BHARATKUMAR LAVJIBHAI GOHIL vs STATE OF GUJARAT

C/LPA/786/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2026
(GJHC240719762026)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 786 of 2026
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION/8522/2026
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2026
In R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 786 of 2026
=============================================
BHARATKUMAR LAVJIBHAI GOHIL
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
=============================================
Appearance:
MR HORMAZ B SHETHNA(2436) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2
MR HS MUNSHAW(495) for the Respondent(s) No. 3
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J. L. ODEDRA

Date : 09/10/2026

JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA)
(1) The appellant was appointed in the year 1999 as a Vidya
Sahayak. At that point in time itself, an FIR had been
registered against the appellant and his family members.
This FIR ultimately resulted in the laying of a charge sheet
and ultimately in a conviction of the appellant and his family
members in the year 2003.
(2) In the year 2003, the appellant was served with a show
cause notice on the ground that he was not discharging his
duties and was absent, unauthorizedly. The appellant gave
a reply stating that he had been put in police custody and
therefore could not be present. The authorities on
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C/LPA/786/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2026
(GJHC240719762026)
consideration of this reply came to the conclusion that the
appellant had in fact signed in the register as if he was
present, even though he was in the custody of the
authorities, and hence he could not be continued in service.
(3) It may be pertinent to state here that in the order of
termination there was no reference to the conviction of the
appellant as such, and the entire set of allegations were
directed against his unauthorized absence, and the
authorities considered the reply of the appellant that he was
forced to be unauthorizedly absent since he was in police
custody. In other words, the question of conviction was not
considered by the authorities while terminating the services
of the appellant.
(4) The order of conviction was challenged by the appellant
by filing a criminal appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 1131 of
2003. This criminal appeal was allowed and he was
acquitted on 01/08/2025.
(5) On his acquittal, the appellant preferred a writ petition
contending that the order of termination dated 02/01/2004
was illegal and unsustainable since the same was not
preceded by an inquiry. The learned Single Judge dismissed
the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had
sought to challenge an order of termination of the year
2004 nearly 21 years thereafter, and the delay was
sufficient to disentitle him for relief. In fact, the learned
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C/LPA/786/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2026
(GJHC240719762026)
Single Judge has made an observation that the appellant
may have had a good case on merits, but the delay
disentitled him from all relief.
(6) Being aggrieved by the said order, the present appeal has
been preferred.
(7) Learned counsel for the appellant seeks to highlight the
fact that the delay could not have been held against the
appellant. It is sought to be argued that since the appellant
had suffered a conviction, there was no point in him
challenging the order of termination since the conviction did
not require an enquiry to be conducted before he was
terminated. It is argued by learned counsel that since it was
an exercise in futility, in the light of the conviction suffered
by the appellant, the appellant chose not to challenge the
order of termination immediately thereafter.
(8) It is his case that Rule 11 of the Rules in fact categorically
state that for a termination on the basis of a conviction, no
enquiry is needed. He therefore submits that since the
appellant had suffered a conviction, there was no point in
challenging the order of termination until his acquittal in the
criminal proceedings. In other words, it is the case of the
learned counsel that until an acquittal was granted in favour
of the appellant, he could not have challenged the order of
termination.We are unable to accept this argument.
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C/LPA/786/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2026
(GJHC240719762026)
(9) It is no doubt true that on a conviction an employee is
liable to be terminated without the conduct of an enquiry. If,
however, the order of termination did indicate that it was not
preceded by an enquiry, the appellant ought to have
challenged the order immediately. Admittedly, the order that
has been passed against the appellant was not based on the
conviction, but was based on his absenteeism for about 42
days. Since, the order of termination was not based on
conviction suffered by the appellant. The question of
invoking Rule 11 to contend that the appellant could not
challenge the order of termination cannot be accepted.
(10) It must be stated here that, on the face of it, if the
appellant thought that the order of termination was illegal,
he ought to have challenged it immediately, especially when
it was not based on the conviction that had been passed
against him. The learned Single Judge, in our view, was
therefore justified in coming to the conclusion that there was
an inordinate delay of 22 years in preferring the writ petition
challenging the order of termination. We, therefore, see no
reason to entertain the appeal, the appeal is therefore
dismissed.
(N.S.SANJAY GOWDA,J)
(J. L. ODEDRA, J)
RIYA
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