Smt Chandri Devi And Another vs Smt. Lalita Chauhan And Another

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
S.C.C. REVISION No. - 104 of 2026
Smt Chandri Devi and another
…..Revisionist(s)
Versus
Smt. Lalita Chauhan and another
…..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Revisionist(s) : Sri Prakash, Sudhanshu Kumar
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) :
AFR
Court No. - 35
HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
1. Heard Sri Sri Prakash, learned counsel for the revisionists. The
record has been perused.
2. The present revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small
Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act, 1887’), has
been filed, assailing the order dated 27.07.2026 passed by the Additional
District Judge/Fast Track Court No.1, Gautam Buddh Nagar, in SCC
Suit No.05 of 2018 (Smt. Lalita Chauhan v. Vinod Kumar Mishra),
whereby the application Paper No.63-Ga, preferred by the revisionists
under Order I Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’), seeking their
impleadment as defendants in the suit, has been rejected.
3. The facts, as emerging from the record, are that respondent no. 1
instituted the aforesaid S.C.C. suit against respondent no. 2, Vinod

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Kumar Mishra, seeking his eviction from the commercial premises
situated at Village Sadarpur, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam
Buddh Nagar, besides recovery of arrears of rent and other consequential
reliefs. The suit is founded on the plaintiff's assertion that a relationship
of landlord and tenant exists between her and the defendant.
4. Revisionist no. 1, Smt. Chandri Devi, claims to have executed a
sale deed dated 22.07.2016 in favour of respondent no. 1 in respect of a
plot measuring 100 square yards. Disputing the said transaction, she
instituted Original Suit No. 38 of 2018 before the Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Gautam Buddh Nagar, seeking cancellation of the aforesaid
sale deed along with a decree of injunction.
5. It appears that the defendant in the S.C.C. suit, namely, Vinod
Kumar Mishra, disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant pleaded
by the plaintiff in his written statement dated 11.07.2018. He asserted
that he was neither a tenant nor in possession of the disputed premises
and that one Manoj, son of Krishna Kumar, was carrying on business
therein under the name and style of Ayush Electronics and Electricals as
a tenant of Smt. Chandri Devi. Manoj is also stated to have instituted
Original Suit No. 23 of 2018 against Smt. Lalita Chauhan and Smt.
Chandri Devi, seeking protection against his alleged illegal eviction.
6. The revisionists subsequently set up the case that Manoj had
remained in possession of the basement and upper basement of the
disputed premises as a tenant of revisionist no. 1 from the year 2010 till
31.12.2019 and that, thereafter, with effect from 01.01.2020, revisionist
no. 2, Pushkar Chauhan, was inducted as a tenant by revisionist no. 1
and commenced running coaching classes from the premises. It is further
their case that revisionist no. 2 has been regularly paying rent to
revisionist no. 1.
7. Earlier, the revisionists had moved an application, Paper No. 40-
Ga, seeking appointment of an Amin Commission to ascertain the factual
position at the disputed premises. The said application was rejected by
the court below on 23.10.2019. Subsequently, on 04.11.2025, the

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SCCR No. - 104 of 2026
revisionists moved the application, Paper No. 63-Ga, under Order I Rule
10 read with Section 151 CPC, seeking their impleadment as defendants
in the pending S.C.C. suit. The said application has been rejected by the
impugned order dated 27.07.2026.
8. While considering the application, the court below noticed that the
revisionists were asserting claims of ownership and tenancy in respect of
the disputed premises. It observed that, despite the assertion that
revisionist no. 2 had been inducted as a tenant by revisionist no. 1, no
rent agreement, rent receipt or other relevant document establishing the
alleged tenancy had been brought on record. On the other hand, the
plaintiff had relied upon the registered sale deed dated 22.07.2016
executed by revisionist no. 1 in her favour, which had not been declared
void by any competent court.
9. The court below further observed that the controversy in the
pending S.C.C. suit was confined to the question of the relationship of
landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereas
questions relating to title and ownership fell beyond the scope of
adjudication in those proceedings. It accordingly held that the
revisionists were neither necessary nor proper parties for effective
adjudication of the dispute and rejected their application for
impleadment.
10. Learned counsel for the revisionists submits that the court below
has failed to appreciate the nature of the claim set up by the revisionists
as well as the material placed on record in support thereof. It is
contended that revisionist no. 1 is the actual owner and landlady of the
disputed premises and that revisionist no. 2 is in occupation thereof as
her tenant. It is pointed out that the defendant in the S.C.C. suit, namely,
Vinod Kumar Mishra, has himself denied the relationship of landlord
and tenant with the plaintiff and asserted that Manoj was occupying the
premises as a tenant of revisionist no. 1. It is, therefore, urged that the
S.C.C. proceedings are being pursued against a person who, according to

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SCCR No. - 104 of 2026
the revisionists, is neither a tenant nor in possession of the disputed
premises.
11. It is further contended that the revisionists have placed on record
documents relating to the business activities of Manoj, including GST,
VAT and sales tax registrations, besides other relevant documents,
which, according to learned counsel, substantiate the nature of his
occupation of the premises. It is urged that the court below has also
failed to properly consider the claim of revisionist no. 2 regarding his
subsequent induction as a tenant and his possession of the premises. 
12. Learned counsel further submits that the revisionists have a direct
interest in the subject matter of the suit and that any decree passed in
their absence may prejudice their possession and independent rights in
the disputed property. It is also contended that the court below has
placed undue reliance upon the sale deed dated 22.07.2016 without
appreciating that the very validity of the transaction has been questioned
by revisionist no. 1 in Original Suit No. 38 of 2018. On these grounds, it
is submitted that the impugned order is legally unsustainable and
warrants interference by this Court.
13. The principal question that arises for consideration is whether a
person asserting an independent claim of ownership, tenancy or
possession in respect of the premises forming the subject matter of a
pending S.C.C. suit is entitled to seek impleadment merely on the
ground that a decree passed in the suit may affect such asserted rights,
and whether the presence of such person is necessary for effective and
complete adjudication of the dispute between the plaintiff and the
defendant.
14. Before examining the rival submissions in the light of the facts of
the present case, it would be appropriate to consider the scope and object
of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and the principles governing the impleadment
of a third party in pending proceedings.

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15. Order I Rule 10(2) CPC confers upon the Court the discretionary
power to add a person as a party to the proceedings where such person
ought to have been joined or whose presence is necessary to enable the
Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the
questions involved in the suit. The object of the provision is to ensure
effective and complete adjudication of the controversy before the Court
and to enable it to grant the reliefs to which the parties may be found
entitled. The power, however, is not intended to bring before the Court
every person who may claim an interest in the subject matter of the suit,
irrespective of the nature of the controversy requiring adjudication. An
independent claim or interest in the subject property, howsoever
substantial it may be, does not, by itself, furnish a ground for
impleadment.  
16. The exercise of this power is thus governed by the nature of the
questions arising for determination in the suit and the necessity of the
proposed party's presence for their effective adjudication. It is not the
mere existence of an interest in the subject matter, but the relevance of
the proposed party's presence to the adjudication of the controversy, that
assumes significance. In this context, the law recognises two distinct
categories of parties, namely, necessary parties and proper parties.
17. The expressions 'necessary party' and 'proper party' have distinct
legal connotations. A necessary party is one without whom no effective
decree can be passed, whereas a proper party is one whose presence,
though not indispensable for passing an effective decree, is required for
complete and effectual adjudication of the questions involved in the suit.
Thus, the mere assertion of an interest in the property forming the
subject matter of the suit does not, by itself, render a person either a
necessary or a proper party.
18. The enquiry under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC must, therefore, be
directed towards the nature of the controversy, the reliefs claimed and
the questions that actually arise for determination in the proceedings.
The relevant consideration is whether the presence of the proposed party

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SCCR No. - 104 of 2026
is required for adjudication of those questions. An independent claim or
interest in the subject property, howsoever substantial it may be, does
not, by itself, furnish a ground for impleadment.
19. The aforesaid principles have been considered by the Supreme
1
Court in Kanaklata Das and Others v. Naba Kumar Das and Others . The
Supreme Court held that, in an eviction suit instituted by a landlord
against a tenant, the landlord and the tenant are ordinarily the necessary
parties. The controversy in such proceedings essentially concerns the
existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant and the grounds on
which eviction is sought under the applicable rent legislation. The
question of title to the premises is not, as a general rule, germane to the
adjudication of such proceedings.
20. The Supreme Court further explained that the plaintiff, being
dominus litis, cannot ordinarily be compelled to implead a third person
against his or her wish unless the proposed party establishes that his or
her presence is necessary for effective adjudication of the controversy. A
person asserting an independent right, title or interest in the property
does not, merely by reason of such assertion, acquire a right to be
impleaded in an eviction proceeding.
21. The aforesaid position has also been followed by this Court. In
2
Shahnaj Begum v. Taj Mohammad and Another , this Court considered a
case in which a third party claiming ownership of the suit premises
sought impleadment in an eviction suit pending before the Small Causes
Court. While declining the prayer for impleadment, this Court observed
that the lis in an eviction suit is essentially between the landlord and the
tenant and that determination of the controversy between them does not
ordinarily require adjudication of an independent claim of ownership
asserted by a third party.
22. It was further held that a question of title or ownership cannot be
brought within the scope of an eviction suit merely because a third
1 (2018) 2 SCC 352
2 (2019) 134 ALR 800

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person seeks to assert an independent interest in the property. The
decisive consideration remains whether the suit can be effectively
adjudicated and a decree passed in the absence of the person seeking
impleadment.
23. The aforesaid approach finds support from the decision of this
Court in Murti Markandeshwar Ji Maharaj Gopal Ki Bagiya City Jhansi
3
v. Smt. Jyoti Gangwani and Another , wherein the Court considered the
question of impleadment of a third party in proceedings under Section 21
of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021. This Court
held that proceedings under the Act are confined to adjudication of
disputes arising out of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant and
that questions relating to independent title or ownership fall beyond the
statutory jurisdiction of the Rent Authority. It was further observed that a
person asserting an independent proprietary right adverse to the landlord
cannot, by invoking Order I Rule 10 CPC, enlarge the scope of eviction
proceedings or convert them into a forum for adjudication of
complicated questions of title. Such disputes are required to be agitated
before the competent civil court in appropriately instituted proceedings.
Accordingly, an independent claim of title, by itself, was held
insufficient to qualify the claimant as either a necessary or a proper party
to proceedings under Section 21 of the Act.
24. The principles governing impleadment of a third party in
proceedings before the Small Causes Court have also been examined by
4
this Court in Manish Bansal v. Jagdish Prasad Mittal and 7 Others . In
that case, the revisionist sought impleadment on the basis of an
independent claim founded upon an unregistered Will, disputing the title
asserted by the plaintiff on the basis of a registered Will. The revisionist
had also instituted independent proceedings seeking declaration of his
rights.
25. The Court, while examining the scope of Order I Rule 10 CPC,
held that a person asserting an independent right or title in the property
3 2026 SCC OnLine All 22417
4 2026 SCC OnLine All 25952

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cannot claim impleadment merely on the ground that such claim is
inconsistent with the title set up by the plaintiff. It was observed that
proceedings before the Small Causes Court are concerned with
adjudication of the landlord-tenant relationship and cannot be enlarged
to determine an independent dispute relating to title. The Court further
held that where the independent claim of the person seeking
impleadment can be adjudicated in separately instituted declaratory
proceedings, his presence is neither necessary nor proper for effective
adjudication of the dispute before the Small Causes Court.
26. The same approach was reiterated by this Court in Smt. Gayatri
5
Devi v. Smt. Omwati Devi and Another . While examining a claim of
independent ownership set up by a third party in an S.C.C. suit, this
Court held that the existence of a competing claim of title does not, by
itself, warrant impleadment. The relevant test is whether the controversy
pending before the Small Causes Court can be effectively and
completely adjudicated in the absence of the person seeking
impleadment.
27. This Court also explained the distinction between an incidental
consideration of a question relating to title and its final adjudication. The
mere assertion of an independent title by a third party does not
necessarily mean that the relief claimed in the S.C.C. suit depends upon
determination of such title. Section 23 of the Act, 1887, becomes
relevant where the plaintiff's right to obtain the relief claimed depends
upon the determination of a question of title which the Small Causes
Court is not competent to finally adjudicate. An independent assertion of
title by a third party, without more, does not attract the application of the
said provision.
28. More recently, this Court, in Lalit Chaturvedi v. Santoshi Lal
6
Chaturvedi , considered the scope of Order I Rule 10 CPC in the context
of a third party seeking impleadment in an S.C.C. suit on the assertion
that the property belonged to a deity and that the applicant was its
5 2026 SCC OnLine All 28746
6 2026 SCC OnLine All 33146

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Shebait/Mohatmin. While declining the prayer for impleadment, this
Court reiterated that Order I Rule 10 CPC is a procedural and facilitative
provision and does not confer upon every person asserting an interest in
the subject matter of a suit a substantive right to participate in the
proceedings. It was emphasised that the power of impleadment must
remain confined to the controversy which the Court is competent to
adjudicate and cannot be exercised to introduce an independent
substantive dispute concerning ownership, representative capacity or
other rights which are not necessary for determination of the pending
suit.
29. The aforesaid decisions, read together, indicate that the
determination of whether a person is a necessary or proper party cannot
rest merely upon the assertion of an interest in the suit property or an
apprehension that the outcome of the proceedings may affect such
interest. The decisive consideration is whether the presence of the
proposed party is necessary for passing an effective decree or for
complete and effectual adjudication of the questions actually involved in
the suit. The power under Order I Rule 10 CPC cannot be invoked to
enlarge the scope of the proceedings by introducing an independent
controversy which does not arise for determination in the suit.
30. The principles emerging from the aforesaid discussion may be
summarised thus: In an eviction suit, the controversy is ordinarily
confined to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff
and the defendant and the grounds on which eviction is sought under the
applicable rent legislation. A third party does not become a necessary or
proper party merely by asserting an independent claim of ownership,
title, interest or possession in respect of the premises forming the subject
matter of the suit. The same principle applies to a claim founded upon an
independent relationship of tenancy, including one alleged to have arisen
subsequent to the institution of the suit. The question of impleadment
must be determined with reference to the pleadings, the reliefs claimed
and the questions actually arising for adjudication. The decisive

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consideration is whether the presence of the proposed party is necessary
for passing an effective decree or is required for complete and effectual
adjudication of the controversy before the Court. An independent dispute
relating to ownership, title, possession or a separate relationship of
tenancy cannot ordinarily be introduced into an eviction suit through an
application under Order I Rule 10 CPC, unless its determination is
shown to be necessary for deciding the controversy involved in the suit.
The mere possibility that the outcome of the proceedings may have some
bearing upon the independent rights asserted by the proposed party does
not, by itself, satisfy the statutory test.
31. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it
is evident that the S.C.C. suit was instituted by respondent no.1 against
respondent no. 2 seeking his eviction from the disputed premises,
recovery of arrears of rent and other consequential reliefs. The
controversy arising in the suit must, therefore, be determined with
reference to the pleadings of the plaintiff and the defendant and the
questions which fall for adjudication between them. These would include
whether the relationship of landlord and tenant pleaded by the plaintiff
exists between the parties, and whether the grounds on which eviction is
sought have been established. The enquiry for the purposes of
impleadment must be confined to whether the presence of the
revisionists is required for adjudication of these questions.
32. The revisionists, however, seek impleadment on the basis of two
distinct claims. Revisionist no. 1 asserts an independent claim of
ownership over the disputed property and disputes the sale deed dated
22.07.2016 executed in favour of respondent no. 1. Revisionist no. 2, on
the other hand, claims to have been inducted as a tenant in the premises
by revisionist no. 1 with effect from 01.01.2020. The claim of revisionist
no. 1 is already the subject matter of Original Suit No. 38 of 2018,
instituted for cancellation of the aforesaid sale deed.
33. Thus, while revisionist no. 1 seeks to assert a proprietary claim
adverse to the title claimed by respondent no. 1, revisionist no. 2 relies

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upon an alleged tenancy created independently by revisionist no. 1. The
proposed impleadment would, in substance, bring into the S.C.C. suit
disputes concerning the ownership of the premises, the validity of the
sale deed and the existence and legal effect of a separate tenancy
allegedly created in favour of revisionist no. 2. The mere fact that these
claims relate to the same premises does not, however, establish that their
adjudication is necessary for deciding the controversy already pending
between the plaintiff and the defendant.
34. The material consideration is not whether the revisionists have
asserted an interest in the disputed premises, or whether such interest
may ultimately be established in independently instituted proceedings. It
is whether, having regard to the nature of the reliefs claimed and the
questions arising in the S.C.C. suit, an effective decree can be passed and
the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant can be
completely adjudicated in their absence. The two claims advanced by the
revisionists must be examined in that context.
35. So far as revisionist no. 1 is concerned, her claim is founded upon
an assertion of ownership which directly disputes the transaction through
which respondent no. 1 claims her right in the property. The validity of
the sale deed dated 22.07.2016 is already in issue in Original Suit No. 38
of 2018, where revisionist no. 1 has sought its cancellation. The
existence of that independent dispute does not, by itself, make her
presence necessary in the S.C.C. suit. The question whether the sale deed
is liable to be cancelled, or whether revisionist no. 1 has any subsisting
proprietary right in the premises, is not required to be finally determined
in order to adjudicate the landlord-tenant controversy pleaded between
respondent nos. 1 and 2. Nor can the pending S.C.C. proceedings be
converted into a forum for adjudication of the competing claims of
ownership merely by seeking impleadment. 
36. The claim of revisionist no. 2 stands on a distinct footing and
requires separate consideration. He does not claim to be a party to the
original transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. His case is

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that revisionist no. 1 inducted him as a tenant with effect from
01.01.2020. Significantly, the S.C.C. suit had already been instituted in
the year 2018. The alleged tenancy in favour of revisionist no. 2 is thus
founded upon an arrangement which, even according to the revisionists,
came into existence after institution of the S.C.C. suit. Such subsequent
induction does not, without more, alter the nature of the controversy as it
stood when the suit was instituted, or make the subsequent alleged tenant
a necessary party to the adjudication of the dispute originally brought
before the Small Causes Court.
37. The material relied upon in support of the alleged tenancy also
assumes relevance in this context. The court below noticed that no rent
agreement, rent receipt or other document evidencing the alleged
induction of revisionist no. 2 as a tenant had been produced. The
documents relating to GST, VAT and sales tax registrations of the
business allegedly carried on by Manoj may indicate the existence of
business activities at the premises. They do not, however, establish either
the creation of a tenancy in favour of revisionist no. 2 with effect from
01.01.2020 or the legal character in which he claims to occupy the
premises. In any event, the question whether revisionist no. 2 has an
enforceable right arising out of the alleged arrangement with revisionist
no. 1 is distinct from the question which the Small Causes Court is
called upon to determine in the pending suit.
38. The further submission that respondent no. 2, Vinod Kumar
Mishra, has himself denied the relationship of landlord and tenant with
respondent no. 1 and has referred to Manoj as a tenant of revisionist no.
1 does not alter the nature of the enquiry. The defendant's denial of the
relationship pleaded by the plaintiff raises a matter for adjudication on
the basis of the pleadings and evidence in the suit. His reference to
Manoj as a person occupying the premises as a tenant of revisionist no. 1
may be relevant to the defence set up by him and will have to be
considered by the court below while adjudicating the controversy on the
basis of the pleadings and evidence. Such reference, however, does not,

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by itself, establish that the revisionists are necessary parties to the suit or
that the controversy cannot be effectively adjudicated in their absence.
39. To hold otherwise would mean that every person whose name or
alleged interest is referred to in the written statement, or who sets up an
independent claim to the premises, could seek entry into an eviction suit,
even though the adjudication of that claim is not necessary for
determining the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Such an approach would permit the scope of proceedings before the
Small Causes Court to be enlarged by the introduction of collateral
disputes concerning title, possession or separate arrangements of
tenancy. The power under Order I Rule 10 CPC is not intended to serve
that purpose.
40. The apprehension that a decree passed in the absence of the
revisionists may adversely affect their asserted rights also does not, by
itself, furnish a ground for impleadment. The possibility that the
outcome of a suit may have some bearing upon the interests claimed by a
third party is not the test prescribed under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC. What
is required to be shown is that the presence of such person is necessary
for passing an effective decree or for complete and effectual adjudication
of the questions involved in the suit. In the present case, the revisionists
have not demonstrated such necessity. Their grievance, in substance,
relates to the possible impact of the proceedings upon claims which they
assert independently of the landlord-tenant relationship pleaded in the
suit.  The possibility that an adjudication may have some bearing upon
an independent claim asserted by a third party is not equivalent to a
finding that such party's presence is indispensable for adjudication of the
suit.
41. It is equally necessary to clarify that rejection of the application
for impleadment does not amount to an adjudication, either expressly or
by implication, of the independent claims advanced by the revisionists.
The validity of the sale deed dated 22.07.2016, the claim of revisionist
no. 1 to ownership of the disputed premises and the question whether

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revisionist no. 2 was validly inducted as a tenant by her are not matters
determined by the impugned order. Nor is their determination necessary
for deciding the present revision. Those questions must remain open for
consideration in appropriate proceedings before the competent forum, in
accordance with law.
42. The procedural power of impleadment cannot be employed to
secure, within proceedings of a limited and defined scope, an
adjudication of substantive rights which do not form part of the
controversy before the Court. The refusal to implead a person signifies
only that his or her presence is not required for deciding the questions
involved in the pending proceedings. It does not, in itself, determine or
extinguish any independent right which such person may otherwise be
entitled to assert before the competent forum.
43. On a cumulative consideration of the pleadings, the material
placed on record and the nature of the controversy involved in the S.C.C.
suit, this Court finds that the revisionists have failed to establish that
their presence is necessary for passing an effective decree or is required
for complete and effectual adjudication of the dispute between the
plaintiff and the defendant. The claim of revisionist no. 1 raises an
independent dispute concerning ownership of the premises and the
validity of the sale deed, whereas the claim of revisionist no. 2 rests
upon an alleged tenancy said to have commenced after institution of the
S.C.C. suit. Neither of these claims has been shown to constitute a
question requiring determination for adjudication of the suit as instituted.
The fact that both claims relate to the same premises, or that the
defendant has referred to Manoj in his written statement as a person
occupying the premises under revisionist no. 1, does not, by itself, render
the revisionists necessary or proper parties to the suit. Their independent
claims, if otherwise maintainable, may be pursued before the competent
forum in accordance with law.
44. The court below has considered the nature of the claims set up by
the revisionists, the material relied upon in support thereof and the scope

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of the controversy pending before it. Its conclusion that the revisionists
are neither necessary nor proper parties is a view consistent with the
principles governing impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and
does not suffer from any illegality or material irregularity warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under
Section 25 of the Act, 1887
45. It is, however, clarified that the adjudication in the present
revision is confined to the question of impleadment of the revisionists in
the pending S.C.C. suit. The refusal to implead them does not involve,
nor does it entail, any adjudication of their independent claims in respect
of the disputed premises. Accordingly, no opinion is expressed on the
merits of Original Suit No. 38 of 2018, the validity or otherwise of the
sale deed dated 22.07.2016, or the existence and legal effect of the
alleged tenancy claimed by revisionist no. 2. All such questions shall
remain open for consideration by the competent court in appropriate
proceedings, in accordance with law and uninfluenced by any
observation made in this judgment.
46. For the reasons recorded above, and subject to the clarification
made hereinbefore, the revision is found to be devoid of merit. The
impugned order dated 27.07.2026 does not warrant interference by this
Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the
Act, 1887. The revision is, accordingly, dismissed.
47. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)
November 05, 2026
RKK/-
Digitally signed by :-
RAJ KUMAR KANNAUJIA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad