Narinder Singh And Another vs Harcharan Singh And Another

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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
239
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
Reserved on: 13.10.2026.
Pronounced on: 13.11.2026.
Uploaded on: 13.11.2026.
Narinder Singh and another
..... Petitioners
Versus
Harcharan Singh and another .......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEERJA K. KALSON
Present: Mr. Yuvraj Garg, Advocate, (Legal Aid Counsel)
for the petitioners.
Mr. Nitesh Sharma, DAG, Punjab.
NEERJA K. KALSON, J.
CRM-28546-2018
1. This is an application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act
for condonation of delay of 193 days in filing the revision petition.
2. For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed
and the delay of 193 days in filing the revision petition is condoned.
CRM-28545-2018
1. This is an application for granting permission to file revision
petition being legal heirs/regal representatives of late Sh. Gian Singh
(original complainant), who had expired on 23.12.2012.
2. For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is
allowed. The applicants are permitted to file/pursue present petition being
legal heirs of late Gian Singh (complainant).
SANJAY
2026.11.13 13:26
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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
CRR-2700-2018
1. The present criminal revision is directed against the judgment
dated 27.09.2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Ludhiana, whereby the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 against his
conviction was allowed and he was acquitted of the charges framed against
him. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
03.03.2014 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, were
set aside.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that Gian Singh submitted a
complaint dated 30.06.2000 before the Deputy Inspector General of Police,
Ludhiana , alleging that his son, Surinder Singh, had entered into an
Agreement To Sell dated 30.09.1999 with respondent No. 1, Harcharan
Singh, in respect of a plot measuring 500 square yards situated at Village
Gill-II, District Ludhiana. According to the complainant, the entire sale
consideration had been paid and possession of the property had been
delivered. On the same day, respondent No. 1 executed a General Power of
Attorney, bearing Vasika No. 31-B, in favour of Gian Singh. Subsequently,
a sale deed bearing Vasika No. 2990 dated 28.03.2000 was executed in
favour of Narinder Singh, Surinder Singh and Kulwinder Singh. The
grievance of the complainant was that respondent No. 1 had cancelled the
General Power of Attorney on 05.11.1999 without furnishing any prior
notice or intimation. On the basis of the complaint, FIR No. 386 dated
13.12.2000 was registered under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B IPC at Police
Station Sadar, Ludhiana.
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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
3. Upon completion of investigation, the final report under Section
173 Cr.P.C. was presented before the learned trial Court. A charge under
Section 420 IPC was framed against respondent No. 1, to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed trial.
4. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined five
witnesses, namely PW-1 Karamjit Singh, PW-2 ASI Baldev Singh, PW-3
Rajinder Kumar, PW-4 Surinder Singh and PW-5 Naresh Chander,
whereafter the prosecution evidence was closed.
5. The statement of respondent No. 1 was recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C., wherein the incriminating circumstances appearing against him
were put to him. He denied the allegations and pleaded false implication. No
evidence was adduced in defence.
6. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Ludhiana, vide judgment dated 03.03.2014, convicted
respondent No. 1 under Section 418 IPC and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs 5,000, with a
default stipulation.
7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of
sentence, respondent No. 1 preferred Criminal Appeal No. 74 of 2014 before
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana. The appeal was allowed
vide judgment dated 27.09.2017, whereby the conviction and sentence were
set aside and respondent No. 1 was acquitted. It is this judgment of acquittal
which has been assailed in the present revision petition by the legal
representatives of the original complainant.
SANJAY
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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the learned
First Appellate Court failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence in its
proper perspective and that the findings recorded in the impugned judgment
are founded upon an erroneous appreciation of the material available on
record. It is submitted that the appellate judgment suffers from material
illegality and irregularity warranting interference by this Court.
9. Elaborating the submissions, learned counsel contends that the
Agreement To Sell dated 30.09.1999 contained recitals regarding the
execution of the General Power of Attorney and receipt of the sale
consideration. It is, therefore, urged that the learned First Appellate Court
erred in entertaining doubts regarding the transaction despite the
documentary material placed on record.
10. It is further contended that the refusal of respondent No. 1 to
furnish specimen signatures warranted an adverse inference against him.
Learned counsel also pointed out that the observation made by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge that complainant Gian Singh survived until 2013
was factually incorrect, as the registered death certificate proves that he
expired on 23.12.2012, and that his non-appearance in the witness box ought
not to have been construed to the detriment of the prosecution.
11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully
examined the material available on record.
12. It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. against an order of acquittal is
narrow, supervisory, and exceptional in scope. The Revisional Court does
not reappreciate oral or documentary evidence or substitute its subjective
SANJAY
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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
evaluation for that of the First Appellate Court. Revisional interference with
a judgment of acquittal is permissible only in extraordinary situations where
the decision displays a glaring procedural defect, patent perversity, or
complete misreading of material evidence occasioning a failure of justice.
Furthermore, while examining a revision preferred against an order of
acquittal, the statutory limitation engrafted under Section 401(3) Cr.P.C.
strictly circumscribes this Court’s jurisdiction, precluding the direct
restoration of a conviction and confining the permissible relief, in cases of
patent perversity, strictly to a remand or retrial. This statutory limitation and
the exact remit of the revisional court have been authoritatively expounded
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishnu Kumar Gupta v. State of
Madhya Pradesh & Anr., 2026 INSC 770 , wherein it was observed in
paragraph 58 as under:
"58. A plain reading of Section 401(3) would indicate that
nothing contained in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorise
the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of
conviction. Significantly, the limitation imposed by sub-section
(3) is directed only against the ultimate relief that may be
granted in revision and not against the scope of examination
that may be undertaken by the revisional court. Thus, while the
High Court is prohibited from directly recording a conviction
in revision, it is not precluded from scrutinising the evidence in
detail to determine whether the acquittal or conviction is
legally sustainable. If such scrutiny discloses manifest illegality
or perversity, the revisional court may set aside the impugned
order and pass such orders as are permissible in law, including
ordering a retrial or remanding the matter, while remaining
within the statutory limitation contained in Section 401(3)."
SANJAY
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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
13. The golden thread running through the web of criminal
jurisprudence dictates that where two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the evidence on record, the view which is favourable to the accused must be
preferred, and the presumption of innocence is reinforced and strengthened
upon an acquittal. Applying this salutary principle to the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C., an
order of acquittal cannot be unsettled merely because an alternative
perspective on the oral and documentary evidence might also be
conceivable, so long as the conclusion arrived at is plausible and reasonable.
Where the findings recorded in favour of the accused rest upon a proper
appreciation of material contradictions, interpolations, and unexplained
lacunae in the prosecution case, such a view pointing to innocence cannot be
characterised as perverse, and this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction will
refrain from substituting its own view to disturb the acquittal.
14. The distinction between a mere breach of contractual obligation
and the offence of cheating was elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
V.Y. Jose and another v. State of Gujarat and another, (2009) 3 SCC 78 ,
wherein it was held that fraudulent or dishonest intention must exist at the
inception of the transaction and cannot be presumed merely from a
subsequent failure to honour a contractual obligation. The Court further
clarified that the availability of a civil remedy does not, by itself, exclude
criminal liability where the essential ingredients of the offence are otherwise
established. In the context of Section 418 IPC, it must additionally be
established that the accused cheated with the knowledge that wrongful loss
was likely to ensue to a person whose interest in the transaction he was
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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
bound, either by law or by legal contract, to protect. The mere existence of
such an obligation, without proof of the requisite deception and dishonest
intention, would not suffice to attract criminal liability under the provision.
Thus, the determinative consideration is whether the requisite dishonest
intention accompanied the original inducement, and not merely whether the
subsequent conduct of a contracting party resulted in a breach of contractual
obligations.
15. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position that the
findings returned by the learned First Appellate Court fall for consideration.
16. The transaction giving rise to the present proceedings centres
upon the agreement to sell dated 30.09.1999 concerning the plot measuring
500 square yards at Village Gill-II, District Ludhiana. According to the
prosecution, respondent No. 1 had received the entire sale consideration,
delivered possession and executed a General Power of Attorney on the same
day. The subsequent revocation of that authority, without prior intimation,
formed the foundation of the allegation of cheating. The controversy,
therefore, was not confined to the factum of revocation, but extended to
whether the circumstances attending the transaction disclosed the requisite
dishonest intention and satisfied the statutory ingredients of the offence.
17. The learned trial Court, while recording the conviction under
Section 418 IPC, placed reliance upon the agreement to sell and the General
Power of Attorney, and treated the cancellation of the latter without notice
as constituting a breach of the obligation owed to the complainant. The
learned First Appellate Court, however, examined the evidentiary foundation
of the transaction and assigned reasons for entertaining doubt regarding the
SANJAY
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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
prosecution case. It noticed, inter alia , the absence of particulars concerning
the sale consideration, the alterations appearing in the agreement to sell, the
references to earlier transactions and the deficiencies in the investigation.
The learned First Appellate Court also noticed that, while the execution of
the General Power of Attorney was admitted by respondent No. 1, the
agreement to sell was disputed. These circumstances were considered
cumulatively by the learned First Appellate Court in concluding that the
prosecution had failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
18. A fortiori , as pertinently highlighted by the learned First
Appellate Court, if the entire sale consideration had, indeed, been liquidated
and possession delivered on 30.09.1999, and the parties were present before
the registering authority, there was no plausible explanation as to what
necessitated entering into an agreement to sell coupled with a General Power
of Attorney rather than executing and registering an outright deed of
conveyance. It was the complainant-buyer who could have insisted upon the
execution and registration of a regular sale deed on that very date. The
learned First Appellate Court found the prosecution explanation wanting in
this regard and considered the circumstance alongside the other deficiencies
noticed in the evidence. The inference so drawn formed part of its
cumulative assessment and cannot be characterised as perverse merely
because another inference might also be conceivable.
19. The principal grievance arising from the revocation of the
General Power of Attorney must be viewed in the light of the distinction
between civil consequences flowing from a contractual transaction and
criminal liability founded upon deception. The revocation of an authority
SANJAY
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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
may give rise to civil consequences; however, the availability of a civil
remedy neither automatically establishes nor excludes the commission of
cheating. What remains essential is the existence of the requisite dishonest
intention and the other statutory ingredients. The appellate Court’s
conclusion must, therefore, be examined with reference to the reasons
assigned in the impugned judgment, rather than upon any assumption that
the civil character of the transaction, by itself, forecloses criminal liability.
20. The question which consequently arises is whether the reasons
assigned by the learned First Appellate Court disclose any manifest
illegality, perversity or material irregularity warranting the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction. The answer must be found in the sustainability of the
appellate Court’s reasoning, without embarking upon a fresh adjudication of
the competing evidentiary inferences.
21. The petitioners have sought to question the appellate Court’s
findings principally on the strength of the agreement to sell, the execution of
the General Power of Attorney and the refusal of respondent No. 1 to furnish
specimen signatures. However, the learned First Appellate Court did not
proceed in disregard of the documentary transaction; rather, it examined the
circumstances surrounding its execution and the evidentiary deficiencies
which, in its assessment, rendered the prosecution case doubtful. The
petitioners' reliance upon the aforesaid circumstances, including the refusal
to furnish specimen signatures, does not establish that the appellate Court’s
reasoning is founded upon a complete misreading or exclusion of material
evidence. The mere possibility of drawing a different inference from the
material on record is insufficient to unsettle the acquittal.
SANJAY
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CRR-2700-2018 (O&M)
22. As regards the discrepancy concerning the year of death of the
original complainant, Gian Singh, the petitioners have pointed out that he
expired on 23.12.2012, whereas the learned First Appellate Court referred to
the year 2013. Although, the discrepancy is apparent yet, it has not been
shown that the said error materially affected the foundation of the judgment
of acquittal or occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The same, therefore, does
not furnish an independent ground for revisional interference.
23. Viewed in its entirety, the impugned judgment reflects a
reasoned consideration of the circumstances which weighed with the learned
First Appellate Court in reversing the conviction. The deficiencies noticed
by that Court were not treated in isolation but were evaluated cumulatively
in the context of the prosecution's obligation to establish the statutory
ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Whether another
conclusion could have been reached on the same material is not
determinative. What is material is that the petitioners have failed to
demonstrate any manifest illegality, perversity or material irregularity
resulting in miscarriage of justice. In the absence of such infirmity, the
judgment of acquittal does not warrant interference in exercise of the
revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
24. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition, being
devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed .
25. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
13.11.2026 (NEERJA K. KALSON)
SN JUDGE
Whether Speaking/Reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
SANJAY
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