Ponraj vs The Inspector of Police
- Court
- Madras High Court
Crl.A(MD) No. 300 of 2020
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 10-11-2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE D.LINGESWARAN
Crl.A(MD) No.300 of 2020
CNR:{HCMD010554632020}
Ponraj ..Appellant
Vs
The Inspector of Police
Aundipatti Police Station,
Theni District.
Cr.No.194 of 2013. ..Respondent
PRAYER: Criminal Appeal filed under Section 347(2) to call for the
records relating to the judgment in S.C.N.119 of 2014 dated 26.08.2020,
on the file of the Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni and set aside the same
and allow this Criminal Appeal.
For Appellant :Mr.J.Lawrance
For Respondent :Mr.A.Robinson
Additional Public Prosecutor
JUDGMENT
This Criminal Appeal is filed challenging the judgment in
S.C.N.119 of 2014 dated 26.08.2020, on the file of the Fast Track Mahila
Court, Theni and set aside the same and allow this Criminal Appeal.
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2. The Case
(a) The case of the prosecution is that the appellant, who was
working as a Mesthri (construction supervisor), entered into a physical
relationship with the prosecutrix, a construction worker, on the promise
of marrying her, made her pregnant and subsequently refused to marry
her. A complaint was lodged and a case in Cr.No.194 of 2013 was
registered by the respondent Police. The case was investigated, evidence
was collected, and the appellant was charge-sheeted and tried before the
trial Court.
(b) The prosecution examined 23 witnesses and exhibited 8
documents. No material objects were marked. The defence filed no
documents. On a consideration of the entire evidence, the learned
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni, convicted the appellant
under Sections 376 and 506(i) of the IPC and acquitted him under
Section 417 of the IPC. For the offence under Section 376 of the IPC,
the appellant was sentenced to undergo ten years of Rigorous
Imprisonment and a fine of Rs.60,000/-, in default, to undergo two years
of Rigorous Imprisonment. For the offence under Section 506(i) of the
IPC, he was sentenced to undergo six months of Simple Imprisonment.
Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the appellant has preferred
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this appeal.
3. This Court has carefully considered the submissions of both sides.
4. Point for Consideration:
Whether the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court are
sustainable?
5. Discussion and Findings
(a) The evidence of the prosecutrix
PW1, the prosecutrix, was 27 years old at the time of the occurrence
and worked as a construction worker under the appellant. By her own
evidence, she knew even before the physical relationship began that the
appellant was a married man with two children. Despite that
knowledge, she continued the relationship with him for about one year.
She disclosed the relationship to no one until she became pregnant, and
only at an advanced stage of pregnancy did she inform her family and
ask the appellant to marry her.
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(b) The legal position
b(i) Under Section 375 of the IPC, absence of consent of the woman
is the foundational ingredient of rape. Under Section 90 of the IPC, a
consent is not a valid consent if it is given under fear of injury or under
a misconception of fact, and the person who obtains it knows, or has
reason to believe, that it was so given. The question in cases of this
kind is therefore whether consent of the woman to sexual intercourse
was vitiated by a false promise of marriage, or whether it was a
voluntary choice made in a relationship that later broke down.
b(ii) The Hon’ble Supreme Court has settled the principles governing
this question through a consistent line of decisions:
(a) In Uday v. State of Karnataka , (2003 (4) SCC 46), the Court held
that where a mature woman has sexual intercourse with a man with full
knowledge of the circumstances, including the difficulties standing in
the way of marriage, her consent cannot be said to have been given
under a misconception of fact merely because the promised marriage
did not take place. The Court also observed that, to apply Section 90 of
IPC, the accused must have known that the consent was given under a
misconception.
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(b) In Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar , ((2005) 1 SCC
88), and Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh , ((2006) 11
SCC 615), the Court examined when a promise to marry can be treated
as having induced consent. It held that the promise must have been
false from its inception and consent of the woman must have been
given because of it.
(c) In Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala , ((2013) 9 SCC 113), the Court
described consent as a conscious and voluntary act that involves a
reasoned choice between alternatives.
(d) In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra , ((2019) 9
SCC 608), the Court summarized the position. Consent under Section
375 involves an active and reasoned understanding of the act and its
consequences. A promise of marriage vitiates consent only if it was
false from the outset and bore a direct nexus to the decision of the
woman to engage in the sexual act. The Court also held that a promise
made in good faith but later not fulfilled does not amount to rape.
(e) The same principles were reaffirmed in Dhruvaram Murlidhar
Sonar v. State of Maharashtra , ((2019) 18 SCC 191), Anurag Soni v.
State of Chhattisgarh , ((2019) 13 SCC 1), Maheshwar Tigga v. State
of Jharkhand , ((2020) 10 SCC 108), and Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v.
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State of Uttar Pradesh , ( 2021 INSC 134 ). In Sonu’s case , the Court
emphasized that the alleged misconception of fact must be proximate in
time to the sexual act and cannot be spread over a long period of
continuing relationship.
b(iii) The common thread of these decisions is that the criminal law
punishes the deception that induces consent, not the failure of a
relationship or the non-performance of a promise. A relationship that
was voluntary when entered into does not become rape because it later
ended in disappointment, however genuine the grievance of the
prosecutrix may be.
(c) Application to the facts
c(i) Applying these principles, this Court finds that the prosecution
has not established that consent of the prosecutrix was vitiated, for the
following reasons.
c(ii) First, there was no concealment or fraud on the part of the
appellant. The prosecutrix admits that she knew, before any physical
intimacy, that the appellant was married and had two children. The one
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fact that would ordinarily make a promise of marriage deceptive,
namely his marital status, was known to her throughout. A woman who
knows that the man is already married, and that he cannot lawfully
marry another woman while his earlier marriage subsists, cannot
reasonably be said to have been misled into believing that a lawful
marriage would follow. Her consent therefore cannot be treated as
given under a misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90
of the IPC.
c(iii) Second, the relationship continued for about one year. It was a
sustained relationship between two adults, and the prosecutrix
remained in it with full knowledge of marital status of the appellant. A
consent that is given repeatedly over such a period, with that
knowledge, cannot be traced to a single misconception operating at the
time of each act. This is precisely the situation that Sonu @ Subhash
Kumar held falls outside Section 90.
c(iv) Third, the conduct of the prosecutrix is consistent with a
consensual relationship and inconsistent with an unwilling or deceived
participant. She disclosed nothing to anyone until her pregnancy was
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advanced, and it was only then that she told her family and asked the
appellant to marry her. Her complaint was lodged after the pregnancy
and the refusal of the appellant to marry her. This shows that her
objective was marriage and that the complaint followed the failure of
that expectation.
c(v) Fourth, the prosecutrix herself admitted that there was a
compromise discussion at the police station and that the appellant had
agreed to pay her Rs.1,50,000/- as compensation but she demanded
Rs.2,50,000/-. She also admitted that the complaint was registered only
when he failed to pay the demanded amount. A complaint of rape, the
gravest of sexual offences, is not ordinarily made to depend on the
payment of money. This circumstance, taken with the others, shows
that the proceedings were set in motion because the settlement failed,
and not because the prosecutrix had been compelled or deceived into
sexual relations. It weakens the prosecution case and raises a
reasonable doubt as to whether the sexual relationship was non-
consensual.
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c(vi) Lack of consent is an essential ingredient of the offence of
rape. On the evidence of the prosecutrix herself, she was a willing party
to the relationship throughout the period of one year, and the
prosecution has failed to prove the absence of consent. The offence
under Section 376 of the IPC is therefore not made out.
(d) The charge under Section 506(i) of the IPC
The charge of criminal intimidation under Section 506(i) of the IPC
arose from, and depends on, the principal allegation of a coerced or
deceptive sexual relationship. No material has been pointed out to this
Court that independently establishes that the appellant threatened the
prosecutrix with intent to cause her alarm. Once the foundation of the
principal charge fails, the conviction under Section 506(i) of the IPC
cannot stand.
6. Conclusion
The Trial Court failed to apply the settled distinction between a
consensual relationship that ended in a broken promise and a sexual act
obtained by deception. For the reasons given above, this Court finds
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that the conviction of the appellant under Sections 376 and 506(i) of the
IPC cannot be sustained.
7. Result
(a) In the result, the appellant is acquitted of the charges under
Section 376 and Section 506(i) of the IPC. The judgment of the learned
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni, in S.C. No.119 of 2014
dated 26.08.2020 is set aside.
(b) Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The bail bond
executed by the appellant is discharged, and the fine amount already
paid by him is ordered to be refunded to him.
10-11-2026
Index: Yes/No
Speaking/Non-speaking order
Neutral Citation: Yes/No
rgm
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Crl.A(MD) No. 300 of 2020
To
1. The Inspector of Police
Aundipatti Police Station,
Theni District.
2. The Additional Public Prosecutor
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
Madurai
Copy To :
Section Officer ( VR Section )
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
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Crl.A(MD) No. 300 of 2020
D.LINGESWARAN, J.
rgm
Crl.A(MD) No.300 of 2020
10-11-2026
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