facts alleged against the accused, in the
backdrop, the relevant provisions contained in Section
90 and Section 375 of the IPC are being reproduced as
under:-
“90. Consent known to be given under fear or
misconception. —A consent is not such a
consent as it intended by any section of this
Code, if the consent is given by a person under
fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact,
and if the person doing the act knows, or has
reason to believe, that the consent was given
in consequence of such fear or misconception;
or Consent of insane person.—if the consent is
given by a person who, from unsoundness of
mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand
the nature and consequence of that to which
he gives his consent; or Consent of child.—
unless the contrary appears from the context,
if the consent is given by a person who is
under twelve years of age.

375. Rape.- A man is said to commit “rape” if he-
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the
vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or
makes her to do so with him or any other
person; or

(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part
of the body, not being the penis, into the
vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or
makes her to do so with him or any other
person; or

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(c) manipulates any part of the body of a
woman so as to cause penetration into the
vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of
such woman or makes her to do so with him or
any other person; or

(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus,
urethra of a woman or makes her to do so
with him or any other person, under the
circumstances falling under any of the
following seven

First- Against her will.
Secondly- Without her consent.
Thirdly- With her consent, when her consent
has been obtained by putting her or any
person in whom she is interested in fear of
death or of hurt. Fourthly- With her consent,
when the man knows that he is not her
husband and that her consent is given
because she believes that he is another man to
whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully
married.

Fifthly- With her consent when, at the time of
giving such consent, by reason of
unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the
administration by him personally or through
another of any stupefying or unwholesome
substance, she is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of that to which she
gives consent.

Sixthly- With or without her consent, when she
is under eighteen years of age.

Seventhly- when she is unable to communicate
consent.

Explanation 1- For the purposes of this
section, “vagina” shall also include labia
majora.

Explanation 2.- Consent means an
unequivocal voluntary agreement when the
woman by words, gestures or any form of
verbal or non-verbal communication,
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communicates willingness to participate in the
specific sexual act:

Provided that a woman who does not
physically resist to the act of penetration
shall not by the reason only of that fact,
be regarded as consenting to the sexual
activity.

Exception1. A medical procedure or
intervention shall not constitute rape.
Exception 2.- Sexual intercourse or sexual acts
by a man with his own wife, the wife not
being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”

20. Needless to emphasis that a consent given by
person would not be a consent as intended by any
Section of the Indian Penal Code, if such consent was
given by the person under the fear of injury, or under a
misconception of fact as contemplated in Section 90 IPC.
Further, Section 375 also describes certain acts which if
committed by the accused under the circumstances
mentioned therein, as the commission of ‘Rape’, even
though committed with the consent of the prosecutrix.
Therefore, the expression “misconception of fact”
contained in Section 90 IPC is also required to be
appreciated in the light of the Clauses –contained in
Section 375 IPC, more particularly the Clauses -Thirdly,
Fourthly and Fifthly thereof, when the accused is
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charged for the offence of ‘Rape’ .
21 . In the present case, the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’
(PW-1) is alleging that she was repeatedly subjected to
forcible sexual intercourse by the accused between the
years 2004-2006. As per her evidence, on one day when
she was on the way to Mahadev she met the accused
between Dadour and Kansa Chowk Bridge, he took her
to his house on the pretext that there was a birthday
function of his son and subjected her to forcible sexual
intercourse. She resisted to the sexual overtures but later
succumbed under threats to her life. Later, after three
months, the accused met her at Mandi and took her to
Hotel Shringar at Sauli-Khad and subjected her to
forcible sexual intercourse in Room Number 204.
Accused drugged and raped her and also clandestinely
recorded the intimate acts without her consent and
permission. Later, during the years, she was again
subjected to forcible sexual intercourse by the accused at
various places at Dadour and Mandi.
22. The careful perusal of the statement of
Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) and complaint (Ext.
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PW1/A) reveal that there is lack of specificity and details
regarding the incidents during the intervening period.
The Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) has come up with
general allegations against the accused for violating her
privacy on various occasions. The version of the
Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) for being subjected to
forcible sexual intercourse in Room Number 204 of Hotel
Shringar at Sauli-Khad is not well substantiated since no
document in this regard have been brought on record by
the prosecution to ascertain her visit with the accused at
the said venue.
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Imran
Khan vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),(2011)10
Supreme Court Cases 192, has held as under:-
“15. It is a trite law that a woman, who is the
victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to
the crime but is a victim of another person's
lust. The Prosecutrix stands at a higher
pedestal than an injured witness as she
suffers from emotional injury. Therefore, her
evidence need not be tested with the same
amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter
called Evidence Act'), nowhere says that her
evidence cannot be accepted unless it is
corroborated in material particulars. She is
undoubtedly a competent witness under
Section 118 of Evidence Act and her evidence
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must receive the same weight as is attached to
an injured in cases of physical violence. The
same degree of care and caution must attach in
the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of
an injured complainant or witness and no
more. If the court keeps this in mind and feels
satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the
prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice
incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to
illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it
to look for corroboration. If for some reason the
court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the
testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for
evidence which may lend assurance to her
testimony short of corroboration required in the
case of an accomplice. If the totality of the
circumstances appearing on the record of the
case disclose that the Prosecutrix does not have
a strong motive to falsely involve the person
charged, the court should ordinarily have no
hesitation in accepting her evidence. The court
must be alive to its responsibility and be
sensitive while dealing with cases involving
sexual molestations. Rape is not merely a
physical assault, rather it often distracts the
whole personality of the victim. The rapist
degrades the very soul of the helpless female
and, therefore, the testimony of the Prosecutrix
must be appreciated in the background of the
entire case and in such cases, non-examination
even of other witnesses may not be a serious
infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly
where the witnesses had not seen the
commission of the offence. (Vide: State of
Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand
Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658; State of U.P. v. Pappu
@Yunus & Anr. AIR 2005 SC 1248; and Vijay @
Chinee v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191).
Thus, the law that emerges on the
issue is to the effect that statement of
Prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence
and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court
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may convict the accused on the sole testimony of
the Prosecutrix.

24. In State of Maharashtra Vs.
Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain AIR 1990 SC 658 ,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a woman, who is
the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the
crime but is a victim of another person's lust and,
therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same
amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court
observed as under :-
"A p rosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put
on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a
victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere
says that her evidence cannot be accepted
unless it is corroborated in material
particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent
witness under Section 118 and her evidence
must receive the same weight as is attached to
an injured in cases of physical violence. The
same degree of care and caution must attach
in the evaluation of her evidence as in the
case of an injured complainant or witness and
no more. What is necessary is that the Court
must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it
is dealing with the evidence of a person who is
interested in the outcome of the charge levelled
by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels
satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the
prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice
incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to
illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires
it to look for corroboration. If for some reason
the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance
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on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may
look for evidence which may lend assurance to
her testimony short of corroboration required
in the case of an accomplice. The nature of
evidence required to lend assurance to the
testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily
depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of
full understanding the court is entitled to
base a conviction on her evidence unless the
same is shown to be infirm and not
trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances
appearing on the record of the case disclose
that the prosecutrix does not have a strong
motive to falsely involve the person charged,
the court should ordinarily have no
hesitation in accepting her evidence."

25. In State of U.P. Vs. Pappu @Yunus & Anr.
AIR 2005 SC 1248 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of
easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it
may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the
charge of rape. It has to be established that there was
consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of
injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads
the court to absolve the accused. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not
satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek
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other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may
get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under
:-
"It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining
of having been a victim of the offence of rape is
not an accomplice after the crime. There is no
rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted
without corroboration in material particulars.
She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured
witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the
physical form, while in the former it is both
physical as well as psychological and
emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it
difficult to accept the version of the Prosecutrix
on its face value, it may search for evidence,
direct or circumstantial, which would lend
assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of
corroboration as understood in the context of an
accomplice, would do."

26. In State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh & Ors.
AIR 1996 SC 1393 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation etc. the
court is duty bound to deal with such cases with utmost
sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant
discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not
be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable
prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault
is enough for conviction and it does not require any
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corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for
seeking corroboration. The court may look for some
assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience.
The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that
of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The
Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual
offence may not be even properly explained, but if found
natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :-
The court overlooked the situation in which a
"
poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the
company of three desperate young men who
were threatening her and preventing her from
raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating
officer did not conduct the investigation
properly or was negligent in not being able to
trace out the driver or the car, how can that
become a ground to discredit the testimony of the
prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over
the investigating agency and the negligence of
an investigating officer could not affect the
credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix
The courts must, while evaluating evidence
remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape,
no self- respecting woman would come forward
in a court just to make a humiliating statement
against her honour such as is involved in the
commission of rape on her. In cases involving
sexual molestation, supposed considerations
which have no material effect on the veracity of
the prosecution case or even discrepancies in
the statement of the prosecutrix should not,
unless the discrepancies are such which are of
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fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an
otherwise reliable prosecution case. Seeking
corroboration of her statement before replying
upon the same as a rule, in such cases,
amounts to adding insult to injury.
Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance
on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a
requirement of law but a guidance of
prudence under given circumstances.


The courts should examine the broader
probabilities of a case and not get swayed by
minor contradictions or insignificant
discrepancies in the statement of the
prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to
throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution
case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires
confidence, it must be relied upon without
seeking corroboration of her statement in
material particulars. If for some reason the court
finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her
testimony, it may look for evidence which may
lend assurance to her testimony, short of
corroboration required in the case of an
accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix
must be appreciated in the background of the
entire case and the trial court must be alive to
its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing
with cases involving sexual molestations."

27. In State of Orissa Vs. Thakara Besra & Anr.
AIR 2002 SC 1963 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
rape is not mere a physical assault, rather it often
distracts the whole personality of the victim. The rapist
degrades the very soul of the helpless female and,
therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be
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appreciated in the background of the entire case and
in such cases, non- examination even of other witnesses
may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case,
particularly where the witnesses had not seen the
commission of the offence.
28. In State of Himachal Pradesh Vs.
Raghubir Singh (1993) 2 SCC 622, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any
other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the
prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction.
Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction
can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix,
if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence
of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A
similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Wahid Khan Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2010) 2 SCC 9 , placing reliance on earlier judgment in
Rameshwar Vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54.
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat
[1983(3) SCC 217] has laid down the elaborate
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guidelines as to how the evidence of the prosecutrix in
the crime of rape should be evaluated by the Court.
30. In Ved Parkash versus State of Himachal
Pradesh (2005 (1) SLC 395) , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court while dealing with the question of value of the

statement of the Prosecutrix, held as under:-
"8. At may be pointed out at the very outset that
by now it is well settled that conviction of a
person accused of the commission of rape can
be based on the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix because she is not an accomplice
but victim of the offence, hence, the injured
person. Her evidence can also not be suspected
for the reason that no self respecting woman
would come forward to lower her dignity and
self esteem by making false allegations of rape
on her. Therefore, a conviction can be based on
the statement of the prosecutrix when her
statement is found cogent, reliable and
confidence inspiring. In case for some reason
the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance
on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look
into other evidence which may lend assurance
to her testimony.. In a case where the
prosecutrix is adult and of full understanding
the Court can base conviction on her evidence
unless shown to be infirm or untrustworthy. In
case the prosecutrix has no motive to falsely
implicate the accused the Court should
ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her
evidence."

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31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aman Kumar
and another vs. State of Haryana, (2004)4 SCC 379
held as under:-
“5. It is well settled that a prosecutrix
complaining of having been a victim of the
offence of rape is not an accomplice after the
crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony
cannot be acted without corroboration in
material particulars. She stands at a higher
pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter
case, there is injury on the physical form, while
in the former it is both physical as well as
psychological and emotional. However, if the
court of facts finds it difficult to accept the
version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it
may search for evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which would lend assurance to
her testimony. Assurance, short of
corroboration as understood in the context of an
accomplice would suffice.

7.Penetration is the sine qua non for an offence
of rape. In order to constitute penetration, there
must be evidence clear and cogent to prove
that some part of the virile member of the
accused was within the labia of the pudendum
of the woman, no matter how little (See Joseph
Lines IC & K 893). It is well-known in the
medical world that the examination of smegma
loses all importance after twenty four hours of
the performance of the sexual intercourse. (See
Dr. S.P. Kholi, Civil Surgeon, Ferozepur v. High
Court of Punjab and Haryana thr. Registrar
(1979) 1 SCC 212). In rape cases, if the gland
of the male organ is covered by smegma, it
negatives the possibility of recent complete
penetration. If the accused is not circumcised,
the existence of smegma round the corona gland
is proof against penetration, since it is rubbed
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off during the act. The smegma accumulates if
no bath is taken within twenty four hours. The
rupture of hymen is by no means necessary to
constitute the offence of rape. Even a slight
penetration in the vulva is sufficient to constitute
the offence of rape and rupture of the hymen is
not necessary. Vulva penetration with or
without violence is as much rape as vaginal
penetration. The statute merely requires
evidence of penetration, and this may occur with
the hymen remaining intact. The actus reus is
complete with penetration. It is well settled that
the prosecutrix cannot be considered as
accomplice and, therefore, her testimony cannot
be equated with that of an accomplice in an
offence of rape. In examination of genital
organs, state of hymen offers the most reliable
clue. While examining the hymen, certain
anatomical characteristics should be
remembered before assigning any significance
to the findings. The shape and the texture of the
hymen is variable. This variation, sometimes
permits penetration without injury. This is
possible because of the peculiar shape of the
orifice or increased elasticity. On the other hand,
sometimes the hymen may be more firm, less
elastic and gets stretched and lacerated earlier.
Thus a relatively less forceful penetration may
not give rise to injuries ordinarily possible with a
forceful attempt. The anatomical feature with
regard to hymen which merits consideration is
its anatomical situation. Next to hymen in
positive importance, but more than that in
frequency, are the injuries on labia majora.
These, viz. Labia majora are the first to be
encountered by the male organ. They are
subjected to blunt forceful blows, depending on
the vigour and force used by the accused and
counteracted by the victim. Further, examination
of the females for marks of injuries elsewhere
on the body forms a very important piece of
evidence. To constitute the offence of rape, it
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is not necessary that there should be
complete penetration of the penis with emission
of semen and rupture of hymen. Partial
penetration within the labia majora of the vulva
or pudendum with or without emission of semen
is sufficient to constitute the offence of rape
as defined in the law. The depth of penetration
is immaterial in an offence punishable under
Section 376 IPC.”

32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tarkeshwar
Sahu vs. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand, (2006)8 SCC
560, held as under:-
10. Under Section 375 IPC, six categories
indicated above are the basic ingredients of the
offence. In the facts and circumstances of this
case, the prosecutrix was about 12 years of
age, therefore, her consent was irrelevant. The
appellant had forcibly taken her to his Gumti
with the intention of committing sexual
intercourse with her. The important ingredient of
the offence under Section 375 punishable
under Section 376 IPC is penetration which is
altogether missing in the instant case. No
offence under Section 376 IPC can be made out
unless there was penetration to some extent. In
absence of penetration to any extent would not
bring the offence of the appellant within the four
corners of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code.
Therefore, the basic ingredients for proving a
charge of rape are the accomplishment of the act
with force. The other important ingredient is
penetration of the male organ within the labia
majora or the vulva or pudenda with or without
any emission of semen or even an attempt at
penetration into the private part of the victim
completely, partially or slightly would be enough
for the purpose of Sections 375 and 376 IPC.
This Court had an occasion to deal with the
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basic ingredients of this offence in the case of
State of U.P. v. Babul Nath. In this case, this
Court dealt with the basic ingredients of the
offence under Section 375 in the following
words:- "8. It may here be noticed that Section
375 of the IPC defines rape and the Explanation
to Section 375 reads as follows:

"Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to
constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to
the offence of rape."

From the Explanation reproduced above it is
distinctly clear that ingredients which are
essential for proving a charge of rape are the
accomplishment of the act with force and
resistance. To constitute the offence of rape
neither Section 375 of IPC nor the Explanation
attached thereto require that there should
necessarily be complete penetration of the penis
into the private part of the victim/prosecutrix. In
other words to constitute the offence of rape it is
not at all necessary that there should be
complete penetration of the male organ with
emission of semen and rupture of hymen. Even
partial or slightest penetration of the male organ
within the labia majora or the vulva or pudenda
with or without any emission of semen or even
an attempt at penetration into the private part of
the victim would be quite enough for the purpose
of Sections 375 and 376 of IPC. That being so it
is quite possible to commit legally the offence of
rape even without causing any injury to the
genitals or leaving any seminal stains. But in
the present case before us as noticed above
there is more than enough evidence positively
showing that there was sexual activity on the
victim and she was subjected to sexual assault
without which she would not have sustained
injuries of the nature found on her private part
by the doctor who examined her."

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33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narender
Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012)7 SCC 171 held
as under:-
“29. However, even in a case of rape, the onus
is always on the prosecution to prove,
affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it
seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It
is no part of the duty of the defence to explain
as to how and why in a rape case the victim
and other witness have falsely implicated the
accused. Prosecution case has to stand on its
own legs and cannot take support from the
weakness of the case of defence. However great
the suspicion against the accused and however
strong the moral belief and conviction of the
court, unless the offence of the accused is
established beyond reasonable doubt on the
basis of legal evidence and material on the
record, he cannot be convicted for an offence.
There is an initial presumption of innocence of
the accused and the prosecution has to bring
home the offence against the accused by
reliable evidence. The accused is entitled to the
benefit of every reasonable doubt. (Vide:
Tukaram & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra,,
AIR 1979 SC 185; and Uday v. State of
Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639).

30 . Prosecution has to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt and cannot take support from
the weakness of the case of defence. There must
be proper legal evidence and material on record
to record the conviction of the accused.
Conviction can be based on sole testimony of the
prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her
testimony. However, in case the court has
reason not to accept the version of prosecutrix
on its face value, it may look for corroboration.
In case the evidence is read in its totality and
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the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to
be improbable, the prosecutrix case becomes

liable to be rejected.”

34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Munna vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 10 SCC 254, has
reiterated the principle that testimony of prosecutrix is
almost at par with an immediate witness and can be
acted upon without corroboration.
35. Reiterating its earlier view in Mohd. Iqbal
v. State of Jharkhand,(2013) 14 SCC, 481, Narender
Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7SCC 171, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mukesh v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2014) 10 SC 327, has held that sole
testimony of prosecutrix is sufficient to establish
commission of rape, even in the absence of any

corroborative evidence.
36. Reiterating the earlier view, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Sham Singh vs. State of Haryana
(2018) 10 SCC 34, State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Pankaj
Chaudhary (2019) 11SCC 575 and Ganesan vs. State
(2020) 10 SCC 573 held that sole testimony of the
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prosecutrix is sufficient to establish commission of rape if
‘duly corroborated’.
37. The prosecution in order to corroborate the
allegations and accusations against the accused
examined Dr. Richa, Medical Officer posted at CHC
Ratti (Balh) in the year 2008. She conducted medical
examination of the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) on
18.09.2008 and issued MLC (Ext. PW2/B) with opinion:-
“The examinee is an adult, healthy, sexually
active female, habitual to sexual intercourse. It is
not possible to say at this stage (duration of 2
years) whether any forced sexual assault had
taken place between 2004 to 2006. There are no
physical evidences in the present examination,
which can or cannot confirm the alleged sexual
assault.”
38. The medical evidence led by the prosecution
does not help in any manner to ascertain that the
Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) had been subjected to
forcible sexual intercourse during the alleged period.
Therefore, the version put on record by her becomes
unbelievable.
39. It may be pertinent to put on record certain
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undisputed facts, which are material and relevant to the
facts and circumstances of the case.
40. The Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) admittedly
belongs to Scheduled Caste (Lohar), which fact is evident
after going through the copy of Parivar Register
(Ext.PW6/B). It is also undisputed that the accused is
Rajput by caste, which fact can be inferred after going
through certificate (Ext. PW9/A) issued by the Pradhan,
Gram Panchayat Dadour. The parties had prior
acquaintance since the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) was
running a ‘Manyari’ Shop (Variety Store) at Kummi
Chowk and the accused during the relevant period was
posted as Teacher (JBT) at Government Primary School,
Kummi. It is also undisputed that the Victim/Prosecutrix
‘G’ (PW-1) at the relevant time was major, aged 25 years
(date of birth i.e. 09.01.1979). Although, the accused has
denied and disputed for being in physical relationship
with the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) for a long period
w.e.f. 2004 to 2006, nevertheless, even if it is assumed
that the parties had physical relationship, it appears to
be consensual in nature. There is nothing on record to
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infer that her consent was obtained by the accused by
misconception of fact or by putting under threat to her
life.
41. Furthermore, it appears that the consent of
the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1), if at all, was conscious
and deliberate choice as distinct from an involuntary
action or in denial. Although, she has testified that when
the accused firstly made physical relationship with her in
the year 2004, she was not a consenting party and she
did not disclose the incident under the fear and threat to
her life. This Court fails to believe the reasons put forth
by her in this regard and if this had been so, she would
have never accompanied the accused on subsequent
occasions and she had a clear choice to refuse for the
coitus and to file a complaint against him. It appears that
she did not resist to his sexual overtures and also did not
file any complaint against him rather voluntarily kept
interacting sexually till her video clip was circulated by
electronic means. There is no reasonable explanation
emerging on record which could have reasonably
prevented the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) to approach
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the police after she was subjected to forceful sexual
intercourse by the accused.
42. Having considered the aforesaid facts, the
evidence of the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) does not
inspire confidence and hence, cannot be relied upon.
43. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Prasad @
Santosh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, 2020(3)
Criminal Court Cases 459 (S.C.) has held that the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix cannot be taken as a gospel
truth at face value and in the absence of any other
supporting evidence.
44. There are allegations against the accused that
he violated the privacy of the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’
(PW-1) on various occasions, knowingly that she belongs
to the Scheduled Caste (Lohar). However, there is no
separate evidence led by the prosecution that the
accused committed the offence on the basis of caste
identity of the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1.)
45. At this juncture, it is necessary to take note of
Section 3(1)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
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Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The said
provision so far relevant reads as follows:-
“Section 3(1)(xii):- Punishments for offences of
atrocities:-
(1) Whoever, not being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Schedules Tribe-
xxx xxx xxx
(xii) being in a positon to dominate the will of a
woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe and Uses that position to
exploit her sexually to which she would
not have otherwise agree;
xxx xxx xxx”
46. Sine qua non , for application of section 3(1)(xii)
of the Act is that an offence must have been committed
against a person on the ground that such person is a
member of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In
the present case, although it has been established that
the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’(PW-1) belonged to the
Scheduled Castes (Lohar), nevertheless, it is not
established that the accused indulged in committing rape
on the Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) since she was a
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member of Scheduled Caste.
47. Therefore, the offence under the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989, is not established merely on the fact that the
Victim/Prosecutrix ‘G’ (PW-1) is a member of the
Scheduled Caste (Lohar) unless there is an intention to
sexually abuse a member of the Scheduled Caste or the
Scheduled Tribes for the reason that the victim belongs
to such caste.
48. In this regard, reference can be made to
Khuman Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019)
SCC OnLine SC 1104, Dinesh @ Buddha Vs. State of
Rajasthan, (2006) 3 SCC 771 and Patan Jamal Vali
Vs . State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2021 Supreme Court
2190 .
49. Coming to the allegations that the accused had
clandestinely recorded the intimate acts on various
occasions without the consent of the Victim/Prosecutrix
‘G’ (PW-1) and subsequently transmitted and circulated
the same in an electronic form. Pertinent to note that
Chapter XI of the Information Technology Act, includes
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the offence punishable under Section 67 which provides
the punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene
material in electronic form. The relevant Section reads
thus:-
“67. Punishment for publishing or transmitting
obscene material in electronic form:- Whoever
publishes or transmits or causes to be published
or transmitted in the electronic form, any material
which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient
interest or if its effect is such as to tend to
deprave and corrupt persons who are likely,
having regard to all relevant circumstances, to
read, see or hear the matter contained or
embodied in it, shall be punished on first
conviction with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to three years and
with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees
and in the event of second or subsequent
conviction with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to five years and
also with fine which may extend to ten lakh
rupees”.
50. The accused has been charged for the
commission of the offences punishable under Section 67
of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The said
provisions of law prescribes the punishment for
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publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually
explicit act etc. in electronic form.
51. Section 67-A is a species of Section 67 which
is a g enus and makes an act of publishing or
transmitting of material containing sexually explicit act
in electronic form. Further, Section 67-B is another
species of Section 67, which makes punishable an act of
publishing or transmitting of material depicting children
in sexually explicit act in electronic form.
52. Needless to emphasize that the electronic
records being more susceptible to tampering, alteration,
transposition, excision etc. and without safeguards, the
whole trial based on proof of electronic records can lead
to travesty of justice. Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence
Act, which deals with admissibility of electronic records,
is being reproduced as under :-
65-B. Admissibility of electronic records –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act, any information contained in an electronic
record which is printed on a paper, stored,
recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media
produced by a computer (hereinafter referred
to as the computer output) shall be deemed to
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be also a document, if the conditions
mentioned in this section are satisfied in
relation to the information and computer in
question and shall be admissible in any
proceedings, without further proof or
production of the original, as evidence of any
contents of the original or of any fact stated
therein of which direct evidence would be
admissible.

53. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anvar P.V.
versus P.K.Basheer and Others (2014) 10 SCC 473 ,
held that Computer Output is not admissible without
compliance of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. It
overruled the Judgment in State ( NCT of Delhi ) versus
Navjot Sandhu alias Afzal Guru (2005)11 SCC 600 .
The Hon'ble Court observed that “the Judgment of Navjot
Sandhu , to the extent, the statement of the law on
admissibility of electronic evidence pertaining to
electronic record of this court, does not lay down correct
position and is required to be overruled.”
54. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Tomaso Bruno & Anr. versus. State of UP
(2015) 7 SCC 178) dealt with the admissibility of
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evidence in a criminal case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that “ the Computer generated electronic records in
evidence are admissible at a trial if proved in the manner
specified by Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. Sub-
section(1) of Section 65B makes admissible as a
document, paper print out of electronic records stored in
optical or magnetic media produced by a computer,
subject to the fulfilment of the conditions specified in
sub-section (2) of Section 65B. Secondary evidence of
contents of document can also be led under Section 65 of
the Indian Evidence Act”.
55. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Vikram Singh and Anr. verus State of Punjab
& Anr., (2017) 8 SCC 518) , f ollowed the law in Anvar
P.V. (supra) clearly stating that where primary evidence
in electronic form has been produced, no certificate
under Section 65B would be necessary.
56. But in a subsequent judgment rendered in
Shafhi Mohammad versus The State of Himachal
Pradesh (2018) 2 SCC 801 , a two Judge Bench of the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court held that requirement of
certificate under Section 65B(4) is not always mandatory.
57. As there was dichotomy of decisions between
Anwar PV's case and Shafhi Mohammad's case ,
therefore, in 2019, a two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred the matter to another three
Judge Bench for clarification on the point. The matter
has been recently decided by the three Judge Bench of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ARJUN PANDITRAO
KHOTKAR VERSUS KAILASH KUSHANRAO
GOPRANTYAL AND ORS , 2020 SCC OnLine SC 571 by
a Judgment dated July 14, 2020 and upheld the law laid
down in Anwar PV's case . Para No.72 contains the
relevant observations. They are extracted hereunder :-
“(a) Anvar P.V (supra), as clarified by us
hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on
Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in
Tomaso Bruno (supra), being per incuriam, does
not lay down the law correctly. Also judgment in
SLP (Crl.) No.9431 of 2011 reported as Shafhi
Mohammad (supra) and the judgment dated
03.04.2018 reported as (2018) 5 SCC 311, do not
lay down the law correctly and are therefore,
overruled.

(b) The clarification referred to above is that the
required certificate under Section 65B(4) is
unnecessary if the original document itself is
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produced. This can be done by the owner of a
laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile
phone, by stepping into the witness box and
proving that the concerned device, on which the
original information is first stored, is owned
and/or operated by him. In cases where the
“computer” happens to be a part of a “computer
system” or “computer network” and it becomes
impossible to physically bring such system or
network to the Court, then the only means of
providing information contained in such electronic
record can be in accordance with Section 65B(1),
together with the requisite certificate under
Section 65B(4). The last sentence in Anvar P.V (
supra) which reads as “.... if an electronic record
as such is used as primary evidence under Section
62 of the Evidence Act....” is thus clarified; it is to
be read without the words “ under Section 62 of
the Evidence Act....” With this clarification, the
law stated in paragraph 24 of Anvar P.V ( supra)
does not need to be revisited”.

58. The above judgment has put to rest the
controversies arising from the various conflicting
judgments and thereby provided a guidelines regarding
the practices being followed in Trial Courts as to the
admissibility of the Electronic Evidences. The legal
interpretation by the Court of the following Sections 22A,
45A, 59, 65A & 65B of the Evidence Act has confirmed
that the stored data in CD/DVD/Pen Drive is not
admissible without a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of
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Evidence Act and further clarified that in the absence of
such a certificate, the oral evidence to prove the existence
of such electronic evidence and the expert view under
Section 45-A Evidence Act cannot be availed to prove
authenticity thereof.
59. Now applying the ratio of law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar's
case supra to the facts of this case and evidence
produced by the prosecution .
60 . In the present case, the prosecution has
neither brought on record the explicit sexual content
allegedly transmitted or circulated in electronic form as
required under Section 67 of the Information Technology
Act, 2000. The evidence on this aspect is completely
missing since the VCD allegedly containing the obscene
and sexually explicit act never formed part of the
prosecution record during the course of trial before the
learned Trial Court.
61. After going through the entire record and
considering the material evidence brought on record,
the allegations against the accused on all counts are not
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established. This Court has no reason to either interfere
or to differ with the findings recorded by the learned Trial
Court.
62. In view of above, we do not find any merit in
this appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
63. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any,
shall also stand disposed of.

(Vivek Singh Thakur)
Judge



(Bhupesh Sharma)
Judge
th
20 November, 2026
( sushma )








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