Madhusudan vs Deputy Commissioner South-West And Ors.

$~81
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Date of decision: 19 May, 2026
+ W.P.(C) 10702/2023, CM APPL. 41473/2023, CM APPL.
57821/2023, CM APPL. 20110/2024 & CM APPL. 66288/2024

MADHUSUDAN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Gaurav Sarin, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Samman Vardhan Gautam, Mr.
Ilesh Shukla, Ms. Khushi Sharma,
Mr. Priyam Tiwari, Ms. Anshika
Priyadarshini, Mr. Chetanya Singh,
Mr. Harish, Ms. Swati and Mr.
Samarth Tyagi, Advocates.
versus
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER SOUTH-WEST AND ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Rajesh Yadav, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Amit K. Batra, Mr. Shashi Bala
and Mr. Dhruv Kumar, Advocates for
R-3/BPCL with Mr. Shekhar Gupta,
BPCL Officer.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, SC with
Mrs. K. K. Kiran Pathak, Mr. Sunil
Kumar Jha, Mr. M. S. Akhtar and Mr.
Kushagra Dixit, Advocates for R-2.
Mr. Tushar Sannu and Ms. Palak
Gupta Joshi, Advocates for GNCTD.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT

SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral)

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1. The Petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 3 August, 2023
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passed by the District Magistrate, South-West, in Case No. 1/17/2018,
whereby the Petitioner’s request for correction of revenue entries in respect
of land comprised in Mustatil No. 54, Killa Nos. 2/2/2 min (1-09), 9 min (3-
11), 10/1 (2-01), 12 (4-12) and 19/1 (0-14), admeasuring 12 bighas and 7
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biswas, situated in the revenue estate of Village Bharthal, New Delhi, has
been rejected. The Petitioner also seeks protection against demolition,
forcible dispossession or interference with the subject land.
2. At the heart of the case lies a short but important question: could the
District Magistrate, while considering correction of revenue records after a
Division Bench of this Court had declared the acquisition proceedings to
have lapsed, refuse such correction by relying on the very acquisition record
from which the impugned revenue entry had emanated.
3. Since the matter has had a long history, the relevant facts must be
noticed with some care.
Factual background
4. The Petitioner claims ownership of the subject land on the basis of a
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registered sale deed dated 11 January, 1985. According to the Petitioner,
mutation was also recorded in his favour, and he constructed a boundary
wall over the land before the acquisition proceedings commenced.
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5. On 4 February, 1988, a notification under Section 4 read with
Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be issued for
acquisition of land situated in Village Bharthal for the public purpose of
expansion of the Bijwasan Oil Terminal of Bharat Petroleum Corporation
Limited (Respondent No. 3). By invocation of the urgency provisions under
Section 17, the enquiry contemplated under Section 5A stood dispensed

1
“subject land”
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with, following which a declaration under Section 6 was issued on 16
February, 1988.
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6. On 16 May, 1988, possession proceedings ( kabza karwahi ) were
drawn up recording that possession of 60 bighas and 17 biswas of land,
including Khasra Nos. 54//2/2/2, 9, 10/1, 12 and 19/1, had been taken and
handed over to BPCL. The proceedings further record the existence of a
boundary wall, tube-well and room upon the land, and state that possession
was delivered in the same condition. The document also records that
possession of Khasra No. 54//22 min, admeasuring 3 bighas and 10 biswas,
could not be delivered on account of the land being built-up.
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7. On 9 December, 1988, the Petitioner instituted W.P.(C) 2803/1988
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before this Court assailing the acquisition proceedings. On 12 December,
1988, a Division Bench directed that the Petitioner shall not be dispossessed
from the land in question. The Petitioner was, correspondingly, restrained
from raising construction or transferring, alienating or parting with
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possession of the land. On 22 February, 1990, the interim order dated 12
December, 1988 was confirmed.
8. During the pendency of W.P.(C) 2803/1988, the Land Acquisition
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Collector announced Award No. 13/1989-90 on 10 August, 1989, assessing
the total compensation for the entire acquired land, ad-measuring 64 Bighas
and 7 Biswas in Village Bharthal, at INR 14,70,195/-. The record reflects
that the Petitioner filed a claim for compensation before the Land
Acquisition Collector. However, the said claim was filed without prejudice
to his rights and contentions raised in his pending writ proceedings.
9. W.P.(C) 2803/1988 was decided along with W.P.(C) 1063/1988 (filed
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by another landowner, Vivek K. Manha) by a Division Bench on 27 April,
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2006. The Court declined to quash the Section 4 notification in its entirety.
It, however, found fault with the dispensation of the Section 5A enquiry
because the original administrative records showed no independent
application of mind by the Lieutenant Governor to specifically invoke
Section 17(4). Holding that mere urgency does not automatically extinguish
the right to file objections, the Court quashed the Section 17(4) notification
and the Section 6 declaration. The Court permitted the Petitioners to file
objections under Section 5A within 30 days, directed the authorities to
consider the objections in accordance with law, directed the parties to
maintain status quo unless varied by a competent court, and required the
Respondents to proceed with the acquisition proceedings in accordance with
law as expeditiously as possible and in any case within six months.
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10. The Government of NCT of Delhi carried the judgment dated 27
April, 2006 to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
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on 21 March, 2012.
11. The Petitioner thereafter filed W.P.(C) 5944/2013 on the ground that
after the dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court, no fresh declaration
under Section 6 had been issued within the period permitted in law. By
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judgment dated 28 October, 2014, another Division Bench of this Court
recorded that the relevant file had been produced before it and no
notification under Section 6, subsequent to dismissal of the SLP by the
Supreme Court, could be found. Following Padmasundara Rao v. State of
2
Tamil Nadu , the Division Bench declared that since the time for issuing the
notification under Section 6 had elapsed, the entire acquisition proceedings
had to be declared as having lapsed. The Petitioner was given liberty to seek
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correction of the revenue record.
12. Thereafter, the Petitioner submitted representations for correction of
the revenue entries. As no action was taken, the Petitioner filed W.P.(C)
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2988/2017. By order dated 15 January, 2018, this Court directed the
Deputy Commissioner, South-West, to decide the Petitioner’s representation
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dated 1 February, 2013 by a reasoned and speaking order within six weeks.
13. The matter then remained pending before the revenue authorities for a
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considerable period. Eventually, by order dated 3 August, 2023, the
District Magistrate rejected the Petitioner’s request for correction. That
order is impugned in the present petition.
The impugned order
14. The impugned order takes note of Petitioner’s consistent case that he
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was never dispossessed pursuant to the kabza karwahi dated 16 May, 1988.
It records his contention that the land was enclosed within a boundary wall
and gate, contained certain constructions, and that neither demolition nor
forcible physical entry had ever taken place.
15. The order further records that BPCL claimed the subject land fell
within its boundary wall, which was disputed by the Petitioner. Upon
physical demarcation being carried out through the revenue authorities, the
Petitioner asserted that the report showed the land in question to be outside
the BPCL boundary wall and within a separate boundary wall constructed by
him in 1986-87, which remained intact. The order also notices the
Petitioner’s contention that the khasra girdawari up to 1994-95 reflected him
in cultivatory possession.

2
(2002) 3 SCC 533.
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16. In the discussion portion, the District Magistrate thereafter refers to a
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field report dated 28 March, 2022 prepared by the Halka Patwari and
verified by the Field Kanungo, which records that the subject land
admeasuring approximately 12 bighas and 7 biswas falls outside the BPCL
boundary wall, whereas only a smaller portion admeasuring about 2 bighas
falls within it.
17. Notwithstanding the above, the District Magistrate concludes that
possession had already been taken by the revenue authorities and handed
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over to BPCL on 16 May, 1988, prior to the status quo order dated 12
December, 1988. Reliance is also placed on the mutation effected in favour
of BPCL in 1999. The impugned order ultimately proceeds on the premise
that “it is the kabza karwahi and the entry of name of BPCL which will
decide the ownership”, and on that basis rejects the request for correction of
revenue entries.
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner
18. Mr. Gautam Sarin, Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the
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impugned order effectively defeats the judgment dated 28 October, 2014.
Once the Division Bench declared the acquisition proceedings qua the
subject land to have lapsed, correction of the revenue record ought to have
followed. The revenue authority could not sit in judgment over the binding
declaration of this Court.
19. The Petitioner is not seeking adjudication of disputed possession or
recovery of physical possession from BPCL. The principal relief is confined
to correction of the revenue record. The second prayer in the writ petition,
seeking protection against dispossession, is said to be ancillary to the interim
protection already granted in these proceedings. If any further possessory
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relief is necessary, the Petitioner will pursue such remedy as may be
available in law.
20. The impugned revenue entries exist solely by virtue of the acquisition
proceedings. Once the acquisition has lapsed, the entries cannot survive
independently as though the acquisition still subsists. Permitting such entries
to continue would result in a legally incongruous position where the
acquisition stands lapsed, yet the State or BPCL continues to be reflected in
the revenue record on the strength of that very acquisition.
21. The District Magistrate misunderstood the scope of the proceedings
before him. The representation was not an adversarial dispute concerning
title or mutation, but a request for correction of the revenue record
consequent upon the lapse of acquisition proceedings declared by this Court.
While the authority could verify the record, it could not reopen or dilute the
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effect of the judgment dated 28 October, 2014.
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22. If BPCL was aggrieved by that judgment dated 28 October, 2014 in
W.P.(C) 5944/2013 on the ground of non-impleadment, its remedy was to
seek recall, review, appeal or such other relief as law permitted. The binding
effect of that judgment could not be disregarded by a revenue authority.
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23. The kabza karwahi dated 16 May, 1988, were merely “paper
proceedings” carried out unilaterally behind the Petitioner’s back, without
taking actual physical possession of the Subject Land. In support of this,
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reliance is also placed on the interim orders dated 12 December, 1988, and
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22 February, 1990 to contend that if possession had already been fully and
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effectively taken on 16 May, 1988, the Respondents would have sought
clarification or modification of the interim protection granted by this Court.
Instead, the protection against dispossession continued after hearing the
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Respondents.
24. The impugned order is internally contradictory. While it notices that
the subject land falls outside BPCL’s boundary wall and within a separate
boundary wall stated to have been constructed by the Petitioner, it
nevertheless concludes that possession is undisputedly with BPCL, without
reconciling the two findings.
25. The District Magistrate wrongly relied upon Indore Development
3
Authority v. Manoharlal . The said decision arose in the context of Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act and the manner of proving possession for the purposes
of lapse under that provision. The present case, concerns a prior judicial
declaration that the acquisition itself had lapsed for non-issuance of a fresh
declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. The District Magistrate could
not invoke Indore Development Authority to reopen that issue.
26. Reliance is placed on Gojer Brothers Private Limited v. State of West
4
Bengal , to submit that once acquisition proceedings lapse, even a
beneficiary in possession cannot retain the land merely on the strength of the
lapsed acquisition. Further reliance is placed upon Baldev Singh v. Land
5
Acquisition Collector , and the subsequent order in Baldev Singh v. Neha
6
Bansal , where revenue correction was directed after acquisition
proceedings were held to have become inoperative.
27. The plea of alternative remedy does not bar the present petition. The
impugned order suffers from a jurisdictional error inasmuch as it proceeds
contrary to binding judgments of this Court and directly affects rights

3
(2020) 8 SCC 129.
4
(2013) 16 SCC 660.
5 rd
In W.P.(C) 5083/2014, decided on 23 January, 2018.
6 th
In CONT.CAS(C) No. 776/2019, deiced on 16 August, 2024.
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protected under Article 300A of the Constitution.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 1
28. Respondent No. 1 supports the impugned order and submits that the
same was passed in compliance with the directions issued by this Court on
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15 January, 2018 in W.P.(C) 2988/2017. Notices were issued to the
concerned departments, replies were obtained from BPCL and the Land
Acquisition Collector, and the relevant records, including the kabza
karwahi , acquisition file, demarcation reports and revenue entries, were duly
examined.
29. The impugned order is a reasoned and speaking quasi-judicial order.
The revenue record, particularly Jamabandi for the year 2002-03, recorded
the land in the name of “Sarkar Daulatmadar makbuja mehkma Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Limited”. The impugned order merely records the
existing revenue position and refuses correction after considering the
relevant material.
30. The impugned order is appealable under the Delhi Land Revenue Act,
1954. Anyone aggrieved by an order of the Deputy Commissioner in
mutation or revenue-entry matters has a statutory remedy before the
Financial Commissioner. On that ground, the writ petition is said to be not
maintainable.
31. Respondent No. 1 has not taken any step to dispossess the Petitioner.
If any issue of possession arises, it is between the Petitioner and BPCL. The
impugned order does not direct demolition or dispossession.
Submissions on behalf of BPCL
32. Mr. Rajesh Yadav, Senior Counsel appearing for BPCL, contests the
writ petition both on maintainability and on merits, as follows: the petition,
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although framed as one seeking correction of revenue records, the dispute in
substance concerns possession of the land, which BPCL asserts has
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remained with it since 16 May, 1988 pursuant to the kabza karwahi
prepared by the revenue authorities. The Petitioner’s plea that the possession
proceedings were merely paper proceedings stands contradicted by the
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acquisition record, the award and the judgment dated 27 April, 2006.
33. The pleadings in the writ petition itself demonstrate that the
controversy is not confined to correction of revenue entries. Reliance is
placed on the prayers seeking restraint against dispossession, demolition and
interference with possession, as well as the Petitioner’s assertion that actual
physical possession always remained with him. The writ petition, therefore,
raises seriously disputed questions of fact not amenable to adjudication
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
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34. Considerable emphasis is placed upon the kabza karwahi dated 16
May, 1988. The said proceedings records demarcation of the land, taking
over of possession of 60 bighas and 17 biswas, and handing over thereof to
BPCL in the presence of revenue officials and BPCL representatives. The
proceedings specifically refer to the subject khasra numbers and also record
that the existing crop, tube-well, room and boundary wall were taken over
and handed over in the same condition. The possession proceedings,
therefore, cannot be treated as a mere paper formality.
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35. Reliance is placed on the Award No. 13/1989-90 dated 10 August,
1989, which records the Petitioner’s claims towards compensation for the
land as well as structures, walls, trees and appurtenant features existing
thereon. The Petitioner’s claim for compensation is inconsistent with the
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present plea that the acquisition never took effect or that possession was
never taken. Moreover, the deposit and adjustment of compensation amounts
showcase that the acquisition proceedings had progressed to completion
with possession, award, compensation and mutation all having followed.
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36. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment dated 27 April, 2006 in
W.P.(C) 2803/1988 and the connected writ petition. The Division Bench, in
para 10 of the judgement, specifically noted that possession in the
Petitioner’s case had already been taken, unlike the connected matter where
possession had not been taken. These observations were made after perusal
of the original acquisition record, including the kabza karwahi , and have
attained finality. Reliance is further placed upon paragraph 22 of the
judgment, where the Division Bench observed that the major portion of the
acquired land had already been utilised and possession thereof had been
taken.
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37. The interim order dated 12 December, 1988 cannot be divorced from
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the subsequent final judgment dated 27 April, 2006. The interim protection
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was granted after possession had already been taken on 16 May, 1988, and
upon disposal of the writ petition the interim order merged into the final
judgment. The direction to maintain status quo must therefore be understood
in the context of the factual position recognised in the final judgment.
38. No court has ever directed restoration of possession to the Petitioner.
If the Petitioner seeks repossession or disputes the validity or effect of the
possession proceedings, such relief must be pursued in appropriate
substantive proceedings. A petition seeking correction of revenue records
cannot be converted into a proceeding for recovery or restoration of
possession.
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39. BPCL was not impleaded as a party either in W.P.(C) 5944/2013, in
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which the judgment dated 28 October, 2014 was rendered, or in W.P.(C)
2988/2017, pursuant to which the Deputy Commissioner was directed to
decide the Petitioner’s representation. Despite being the beneficiary of the
acquisition, having deposited compensation and being in possession
according to the acquisition record, it was kept out of those proceedings.
BPCL submits that the effect of such non-impleadment cannot be ignored.
In this regard, reliance is placed on Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola
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Nath Sharma , and Mutha Associates v. State of Maharashtra .
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40. The judgment dated 28 October, 2014 merely declared lapse of the
acquisition proceedings on account of non-issuance of a fresh declaration
under Section 6 within the prescribed period. The judgment did not examine
issues concerning possession, utilisation of the land by BPCL, mutation
effected in its favour in 1999, or restoration of possession to the Petitioner. It
is therefore submitted that the said judgment cannot be relied upon either to
dislodge BPCL’s possession or to disregard the existing revenue entries.
41. Preparation of a possession memorandum or panchnama is a legally
recognised mode of taking possession under the Land Acquisition Act,
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1894. Once possession was taken under the urgency provisions on 16 May,
1988, the land vested free from encumbrances, and no further act of physical
ouster or demolition was necessary to complete such vesting.
42. Reliance is also placed on sections 20, 21, 26 and 64 of the Delhi
Land Revenue Act, 1954 to submit that the record of rights and annual

7
(2011) 2 SCC 54.
8
(2013) 14 SCC 304.


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register are required to reflect entries relating to cultivation, occupation and
subsequent changes therein. The impugned order was passed in exercise of
powers under Section 26 and is appealable under Section 64 before the
Financial Commissioner. The present writ petition, therefore, ought not to be
entertained in view of the efficacious statutory remedy available to the
Petitioner. In this regard, reliance is placed on Indraprastha Medical
9
Corporation v. National Highways Authority of India .
43. Moreover, under the Delhi Land Revenue Act and the Delhi Land
Reforms Act, possession has a material bearing on rights and liabilities
relating to agricultural land. Revenue entries cannot be corrected in favour
of a person who is not in possession, particularly where possession stands
recorded in favour of another person or authority. Reliance, in this respect, is
10 11
placed on Balbir Singh v. A.D.M. (Rev.) , and A.D.M (Rev.) v. Siri Ram .
12
44. BPCL also relies upon Phoolwati & Ors. v. Ram Dei & Ors. , to
submit that mutation in revenue records is concerned with possession of land
and that artificial or unsubstantiated assertions of possession cannot be
13
accepted. BPCL further relies upon Chattar Pal v. Mandir Thakurdji , to
submit that the mutation authority is required to examine who is in “lawful
possession of the property” on the date of consideration. From these
authorities, it is submitted that the District Magistrate rightly considered
possession before declining correction of the revenue record.
45. BPCL distinguishes Gojer Brothers on the ground that the said case

9
2009 (5) AD (Delhi) 586.
10
1995 SCC OnLine Del 6.
11
(2000) 5 SCC 451.
12
2008 SCC OnLine Del 350.
13
(2003) 10 SCC 360.
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involved a specific direction for restoration of possession to the landowner.
No such direction exists in the present case, nor has the Petitioner obtained
any order directing delivery of possession by BPCL. Accordingly, Gojer
Brothers cannot be relied upon to indirectly secure a possessory relief in the
present proceedings
46. Baldev Singh is also distinguished by contending that possession was
not in dispute there in the manner it is here. The revenue entries in the
present case rest not merely on the acquisition proceedings, but also on
possession allegedly taken in 1988, mutation effected in 1999, and
continued use of the land by BPCL as part of the safety buffer surrounding
the petroleum installation.
47. If the revenue entry is corrected in favour of the Petitioner, the
Petitioner may use such entry to disturb BPCL’s possession or to interfere
with the safety buffer. The consequence may not be merely a private dispute
over land but a serious safety issue affecting a petroleum installation.
Points of determinations
48. On the pleadings and submissions, the following questions arise for
consideration:
(i) Whether the writ petition should be declined on the ground that the
Petitioner has an alternative statutory remedy under the Delhi Land Revenue
Act, 1954.
(ii) What was the scope of the District Magistrate’s authority while
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deciding the Petitioner’s representation after the judgment dated 28
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October, 2014 in W.P.(C) 5944/2013 and the order dated 15 January, 2018
in W.P.(C) 2988/2017.
(iii) Whether the District Magistrate could refuse correction of the revenue
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record by relying upon the kabza karwahi dated 16 May, 1988 and the
existing revenue entry, after the acquisition proceedings concerning the
subject land had been declared to have lapsed.
(iv) Whether BPCL’s objections founded on possession, non-impleadment
in the earlier proceedings, public safety, and the scheme of the Delhi
revenue laws are sufficient to sustain the impugned order.
(v) What relief, if any, should be granted, particularly since the Petitioner
does not seek a direction for delivery of possession in the present
proceedings.
Maintainability and alternative remedy
49. The objection founded on alternative remedy may be considered at the
threshold. The Respondents are right in submitting that orders concerning
mutation or correction of revenue entries are, in the ordinary course,
amenable to the appellate structure contemplated under the Delhi Land
Revenue Act, 1954. A writ court does not bypass a statutory remedy merely
because a party has chosen to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution.
50. That rule, however, is one of judicial restraint; it is not a limitation on
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has consistently recognised that the
existence of an alternative remedy does not bar the exercise of writ
jurisdiction where the impugned order is without jurisdiction, violates
principles of natural justice, proceeds in disregard of a binding legal
position, or raises an issue which the statutory authority cannot effectively
14
decide.

14
Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation , (2003) 2 SCC 107; Radha Krishan Industries v. State of
Himachal Pradesh , (2021) 6 SCC 771.
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51. The present case is not a routine dispute concerning mutation entries
between rival claimants. The Petitioner’s grievance is that the revenue
authority refused to give effect to a binding declaration of this Court that the
acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject land had lapsed. The
controversy, therefore, is whether an acquisition-based revenue entry can
survive after the acquisition itself has ceased to exist in law.
52. Reliance placed on Indraprastha Medical Corporation by BPCL is
thus misplaced. That decision arose in the context of disputed demarcation
proceedings and questions of encroachment, where the demarcation reports
themselves had not been challenged before the competent statutory forum.
The present case stands on a different footing, since the controversy
concerns the legal effect of a binding judicial declaration that the acquisition
proceedings had lapsed. The issue also bears upon rights protected under
Article 300A of the Constitution, the continuance of the impugned entries
being sought to be justified on the basis of an acquisition which no longer
survives in law.
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Effect of the judgment dated 27 April, 2006
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53. The judgment dated 27 April, 2006 must be read as a whole. BPCL’s
submissions draw strength from certain observations contained in that
judgment, particularly in paragraphs 10 and 22. The Division Bench noticed
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the kabza karwahi dated 16 May, 1988, the Respondents’ case that
possession of a larger portion of the acquired land had been taken, and the
fact that part of the acquired land had been utilised for the public purpose.
BPCL is, therefore, right in submitting that the 2006 judgment cannot be
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read as if the possession proceedings of 16 May, 1988 were not noticed by
this Court.
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54. But that is not the end of the matter. The legal effect of a judgment is
found not by isolating one observation but by reading the reasons with the
operative directions. The Division Bench did not hold that the acquisition
had become complete in all respects and that no further statutory act was
required. On the contrary, it found the dispensation of enquiry under Section
5A to be legally unsustainable. It then preserved the notification under
Section 4, permitted the Petitioners to file objections under Section 5A,
directed the authorities to decide those objections in accordance with law
after hearing the parties, and required the Respondents to proceed with the
acquisition proceedings expeditiously and, in any case, within six months.
The protection earlier granted to the Petitioners was also continued by
directing the parties to maintain status quo unless otherwise ordered by a
competent court.
55. If the acquisition had already stood concluded qua the Petitioner in a
manner which made further statutory compliance unnecessary, there would
have been no occasion to permit objections under Section 5A or to direct the
authorities to proceed further in accordance with law. The judgment,
therefore, did not put a quietus to the acquisition in favour of the acquiring
authority or BPCL. It restored the statutory process to a stage at which the
Petitioner’s objections under Section 5A had to be considered and a further
declaration under Section 6, if warranted, had to be issued within the period
permitted by law.
56. The observations regarding possession and utilisation were made in
the context of the prayer to quash the Section 4 notification as a whole. The
Division Bench declined to set aside the entire acquisition at that stage
because the public purpose had substantially progressed and the larger
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acquisition had been acted upon. That reasoning cannot be transposed into a
finding that the acquisition stood completed for all time, irrespective of
whether the Respondents thereafter complied with the mandatory statutory
steps. The Court preserved the Section 4 notification but insisted upon a
lawful continuation of the process. The Respondents were therefore required
to carry the matter forward from the Section 5A stage, which they did not
do. The consequence of the Respondents’ failure to carry the acquisition
forward thereafter fell for consideration before the Division Bench in
W.P.(C) 5944/2013.
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Effect of the judgment dated 28 October, 2014
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57. The judgment dated 28 October, 2014, in W.P.(C) 5944/2013 is the
decisive event for the present controversy. The Division Bench was directly
concerned with the subject land forming part of the present proceedings. The
Court did not proceed on assumption. It called upon the Respondents to
produce the relevant record in order to ascertain whether any declaration
under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been issued after
dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court. Upon examining the record,
the Court found that no such declaration had been issued. Applying
Padmasundara Rao , the Division Bench accordingly declared that the entire
acquisition proceedings had lapsed.
58. That declaration must be given its full legal effect. The expression
“entire acquisition proceedings” cannot be treated as an empty formality.
Once the acquisition proceedings stood declared as lapsed, the acquisition
could no longer furnish the legal basis for continuing the State or BPCL as
owner, bhumidar or tenure-holder in the revenue record. Even if the entry
was originally made on the footing that the acquisition was valid and
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operative, it could not continue unchanged after the very foundation of that
acquisition had ceased to exist in law.
59. Once the acquisition proceedings had been declared to have lapsed,
the District Magistrate was bound to consider the Petitioner’s representation
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on that basis. The direction issued by this Court on 15 January, 2018 to
pass a reasoned order on the representation did not permit the District
Magistrate to reopen or dilute the effect of the declaration of lapse.
60. The impugned order, however, proceeds on the basis that the earlier
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kabza karwahi dated 16 May, 1988 and the existing revenue entries
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rendered the judgment dated 28 October, 2014 effectively inapplicable to
the subject land. Whether those documents could nevertheless sustain the
impugned entries despite the declaration of lapse is the issue to which the
Court must now turn.
Whether the kabza karwahi could sustain the entry
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61. BPCL’s reliance upon the kabza karwahi dated 16 May, 1988 cannot
be dismissed as wholly irrelevant. The document forms part of the
acquisition record and records that possession of substantial land was taken
and handed over to BPCL. It was also noticed in the earlier round of
proceedings. BPCL is therefore justified in contending that the District
Magistrate could not altogether ignore the document.
62. The question, however, is not whether the kabza karwahi exists. Nor
is the question whether a possession memorandum or panchnama can, in
law, be a recognised mode of taking possession. There can be no quarrel
with that proposition after Indore Development Authority . The real question
is narrower and different: after the acquisition proceedings concerning the
subject land had been declared to have lapsed, could the kabza karwahi
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continue to operate as the legal foundation for recording ownership or tenure
in favour of the State or BPCL? In the Court’s view, it could not.
63. A possession proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act is not an
independent instrument of transfer. It does not operate as a conveyance in
favour of the State or the beneficiary. It derives its legal efficacy from the
acquisition in aid of which it is drawn. If the acquisition survives, the
statutory consequences may follow. If the acquisition is declared to have
lapsed, steps taken only as part of that acquisition cannot be used as though
the acquisition still subsists.
64. The impugned order misses this distinction. It treats the kabza
karwahi as though it has an existence independent of the acquisition. It then
treats the revenue entry as though it has an existence independent of the
kabza karwahi . Finally, it combines the two and proceeds on the footing that
“it is the kabza karwahi and the entry of name of BPCL which will decide
the ownership”, and accordingly rejects the request for correction of the
revenue entries.
65. Revenue entries are maintained primarily for fiscal and administrative
purposes and may carry evidentiary value regarding possession, cultivation
15
or revenue liability. They do not, by themselves, confer or extinguish title.
Moreover, a possession proceeding under a lapsed acquisition cannot
become a substitute for acquisition. The source cannot survive after the
foundation has gone.
66. This conclusion does not ignore the scheme of the Delhi Land
Revenue Act, 1954 or the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. Possession has
significance under those statutes. The record of rights and the annual register
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are meant to reflect persons cultivating or otherwise occupying land. Balbir
Singh and Siri Ram , relied upon by BPCL, recognise the importance of
maintaining revenue records in conformity with the actual position on the
spot. BPCL’s reliance on those authorities is, to that extent, well placed.
67. But those authorities do not answer the present case. They do not hold
that a revenue entry founded upon acquisition may continue to show the
State or the beneficiary as owner after the acquisition itself has been
declared to have lapsed. They deal with the importance of recording
possession in the revenue administration. They do not convert a possession
entry into title, nor do they permit a revenue authority to maintain an
acquisition-based ownership entry after the legal basis of the acquisition has
disappeared.
68. Reliance placed on Chattar Pal is misconceived. That judgement
emphasises that mutation authorities must consider who is in lawful
possession at the relevant time. The emphasis, however, is on “lawful
possession.” In the present case, BPCL seeks to sustain the impugned entry
on the footing that possession was taken under the acquisition proceedings
and that mutation followed as a consequence thereof. Once the acquisition
proceedings themselves were declared to have lapsed, the acquisition could
no longer furnish the legal basis for continuing the impugned entry.
Phoolwati also does not advance BPCL’s case. That decision arose in the
context of a civil suit involving challenge to a registered sale deed and a plea
of adverse possession, and cannot be treated as authority for the proposition
that an acquisition-based revenue entry may survive even after the
acquisition itself has ceased to exist in law.

15
Sawarni v. Inder Kaur & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 223.
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69. Similarly, Indore Development Authority does not carry BPCL far
enough. That judgment explains the mode and effect of taking possession
under land acquisition law, but does not hold that a possession memorandum
drawn under a lapsed acquisition may thereafter survive as an independent
source of title or revenue ownership.
70. BPCL does not defend the impugned entry as an independent record
of possession divorced from the acquisition proceedings. Its case is that
possession was taken under the acquisition, the award was made,
compensation was deposited or adjusted, and mutation followed as a
consequence. The entry is thus sought to be sustained entirely on the basis of
the acquisition itself. Once the acquisition proceedings had been declared to
have lapsed, the District Magistrate could not continue to treat the kabza
karwahi and the consequential revenue entries as determinative of
ownership or tenure. The impugned order is vitiated not because it
considered the kabza karwahi , but because it accorded that document a legal
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effect it could no longer sustain after the judgment dated 28 October, 2014.
The field report and the contradiction in the impugned order
71. The impugned order is also vulnerable because it fails to reconcile its
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own record. The District Magistrate noticed the field report dated 28
March, 2022 obtained from the revenue officials of Kapashera Tehsil. The
report records that the subject land falls outside the boundary wall of BPCL.
It further records that only the remaining area of Khasra Nos. 54//2/2/2 min
(0-15) and 9 min (1-5), admeasuring approximately 2 bighas, falls within
BPCL’s boundary wall.
72. This finding did not, by itself, conclude the question of possession.
BPCL may still contend that the land outside its boundary wall forms part of
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a safety buffer or that possession had been taken earlier through the kabza
karwahi . Equally, the Petitioner may rely upon the field report, the separate
boundary wall, and the khasra girdawari entries to support his own claim of
possession. The point for present purposes is narrower. Once the field report
recorded that the Petitioner’s claimed land fell outside BPCL’s boundary
wall, the District Magistrate could not, without further reasoning, describe
possession and ownership of BPCL as undisputed.
73. The impugned order does precisely that. Despite noticing the field
report, it proceeds to treat as an “undisputed fact” that possession had been
taken by the revenue authorities and handed over to BPCL on 16th May,
1988. The conclusion is asserted rather than reasoned. The order does not
explain why the kabza karwahi was treated as conclusive despite the
subsequent field report, nor does it address the Petitioner’s reliance on the
separate boundary wall and the khasra girdawari entries. It also fails to
explain how a seriously contested factual position came to be treated as
undisputed.
74. A revenue authority deciding a representation for correction of entries
was not required to conduct a full civil trial on title or possession. But it was
required to give reasons consistent with the material before it. The authority
could not record a field position which raises a serious doubt about BPCL’s
claim to physical control over the exact land, and then return a conclusion
that assumes the contrary without explanation.
Gojer Brothers and Baldev Singh
75. The Petitioner relies on Gojer Brothers to submit that once
acquisition proceedings lapse, a beneficiary cannot retain the land merely
because possession may have been taken earlier. The principle is relevant,
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but its application in the present case must be kept within the limits of the
relief sought.
76. The Petitioner has clarified that no direction for delivery of possession
is sought in the present proceedings. This Court, therefore, is not required to
direct BPCL to hand over physical possession. Nor is it necessary to decide,
finally and conclusively, who is in actual physical control of the whole or
any part of the land. That controversy has factual and evidentiary
dimensions. It can be pursued, if necessary, in appropriate proceedings.
77. Gojer Brothers nevertheless has relevance for a narrower proposition.
Once acquisition proceedings lapse, continued control over land cannot be
justified merely by referring to the lapsed acquisition. If a beneficiary or
authority seeks to retain possession, regulate access or use the land, the
source of that control must be traceable to some subsisting authority in law.
The lapsed acquisition cannot itself remain the answer.
78. Baldev Singh is closer to the present case on the issue of correction of
revenue records. There also, after acquisition proceedings became
inoperative for want of a valid subsequent declaration, this Court directed
correction of the revenue records. In the contempt proceedings which
followed, the Court rejected the attempt of the revenue authorities to avoid
correction by relying upon urbanisation and administrative objections. The
principle which emerges is that once the legal basis of acquisition ceases to
exist, the revenue record must be brought in conformity with that position.
79. BPCL is right in submitting that Baldev Singh did not involve the
same intensity of dispute on possession as the present case. That distinction
must be acknowledged. But the present judgment does not use Baldev Singh
to decide possession. It uses Baldev Singh for the more limited proposition
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that revenue authorities cannot preserve acquisition-based entries after the
acquisition has become legally ineffective. On that principle, Baldev Singh
supports the Petitioner.
Non-impleadment of BPCL in earlier proceedings
80. BPCL submits that it was not a party to W.P.(C) 5944/2013. That
contention deserves fair consideration. BPCL was the intended beneficiary
of the acquisition. It claims that compensation was deposited or adjusted at
its instance. It further claims that possession had been handed over to it and
that the land was being used as part of the safety buffer of its petroleum
installation. In an appropriate case, a beneficiary of acquisition may be a
necessary or at least a proper party. Bhola Nath Sharma , recognises that a
beneficiary or local authority for whose benefit acquisition is undertaken
may have a right to participate in proceedings affecting acquisition or
compensation. Mutha Associates is relied upon for the principle that orders
affecting a party’s rights should not be passed behind its back.
81. Those principles do not assist BPCL in the present case. If BPCL was
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aggrieved by the judgment dated 28 October, 2014 on the ground of non-
impleadment, its remedy lay in seeking appropriate relief before a competent
court. What could not be permitted was for the District Magistrate, while
deciding a revenue representation, to effectively treat the said judgment as
inapplicable and thereby sustain an acquisition-based revenue entry despite
the judicial declaration that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed.
Possession and the limits of this judgment
82. The present proceedings should not be allowed to drift into a
possession suit. Both sides have placed substantial material on possession.
BPCL has the kabza karwahi , the award, the assertion of utilisation and
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buffer-zone use, and the observations in the 2006 judgment. The Petitioner
has the interim orders of 1988 and 1990, the continuation of status quo , the
2014 lapse judgment, the field report showing the subject land outside
BPCL’s boundary wall, the plea of a separate boundary wall, and khasra
girdawari entries up to 1994-95.
83. These materials are not all pointing in one direction. A final finding
on physical possession, particularly present possession, may require
evidence. The Petitioner’s counsel has rightly stated that no direction for
delivery of possession is sought in this petition.
84. This judgment is therefore confined to the legality of the impugned
order and the correction of the acquisition-based revenue entry. It does not
direct BPCL to deliver possession. It does not adjudicate any claim for
damages, restitution, mesne profits, security access, buffer-zone entitlement
or public safety control. Those matters are left open.
85. It must also be made clear that correction of the revenue record will
not authorise either party to take law into its own hands. If the Petitioner
claims access, cultivation or protection against obstruction, he must pursue
the pending application or such other remedy as he may be advised. If BPCL
claims that the land is essential for a petroleum safety buffer or that it is in
lawful possession otherwise than through the lapsed acquisition, it too must
seek relief in accordance with law. If the State or BPCL require the land for
a public purpose, including safety of a petroleum installation, nothing
prevents the State from initiating acquisition or any other lawful process.
Conclusion and Relief
86. For the reasons already indicated, the impugned order cannot be
sustained. The defect is not merely one of inadequate reasoning or erroneous
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appreciation of the record. The order proceeds on a legal premise which the
District Magistrate was not entitled to adopt. It accordingly suffers from a
jurisdictional error and is liable to be set aside.
rd
87. The impugned order dated 3 August, 2023 is accordingly quashed.
88. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to correct the revenue record in
respect of land comprised in Mustatil No. 54, Killa Nos. 2/2/2 min (1-09), 9
min (3-11), 10/1 (2-01), 12 (4-12) and 19/1 (0-14), admeasuring 12 bighas
and 7 biswas, situated in the revenue estate of Village Bharthal, New Delhi,
by removing the entry which records the State or BPCL as owner/tenure-
holder on the basis of the acquisition proceedings which have been declared
to have lapsed, and by restoring the revenue record in accordance with the
legal position obtaining prior to the acquisition, subject of course to any
lawful subsequent order passed by a competent court or authority.
89. The correction shall be carried out within eight weeks from today.
90. It is clarified that this direction is confined to correction of the
revenue entry flowing from the acquisition proceedings. It shall not be
construed as a direction for delivery of physical possession to the Petitioner.
It shall also not be construed as an adjudication that BPCL is or is not in
actual physical possession of the subject land or any part thereof. All rights
and contentions of the parties on actual possession, access, user, safety
restrictions, restitution, damages, compensation, adjustment or recovery of
amounts, and any fresh acquisition or other lawful process are left open.
91. Since an interim order protecting the Petitioner against dispossession
has operated during pendency of these proceedings, and since the Court has
not finally decided possession, the interim protection against forcible
dispossession shall continue for 60 days from today. During this period,
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neither side shall alter the existing physical position by force. The Petitioner
may pursue such pending application or other remedy as may be available in
law. After expiry of 60 days, the parties shall be governed by such orders as
may be passed in appropriate proceedings and by remedies available under
law.
92. BPCL’s concern regarding safety of the petroleum installation is
expressly left open. Nothing in this judgment prevents BPCL or the
appropriate government from taking lawful measures for protection of the
installation, for regulation of access in accordance with law, or for
acquisition of the land, if so advised.
93. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. Pending applications
stand disposed of, with liberty to the parties to pursue appropriate remedies
in accordance with law.

SANJEEV NARULA, J
MAY 19, 2026/ hc
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