Sh. Kishori Lal & Ors vs Sh. Longa Ram (Since Deceased) Though His Lrs & Anr
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 14.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 19.11.2026
+ RFA 515/2014
SH. KISHORI LAL & ORS .....Appellants
Through: Mr. V.P. Rana, Mr. Aviral Jain
and Ms. Rut Pawar, Advocates.
versus
SH. LONGA RAM (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH HIS
LRS & ANR .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ram Kishan Saini and Ms.
Neelam Saini, Advocates for
R-1E.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
O.A.(APPLT) 1/2026
1. This Chamber Appeal under Chapter II Rule 5, read with
Chapter I, Part D, Volume V, Rules 14 to 16 of the Delhi High Court
Rules has been filed by Respondent No. 1(E) in the captioned
1
Regular First Appeal .
2. The Chamber Appeal essentially assails the Order dated
2
20.07.2026 passed by the learned Registrar of this Court. However,
the relief expressly sought in the Chamber Appeal is an order
1
RFA
2
Impugned Order
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 1 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
declaring that RFA No. 515/2014, titled Sh. Kishori Lal and Others v.
Sh. Longa Ram and Others , has stood abated.
3. At the outset, it is noted that the express relief sought in the
Chamber Appeal widens the scope of examination done in the
Impugned Order. By that Order, the learned Registrar allowed CM
APPL. Nos. 775/2025 and 776/2025 , filed under Order XXII Rule 4
3
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , to bring on record the Legal
Representatives of deceased Respondent Nos. 1(A) and 1(B),
respectively . Similarly, the learned Registrar also allowed CM APPL.
No. 41635/2025 , seeking substitution of the Legal Representatives of
deceased Respondent No. 1(G), and CM APPL. No. 41636/2025 ,
seeking condonation of delay in filing that substitution application.
4. It is made clear that this Court will examine the correctness of
the Impugned Order in the discussion that follows. If the Impugned
Order is set aside or modified, in whole or in part, the question of
continuing the abatement of the main RFA will arise for
consideration. Otherwise, deciding the relief sought in the Chamber
Appeal would be academic.
5. For clarity and to avoid ambiguity, the parties are referred to by
their respective ranks in the captioned RFA, rather than by their ranks
in the Chamber Appeal.
BRIEF FACTS:
6. Sine superfluis, the facts germane to the institution of the
present Chamber Appeal are as follows:
(a) The RFA came to be filed by the Appellants seeking to assail
the Judgment and Decree dated 06.06.2014 passed by the
3
CPC
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 2 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
learned Additional District Judge-17, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi,
in Civil Suit No. 221/2014 ( Old Suit No. 160/2003 ).
(b) During the pendency of the suit, original Respondent No. 1
died. His Legal Representatives were thereafter brought on
record and are arrayed in the present appeal as Respondent Nos.
1(A) to 1(J).
(c) During the pendency of the captioned RFA, the following Legal
Representatives of original Respondent No. 1, Sh. Longa Ram,
passed away:
(i) Respondent No. 1(A) - Sh. Om Prakash,
(ii) Respondent No. 1(B) - Sh. Jagdish Chandra, and
(iii) Respondent No. 1(G) - Smt. Prem/Premwati.
(d) The material on record reveals that Respondent Nos. R1(A),
R1(B) and R1(G) passed away on 15.06.2020, 21.06.2023 and
27.12.2024, respectively .
(e) Accordingly, on 07.01.2025, CM APPL. Nos. 775/2025 and
776/2025 were filed, seeking to bring on record the Legal
Representatives of Respondent Nos. 1(A) and 1(B),
respectively . Subsequently, on 12.07.2025, CM APPL. No.
41635/2025 was filed to bring on record the legal representative
of Respondent No. 1(G), along with CM APPL. No.
41636/2025 seeking condonation of delay in filing that
application.
(f) By the Impugned Order, the learned Registrar, after hearing the
parties‟ objections, allowed all the aforementioned applications
filed by the Appellants. The sole ground of objection to each
application seeking to bring the deceased Respondents‟ Legal
Representatives on record was delay in filing that application.
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 3 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
(g) Aggrieved by the aforesaid composite Impugned Order
concerning the aforementioned applications, Respondent No.
1(E) has preferred the present Chamber Appeal, assailing the
findings recorded in respect of those applications.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
7. Learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1(E) [ who has
filed the present Chamber Appeal ] would seek to assail the Impugned
Order on the ground that the Applications for substitution have been
allowed without due regard to the statutory provisions governing
limitation and abatement under Order XXII of the CPC and the
4
Limitation Act, 1963 .
8. With respect to CM APPL. Nos. 775/2025 and 776/2025 ,
learned counsel would submit that Respondent Nos. 1(A) and 1(B)
died on 15.06.2020 and 21.06.2023, respectively , whereas the
applications to bring their Legal Representatives on record were filed
only on 07.01.2025. The applications were thus filed after delays of 4
years and 206 days and 1 year and 200 days, respectively .
9. Learned counsel would further contend that, under Order XXII
Rule 4 of the CPC, the prescribed period of 90 days for applying to
bring the Legal Representatives of each deceased Respondent on
record had expired well before the substitution applications were filed.
Learned counsel would also submit that neither substitution
application was accompanied by an application seeking condonation
of delay or setting aside of the abatement. In the absence of such
applications, it would be contended, the learned Registrar could not
have allowed the Legal Representatives to be brought on record.
4
Limitation Act
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 4 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
10. Adverting to CM APPL. Nos. 41635/2025 and 41636/2025 ,
concerning Respondent No. 1(G), learned counsel would submit that
the Order dated 24.02.2025 clearly recorded that the particulars of the
Legal Representatives had already been supplied to the Appellants‟
counsel. It would be argued that the explanation subsequently
furnished, namely , that the particulars were received only on
10.07.2025 through WhatsApp, was contrary to the judicial record.
11. Learned counsel would further rely upon the Order dated
09.07.2025, whereby the learned counsel for the Appellants had
sought and obtained four weeks‟ time to file an Application for
substitution. According to Respondent No. 1(E), this Order
demonstrated that the Appellants were already aware of the death and
the requirement to take steps for substitution. Respondent No. 1(E)
also disputed the assertion regarding the WhatsApp communication,
contending that the number referred to in the Application belonged to
the Appellants‟ own counsel and not to counsel for Respondent Nos.
1(D) to 1(J).
12. It would further be submitted that the delay in filing CM APPL.
No. 41635/2025 had been incorrectly computed as 105 days and was,
in fact, 136 days. It would be contended by the learned counsel
appearing for Respondent No. 1(E) that no sufficient cause had been
disclosed for condoning the delay and that the application seeking
substitution could not have been allowed without an appropriate
application for setting aside abatement.
13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1(E)
would seek to rely upon the judgments passed in Dhurandhar Prasad
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 5 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
5
Singh v. Jai Prakash University , Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish
6 7
Chandra , State of Kerala v. Madhavakurup Ramachandran Pillai ,
8
Goman Wanti v. Darshan Singh , and Nethra Chits (Pvt.) Ltd. v. B.
9
Ramachandra Reddy .
14. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the Appellants [ of the
RFA ] would, at the outset, submit that Bhupinder Singh (Respondent
No. 1(E)) has filed the present Chamber Appeal in his personal
capacity. Before the learned Registrar, however, he had filed
objections to the substitution applications in his capacity as attorney
for deceased Respondent Nos. 1(A), 1(B) and 1(G).
15. It would be contended that, upon the death of the principals, the
agency stood terminated by operation of Section 201 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872. Accordingly, the objections filed by Respondent
No. 1(E) could not be treated as having been filed by or on behalf of
the Legal Representatives of the deceased Respondents. Since those
Legal Representatives did not independently challenge the orders
allowing the substitution applications, learned counsel would submit
that Respondent No. 1(E), having no locus to maintain the present
Chamber Appeal in his personal capacity, cannot pursue it.
16. With regard to CM APPL. Nos. 775/2025 and 776/2025 ,
learned counsel would submit that information regarding the deaths of
Respondent Nos. 1(A) and 1(B) was furnished on 25.11.2024 and that
the particulars of their Legal Representatives were supplied on
08.12.2024. Since the substitution applications were filed on
07.01.2025, it would be contended that they had been filed within 90
5
(2001) 6 SCC 534
6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 291
7
1999 SCC OnLine Ker 99
8
2006 SCC OnLine P&H 111
9
2003 SCC OnLine AP 620
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 6 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
days of receipt of the particulars necessary for effecting substitution.
The learned Registrar had, therefore, correctly considered the dates on
which the information and particulars were furnished instead of
treating the applications as barred solely by reference to the dates of
death.
17. Learned counsel would further submit that Order XXII Rule
10A CPC places an obligation upon a pleader appearing for a
deceased party to inform the Court about the death of that party.
Reliance in that regard would be placed upon Binod Pathak and
10
Others v. Shankar Choudhary and Others , particularly paragraphs
29, 50 and 63, to contend that the obligation to facilitate the bringing
of Legal Representatives on record cannot be construed narrowly so as
to permit a party to take advantage of a failure to furnish the requisite
information and thereby defeat the proceedings.
18. In relation to CM APPL. Nos. 41635/2025 and 41636/2025 ,
learned counsel would submit that the particulars of her Legal
Representatives were furnished on 10.07.2025 through WhatsApp and
that CM APPL. No. 41635/2025 was filed on 13.07.2025. It would be
contended that the application had been filed promptly after receipt of
the particulars and that CM APPL. No. 41636/2025 specifically
sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on
the ground that the particulars had been received only on 10.07.2025.
19. Learned counsel would further submit that it is also pertinent to
note that the Application seeking condonation of delay, being CM
APPL. No. 41636/2025, avers that the date on which the learned
counsel for the Respondent so heavily relies upon, i.e., Order dated
24.02.2025, which records that the information of the demise of
10
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1411
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 7 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
Respondent No. 1(G) along with the details of her LRs was provided
to the counsel for the Appellant, none had appeared for the Appellant
and no such information as on that date was received by the learned
counsel representing the Appellant.
20. It would be further submitted that in support of the assertion
that the relevant details concerning the deceased Respondent were
received on 10.07.2025, one of the Appellants‟ counsels has filed a
personal affidavit along with the Application seeking condonation of
delay, being CM APPL. Nos. 41636/2025 .
21. Learned counsel would further rely upon Om Prakash @
11
Lalloowa v. Satish Chandra , particularly paragraph 23, to submit
that a prayer for bringing the Legal Representatives of a deceased
party on record may, in an appropriate case, be construed as a prayer
for setting aside abatement. Reliance would also be placed
12
upon Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini , in
support of the submission that the Court may grant appropriate
consequential relief where the substance of the application and the
relief sought justify such an approach.
22. Learned counsel would also seek to rely upon Sesh Nath Singh
13
v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd , particularly
paragraphs 57 and 62, to contend that a separate application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not invariably necessary for the
Court to exercise its power to condone delay. It would be submitted
that, in the present case, an application seeking condonation of delay
had, in any event, been filed in relation to the substitution of the Legal
Representatives of Respondent No. 1(G).
11
2025 SCC OnLine SC 291
12
(2003) 10 SCC 691
13
(2021) 7 SCC 313
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 8 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
23. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the material on record, including the Impugned Order, the relevant
applications as before the Learned Registrar, and the Written
Submissions filed in support of their respective contentions before this
Court.
24. Succinctly put, the present Chamber Appeal concerns the
correctness of the Impugned Order insofar as it allowed the
substantive applications seeking to bring on record the Legal
Representatives of deceased Respondent Nos. 1(A), 1(B) and 1(G).
Although the applications were disposed of by a common order, each
concerns a different deceased Respondent and arises from distinct
factual circumstances. For clarity and consistency, this Court proposes
to consider the challenges to the findings on each application under
the similar headings and in the same order as in the Impugned Order.
A. CM APPL.775/2025 (u/O 22 Rule 4 CPC for bringing on
record the LRs of R-1(A)and CM APPL.776/2025 (u/O 22 Rule
4 CPC for bringing on record the LRs of R-1(B))
25. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to reproduce the
analysis and findings of the learned Registrar in the Impugned Order
in respect of these two applications, which read as follows:
“ CM APPL.775/2025 (u/O 22 Rule 4 CPC moved by appellant for
bringing on record the LRs of R-1(A)-Sh. Om Prakash and CM
APPL.776/2025 (u/O 22 Rule 4 CPC moved by appellant for
bringing on record the LRs of R-1(B)-Sh. Jagdish Chandra)
1. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that the information
regarding death of respondent Nos.1A and 1B was furnished
for the first time on 25.11.2024, which is reflected in the order
of that date. Learned counsel further submits that it was
directed vide the said order to learned counsel for the
respondents to furnish him the details of legal heirs of the said
deceased respondents within seven working days.
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 9 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
2. Learned counsel for appellants further submits that it was duty
of learned counsel for the respondents to furnish him the
details of proposed LRs in view of order dated 25.11.2024 and
the details were furnished to him only on 08.12.2024, that too
without death certificates of respondents. It is submitted that
the application for bringing on record the LRs was filed on
06.01.2025 within the limitation period computed from the
date of receiving the details of the LRs of deceased
respondents.
3. Learned counsel for the proposed LRs of deceased respondents
submit that the applications for substitution of LRs were filed
beyond the limitation period. It is further submitted that it is
the duty of the appellants to make enquires and collect the
details of LRs of deceased respondent on his own and the duty
of counsel for deceased respondent stops after furnishing the
information with regard to the death of his client.
4. This Court does not agree with the submissions of learned
counsel for proposed LRs made in para 3 above to the extent
that duty of counsel of deceased respondent stops after
furnishing the information with regard to death of his client
and the said duty does not extend to furnishing of details of
proposed legal representatives of deceased respondent.
Hon‟ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Food Corporation of
India vs. Sri Ramchandra Boiled and Raw Rice Mill, 1983
SCC OnLine AP71, referring to Rule 10A CPC, held in para 3
interalia, that “.......when the learned counsel for the defendant
is aware of the death of the defendant, then it is expected of
him to facilitate the Court to bring his LRs within the statutory
period of limitation, to give intimation of the death of the
defendant. When such is the position it is the bounden duty of
the counsel to give intimation of the LRs or to make an enquiry
from the person that gave the information and furnish the same
immediately either to the Court or the counsel for
plaintiff.......”
5. This court, hence, agrees with the submissions made by
learned counsel for the appellants that the applications for
substitution have been moved within time after the details of
proposed LRs were supplied to him.
6. Considering the facts, the present applications are allowed and
LRs of deceased respondent Nos.1A and 1B, details whereof
are mentioned in para 4 of CM APPL.775/2025 and para 5 of
CM APPL.776/2025, respectively are brought on record.
7. Applications stand disposed of.”
26. The principal objection raised by Respondent No. 1(E) to the
substitution of the Legal Representatives of Respondent Nos. 1(A)
and 1(B) is that the applications were filed beyond 90 days from the
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 10 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
dates of death and that no separate applications seeking condonation
of delay or setting aside of abatement accompanied them. The
Appellants, on the other hand, contend that they were first informed of
the deaths on 25.11.2024, that the particulars of the Legal
Representatives were supplied on 08.12.2024, and that the
applications were promptly filed on 07.01.2025, within 90 days of
receipt of the particulars.
27. Order XXII of the CPC, inter alia , governs the consequences of
the death of a party during the pendency of proceedings and the
procedure for bringing the Legal Representatives of such party on
record. Rule 3 deals with the death of a Plaintiff or Appellant, while
Rule 4 deals with the death of a Defendant or Respondent where the
right to sue survives. Under the applicable provisions, if no
application is made within the prescribed period to bring the legal
representatives on record, the proceedings abate insofar as the
deceased party is concerned, or, in some cases, the entire proceeding.
Such abatement occurs by operation of law and does not depend upon
the passing of a specific judicial order.
28. The relevant periods of limitation are prescribed under Articles
120 and 121 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Article 120
prescribes a period of 90 days for an application to bring the Legal
Representatives of a deceased party on record, commencing from the
date of death. Article 121 prescribes a period of 60 days for an
application to set aside abatement, commencing from the date on
which abatement occurs. Consequently, the period prescribed under
Article 120 cannot, as a matter of law, be computed from the date on
which the surviving party receives information of the death or obtains
the particulars of the Legal Representatives. The date of death remains
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 11 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
the statutory starting point. However, the circumstances in which the
death became known, the steps taken to obtain the particulars of the
Legal Representatives, and the conduct of the parties in
communicating such information remain relevant when the Court
examines whether the resulting delay and abatement warrant relief.
29. In this context, Order XXII Rule 10A CPC assumes
significance. The provision imposes an obligation upon a pleader
appearing for a party to inform the Court of the death of that party,
thereby facilitating the taking of appropriate procedural steps in the
pending proceedings. The scope and object of this provision have
been extensively considered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Binod
Pathak v. Shankar Choudhary (supra). The Hon‟ble Supreme Court,
inter alia , emphasised that Rule 10A was introduced to prevent
procedural injustice arising from the failure to communicate the death
of a litigant and to ensure that the opposite party is not taken by
surprise by a plea that the proceedings have abated. The provision
must, therefore, be understood in light of its underlying purpose and
not treated as an empty procedural formality.
30. In Binod Pathak (supra ), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that
where the obligation contemplated under Order XXII Rule 10A CPC
has not been discharged, and there is no cogent material establishing
that the opposite party nevertheless had sufficient opportunity to
know, and in fact knew, of the death of the deceased party, a plea of
abatement raised by a party that failed to comply with the said
obligation cannot be entertained. The Court reiterated the principle
that no party should be permitted to take advantage of its own lapse to
defeat the proceedings. The decision underscores that the question of
abatement cannot, in every case, be determined by a mechanical
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 12 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
reference to the expiry of the statutory period without examining the
circumstances in which the death became known and the conduct of
the party relying upon abatement.
31. At the same time, the decision does not dispense with Articles
120 and 121 of the Limitation Act or render Order XXII inapplicable.
The statutory periods continue to govern substitution and setting aside
of abatement. The relevance of Binod Pathak (supra) lies in the
assessment of the conduct of the parties and the circumstances in
which the requisite procedural steps could reasonably have been
taken. The Court must, therefore, examine whether the plea of
abatement is being raised in circumstances where the party relying
upon it has itself failed to discharge the obligation imposed by law,
and whether the opposing party had a fair and effective opportunity to
take the necessary steps. The relevant observations as made in Binod
Pathak (supra) read as under:
“ 29. With enforcement of 1976's amendment to the CPC, once a
party to the suit dies, a duty is cast upon the lawyer representing
such party, to communicate the fact of death to the opposite party
in terms of provisions contain in Rule 10A of Order XXII of the
CPC. It is nobody's case that there was compliance of this rule in
the case at hand by the advocate appearing for the defendants.
Unless this primary obligation is discharged and it is established
with cogent evidence that the opposite party had sufficient
opportunity to know and, had, in fact, knowledge of the death of
the defendant, the plea of abatement of the suit at the instance of
party having failed to comply with the obligation mentioned under
Rule 10A of Order XXII of the CPC cannot be entertained. Nobody
can be allowed to reap the benefit of his own lapse and to non-suit
the plaintiff.
*
32. Rule 10A is intended to avoid delay in making an application
for bringing legal representatives of the deceased party on record. It
seeks to mitigate the hardship arising from the fact that a party to a
suit may not come to know about the death of the other side during
the pendency of the proceedings. In such a situation, it would be
appropriate to ask the advocate of the party to give intimation of
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 13 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
the death of the party represented by him so as to enable the other
side to take appropriate steps.
*
38. Order III, Rule 4 prescribes the manner of appointment of a
pleader and also the limit upto which such appointment remains in
force. Every appointment of a pleader will be continued inter alia
until the client or the pleader dies. As a general rule, therefore, on
the death of the client his contract with the pleader comes to an
end. So also, his authority to act on behalf of his client expires.
39. Rule 10A, as inserted by the Amendment Act, 1976 carves out
an exception to the above general rule and casts a duty upon the
advocate appearing for the party to intimate the court about the
death of his client. For this purpose, a deeming fiction has been
created that the contract between the (deceased) client and the
pleader subsists to that limited extent. [See: Gangadhar v. Raj
Kumar , (1984) 1 SCC 121 ]
40. Rule 10A of Order XXII is salutary in nature. It has been
introduced to mitigate hardship arising from the fact that a suit,
appeal or other proceeding may take long time and a party to a suit,
appeal or other proceeding may die and the other party may not be
aware of such a situation. Rule 10A seeks to do justice over
technicalities by requiring an advocate appearing for the party to
intimate the court about the death of his client and provides an
opportunity to the other side to take necessary steps to bring heirs
and legal representatives of the deceased party on record. Rule 10A
is thus not an empty formality. Preeminent object of the rule is to
do full and complete justice.
*
45. The genesis of the provision of Rule 10A of the Order XXII lies
in the doctrine of „clean hands‟. The doctrine of „clean hands‟
originates from the Roman Law, and finds expression in two latin
maxims being (i) ex injuria ius non oritur and (ii) nullus commodum
capere potest de injuria sua propia , which mean “from wrong, no
right arises” and “no one can take advantage of their own wrong”,
respectively. [See: Schwebel, Stephen M. “ Clean Hands, Principle”
Eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum, Oxford University Press, 2009] .
*
57. On the basis of the aforesaid, we are of the considered view that
the underlying ethos of Order XXII, Rule 10A is not based on the
maxim of „ ex injuria ius non oritur ‟. A „right‟ accrues in the eyes
of law through two principal channels : first through the force of
any law or statute itself, and secondly , through acts enabled by the
law that possess the normative force to create enforceable claims
backed by the operation of law or facilitated by conventional legal
norms such as a gift, will, consent, contract etc., acts that have the
capacity to create legal rights. Any legal norm, must possess
normativity and generality, which together must have such an
effect that the norm ought to become valid in law or through the
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 14 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
law, in order for it to give birth to a right. In other words, only
those acts which attain legal validity inherently within the legal
system or through its mechanism can be said to give rise to a
„right‟.
*
59. The question of allowing abatement of suit is one of discretion
and therefore, an advantage. Under Rule 10A of Order XXII, the
duty of a pleader to apprise the court as well as the other parties to
the suit or appeal of the death of his client is a duty of candour and
propriety as a responsible officer of the court. The failure of a party
to perform the duty under Rule 10A constitutes a wrongful act and
such party must not be allowed to avail the benefit arising
therefrom in the form of abatement of suit.
*
60. Rule 10A of Order XXII, as inserted by the Amendment Act,
1976 imposes an obligation on the pleader appearing for the party
to intimate death of his client to the court. But there is difference of
opinion as to whether the duty imposed on the pleader is confined
to factum of death of a party or also to furnish names and
particulars of legal representatives.
61. According to one view, there is no obligation on the pleader
appearing on behalf of the deceased party to furnish or supply list
of legal representatives of the deceased.
62. According to the other view, however, the pleader has not only
to inform the court as to death of the party but he must also furnish
particulars of legal representatives.
63. However, we are of the view that providing merely an
information with regard to the fact of death is not sufficient
compliance of the Rule 10A of the CPC. unless and until the
counsel furnishes the information with regard to the details of
the persons on whom and against whom the right to sue
survives and the information under Rule 10A of the CPC. and
the object behind it would remain incomplete as the parties
would still be labouring to inquire who are the legal
representatives and find out as to upon whom and against
whom the right to sue survives .”
(emphasis supplied)
32. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has also considered the
relationship between an application for substitution and the
consequential relief of setting aside abatement in Mithailal
Dalsangar Singh ( supra) and Om Prakash Gupta alias Lalloowa
( supra) . These decisions recognise that the absence of a separately
worded prayer for setting aside abatement does not, by itself,
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necessarily defeat an application for substitution. In an appropriate
case, the prayer for substitution may be construed as incorporating the
consequential relief of setting aside abatement. However, the grant of
such relief remains dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the
case and the sufficiency of the explanation offered for the delay. The
distinction is between the form in which the consequential relief is
sought and the substantive requirement that the Court be satisfied that
the delay and abatement ought to be excused. The relevant
observations as made in Om Prakash Gupta alias Lalloowa (supra)
read as under:
“ 11. Rule 1 of Order XXII, CPC provides that when a party to a
suit passes away, the suit will not abate if the right to sue survives.
In instances where the right to sue does survive, the procedure for
bringing on record the legal representative(s) of the
plaintiff/appellant and the defendant/respondent are provided in
Rules 3 and 4, respectively, of Order XXII. The suit/appeal
automatically abates when an application to substitute the legal
representative(s) of the deceased party is not filed within the
prescribed limitation period of 90 days from the date of death, as
stipulated by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It could well
be so that death of a defendant/respondent is not made known to
the plaintiff/appellant within 90 days, being the period of
limitation. Does it mean that the suit or appeal will not abate? The
answer in view of the scheme of Order XXII cannot be in the
negative. In the event the plaintiff/appellant derives knowledge of
death immediately after the suit/appeal has abated, the remedy
available is to file an application seeking setting aside of the
abatement, the limitation wherefor is stipulated in Article 121 and
st
which allows a period of 60 days. Therefore, between the 91 and
th
the 150 day after the death, one has to file an application for
st
setting aside the abatement. On the 151 day, this remedy becomes
time-barred; consequently, any application seeking to set aside the
abatement must then be accompanied by a request contained in an
application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act in filing the application for setting aside the
abatement. Thus, the total time-frame for filing an application for
substitution and for setting aside abatement, as outlined in Articles
120 and 121 of the Limitation Act, is 150 (90 + 60) days. The
question of condonation of delay, through an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, arises only after this period and not
st
on the 91 day when the suit/appeal abates. From our limited
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experience on the bench of this Court, we have found it somewhat
of a frequent occurrence that after abatement of the suit and after
th
the 150 day of death, an application is filed for condonation of
delay in filing the application for substitution but not an application
seeking condonation of delay in filing the application for setting
aside the abatement. The proper sequence to be followed, therefore,
is an application for substitution within 90 days of death and if not
filed, to file an application for setting aside the abatement within 60
days and if that too is not filed, to file the requisite applications for
substitution and setting aside the abatement with an accompanying
application for condonation of delay in filing the latter application,
i.e., the application for setting aside the abatement. Once the court
is satisfied that sufficient cause prevented the plaintiff/appellant
from applying for setting aside the abatement within the period of
limitation and orders accordingly, comes the question of setting the
abatement. That happens as a matter of course and following the
order for substitution of the deceased defendant/respondent, the
suit/appeal regains its earlier position and would proceed for a
trial/hearing on merits. Be that as it may.
*
17. According to Mr. Basant, the application filed by the heirs of
Satish Chandra was an application intimating the death of Satish
Chandra under Order XXII Rule 10-A, CPC and it was not an
application under Rule 4 thereof; thus, there being no valid and
proper application for substitution, the appeal was rightly held to
have abated.
18. We find no force in the argument advanced by Mr. Basant. The
application filed by the heirs of Satish Chandra was registered as a
substitution application and the prayer was also for deletion of the
name of Satish Chandra and substitution of his three sons in his
place. In view thereof and having regard to the law laid down in
Ram Charan (supra), we hold that an application having been filed
by the heirs of Satish Chandra, the heirs of Om Prakash were not
legally obliged to apply separately for substitution.
19. In our opinion, the law not having expressly mandated that an
application for substitution has to be filed by the plaintiff/appellant
upon receiving intimation of death, requiring a formal application
from the plaintiff only will serve no tangible purpose. A justice-
oriented approach has to be followed in interpreting the provisions
of the CPC is the well settled law. Reference may usefully be made
33
to the decision in Chinnammal v. P. Arumugham , where it was
held:
“17. It is well to remember that the Code of Civil
Procedure is a body of procedural law designed to
facilitate justice and it should not be treated as an
enactment providing for punishments and penalties. The
laws of procedure should be so construed as to render
justice wherever reasonably possible. It is in our opinion,
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not unreasonable to demand restitution from a person who
has purchased the property in court auction being aware of
the pending appeal against the decree.”
(emphasis supplied)
*
22. There is another equally important aspect, which merits our
attention. The second appeal was restored by the High Court vide
th
order dated 25 May, 2018. This order, restoring the second
th
appeal, was recalled vide order dated 11 January 2019. The reason
given was that, in the absence of an application praying for setting
aside the abatement, the second appeal could not have been ordered
to be restored.
23. We find it difficult to agree with such reasoning. When an
application praying for substitution had been made, then, even
assuming that it does not have an explicit prayer for setting aside
the abatement, such prayer could be read as inherent in the prayer
for substitution in the interest of justice. We draw inspiration for
such a conclusion, having read the decision in Mithailal Dalsangar
35
Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini . This Court reiterated the need
for a justice-oriented approach in such matters. Inter alia , it was
held that prayer to bring on record heir(s)/legal representative(s)
can also be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement.
The relevant passage reads as under:
“8. Inasmuch as the abatement results in denial of hearing
on the merits of the case, the provision of abatement has to
be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for
setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent
upon an abatement, have to be considered liberally. A
simple prayer for bringing the legal representatives on
record without specifically praying for setting aside of an
abatement may in substance be construed as a prayer for
setting aside the abatement. So also a prayer for setting
aside abatement as regards one of the plaintiffs can be
construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement of the
suit in its entirety. Abatement of suit for failure to move an
application for bringing the legal representatives on record
within the prescribed period of limitation is automatic and
a specific order dismissing the suit as abated is not called
for. Once the suit has abated as a matter of law, though
there may not have been passed on record a specific order
dismissing the suit as abated, yet the legal representatives
proposing to be brought on record or any other applicant
proposing to bring the legal representatives of the
deceased party on record would seek the setting aside of
an abatement. A prayer for bringing the legal
representatives on record, if allowed, would have the
effect of setting aside the abatement as the relief of setting
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aside abatement though not asked for in so many words is
in effect being actually asked for and is necessarily
implied. Too technical or pedantic an approach in such
cases is not called for.
9. The courts have to adopt a justice-oriented approach
dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a
litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a
lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross
negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to
misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking the
indulgence of the court. The opinion of the trial Judge
allowing a prayer for setting aside abatement and his
finding on the question of availability of „sufficient cause‟
within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of Order 22
and of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deserves to
be given weight, and once arrived at would not normally
be interfered with by superior jurisdiction.
10. In the present case, … such an approach adopted by
the Division Bench verges on too fine a technicality and
results in injustice being done. There was no order in
writing passed by the court dismissing the entire suit as
having abated. The suit has been treated by the Division
Bench to have abated in its entirety by operation of law.
For a period of ninety days from the date of death of any
party the suit remains in a state of suspended animation.
And then it abates. The converse would also logically
follow. Once the prayer made by the legal representatives
of the deceased plaintiff for setting aside the abatement as
regards the deceased plaintiff was allowed, and the legal
representatives of the deceased plaintiff came on record,
the constitution of the suit was rendered good; it revived
and the abatement of the suit would be deemed to have
been set aside in its entirety even though there was no
specific prayer made and no specific order of the court
passed in that behalf.”
(emphasis supplied)
…”
(emphasis supplied)
33. In the present case, the Impugned Order records that
information regarding the deaths of Respondent Nos. 1(A) and 1(B)
was furnished on 25.11.2024 and that the particulars of their Legal
Representatives were supplied on 08.12.2024. The applications for
substitution were thereafter filed on 07.01.2025. The Appellants'
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explanation is, therefore, that they took steps for substitution promptly
after the particulars necessary to identify the Legal Representatives
became available to them. The learned Registrar considered this
sequence of events and accepted the explanation furnished by the
Appellants.
34. Respondent No. 1(E) before this Court does not dispute the
dates on which the deaths and the particulars of the Legal
Representatives were communicated, or the date on which the
substitution applications were filed. Its objections are procedural; first ,
that no application for condonation of delay was filed; and second ,
that no separate application seeking to set aside abatement
accompanied the applications for substitution.
35. In this considered opinion of this Court, the objection that the
Appellants were required to file a separate application to set aside
abatement is not sustainable. As held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh ( supra ) and Om Prakash Gupta alias
Lalloowa ( supra ), a prayer to bring the Legal Representatives on
record may, in an appropriate case, be construed as including the
consequential prayer to set aside abatement. The absence of a
separately worded prayer is therefore not, by itself, fatal in the present
case, too.
36. As to the absence of a separate application for condonation of
delay, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held in Sesh Nath Singh ( supra )
that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not invariably require a
formal written application. Although filing such an application is the
usual practice and helps the Court assess the reasons for the delay, the
Court may exercise its discretion to condone delay without one.
Condonation is not automatic, and the applicant must establish
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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sufficient cause, and the Court must be satisfied that the explanation
justifies the delay. If the material on record is inadequate, the Court
may require the applicant to file an application or affidavit explaining
it. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as in Sesh
Nath Singh ( supra ) are as follows:
“ 58. In Ramlal, Motilal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. , AIR
1962 SC 361 , this Court affirmed the view taken by the Madras
High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan , 1889 SCC OnLine Mad 1 ,
and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives the courts a
discretion, which is to be exercised in the way in which judicial
power and discretion ought to be exercised, upon principles which
are well understood. The expression “sufficient cause” should be
construed liberally to advance substantial justice, as held by this
Court, inter alia, in Shakuntla Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari , AIR
1969 SC 575 and in State of W.B. v. Howrah Municipality , (1972)
1 SCC 366 .
59. The condition precedent for condonation of the delay in filing
an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause.
Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute
“sufficient cause” or not would be dependent upon facts of each
case. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or
rejecting the explanation furnished by the appellant applicant for
the delay in taking steps. Acceptance of explanation furnished
should be the rule and refusal an exception, when no negligence or
inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting
party.
60. It is true that a valuable right may accrue to the other party by
the law of limitation, which should not lightly be defeated by
condoning delay in a routine manner. At the same time, when
stakes are high, the explanation should not be rejected by taking a
pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter, causing thereby
irreparable loss and injury to the party against whom the lis
terminates. The courts are required to strike a balance between the
legitimate rights and interests of the respective parties.
61. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not speak of any
application. The section enables the court to admit an application or
appeal if the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be, satisfies
the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application
and/or preferring the appeal, within the time prescribed. Although,
it is the general practice to make a formal application under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in order to enable the court or
tribunal to weigh the sufficiency of the cause for the inability of the
appellant applicant to approach the court/tribunal within the time
prescribed by limitation, there is no bar to exercise by the
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BHATIA
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court/tribunal of its discretion to condone delay, in the absence of a
formal application.
62. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it
amply clear that, it is not mandatory to file an application in writing
before relief can be granted under the said section. Had such an
application been mandatory, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would
have expressly provided so. Section 5 would then have read that the
court might condone delay beyond the time prescribed by
limitation for filing an application or appeal, if on consideration of
the application of the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be,
for condonation of delay, the court is satisfied that the appellant
applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period. Alternatively, a proviso
or an Explanation would have been added to Section 5, requiring
the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, to make an
application for condonation of delay. However, the court can
always insist that an application or an affidavit showing cause for
the delay be filed. No applicant or appellant can claim condonation
of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as of right, without
making an application.”
(emphasis supplied)
37. In the present case, some relevant dates are necessary to be
taken note of. For instance, the RFA was filed in 2014 and admitted
on 26.02.2016. It was next taken up on 18.09.2023, following an
application by the Appellants for an early hearing. The matter was
thereafter listed on four occasions without any disclosure concerning
the deaths of Respondent Nos. 1(A) and 1(B) by any of the
Respondents. The deaths were disclosed only on 25.11.2024 as
recorded in the Order of the said date. The Appellants received the
particulars of the Legal Representatives on 08.12.2024 and filed the
substitution applications on 07.01.2025, approximately one month
later.
38. In these circumstances, the record supports the Appellants‟
explanation that they acted within a reasonable time after receiving the
particulars needed to identify the Legal Representatives. Before the
disclosure on 25.11.2024, the Appellants had not been provided with
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BHATIA
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the relevant information concerning the deaths, even though there is a
specific mandate of law in this regard.
39. Further, the appeal had also not been listed for a substantial
period before it was taken up in September 2023. The delay must
therefore be assessed in light of when the deaths and the particulars of
the Legal Representatives were communicated, as well as the
Appellants‟ conduct after receiving that information. Applying the
principles in Binod Pathak ( supra ), Mithailal Dalsangar Singh
( supra ) and Om Prakash Gupta alias Lalloowa ( supra ), a justice-
oriented approach is warranted. On the circumstances recorded in the
Impugned Order, the absence of a separate application for
condonation of delay does not, by itself, defeat the substitution
applications.
40. Having considered the parties‟ submissions and the material
recorded in the Impugned Order, this Court finds no sufficient ground
to interfere with the learned Registrar‟s decision allowing CM APPL.
Nos. 775/2025 and 776/2025. The applications for substitution may,
in an appropriate case, be construed as including the consequential
prayer to set aside abatement. The Court must also consider when the
deaths and the particulars of the Legal Representatives were
communicated, rather than determine the plea of abatement solely by
reference to the dates of death. Finally, the absence of a formal
application for condonation of delay is not invariably fatal, provided
the record establishes sufficient cause. In the circumstances of this
case, the decision allowing the applications warrants no interference.
41. Accordingly, the challenge to the Impugned Order, insofar as it
allows CM APPL. Nos. 775/2025 and 776/2025 concerning the Legal
Representatives of Respondent Nos. 1(A) and 1(B), is rejected.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
B. CM APPL. 41635/2025 (for bringing on record the LRs
ofR1(G)and CM APPL. 41636/2025 (delay of105 days)
42. At this stage, it is apposite to reproduce the analysis and
findings of the learned Registrar in the Impugned Order in respect of
these two applications, which read as follows:
“ CM APPL. 41635/2025 (for bringing on record the LRs of R1(G)-
Smt. Premwati and CM APPL. 41636/2025 (delay of 105 days)
8. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that death of
respondent No.1G occurred on 27.12.2024, as per death
certificate. Learned counsel further submit that on 24.02.2025
none was present on behalf of the appellants and learned
counsel for respondent No1(D to J) made statement in the
Court that details of LRs of deceased respondent No.1G have
been supplied to learned counsel for the appellant. However,
fact of the matter is that no such details were supplied.
9. It is further submitted that details of LRs of respondent No.1G
were supplied on 10.07.2025 through WhatsApp
no.8390234533 and the present application was filed on
13.07.2025, just after two days of receiving of the details.
Learned counsel for appellants submit that the application has
been filed within the limitation period from the date of
receiving the details of proposed LRs of deceased respondent
No.1G. Learned counsel for appellant further submits that as a
precaution, he has moved an application (CM 41636/2025 u/S
5 of Limitation Act) for condonation of delay.
10. In view of the aforesaid, this court agrees with the submissions
made by learned counsel for the appellants. Consequently, the
present applications are allowed and LRs of deceased
respondent No.1G, details whereof having been mentioned in
para 3 of CM 41635/2025, are brought on record.
11. Amended memo of parties be filed within four weeks.”
43. The position concerning Respondent No. 1(G) stands on a
slightly different footing. She passed away on 27.12.2024. CM APPL.
No. 41635/2025, seeking substitution of her Legal Representatives,
was filed on 13.07.2025, accompanied by CM APPL. No.
41636/2025, seeking condonation of delay in filing the substitution
application.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
44. The principal objection raised by Respondent No. 1(E) to the
aforesaid applications is premised on the Order dated 24.02.2025,
which records that the particulars of the Legal Representatives of
Respondent No. 1(G) had already been furnished to the learned
counsel for the Appellants. It is contended that the explanation
subsequently furnished by the Appellants, to the effect that the said
particulars were received only on 10.07.2025 through WhatsApp, is
contrary to the judicial record. Respondent No. 1(E) would further
dispute the WhatsApp communication relied upon by the Appellants
and contend that the explanation furnished in support of the
application seeking condonation of delay is, therefore, untenable.
45. On the other hand, the Appellants maintain that the particulars
of the Legal Representatives of Respondent No. 1(G) were
communicated to their counsel only on 10.07.2025 through WhatsApp
and that CM APPL. No. 41635/2025 was filed on 13.07.2025,
immediately upon receipt thereof. In support of this explanation,
learned counsel would draw the attention of this Court to the personal
affidavit furnished by one of the learned counsel appearing for the
Appellants, affirming on oath the date and manner in which the
requisite particulars were received. It is, thus, contended that the delay
stands satisfactorily explained and that the learned Registrar
committed no error in allowing the applications.
46. At this juncture, it would be apposite to note that the legal
principles governing the substitution of Legal Representatives of a
deceased party and the condonation of delay in filing an application
seeking such substitution have already been elaborately dealt with in
the foregoing portion of this judgment. Accordingly, for the sake of
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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brevity and to avoid repetition, this Court does not deem it necessary
to reiterate the same herein.
47. In the present case, the Appellants have specifically asserted
that the particulars of the Legal Representatives of Respondent No.
1(G) were received only on 10.07.2025 through WhatsApp and that
the substitution application was filed on 13.07.2025. Significantly,
this assertion is supported by a sworn affidavit furnished by one of the
learned counsel appearing for the Appellants. The explanation,
therefore, is not founded merely upon a bald assertion in the
application seeking condonation of delay, but is supported by an
affidavit on oath affirming the circumstances in which the requisite
particulars were received.
48. This Court also takes note of the objection founded upon the
Order dated 24.02.2025, which records that the particulars of the
Legal Representatives had been supplied to the learned counsel for the
Appellants. However, Respondent No. 1(E) has not placed any
independent material on record to demonstrate that the particulars
were actually received by the Appellants or their counsel on the date
or at the point of time suggested by him. The mere recording of the
aforesaid fact in the Order dated 24.02.2025, in the absence of any
material establishing actual communication or receipt of the
particulars by the Appellants' counsel, would not, in the facts of the
present case, be sufficient to displace the specific assertion supported
by a sworn affidavit.
49. It is also relevant that the Appellants have demonstrated
promptitude in taking steps for substitution immediately upon receipt
of the particulars. The substitution application came to be filed within
three days of the date on which the particulars are stated to have been
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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received. This subsequent conduct lends credence to the explanation
furnished by the Appellants and indicates that there was no deliberate
inaction on their part once the requisite particulars became available.
50. In this regard, this Court is guided by the settled principle that
the expression „sufficient cause‟ under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
is required to be construed in a manner that advances substantial
justice, while keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each
case. The exercise of discretion in condoning delay must, therefore, be
informed by the bona fides of the explanation furnished, the conduct
of the party seeking condonation and the material available on record.
In the present case, the sworn affidavit filed by the Appellants'
counsel, coupled with the prompt filing of the substitution application
and the absence of any material produced by Respondent No. 1(E) to
substantiate his contrary assertion, persuades this Court to accept the
explanation furnished by the Appellants.
51. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the explanation furnished by the Appellants
constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing CM
APPL. No. 41635/2025. The learned Registrar has rightly accepted
the explanation furnished by the Appellants, particularly in view of
the sworn affidavit placed on record and the absence of any cogent
material to rebut the same. Consequently, this Court finds no infirmity
in the Impugned Order dated 20.07.2026, insofar as it allows CM
APPL. Nos. 41635/2025 and 41636/2025, warranting interference in
the present Chamber Appeal.
52. Accordingly, the challenge to the Impugned Order insofar as it
allows CM APPL. Nos. 41635/2025 and 41636/2025 , concerning the
Legal Representatives of Respondent No. 1(G), is rejected.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
53. This Court now briefly takes note of certain ancillary issues
arising in the present Chamber Appeal.
C. Locus of Respondent No. 1(E)to file the Chamber Appeal
54. The Appellants before this Court have questioned the
Respondent No. 1(E)‟s locus to file the present Chamber Appeal.
Since this Court has found the Impugned Order to be sustainable, it
may not be necessary to decide that objection. In any event, the
objection is ex facie without merit.
55. Rule 5 of Chapter II of the Delhi High Court (Original Side)
Rules, 2018 provides that “ any person aggrieved by any order made
by the Registrar under Rule 3 of this Chapter ” may appeal against that
order to the Judge in Chambers within fifteen days.
56. The learned Registrar allowed the substitution of the Legal
Representatives of three Respondents. Respondent No. 1(E) was
aggrieved by that decision because, had the substitution not been
allowed, his plea that the RFA had abated could have been considered
on its merits. He therefore had a direct interest in challenging the
learned Registrar‟s order and qualifies as an aggrieved person for the
purposes of Rule 5. The objection to his locus is accordingly rejected.
D. Prayer for a declaration that the RFA had abated
57. This Court has upheld the Impugned Order and found that the
substitution of the respondents‟ Legal Representatives was in
accordance with law. It is therefore not required to consider the
Chamber Respondent No. 1(E)‟s specific prayer for a declaration that
the RFA had abated.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24
CONCLUSION:
58. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no ground
to interfere with the Impugned Order insofar as it allows CM APPL.
Nos. 775/2025 and 776/2025 , concerning the Legal Representatives
of Respondent Nos. 1(A) and 1(B). Similarly, no interference is
warranted with the Impugned Order insofar as it allows CM APPL.
Nos. 41635/2025 and 41636/2025 , concerning the substitution of
Legal Representatives of Respondent No. 1(G).
59. Accordingly, the present Chamber Appeal is dismissed.
60. The Chamber Appeal is disposed of in the above terms. Any
pending applications in the Chamber Appeal also stand disposed of.
RFA 515/2014
61. List on 17.03.2027 before Roster Bench for further
consideration.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 19, 2026/va
Signature Not Verified
RFA 515/2014 Page 29 of 29
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:13:24