Leena Paulose vs Directorate Of Enforcement

$~P-2
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 08.04.2026
Pronounced on: 05.05.2026
Uploaded on: 05.05.2026
+ BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 & CRL.M.A. 38115/2024,
18039/2025, CRL.M.As. 32921-32922/2025
LEENA PAULOSE .....Petitioner
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT .....Respondent
Appearances:-
For Petitioner:
Mr. Anant Malik, Mr. Paul John, Mr. Kunal Narwal and Ms. Ananya
Chandra, Advocates.
For Respondent:
Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Spl. SC with Mr. Vivek Gurnani, Panel Counsel, Mr.
Kanishk Maurya, Mr. Prekshit Chauna, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
JUDGMENT
1. By way of this application, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”], read with Section 45 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 [“PMLA”], the petitioner
seeks regular bail in connection with ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021, dated
08.08.2021, under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA.
2. I have heard Mr. Anant Malik, learned counsel for the petitioner,
and Mr. Vivek Gurnani, learned counsel for the Directorate of
Enforcement [“ED”]. The counter affidavit of the respondent is also on
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 1 of 27

record.
A. P ROSECUTION C ASE
3. The prosecution case, as it emerges from the material on record, is
summarised hereinbelow:
A. The genesis of the present ECIR lies in an investigation pertaining
to another ECIR/DLZO-II/05/2019 [“the 2019 ECIR”], related to
Religare Finvest Limited. During the investigation in respect of the
2019 ECIR, it was found that one Ms. Aditi Singh had made
certain financial transactions, on the basis of which she was
summoned on 17.06.2021. Her statement was recorded under
Section 50 of the PMLA, and she tendered her mobile phone.
B. After CDR and technical analysis of her phone, it was revealed that
she was getting calls, purportedly from Government of India
officers, specifically the Home Minister’s office and the Prime
Minister’s office. It was also found that the calls were made
through a mobile application, by which the caller can hide his/her
real number and choose a number that he/she wants to reflect on
the screen of the recipient.
C. The caller was identified to be Sukesh Chandrasekhar @ Sukash
Chandrasekhar [hereinafter, “Sukesh”], who was in judicial
custody in Rohini Jail, in connection with unrelated criminal
proceedings. Sukesh is the petitioner’s husband.
D. FIR No. 208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, lodged at Special Cell, Delhi,
for offences punishable under Sections 170, 384, 386, 388, 419,
420, 506, 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“IPC”] and
Section 66(D) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 [“the IT
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 2 of 27

Act”], was registered on the complaint of Ms. Aditi Singh, with
respect to extortion of money to the tune of more than Rs. 200
crores, against unknown persons.
E. Upon a demand being made by Sukesh, modalities for payment
were communicated to Aditi Singh. Once the time and place was
fixed, two brothers, by the names of Pradeep Ramdanee and
Deepak Ramnani, would reach the place and take the delivery in
terms of the arranged modalities. The same pattern was repeated
multiple times. The money would then be transferred through
hawala channels, either within India or outside. The money was
routed through various entities, including the petitioner herein, as
well as shell companies through accommodation entry providers,
and other co-accused.
F. In furtherance of a complaint, Delhi Police laid a trap and
apprehended Pradeep Ramdanee and Deepak Ramnani, who used
to collect cash from the complainant on the instructions of Sukesh.
Sukesh was thereafter arrested on 08.08.2021 from Rohini Jail. The
allegation against him was that he extorted more than Rs. 200
crores from Aditi Singh, including by impersonation of senior
government functionaries. She was promised the assistance of the
said government functionaries to secure bail for her husband, who
was in judicial custody in connection with the affairs of Religare
Finvest Limited.
G. Sections 384, 386, 388, 419, 420, and 120B of the IPC are
scheduled offences under Part A of the PMLA. ED, therefore,
recorded ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021 to investigate offences of money
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 3 of 27

laundering under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA. The present bail
application arises out of proceedings emanating from this ECIR.
H. The first prosecution complaint was filed on 04.12.2021 before the
Sessions Court, Patiala House Courts. In the prosecution
complaint, ED relied upon 192 documents, including statements
under Section 50 of the PMLA, bank accounts statements and other
documents related to proceeds of crime. Eight individuals were
arrayed as accused persons, including the present petitioner, who is
Sukesh’s wife. Five more supplementary prosecution complaints
were filed, taking the total number of accused persons to eighteen.
I. In respect of the predicate offence, a chargesheet has also been
filed in FIR No. 208/2021, lodged at Police Station Special Cell. In
the chargesheet, Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act,
1999 [“MCOCA”] has been invoked, alleging that Sukesh and the
petitioner were running an organised crime syndicate alongwith
their associates. The petitioner has been named in four prior cases
with Sukesh, details of which are as follows:
i. FIR No. 186/2017, lodged at Police Station Crime Branch,
Delhi, under Sections 201/120B of the IPC and Sections
7/12/13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
ii. Crime No. 24/2013, registered at Central Crime Branch
Police, Chennai, under Sections 406/409/420/34 of the IPC
and Section 66D of the IT Act.
iii. Crime No. 33/2015, registered at Economic Offences Wing,
Mumbai, under Sections 420/120B of the IPC and Sections
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 4 of 27

3/4 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes
1
(Banning) Act, 1978 .
iv. Crime No. 64/2013 [RC 6E/2014/BSFC] registered at
Central Crime Branch, Chennai, under Sections
406/409/420/120B of the IPC and Sections 13(1)(d)/13(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
J. The petitioner was arrested in connection with FIR No. 208/2021,
lodged at Police Station Special Cell, on 05.09.2021. While she
was in judicial custody, she was arrested in connection with
ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021 on 09.10.2021.
K. The investigation revealed that the petitioner had five
proprietorship concerns, namely M/s Nail Artistry, M/s Super Car
Artistry, M/s News Express Post, M/s L S Fisheries, and M/s L S
Education. She had opened M/s Nail Artistry in 2018, and was
doing business of Nail Salon at Kochi, Chennai, and Bangalore,
whereas M/s Super Car Artistry was opened in September 2020,
and was doing business of sales/purchase of used high end
vehicles. The three other entities are stated to be relatively inactive.
Analysis of bank accounts of these companies revealed that, during
the period of crime, i.e. June 2020 to August 2021, various
amounts were credited from different unrelated firms/individuals in
these accounts.
L. On the basis of statements of co-accused B. Mohanraj, Jeetender
Kothari, Kamlesh Kothari, and the petitioner herself, it was
1
The petitioner was not chargesheeted in Crime No. 33/2015, registered at Economic Offences Wing,
Mumbai.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 5 of 27

revealed that the petitioner was the owner of a residential property
[bearing Nos. 12 and 13, Kanathur Reddy Kuppam Village, Opp.
Mayajal, ECR, Chennai] purchased through a benami transaction.
M.During investigation, 26 high end vehicles purchased from the
proceeds of crime were seized from the premises linked to Sukesh
and his associates. Out of the 26 vehicles, 16 vehicles were seized
from the premises of the petitioner. All these vehicles were, in fact,
purchased in the name of M/s Super Car Artistry or M/s Nail
Artistry.
N. Statements of Shiva Subramanian and Anand Moorthy revealed
that the transfer of approximately Rs. 20 lakhs in the bank account
of M/s Nail Artistry took place by swiping debit/credit cards on 1%
commission, against which cash was taken from the petitioner.
O. During the period of crime, the petitioner booked multiple
chartered flights, costing approximately Rs. 7.29 crores, using the
services of Halo Airways Pvt. Ltd.
P. The petitioner is also alleged to have opened a Demat account, and
traded in shares at the behest of Sukesh, who claimed to have
inside information.
4. The petitioner had earlier preferred a bail application before the
Sessions Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 19.05.2023. The
Sessions Court noted that the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA are not
required to be fulfilled by the petitioner, on account of being a woman.
However, the Court dismissed her bail application having regard to
sufficiency of evidence, seriousness of allegations against the petitioner,
possibility of tampering evidence, and the fact that efforts were already
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 6 of 27

being made for early completion of trial.
B. S UBMISSIONS BY LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES
5. Mr. Malik, in support of the application, submitted as follows:
a. The petitioner, being a woman, falls within the proviso to Section
45 of the PMLA, and therefore the rigours of the twin conditions
prescribed under Section 45 would not apply to her. Reference in
this connection was made to Supreme Court judgments in Shashi
2
Bala @ Shashi Bala Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement and
3
Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement .
b. The petitioner seeks the benefit of Section 479 of the BNSS
(corresponding to Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
[“CrPC”]), which provides that an undertrial who has undergone
detention for up to one-half of the maximum prescribed sentence,
is ordinarily entitled to be released on bail. The maximum
punishment prescribed under Section 4 of the PMLA is seven
years, whereas the petitioner was arrested on 09.10.2021, and has
already remained in judicial custody for more than four years and
six months.
c. The prosecution has cited as many as 311 witnesses, and the matter
is still at the stage of arguments on charge, with no likelihood of
the trial concluding in the near future.
d. The petitioner also claims parity with several co-accused persons,
who have already been granted bail by this Court as well as the
Trial Court. Mr. Malik submitted that out of the 18 accused persons
2
Criminal Appeal No. 212/2025 decided on 15.01.2025 [hereinafter, “ Shashi Bala ”].
3
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2269 [hereinafter, “ K. Kavitha ”].
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 7 of 27

in the present ECIR, 12 have already been granted bail, three by
this Court and nine by the Special Court. It was submitted that both
co-accused Arun Muthoo and Avtar Singh Kochar were granted
bail despite the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA being
applicable to them, and the petitioner’s case stands on an even
better footing, both on facts and applicability of the twin conditions
for grant of bail.
e. The petitioner was merely a beneficiary of the alleged proceeds of
crime, under the bonafide impression that the money was being
earned by her husband through legitimate means, and was being
transferred to her, in the ordinary course of their matrimonial
relationship. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on an
Income Tax notice received by Sukesh for payment of tax and
penalties for the Assessment Year 2012-13 till 2018-19. In
particular, his tax liability for Assessment Year 2018-19 alone
amounted to Rs. 1,23,16,61,880/-. It was further submitted that the
petitioner is an independent businesswoman, as well as a
professional model, actress, and dentist, having sufficient
legitimate sources of income of her own. In support of this
contention, she has placed on record her ITR acknowledgement for
the Assessment Year 2020-2021, which reflects an income of
Rs.43,69,050/-.
f. It was further submitted that co-accused Jacqueline Fernandez,
whose role was allegedly similar to that of the petitioner, i.e.
beneficiary of the proceeds of crime, was chargesheeted but not
arrested at all.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 8 of 27

g. Lastly, it was submitted that the petitioner is not a flight risk. Mr.
Malik pointed out that the petitioner did not abscond even after
being served notice by the ED; in fact, she joined and cooperated
with the investigation throughout. She has deep roots in society,
and there is no likelihood of her evading the process of law, if
released on bail.
6. Mr. Gurnani, on the other hand, submitted as follows:
a. Women are not automatically exempted from the rigours of Section
45 of the PMLA. It was argued that the proviso to Section 45
cannot be construed as mandatory in nature, as such an
interpretation would risk enabling misuse, by allowing women to
be used as conduits or scapegoats in money laundering activities.
To this effect, Mr. Gurnani relied on Saumya Charausia v.
4
Directorate of Enforcement .
b. The petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Section 479 of the
BNSS, as she is involved in multiple cases, at least four with co-
accused Sukesh. In view of Section 479(2) of the BNSS, she
cannot claim the benefit of prolonged incarceration.
c. In any event, this is a fit case for invocation of the second proviso
to Section 479(1), and detention beyond the provided period.
d. It was also argued that any delay attributable to the accused must
be excluded while computing the period of custody for the
purposes of Section 479 of the BNSS. Learned counsel relied upon
5
Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary v. Union of India and Satender Kumar
4
(2024) 6 SCC 401 [hereinafter, “ Saumya Chaurasia ”].
5
(2023) 12 SCC 1 [hereinafter, “ Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary ”].
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 9 of 27

6
Antil v. CBI . Although the matter is at the stage of arguments on
charge, ED has already concluded its arguments, and it is the
petitioner and other accused, who are responsible for delaying the
proceedings.
e. On the issue of parity, Mr. Gurnani submitted that parity must be
assessed in light of the role attributed to each accused. In the
present case, it was argued that the petitioner was not a peripheral
participant, but rather the second-in-command of the alleged crime
syndicate, and that the proceeds of crime were actively handled and
moved at her instance. It was further submitted that the utilisation
of the proceeds of crime, as detailed earlier, occurred subsequent to
the commission of the predicate offence, thereby establishing her
active involvement.
f. The authorities cited by learned counsel for the parties are
dismissed at the appropriate juncture, below.
C. A NALYSIS
I. A PPLICABILITY OF S ECTION 45 OF PMLA
7. The first question that falls for consideration is whether the
petitioner, being a woman, should be granted the benefit of the proviso to
Section 45 of the PMLA. The provision reads as follows:
Section 45: Offences to be cognizable and non bailable:
“
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person accused of an offence
under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond
unless--
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given a opportunity to oppose
the application for such release; and
6
(2022) 10 SCC 451 [hereinafter, “ Satender Kumar Antil ”].
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 10 of 27

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he
is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years, or
is a woman or is sick or infirm, or is accused either on his own or
along with other co-accused of money-laundering a sum of less
than one crore rupees may be released on bail, if the Special
7
Court so directs: ……. ”
8. Although Section 45 provides for satisfaction of certain conditions
for grant of bail in cases under PMLA, the proviso expressly vests
discretion upon the Court, in case the accused is a woman. The Supreme
Court, in K. Kavitha , while examining the scope and applicability of the
proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA, and after considering its earlier
decision in Saumya Chaurasia , held as follows:
16. A perusal of the above proviso would thus reveal that
“
the proviso permits certain category of accused including woman to
be released on bail, without the twin requirement under Section 45 of
the PMLA to be satisfied. No doubt that, as argued by the learned
ASG, in a given case the accused even if a woman may not be
automatically entitled to benefit of the said proviso and it would all
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
17. However, when a statute specifically provides a special treatment
for a certain category of accused, while denying such a benefit, the
Court will be required to give specific reasons as to why such a benefit
is to be denied.
xxx xxx xxx
22. We find that the learned Single Judge erroneously observed that
the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA is applicable only to a
“vulnerable woman”.
23. We further find that the learned Single Judge totally misapplied the
ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Saumya
Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement.
7
Emphasis supplied.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 11 of 27

24. A perusal of the judgment of this Court in the case of Saumya
Chaurasia (supra) would show that this Court has observed that the
Courts need to be more sensitive and sympathetic towards the category
of persons included in the first proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA and
similar provisions in the other Acts. The Court observes that the
persons of tender age and women who are likely to be more vulnerable
may sometimes be misused by unscrupulous elements and made
scapegoats for committing such crime.
25. No doubt that this Court observes that nowadays the educated and
well-placed women in the society engage themselves in commercial
ventures and enterprises and advertently or inadvertently engage
themselves in the illegal activities. The Court therefore puts a caution
that the Courts, while deciding such matters, should exercise the
discretion judiciously using their prudence.
26. This Court in the case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra), while
paraphrasing proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA stated in paragraph
23 as follows:
“ 23. ….. No doubt the courts need to be more sensitive and
sympathetic towards the category of persons included in the first
proviso to Section 45 and similar provisions in the other Acts, as
the persons of tender age and women who are likely to be more
vulnerable, may sometimes be misused by the unscrupulous
elements …….”
27. This Court, in the carefully couched paragraph extracted above
used the phrase “persons of tender age and woman who are likely to be
more vulnerable, may sometimes be misused by the unscrupulous
elements”. This is vastly different from saying that the proviso to
Section 45(1) of the PMLA applies only to “vulnerable woman”.
Further, this Court in the case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra) does not
say that merely because a woman is highly educated or sophisticated
or a Member of Parliament or a Member of Legislative Assembly, she
is not entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 45(1) of the
8
PMLA. ”
9. In Shashi Bala , the ED, in fact, itself admitted that the rigours of
Section 45 of the PMLA would not be applicable to a woman.
10. The import of the above decisions is that in the case of a woman
accused, even under PMLA, discretion is vested in the Court with regard
8
Emphasis supplied.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 12 of 27

to bail, and she is not to be subjected to the rigours of Section 45, unless
exceptional reasons are demonstrated. The benefit of the proviso to
Section 45 of the PMLA is available to all women as a class, and is not
limited to “ vulnerable women ”, to the exclusion of educated or
sophisticated individuals. ED’s case turns on the alleged involvement of
the petitioner as a principal accused in the predicate case, and the
quantum of proceeds of crime, which allegedly came into her hands, or
passed through her hands. In my view, these factors are insufficient to
oust the protection conferred upon the petitioner by statute. No such
special circumstances have been shown in the present case.
PPLICABILITY OF ECTION OF
II. A S 479 BNSS
11. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that she is entitled
to the benefit of Section 479 of the BNSS [corresponding to Section
436A of the CrPC], which reads as follows:
“ Section 479: Maximum period for which under-trial prisoner can be
detained
(1) Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or
trial under this Sanhita of an offence under any law (not being an
offence for which the punishment of death or life imprisonment has
been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone
detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum
period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he
shall be released by the Court on bail :
Provided that where such person is a first-time offender (who has never
been convicted of any offence in the past) he shall be released on bond
by the Court, if he has undergone detention for the period extending up
to one-third of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for such
offence under that law:
Provided further that the Court may, after hearing the Public
Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the
continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half
of the said period or release him on bail bond instead of his bond :
Provided also that no such person shall in any case be detained during
the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for more than the maximum
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 13 of 27

period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.
Explanation.—In computing the period of detention under this section
for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in
proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.
(2 ) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), and subject to the
third proviso thereof, where an investigation, inquiry or trial in more
than one offence or in multiple cases are pending against a person, he
shall not be released on bail by the Court .
(3) The Superintendent of jail, where the accused person is detained, on
completion of one-half or one third of the period mentioned in sub-
section (1), as the case may be, shall forthwith make an application in
writing to the Court to proceed under sub-section (1) for the release of
9
such person on bail. ”

“ 63. Section 436-A of the Code has been inserted by Act 25 of
2005. This provision has got a laudable object behind it,
particularly from the point of view of granting bail. This provision
draws the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can
be detained. This period has to be reckoned with the custody of
the accused during the investigation, inquiry and trial. We have
already explained that the word “trial” will have to be given an
expanded meaning particularly when an appeal or admission is
pending. Thus, in a case where an appeal is pending for a longer
time, to bring it under Section 436-A, the period of incarceration
in all forms will have to be reckoned, and so also for the revision.
64. Under this provision, when a person has undergone detention
for a period extending to one-half of the maximum period of
imprisonment specified for that offence, he shall be released by the
court on his personal bond with or without sureties. The word
“shall” clearly denotes the mandatory compliance of this
provision. We do feel that there is not even a need for a bail
application in a case of this nature particularly when the reasons
9
Emphasis supplied.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 14 of 27

for delay are not attributable against the accused. We are also
conscious of the fact that while taking a decision the Public
Prosecutor is to be heard, and the court, if it is of the view that
there is a need for continued detention longer than one-half of
the said period, has to do so. However, such an exercise of power
is expected to be undertaken sparingly being an exception to the
general rule. Once again, we have to reiterate that “bail is the
rule and jail is an exception” coupled with the principle governing
the presumption of innocence. We have no doubt in our mind that
this provision is a substantive one, facilitating liberty, being the
core intendment of Article 21. The only caveat as furnished under
the Explanation being the delay in the proceeding caused on
10
account of the accused to be excluded…. ”
11
b. In Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary , the Supreme Court held that
the benefit of Section 436A of the CrPC extends to cases
under the PMLA. However, it does not confer an absolute
right to bail, and the Court can deny such benefit, particularly
where the delay in trial is attributable to the accused. The
decision has been followed in Ajay Ajit Peter Kelkar v.
12
Directorate of Enforcement & Ors. .
13
c. In V. Senthil Balaji v. Directorate of Enforcement , although
the Supreme Court was not dealing with a plea under Section
436A of the CrPC, it held that where the trial of the
scheduled offence and the PMLA complaint is unlikely to
conclude within a reasonable time, Constitutional Courts
must exercise their extraordinary jurisdiction to grant bail.
The Court observed that Section 45 of the PMLA cannot be
used as a tool for prolonged incarceration, as continued
10
Emphasis supplied.
11
Paragraph 321.
12
2024 SCC OnLine SC 4055, paragraph 3.
13
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, paragraphs 27-29 [“ V. Senthil Balaji ”].
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 15 of 27

14. In the context of the present case, the applicability of Section 479
is thus dependent upon the following questions:
A. Has the petitioner crossed the threshold period of custody under
Section 479(1) and/or the first proviso thereto?
B. Is the period required to be adjusted under the explanation to
Section 479(1) on account of any delay attributable to the accused?
C. In the petitioner’s case, does Section 479(2) require bail to be
refused, in view of multiple offences/cases pending against her,
despite crossing the threshold period of custody?
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 16 of 27

D. Do the facts of the case require an exception to be made under the
second proviso to Section 479(1), even if the petitioner has crossed
the threshold period of custody?
15. As far as the period of custody is concerned, the Nominal Roll in
the present case shows that as of 13.01.2025, the petitioner had
undergone custody for a period of 3 years, 3 months, and 24 days. As of
today, therefore, she has undergone custody for a period of 4 years, 7
months, and 14 days. The maximum period of sentence for the offence
under Section 3 of the PMLA is seven years. The petitioner has thus
14
prima facie crossed the threshold of one-half the period of custody .
16. In the present case, however, Mr. Gurnani relied upon the
Explanation to Section 479(1), submitting that, even after filing of the last
prosecution complaint on 22.12.2024, several adjournments have been
15
taken by the petitioner and the other accused for arguments on charge .
He, therefore, submitted that the computation of the period of custody,
ought to be adjusted for such delay.
17. The position that arguments on charge are yet to be advanced by
the accused, despite several dates of hearing, is undisputed. The argument
of Mr. Malik, however, is that the Court’s approach should be holistic,
and take account of the delays caused by the prosecution as well as those
14
As the petitioner has crossed one-half the maximum period of sentence in the present case, it is not
necessary to examine whether she is entitled to the benefit of the first proviso to Section 479(1), which
reduces the required period to one-third the maximum sentence in case of “ a first time offender (who
has never been convicted of any offence in the past) ”. Suffice it to note that no previous conviction of
the petitioner for any offence appears from the record.
15
Reference may be made to the orders of the Special Court dated 24.04.2025, 25.04.2025, 29.04.2025,
02.05.2025, 19.05.2025, 21.05.2025, 01.08.2025, 02.08.202505.08.2025, 06.08.2025, 07.08.2025,
08.08.2025, 11.08.2025, 12.08.2025, 13.08.2025, 02.09.2025, 09.09.2025, 10.09.2025, 11.09.2025,
12.09.2025, 15.09.2025, 17.09.2025, 18.09.2025, 20.09.2025, 23.09.2025, 24.09.2025, 25.09.2025,
27.10.2025, 07.11.2025, 10.11.2025, 11.11.2025, 28.11.2025, 17.01.2026, 27.01.2026, 28.01.2026,
29.01.2026, and 24.03.2026.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 17 of 27

caused by the accused. He submitted, on the facts of the present case, that
filing of prosecution complaints took over three years, between filing of
the first prosecution complaint on 04.12.2021, and the fifth
supplementary complaint on 20.12.2024. Even when the last
supplementary complaint was filed, the petitioner had already been in
custody for more than three years and two months, which is almost half
of the maximum sentence under Section 4 of the PMLA.
18. On consideration of the entire chronology of events, I am inclined
to agree with Mr. Malik. The first prosecution complaint was filed on
04.12.2021, and five complaints have been filed subsequently over three
and a half years. It is not the case that the petitioner never completed her
16
arguments on the point of charge . However, charges were not framed,
due to the filing of successive prosecution complaints, lastly on
20.12.2024. The ED then advanced its arguments on charge, in respect of
each of the accused, until 23.04.2025. By this time, the petitioner had
been in custody for 3 years, 7 months, and 4 days. Thus, even assuming
that the period after 24.04.2025 constitutes delay attributable to the
accused, it is only such period that would be excluded from the
computation of the period of custody, under the Explanation to Section
479 of the BNSS. In the present case, however, the petitioner had already
completed more than half the maximum period of sentence by
23.04.2025, as she was arrested in connection with the subject case on
09.10.2021. It would thus be inappropriate to deny her the benefit of the
provision on this ground.
16
Reference may be made to the order of the Special Court dated 05.07.2023, wherein counsel for the
petitioner had argued on charge.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 18 of 27

19. The next aspect to be considered is whether the petitioner is to be
deprived of the benefit of the statute by reason of Section 479(2) of the
BNSS.
20. Mr. Gurnani submitted that the said provision, which was not part
of Section 436A of the CrPC, but has been introduced in BNSS, makes an
express exception in the case of individuals, who are subjected to
investigation, inquiry or trial, in more than one offence or in multiple
pending cases. It is submitted that in the petitioner’s case, in addition to
the present complaint proceedings instituted by ED, she is accused in
three cases, enumerated in paragraph 3(I), as also in the predicate offence,
i.e. FIR No. 208/2021 at PS Special Cell. It was, however, accepted that,
other than FIR No. 208/2021, the petitioner is on bail in the other three
17
cases .
21. Mr. Malik, on the other hand, submitted that Section 479(2) of the
BNSS does not create an absolute bar to grant of bail, even in cases where
more than one offence or multiple cases are pending against the accused.
He argued that a strict or literal interpretation of the section would deprive
an undertrial from the concession of bail, even if he/she has undergone
more than half the maximum period of sentence. According to Mr. Malik,
the section ought to be read as a whole, and construed in a manner
consistent with the constitutional right to life and liberty, particularly at a
pre-conviction stage. Mr. Malik submitted that such an approach would
also be consistent with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Badshah
17
Although four cases are enumerated in paragraph 3(I) hereinabove, the petitioner was not
chargesheeted in Crime No. 33/2015 registered at PS EOW.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 19 of 27

18
Majid Malik v. Directorate of Enforcement & Ors. , which was also
rendered under Section 479 of the BNSS, in a case involving an offence
under PMLA. The Supreme Court noted that the accused had not been
convicted in any offence in the past. Although the observations of the
Court make it clear that the accused was also an accused in the predicate
offence, i.e. there was more than one FIR pending against him, he was
released on bail under Section 479(1) of the BNSS.
22. Mr. Gurnani, however, submitted that Badshah Majid Malik does
not consider the provision of Section 479(2) of the BNSS at all. Further,
he drew my attention to three judgments of other High Courts, in which
Section 479(2) of the BNSS has been interpreted, in two of which
Badshah Majid Malik was also cited.
23. The Karnataka High Court in K Ramakrishna v. Directorate of
19
Enforcement [also a PMLA case] favoured a conjoint reading, and held
that Section 479(2) of the BNSS would also apply to the case of a “ first
20
time offender ” . The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir & Ladakh in
21
Muninder Singh @ Sonu v. UT of J&K & Ors. came to a similar
conclusion with regard to a “ first time offender ”, if the charge was under
22
more than one offence. In Panna Lal Mahto @ Ganjhu v. Union of India
[also a PMLA Case], the Jharkhand High Court distinguished Badshah
Majid Malik, on the ground that the accused therein was facing
prosecution in several predicate and scheduled offence cases.
18
SLP (Crl.) No. 10846/2024, decided on 18.10.2024 [hereinafter, “ Badshah Majid Malik ”].
19
Criminal Petition No. 9930/2024, decided on 23.11.2024.
20
A special leave petition against the said judgment was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to the
accused to approach the Trial Court [SLP Crl No. 6/2025, dated 24.02.2026].
21
BAIL APP No. 136/2025, decided on 28.11.2025.
22
BAIl APP No. 9384/2022, decided on 06.12.2024.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 20 of 27

24. Relying upon these judgments, Mr. Gurnani submitted that, in cases
to which Section 479(2) of the BNSS applies, the Court must consider the
question of the petitioner’s entitlement to bail in its discretion, without
strict applicability of Section 479(1) of the BNSS.
25. As far as the interpretation of the section is concerned, I am of the
view that a holistic interpretation, informed both by the statutory objective
and constitutional context, must be favoured. As noted by the Supreme
Court, in Satinder Kumar Antil and V. Senthil Balaji [in the context of
Section 436A of the CrPC], the statute provides a safeguard against
prolonged incarceration pending trial. While an exception can be made
under the first proviso to Section 436A CrPC [now the second proviso to
Section 479(1) of the BNSS], that exception must be sparingly invoked to
further the constitutional guarantee of liberty. In BNSS, a further
provision was made, which entitles a first-time offender to the benefit of
Section 479(1), upon completion of a lesser proportion of the maximum
rd
sentence [1/3 ]. It would, in my view, be inconsistent in this approach to
hold that Section 479(2) entirely eclipses Section 479(1), even if the
accused is facing trial in more than one offence in the same FIR, or more
than one criminal case. Instead, a harmonious reading of the various
provisions contained in Section 479 of the BNSS requires the Court to
take into account multiplicity of offences or pending proceedings as a
significant factor, but does not altogether deprive the Court of its
discretion to grant bail once the accused has crossed the custody threshold
of Section 479(1) of the BNSS.
26. Adopting this approach, in the present case, the petitioner has
already undergone custody for more than four years and six months
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 21 of 27

against a maximum prescribed sentence of seven years, i.e.,
approximately two-thirds of the maximum sentence. This period of
incarceration is significantly beyond the threshold contemplated under
Section 479 of the BNSS. The case is still at the stage of framing of
charges, and given the number of witnesses [311] and the volume of
documents, it is unlikely that the trial will conclude in the near future. In
fact, it is not implausible that the petitioner will even serve the maximum
period of imprisonment, before the trial is concluded. Further, although
the petitioner is involved in three other cases, except the predicate
offence, she is on bail in all of them. In view of these factors, and upon a
holistic consideration of Section 479 of the BNSS, the petitioner, in my
view, is entitled to the benefit of the said provision.
27. Once it is held that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the
statute, an exception can be made under the second proviso, but that
power is to be exercised sparingly, as held by the Supreme Court in
Satinder Kumar Antil . I have not been shown any compelling reason to
apply that exception in the present case.
III. P ARITY
28. Out of the 18 accused persons arrayed in the present ECIR, 12 have
already been enlarged on bail, three by this Court and nine by the Special
Court.
29. In particular, reliance has been placed on the order granting bail to
23
co-accused Arun Muthoo by this Court , who was allegedly involved in
assisting Sukesh in laundering and layering the proceeds of crime. While
23
BAIL APPLN 1821/2024, decided on 20.02.2025.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 22 of 27

granting bail, this Court had also extended to him the benefit of Section
436A of the CrPC. Bail was also granted by this Court to co-accused
24
Avtar Singh Kochar , who was alleged to be the principal hawala
operator facilitating the movement of the proceeds of crime, though his
age and medical ailments were also relevant considerations. Both Arun
Muthoo and Avtar Singh Kochar were thus granted bail, despite the
rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA being applicable to them.
25
30. Co-accused Pooja Singh has also been granted bail by this Court .
She was alleged to be a salaried employee whose role was confined to
handling of the alleged extorted amount.
31. Further, co-accused Jacqueline Fernandez, whose role was
allegedly similar to that of the petitioner, being a beneficiary of the
proceeds of crime, was granted bail by the Special Court vide order dated
15.11.2022.
32. Certain other co-accused have also been enlarged on bail by the
Special Court, including Pradeep Ramdani, who was allegedly caught
red-handed with proceeds of crime and was granted bail vide order dated
02.08.2022, and Pinky Irani, who was alleged to have facilitated
interactions with celebrities and arranged expensive gifts for commission,
was granted bail vide order dated 15.02.2022.
33. The role attributed to the petitioner in the present case under
PMLA, is primarily that of handling, utilisation, and enjoyment of the
proceeds of crime. She is alleged to have operated five proprietorship
concerns, including M/s Nail Artistry and M/s Super Car Artistry,
24
BAIL APPLN 1814/2022, decided on 29.11.2023.
25
BAIL APPLN 79/2023, decided on 29.08.2023.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 23 of 27

through which substantial funds were routed from unrelated firms and
individuals during the period from June 2020 to August 2021. These
entities were allegedly used for facilitating cash transactions and
acquiring high-end assets. The petitioner is further alleged to be the
beneficial owner of a residential property in Chennai acquired through a
benami transaction. Out of 26 luxury cars allegedly purchased from the
proceeds of crime, 16 were recovered from premises linked to her, the
cars having been purchased in the names of her firms. Statements of
witnesses also indicate that approximately Rs. 20 lakhs was transferred
into her company accounts through debit and credit card swipes against
cash transactions on commission. She is also alleged to have booked
multiple chartered flights worth approximately Rs. 7.29 crores and to
have opened a Demat account for trading in shares at the behest of
Sukesh, thereby assisting in the enjoyment and utilisation of the proceeds
of crime.
34. While utilisation of the proceeds of crime is a matter to be
considered at trial, Avtar Singh Kochchar, who was alleged to be the
principal hawala operator, Arun Muthoo, who allegedly handled and
layered the proceeds of crime, and Jacqueline Fernandez, who was
alleged to be a beneficiary enjoying the proceeds of crime, have already
been granted bail. I am of the view that the petitioner’s case cannot be
said to stand on a graver footing than theirs. Particularly in the context of
PMLA proceedings, the roles attributed to hawala operators and those
directly involved in layering and movement of the proceeds of crime are
also of utmost significance. Further, Jacqueline Fernandez is also, like the
petitioner, accused as a beneficiary or user of proceeds of crime. The
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 24 of 27

petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of parity with the co-
accused.
IV. R ESULT OF THE A BOVE D ISCUSSION
35. Having regard to the period of custody undergone, viewed in the
light of Section 479 of the BNSS, the fact that the petitioner had joined
the investigation prior to her arrest, the non-applicability of the stringent
conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA, and the benefit of parity with
similarly placed co-accused who have already been granted bail, I am of
the considered view that the petitioner is entitled to be released on bail in
the present case.
36. It may be noted that by a separate judgment delivered today, I have
declined bail to the petitioner in the predicate offence [FIR No. 208/2021,
dated 07.08.2021, lodged at Special Cell, Delhi]. In my view, the present
case, however, stands on a different footing, for the following principal
reasons:
A. First, the twin restrictions on grant of bail under Section 21(4) of
MCOCA are applicable to the petitioner, whereas Section 45 of the
PMLA is not.
B. Second, the maximum period of sentence under Section 3 of
MCOCA is life imprisonment, whereas in the present case, it is
imprisonment for a period of seven years, which leads to an
entirely different consideration of the period of custody already
undergone.
C. Third, considerations of parity also enure to the petitioner’s benefit
in the present case, where the allegations against her are confined
to benefiting from the proceeds of crime. In contrast, the predicate
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 25 of 27

offence concerns her involvement as a member and second-in-
command of the organised crime syndicate.
ONCLUSION
D. C
37. In view of the above discussion, the application is allowed, and it is
directed that the petitioner be released on bail in connection with
ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021, dated 08.08.2021, under Sections 3 and 4 of
PMLA, subject to furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 10,00,000/-,
alongwith two sureties in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the
concerned Special Court, and subject to the further following conditions:
a. The petitioner shall appear before the Special Court on each and
every date of hearing;
b. The petitioner shall surrender her passport before the Special
Court, and shall not leave the country without prior permission of
the Special Court;
c. The petitioner shall provide her permanent address to the Special
Court, as also the address where she is residing during the
pendency of the case. The petitioner shall intimate the Investigating
Officer [“IO”], and file an affidavit before the Special Court,
regarding any change in residential address;
d. The petitioner shall provide her mobile number to the concerned
IO/Station House Officer, which shall be kept in working condition
at all times. The mobile number shall not be switched off or
changed without prior intimation to the IO during the pendency of
the trial;
e. The petitioner shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement,
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 26 of 27

threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the
case or tamper with the evidence of the case, in any manner
whatsoever;
f. The petitioner shall not commit any offence during the period of
her release.
38. The bail application is disposed of in terms of the above.
39. It is clarified that any observations made in the present judgment
are solely for the purpose of deciding the present bail application, and
shall neither influence the trial proceedings, nor be construed as an
expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
40. Copy of the judgment be communicated to the concerned Jail
Superintendent electronically for information and necessary compliance.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
MAY 5, 2026
PV/SS/AD/KA/
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.05.2026
19:12
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024 Page 27 of 27