Jagtar Singh Johal @ Jaggi vs National Inestigation Agency

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 07.09.2026
Pronounced on: 18.09.2026
Uploaded on: 18.09.2026


# CNR No. DLHC010019802022
+ CRL.A. 493/2023
# CNR No. DLHC010020042022
+ CRL.A. 538/2023
# CNR No. DLHC010020052022
+ CRL.A. 539/2023
# CNR No. DLHC010020062022
+ CRL.A. 540/2023
# CNR No. DLHC010020072022
+ CRL.A. 541/2023
# CNR No. DLHC010381882024
+ CRL.A. 569/2024
# CNR No. DLHC010387712024
+ CRL.A. 577/2024


JAGTAR SINGH JOHAL @ JAGGI .....Appellant
Through: Mr.Jawahar Raja,
Ms.Maulshree Pathak, Ms.Aditi
Saraswat, Ms.Nitai Hinduja &
Mr.Ishaan Goel, Advs.
versus

NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr.Rajkumar Bhaskar Thakare,
ASG with Ms.Shilpa Singh,
SPP & Ms.Priyam Agrawal,
Adv. for NIA along with Dysp
Ram Gopal Sharma, IO/NIA.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
Signature Not Verified
CRL.A. 493/2023 & connected matters Page 1 of 30

Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43


J U D G M E N T

NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
1. These appeals have been filed by the appellant challenging the
orders passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-03, New
Delhi, in the FIR(s), details of which, for the sake of reference, are
given in a tabular form hereinbelow:-
S.No. Appeal
Impugned
Order of the
learned Trial
RC and FIR No. Sections
No.
Court
1. Crl.A.
Order dated
25.04.2024 in
SC No.
NIA/07/2022

RC No.
27/2017/N.I.A/D
LI
FIR No 06/2017
– PS Division 8
Ludhiana,
Punjab

Sec. 120-B,
302, 34. 379.
416 IPC,

Sec. 16, 17,
18, 18A, 18B,
20, 21 and 23
of UAPA,
1967

S.25 & 27 of
the Arms Act,
1959
2. Crl.A.
569/2024

Order dated
25.04.2024 in
SC No.
N.I.A/07/2022.
RC No.
07/2019/N.I.A/D
LI
FIR No
113/2017 PS
Division – 04,
Jalandhar
District, Punjab
Sec. 120-B,
302, 34, 379,
416 of IPC

Sec. 16, 17,
18, 18A, 18B,
20, 21 and 23
of UAPA.

Sec. 25 & 27
577/2024

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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

of the Arms
Act, 1959
3. Crl.A.
Order dated
07.09.2022
N.I.A RC
No.18/2017/N.I.
A/DLI
FIR No.
442/2017
PS Jhodewal,
District
Ludhiana,
Punjab
Sec.120B/
302/ 34/ 379/
416 IPC,
R/W.

Sec.16/ 17/
18/ 18A/ 18B/
20/ 21 & 23
UAPA &

Sec.25/27
Arms Act
4. Crl.A.

493/2023

Order dated
07.09.2022
RC
22/2017/N.I.A/D
LI
FIR No
218/2017
PS Salem Tabri,
District
Ludhiana,
Punjab
Sec.120B/302
/34/379/416
IPC, R/W.

Sec.16/ 17
/18/ 18A/
18B/ 20/ 21
& 23 Of
UAPA &

S.25/27 of the
Arms Act
5. Crl.A.
538/2023

Order dated
07.09.2022
RC-
26/2017/N.I.A/D
LI.
FIR No 7/2016
PS Division-2,
Ludhiana,
Punjab
Sec.120B/302
/34/379/416
IPC, R/w.

Sec.16/17
/18/18A/
18B/20/21 &
23 Of UAPA
&

Sec.25/27 of
the Arms Act

539/2023

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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

6. Crl.A.
Order dated
07.09.2022

RC-
23/2017/N.I.A/D
LI
FIR No 13/2017
PS Maloud,
District Khanna,
Punjab
Sec.120B/302
/34/379/416
IPC, R/w

Sec.16/17
/18/18A/
18B/20/21 &
23 Of UAPA
&

Sec.25/27 of
the Arms Act
7. Crl.A.
540/2023

Order dated
07.09.2022
RC-
25/2017/N.I.A/D
LI
FIR No
119/2016
PS City Khanna,
District Khanna,
Punjab
Sec.120B/302
/34/379/416
IPC, R/w.

Sec.16/17
/18/18A/
18B/20/21 &
23 of UAPA
&

Sec.25/27 of
the Arms Act

541/2023

2. As the allegations against the appellant in the above RCs are
similar and common submissions have been made not only by the
learned counsel for the appellant, but also by the learned ASG, these
appeals are being considered and disposed of by this common
judgment.
3. Before proceeding further with the adjudication of these appeals
on merits, we would note and highlight that by a judgment dated
18.09.2024, passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, Crl.A. No.
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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

493/2023, 538/2023, 539/2023, 540/2023 and 541/2023, had been
dismissed on the ground of limitation, while Crl.A. Nos. 569/2024 and
577/2024 had been dismissed on merits, declining bail to the
appellant. This judgment was challenged by the appellant before the
Supreme Court by way of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 3968-74/2025, which were
converted into Crl.A. Nos. 3377-83/2026. The said Criminal Appeals
were disposed of by the Supreme Court vide a common judgment
dated 15.07.2026 in the following terms:-
“..... Considering the submissions made and
taking note of the fact that the present appeals
are pending before us from the year 2025, we
deem it appropriate to give one more
opportunity to the appellant to argue all the
appeals before the High Court on merits and
in accordance with law.
In such view of the matter, the impugned order
is set aside and the matters are remitted to the
High Court to be decided afresh on merits and
in accordance with law without going into the
question of condonation of delay. We request
the High Court to make an endeavour to
dispose of the said appeals within a period of
two months from the date of receipt of a copy
of this order.
All issues are left open to be raised and
argued by the contesting parties.”

4. The present appeals have been listed before this Bench pursuant
to the above order of the Supreme Court.
5. For the sake of convenience, we shall be considering the
allegations made against the appellant in the charge-sheet filed in RC
No. 27/2017/NIA/DLI (Amit Sharma Murder Case) SC No.
N.I.A./07/2022. As noted hereinabove, the allegations in the other
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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

RC(s) are almost identical.

ALLEGATIONS IN THE CHARGE-SHEET:
6. In the charge-sheet, the appellant has been arrayed as accused
no. 6 and the allegations against him are as under:-
“The Conspiracy: Pre-incident Stage
17.22 In the year 2006, when Hardeep Singh
(A-1) was about six years old, he was adopted
by his 'taya', Daljit Singh and taken to Italy.
The two passports recovered from Hardeep
Singh (A-1) bear the name of Daljit Singh
under the head, "Name of Father/Legal
Guardian" as opposed to the name of his
biological father, Balwinderpal Singh.
Hardeep Singh (A-1)'s mother's name
mentioned in his passports is Kulwinder Kaur,
the wife of his 'taya' Daljit Singh and not
Surinder Kaur, his biological mother. Hardeep
Singh (A-1) subsequently became a permanent
resident of Italy.

17.23 In or around June, 2013 when Hardeep
Singh (A-1) was staying with his 'taya's' family
in Solarolo Rainerio, Cremona, Italy, one
Gurjinder Singh @ Shastri (A-15) approached
Daljit Singh, and asked him if 'a guest' could
stay at their house for a few days. This 'guest'
was Harminder Singh @Mintoo (A-5). It has
been established that Harminder Singh @
Mintoo (A-5) is a founder member and, after
2010, the self-styled chief of the terrorist gang,
KLF.

17.24 During his stay at the house of Daljit
Singh, Harminder Singh @ Mintoo (A-5)
interacted closely with Hardeep Singh (A-1).
He saw in Hardeep Singh (A-1) a potential
recruit of the KLF and started motivating him
towards that end. It has been established
during the investigation that Harminder Singh
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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

@ Mintoo (A-5) convinced the impressionable
Hardeep Singh (A-1) of the need to commit
violence in the name of 'Khalistan'.

17.25 In between his stay at Daljit Singh's
house, Gurjinder Singh @ Shastri (A-15),
Harminder Singh @ Mintoo (A-5) and
Hardeep Singh (A-1) took a tour of France
and Germany by road. When they were in
Paris, France, Harminder Singh Mintoo (A-5)
and Gurjinder Singh @ Shastri (A-15) went to
Paris airport and received Jagtar Singh Johal
(A-6), who had arrived from the U.K.. Jagtar
Singh Johal (A-6), a U.K. national had been
sent to France from the U.K. by Gursharanbir
Singh (A-16) to deliver GBP 3000 to
Harminder Singh @ Mintoo (A-5); a part of
this money was given by Harminder Singh @
Mintoo (A-5) to Hardeep Singh (A-1) to
motivate him to join the KLF and recruit him
for executing the conspiracy.

17.26 It has been established that Jagtar Singh
Johal (A-6) is a close confidante of Harmeet
Singh PhD (A-14) and Gursharanbir Singh (A-
16). The statements of witnesses have
established that Jagtar Singh Johal (A-6) is a
member of the KLF and that be actively
participated and had complete knowledge of
the conspiracy.

17.27 That before leaving Daljit Singh's house,
after a day of about fifteen days, Harminder
Singh Mintoo (A-5) shared a Skype ID
billoobakra with Hardeep Singh (A-1) for the
purpose of maintaining contact with him.
Harminder Singh Mintoo (A-5) was deported
from Thailand and arrested by Indian
authorities in November, 2014. When hearing
of the news of Harminder Singh Mintoo (A-5)'s
arrest, Hardeep Singh (A-1) tried to contact
him on the above mentioned Skype ID, the call
was answered by Harmeet Singh PhD (A-14).”
(emphasis supplied)
Signature Not Verified
CRL.A. 493/2023 & connected matters Page 7 of 30

Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43



SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
APPELLANT:

7. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant
has been in custody since 04.11.2017 and has, therefore, undergone
incarceration for a period of more than 8 years. He submits that, in
spite of repeated orders of the Supreme Court directing the learned
Trial Court to expedite the trial, only 40 witnesses have so far been
examined. He submits that around 123 more witnesses are yet to be
examined by the prosecution and, therefore, there is no possibility of
the trial concluding any time soon. Placing reliance on the judgments
of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb , (2021) 3 SCC
713; Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2024) 8 SCC
293; Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) , 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 10; and, Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation
Agency, Jammu , 2026 SCC OnLine SC 881, he submits that the
appellant is entitled to be released on bail on the ground of inordinate
delay in conclusion of the trial.
8. He submits that even otherwise, the allegations made against
the appellant do not stand much water inasmuch as, on the same
allegations, by a judgment dated 04.03.2025 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Moga, Punjab in CIS No. SC/71/2018
titled State of Punjab v. Taljeet Singh @ Jimmy & Ors. , wherein the
appellant was arrayed as accused no. 2, the appellant has been
acquitted of all charges.
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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

9. He further places reliance on the order dated 15.03.2022 passed
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in CRA-D-405-2020 titled
Jagtar Singh Johal Alias Jaggi v. National Investigation Agency ,
whereby, in RC No. 24/2017/NIA/DLI in SC No.08/2022, which
again contained similar allegations against the appellant, the appellant
was directed to be released on bail. He submits that the said order was
challenged by the respondent before the Supreme Court by way of an
SLP (Crl.) No. 6717/2022, however, the same was dismissed by the
Supreme Court vide order dated 08.08.2023. He submits that,
therefore, the appellant should be released on bail in the RC(s)
involved in the present appeals as well.
10. He submits that in the judgment dated 18.09.2024, while
dismissing the bail application of the appellant, the Coordinate Bench
of this Court had noticed that there were two protected witnesses,
whose statements had to be recorded by the learned Trial Court. With
the passage of time, one of the protected witnesses, that is, protected
witness ‘N’ (PW-50), has been dropped by the prosecution as he has
since expired. As far as protected witness ‘P’ (PW-49) is concerned,
though almost 2 years have since passed, and in spite of directions of
the Supreme Court contained in the orders dated 20.05.2025,
11.12.2025 and 08.05.2026 passed in Crl.A. Nos. 3377-83/2026, the
statement of the said witness has not been recorded. He submits that,
therefore, this also cannot act as a ground to deny bail to the appellant.
11. He submits that the appellant had never met Hardeep Singh @
Shera @ Pahalwaan (A-1) or Ramandeep Singh @ Canadian @ Bagga
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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

(A-2). He further submits that the appellant has not been named in
connection with any of the activities relating to the incidents in
question, except for the allegation that the appellant carried GBP
3,000 from the United Kingdom to France to be delivered to
Harminder Singh @ Mintoo (A-5). Neither was the appellant named
in connection with the purchase of the weapons allegedly used in the
said incidents, nor was he stated to have been involved in the
collection of funds for the said incidents during the period from 2016
to 2017. He further submits that the appellant was not named in
connection with the seizure of the said weapons in the charge-sheets
filed against him in any of the aforesaid RCs. He, therefore, submits
that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED ASG APPEARING FOR
THE RESPONDENT:

12. On the other hand, the learned ASG, appearing for the
respondent, submits that the reliance of the appellant on the order
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana is ill-founded as, at
that time, not even a single witness had been examined by the
prosecution. Much water has since flown as charges now stand framed
against the appellant, which would also entail the effect that the
appellant would not satisfy the conditions contained in Section 43D(5)
of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (in short, ‘UAP
Act’), disentitling him from being released on bail. Further, 40
witnesses already stand examined and the trial is moving at an
expedited pace because of the orders passed by the Supreme Court.
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CRL.A. 493/2023 & connected matters Page 10 of 30

Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

13. He submits that the reliance of the appellant on the judgment
dated 04.03.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Moga, Punjab, is also ill-founded as each of these cases will depend
on the evidence led in them and there cannot be a precedential value
attached to the orders passed in other trial. He also submits that the
said judgment passed by learned Sessions Judge, Moga acquitted the
appellant under Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of UAP Act on the primary
premise that the sanction which was accorded under Section 45(2) of
the UAP Act was not a valid sanction.
14. He further submits that in the present case, the appellant is a
foreign national and is a flight risk. In spite of the delay, even the
Supreme Court did not consider this to be a fit case for releasing the
appellant on bail, but instead remanded the matter back to this Court
for a fresh consideration on merits.
15. On merits, he submits that the appellant is being charged with
offences for encouraging terrorism, separatism and killing of persons
belonging to a particular community. These are serious offences and
for which, the appellant should not be released on bail. He submits
that there are also complaints from the witnesses of them being
threatened and, in case the appellant is released on bail, the trial itself
will get prejudiced.
16. Placing reliance on the order dated 14.07.2026, passed by the
learned Trial Court, he submits that the learned Trial Court has, for the
protected witnesses, directed the matter to be placed on 15.09.2026 for
compliance with the terms of Practice Direction No. 5 in Guidelines
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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

on Mutual Legal Assistance, and on 14.10.2026 for recording the
evidence of the said witness. He submits that, therefore, the appellant
be not released on bail.
17. While placing reliance on Gulfisha Fathima (supra), he
submits that where the prosecution material discloses reasonable
grounds for believing the allegations to be prima facie true, the
statutory restraint must apply to the same. He further submits that as
charges have already been framed in the trials, a prima facie case has
been made out against the appellant and therefore, he is not entitled to
be released on bail.

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS:
18. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties.
19. At the outset, we would note the effect in law of delay in
conclusion of the trial and the long period of incarceration of the
appellant in custody, affecting his fundamental rights under Article 21
of the Constitution of India vis-à-vis the restriction contained in
Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. This was considered by us in a
judgment titled Khuram Parvez v. National Investigation Agency,
2026:DHC:5092-DB , wherein we observed as under:-
“52. In K.A. Najeeb (supra), the Supreme
Court considering the balance to be achieved
between the Fundamental Right of an accused
for a speedy trial vis-à-vis the restrictions
imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA on
release of the accused on bail, held that these
restrictions do not oust the ability of the
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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds
of violation of Part III of the Constitution. It
held that whereas at the commencement of
proceedings, the courts are expected to
appreciate the legislative policy against grant
of bail, however, these restrictions will melt
down where there is no likelihood of the trial
being completed within a reasonable time and
the period of incarceration already undergone
has exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. It was further held that
Section 43D(5) of UAPA is comparatively less
stringent than Section 37 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985,
where the court needs to be satisfied that
prima facie the accused is not guilty and that
he is unlikely to commit another offence while
on bail. Instead, Section 43D(5) of the UAPA
merely provides another possible ground for
the court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-
settled considerations like gravity of offence,
etc.. We quote from the judgment as under:

“ 17. It is thus clear to us that the
presence of statutory restrictions like
Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does
not oust the ability of the constitutional
courts to grant bail on grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution.
Indeed, both the restrictions under a
statute as well as the powers exercisable
under constitutional jurisdiction can be
well harmonised. Whereas at
commencement of proceedings, the
courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail
but the rigours of such provisions will
melt down where there is no likelihood
of trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has
exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. Such an approach
would safeguard against the possibility
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Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the
UAPA being used as the sole metric for
denial of bail or for wholesale breach of
constitutional right to speedy trial.

18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are
conscious of the fact that the charges
levelled against the respondent are
grave and a serious threat to societal
harmony. Had it been a case at the
threshold, we would have outrightly
turned down the respondent's prayer.
However, keeping in mind the length of
the period spent by him in custody and
the unlikelihood of the trial being
completed anytime soon, the High Court
appears to have been left with no other
option except to grant bail. An attempt
has been made to strike a balance
between the appellant's right to lead
evidence of its choice and establish the
charges beyond any doubt and
simultaneously the respondent's rights
guaranteed under Part III of our
Constitution have been well protected.

19. Yet another reason which persuades
us to enlarge the respondent on bail is
that Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA is
comparatively less stringent than Section
37 of the NDPS Act. Unlike the NDPS
Act where the competent court needs to
be satisfied that prima facie the accused
is not guilty and that he is unlikely to
commit another offence while on bail;
there is no such precondition under
UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D(5) of the
UAPA merely provides another possible
ground for the competent court to refuse
bail, in addition to the well-settled
considerations like gravity of the
offence, possibility of tampering with
evidence, influencing the witnesses or
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Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

chance of the accused evading the trial
by absconsion, etc.”

53. The above judgment and various others of
the Supreme Court were considered by the
Supreme Court in Gulfisha (supra), and the
Supreme Court framed the question to be
considered as “in prosecution under the
UAPA, when delay and prolonged
incarceration are invoked as grounds for bail,
what is the principled approach by which a
constitutional court is to examine such a
plea.”

54. In answer to the above question, the
Supreme Court held as under:

“ 30. Article 21 occupies a central place
in the constitutional scheme. The right to
life and personal liberty, and the
insistence that any deprivation must
conform to procedure established by
law, are foundational guarantees. The
right to a speedy trial has been
recognised as an important facet of this
guarantee. It follows that pre-trial
incarceration cannot, by the mere
passage of time, be permitted to assume
the character of punishment.

31 . At the same time, Article 21 has
never been understood as operating in
isolation from law. The constitutional
promise is not that liberty will be
unregulated, but that deprivations of
liberty will not be arbitrary,
unconscionable, or unfair. The
expression “procedure established by
law” reflects that balance. The UAPA,
as a special statute enacted to address
offences alleged to affect the security of
the State and the stability of civic life,
represents a legislative judgment as to
the conditions under which bail may be
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Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

granted at the pre-trial stage. Section
43D(5) of UAPA embodies the exercise
of that judgment.

32 . In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb ,
this Court recognised a constitutional
safeguard that cannot be ignored:
statutory restrictions cannot be applied
so as to render the guarantee of personal
liberty illusory. It was held that where
the trial is not likely to commence or
conclude within a reasonable period,
constitutional courts retain the
jurisdiction to grant bail
notwithstanding statutory restraints. The
decision thus operates as a protection
against unconscionable detention and
there can be no second opinion on the
said principle.

33 . The same decision, however, does
not indicate as laying down a
mechanical rule under which the mere
passage of time becomes determinative
in every case arising under a special
statute. The jurisprudence of this Court
does not support a construction whereby
delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory
regime enacted by Parliament to address
offences of a special category.

34 . The constitutional inquiry into delay
is not an inquiry into guilt. It is an
inquiry into whether continued detention
remains constitutionally permissible in
the circumstances of the case. That
inquiry is necessarily contextual.
Context includes the nature of the
allegation, the statutory field, the stage
of the proceedings, the realistic
trajectory of the trial, the causes
contributing to delay, and the risks
attendant upon release. Delay cannot be
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Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:18.09.2026
16:36:43

detached from these considerations and
treated as a solitary determinant.

35 . The proper constitutional question,
therefore, is not whether Article 21 is
superior to Section 43D (5). The proper
question is how Article 21 is to be
applied where Parliament has expressly
conditioned the grant of bail in relation
to offences alleged to implicate national
security. The law does not contemplate
an either-or approach. Nor does it
contemplate an unstructured blending of
statutory and constitutional
considerations. What is required is
disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives
due regard to both.
xxx
101 . It is well recognised that Article 21
rights, though not absolute, require the
State and the Court to justify continued
custody with reference to the specific
individual before it. Treating all accused
identically irrespective of their roles
would risk transforming pre-trial
detention into a punitive mechanism
divorced from individual circumstances.
The constitutional mandate demands a
differentiated inquiry: where prolonged
custody disproportionately burdens
those whose roles are limited, the
balance between individual liberty and
collective security may call for
conditional release, while the same
balance may tilt differently for those
alleged to have orchestrated the
offence.”

55. The Supreme Court also examined the
principles governing the scope of judicial
inquiry under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA at
the bail stage, and held as under:

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“ 80. From the foregoing discussion,
certain propositions governing the
application of Section 43D(5) emerge
with clarity. First , the provision
embodies a deliberate legislative
departure from ordinary bail
jurisprudence, premised upon the
distinctive nature of offences under
Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Second ,
the expression “prima facie true”
mandates a threshold judicial inquiry
which is neither perfunctory nor
adjudicatory, requiring the Court to
examine whether the prosecution
material, taken at face value, discloses
the essential statutory ingredients of the
alleged offence. Third , the inquiry is
necessarily accused-specific, directed to
the role and attribution qua the
individual, and does not admit of
collective or undifferentiated treatment
merely because allegations arise from a
common transaction or
conspiracy. Fourth , the bail stage under
Section 43D(5) is not a forum for
evaluating defences, weighing evidence,
or conducting a mini-trial; judicial
restraint at this stage is not an
abdication of duty but a fulfilment of the
statutory mandate. These propositions,
read together, define the contours of
judicial power and responsibility under
the provision.
81. The correct application of Section
43D(5), therefore, requires the Court to
undertake a structured inquiry confined
to the following:
i. whether the prosecution material,
accepted as it stands, discloses a
prima facie case satisfying the
statutory ingredients of the offence
alleged;
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ii. whether the role attributed to the
accused reflects a real and
meaningful nexus to the unlawful
activity or terrorist activity
proscribed under the Act, as
distinguished from mere association
or peripheral presence; and
iii. whether the statutory threshold is
crossed qua the individual accused,
without embarking upon an
assessment reserved after full-fledged
trial.
82. Where these requirements are met,
the statutory restraint on the grant of
bail must operate with full force; where
they are not, the embargo stands lifted.
This approach preserves the legislative
purpose of the Act, and ensures that the
exceptional nature of the bail regime
under Section 43D(5) is neither diluted
by overreach nor distorted by
mechanical application.”

56. The correctness of the above judgment,
insofar as interplay between Article 21 of the
Constitution of India and Section 43D(5) of
the UAPA is concerned, has been doubted by
the Supreme Court in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v.
National Investigation Agency, Jammu, 2026
INSC 503. It explained K.A. Najeeb (supra),
as under:
“31. In K.A. Najeeb, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court was clear and
unequivocal in holding that once it is
obvious that a timely trial would not be
possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of
time, the courts would ordinarily be
obligated to enlarge the accused on bail.
We have already extracted supra
paragraph 17 of the said judgment
where it has been clearly stated that the
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presence of statutory restrictions like
Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act per se
does not oust the ability of the
constitutional courts to grant bail on
grounds of violation of Part III of the
Constitution. Whereas at the
commencement of the proceedings, the
courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail
but the rigors of such provisions will
„melt down‟ where there is no likelihood
of the trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has
exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. In the facts of that
case, this Court observed that it was
conscious of the fact that the charges
levelled against the accused were grave
and a serious threat to societal harmony
and had it been the case at the threshold,
perhaps the Court would have outrightly
rejected such a prayer. However,
keeping in mind the duration of
incarceration and the unlikelihood of the
trial being completed in the near future,
the accused had to be enlarged on bail.

xxx
35. The often invoked phrase „bail is the
rule and jail is the exception‟ is not
merely an empty statutory slogan
flowing from the CrPC as Gurwinder
has stated. It is a constitutional principle
flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution and the presumption of
innocence which is the cornerstone of
any civilised society governed by the
rule of law. Statutes may undoubtedly
calibrate the manner in which that
principle is applied, particularly in cases
involving national security or terrorist
offences for which the UAP Act is meant,
but those cannot altogether invert the
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constitutional relationship between
liberty and detention. The statutory
embargo of Section 43-D(5) must remain
a circumscribed restriction that operates
subject to the guarantee of Articles 21
and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, we
have no manner of doubt in stating that
even under the UAP Act, „bail is the rule
and jail is the exception‟; of course, in
an appropriate case, bail can be denied
having regard to the facts of that
particular case.”

57. Further, while highlighting the low
conviction rate in UAPA, the Supreme Court
opined that:-
“42.3. Thus, from the aforesaid figures,
it is evident that the country-wide
percentage of conviction under the UAP
Act for the five years comprising the
period 2019-23 hovers between 2% to
6%. In other words, there is 94% to 98%
possibility of acquittal in such cases in
the country. When it comes to the Union
Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the
percentage of conviction is abysmal, to
say the least. For the aforesaid period,
the annual rate of conviction is always
less than 1%. It means that at the end of
the trial, there is 99% possibility of
acquittal in such cases. With these kind
of statistics staring at our face, the
question is, should we continue the
detention of the appellant or defer the
consideration to a later stage, simply
because the charges are serious?”


58. We must also note that this issue
concerning the interplay between Article 21 of
the Constitution and Section 43D(5) of the
UAPA Act, has now been referred to a larger
Bench in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of
NCT of Delhi (order dated 22.05.2026 passed
by the Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.)
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2867/2026). In the said order, the Supreme
Court has observed that delay cannot be the
sole ground for releasing the accused on bail
and that the inquiry into delay is contextual
and must take into account the nature of the
allegations, the statutory field, the stage of the
proceedings, the realistic trajectory of the
trial, the causes contributing to the delay, the
role attributed to the accused, the prima facie
material, the availability of intermediate
safeguards, and the risks attendant upon
release. It has further observed as under: -
“ 20. We are also conscious that an
unqualified reading of the proposition
that lapse of time by itself must compel
bail in every case under the UAPA may
have serious consequences. Such an
approach may leave little room for
courts to examine the nature of
allegations, centrality of role, protected
witnesses, risk of intimidation,
possibility of reactivation of networks,
nature of delay and whether such delay
is attributable to the accused
himself/herself, public order concerns
and national security implications. On
the other hand, an equally unqualified
insistence on Section 43D(5) without
regard to prolonged incarceration would
imperil Article 21. The Constitution does
not command either extreme. It is this
precise issue that may warrant attention
of the appropriate bench dealing with
the issues.

21. The question, therefore, is not
whether Article 21 survives Section
43D(5). It undoubtedly does. The true
question is how Article 21 is to be
applied in a statutory field where
Parliament has consciously imposed
restrictions on bail in respect of offences
alleged to affect the security of the State
and the stability of civic life.
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22. We clarify that nothing in this order
is intended to whittle down, dilute, read
narrowly, or detract from the authority
of K.A. Najeeb. ...”

59. In the said order, after having referred the
issue to the larger Bench, the Supreme Court
still went on to consider the case of the
appellant therein for bail and, taking into
account the substantial period of incarceration
already undergone by the appellant therein,
released the appellant on interim bail for a
period of 6 months.

60. In Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors. v.
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference
and Anr., (2024) 18 SCC 643, the Supreme
Court has also held that merely because a
question of law is referred to a larger Bench,
the High Court must not refrain from
considering the matter before it in accordance
with the law binding on it. It has opined as
under:
“ 35. We are seeing before us judgments
and orders by High Courts not deciding
cases on the ground that the leading
judgment of this Court on this subject is
either referred to a larger Bench or a
review petition relating thereto is
pending. We have also come across
examples of High Courts refusing
deference to judgments of this Court on
the score that a later coordinate Bench
has doubted its correctness. In this
regard, we lay down the position in law.
We make it absolutely clear that the
High Courts will proceed to decide
matters on the basis of the law as it
stands. It is not open, unless specifically
directed by this Court, to await an
outcome of a reference or a review
petition, as the case may be. It is also not
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open to a High Court to refuse to follow
a judgment by stating that it has been
doubted by a later coordinate Bench. In
any case, when faced with conflicting
judgments by Benches of equal strength
of this Court, it is the earlier one which
is to be followed by the High Courts, as
held by a 5-Judge Bench in National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi. The
High Courts, of course, will do so with
careful regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case before it.”

20. Applying the above tests to the facts of present case, we find
that the appellant has remained in custody for more than 8 years.
Though the charges stand framed against the appellant in the aforesaid
RCs, only 40 witnesses have so far been examined and we are
informed that there are another 123 witnesses whose testimony is yet
to be recorded. Out of these witnesses, there are about 63 common
witnesses to the above RC(s), however, in spite of that, the trial is
certainly not likely to conclude any time soon. We are reinforced in
this belief as, in spite of the orders dated 20.05.2025, 11.12.2025 and
08.05.2026 passed by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.
3377-83/2026, the pace of the trial has not really picked up and even
the statement of the protected witnesses has not been recorded.
21. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana, in its order dated
15.03.2022, when the appellant had undergone custody of only about
5 years, and only on the ground of delay, held it to be a fit case to
direct the release of the appellant on bail in RC No. 24/2017/NIA/DLI,
which contained similar allegations against the appellant. We quote
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from the said judgment as under:-
“Undoubtedly the bail proceedings under a
special enactment will have to be viewed as
distinct and the Courts are duty bound to
refuse bail where the suspect is prima facie
believed to be guilty. We are conscious that
the charges levelled against the appellant are
grave and in the nature of making an attempt
to destabilise public order in the State of
Punjab. Be that as it may, we are refraining
from making any observations on merits lest it
may prejudice the trial. In the same vein we
are of the view that Constitutional Courts
ought to exercise their power to grant bail
notwithstanding the limitations specified under
special enactments keeping in view the right of
an accused to speedy trial and access to
justice.
xxxxx
Adverting to the facts of the present case
it has gone uncontroverted that the appellant
has been charged under Sections 16,17,18 of
the 1967 Act and Section 120-B of the IPC but
not under Section 307 IPC. Appellant has
suffered incarceration for a period of almost
five years. It has gone uncontroverted that the
prosecution has cited 197 witnesses and the
trial is yet to commence. We are aware that
even a sentence of life imprisonment can be
imposed for the offence with which the
appellant has been charged under the 1967
Act and the IPC but we cannot ignore the fact
that the sentence could range between 5 years
to imprisonment for life. Concededly appellant
has already undergone incarceration of almost
5 years with the trial yet to commence.
Under such peculiar circumstances and
keeping in view the dictum laid down by the
Apex Court in Union of India vs. K.A.Najeeb
(supra) we are inclined to accept the instant
appeal.
For the reasons recorded above the
impugned order dated 24.06.2020 passed by
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the Special Judge, NIA, SAS Nagar, Mohali is
set aside. Appellant is held entitled to regular
bail during pendency of the trial.”

22. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Moga, Punjab, in the
judgment dated 04.03.2025, on a similar allegation against the
appellant, has also acquitted the appellant not only on the ground of
lack of proper sanction under Section 45(2) of the UAP Act, but also
on merits. We quote from the said order as under:-
“112. To prove charges under Section 120-B
IPC, let first of all discuss ingredients of above
said Section, which is reproduced as under :-
Section 120-A IPC. Definition of
criminal conspiracy: When two or more
persons agree to do, or cause to be
done:-
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal
means, such an agreement is
designated a criminal conspiracy.
However, from the above discussed
evidence, the prosecution has miserably failed
to prove that all the accused hatched criminal
conspiracy with one another to indulge in
terrorist activities and collected raised funds
for the activities of said unlawful
association/assembly and conspired with each
other to commit terrorist acts and harbored
Tarlok Singh @ Laadi, who is terrorist and
indulged in terrorist activities. The
prosecution has also failed to lead any
evidence that the accused were members of
terrorist organization which was involved in
terrorist activities and also failed to lead
cogent and convincing evidence that Hardeep
Singh @ Shera @ Bhalwan in connivance with
co-accused impersonated himself as Kamaljot
Singh @ used his driving license/ID for
receiving money/funds through Westem Union
for using the same for terrorist activities & for
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unlawful association/assembly and induced
Western Union to deliver the fund to him and
cheated the employees of Western Union and
forged driving license of Kamaljot Singh,
which is a valuable document and used the
same as genuine one knowing well that the
same is forged one. As such, the accused are
entitled to acquittal under Sections
17,18,19,20 of Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act and 120-
B.419,420,467,468,471 IPC.”

23. We are informed that the said order of acquittal has attained
finality and has not been challenged by the prosecution.
24. Though the learned ASG may be correct in his submission that
the above order of acquittal cannot act as a res judicata , the fact
remains that on similar averments, the appellant is being implicated in
these RCs as a co-conspirator. Therefore, at least for enlarging the
appellant on bail, this order shall have a strong persuasive value.
25. As regards the submission of the learned ASG that the
appellant, being a foreign national, is a flight risk, we are of the
opinion that the liberty of the appellant cannot be curtailed only on
this ground. Instead, we shall impose conditions that should ensure
that he does not become a flight risk.
26. Similarly, the allegation of the learned ASG that certain
witnesses have complained to the learned Trial Court of being
threatened and, in case the appellant is released on bail, there being a
chance of him influencing the trial, also does not persuade us to deny
bail to the appellant, especially given the long period of incarceration
and the factors we have noticed herein above. There are various
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accused who are facing trial in the above RC(s), and no document has
been produced before us to substantiate that the threats are in any
manner emanating from the appellant or at his behest.
27. Given the above factors, the impugned orders passed by the
learned Trial Court cannot be sustained and are accordingly set aside.
The appellant is directed to be released on bail in the above RC(s) on
the following conditions:-

i. The appellant shall execute a personal bond in the sum of
Rs.5,00,000/- with two sureties each in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned Trial Court;
ii. The appellant shall surrender his passport, if any, before the
learned Trial Court. In case he does not hold a passport, an
affidavit to that effect shall be filed by him before the learned
Trial Court;
iii. The appellant shall use only one mobile phone and/or one
landline number during the course of trial, which shall always
be kept in the switched-on mode. He shall furnish his residential
address, mobile/landline contact number, and e-mail address to
the Investigating Officer as also to the learned Trial Court. The
appellant shall not change his place of residence or contact
particulars without giving at least seven days’ prior written
intimation to the Investigating Officer and the learned Trial
Court;
iv. The appellant shall cooperate with the trial and appear before
the learned Trial Court on each date of hearing, unless
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exempted by the learned Trial Court from such appearance.
v. The appellant shall not exhibit any conduct that has the effect of
delaying the trial proceedings;
vi. The appellant shall not directly or indirectly contact, influence,
threaten or communicate with any prosecution witness,
protected witness, complainant or person acquainted with the
facts of the case;

vii. The appellant shall not tamper with evidence, electronic
material, records, devices or documents relating to the case;
viii. The appellant shall not make any public statement, including
through print, electronic media or social media, touching upon
the merits of the case, the evidence, the witnesses or the
pending trial;
ix. The appellant shall not participate in any activity which may
prejudice public order or the integrity of the trial;
x. The appellant shall not join any WhatsApp group or other social
media platforms where anti-national material is uploaded or
circulated or propagated. He shall also not
upload/share/disseminate or circulate any anti-national material
on any social media platform or otherwise. He shall also furnish
an undertaking to this effect before the learned Trial Court;
xi. The appellant shall report to the concerned Investigating Officer
once every fortnight, or at such intervals as may be directed by
the learned Trial Court.

28. In the event of breach of any condition, it shall be open to the
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prosecution to seek cancellation of bail before the appropriate court.
29. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
30. A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court as
also to the concerned Jail Superintendent for information and
necessary compliance.


NAVIN CHAWLA, J


RAVINDER DUDEJA, J
SEPTEMBER 18, 2026/ rv/as


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