MERUBHAI RAMABHAI VAGHELA vs RAVINDRABHAI KANTILAL CHAUHAN
- Court
- Gujarat High Court
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 65 of 2016
With
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1128 of 2015
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Sd/-
================================================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
୰
================================================================
MERUBHAI RAMABHAI VAGHELA
Versus
RAVINDRABHAI KANTILAL CHAUHAN & ORS.
================================================================
Appearance:
MR RJ GOSWAMI(1102) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
ABATED for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2,3
MS JYOTI BHATT ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 4
KSHITIJ AMIN for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No.1 in Criminal Appeal
No.1128 of 2015
================================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 31/08/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The Criminal Appeal No.65 of 2016 is filed by the
complainant-Merubhai Ramabhai Vaghela and Criminal
Appeal No.1128 of 2015 is filed by the State under the
provisions of Section 372 r/w Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the same impugned
judgment and order dated 23.07.2015 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) (hereinafter be
Page 1 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
referred to as the “Trial Court”) in Sessions Case No.128 of
2010, whereby the Trial Court has acquitted the respondents
accused from the charges under Sections 306, 498A and 114
of the India Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as the
“IPC”) r/w Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. The facts of the case giving rise to present appeal are that
the complainant has given complaint stating that the marriage
of the daughter of the complainant, namely, Meenaben, was
solemnized with accused Ravindrabhai Kantilal Chauhan on
27.05.2003. After the marriage, she started residing with the
accused persons and their family near Ramdevnagar Cross
Road, opposite the house of Sadvichar Parivar, Satellite,
Ahmedabad. Initially, she stayed at her matrimonial home for
about 4 to 5 days, thereafter returned to her parental home,
and after about one year, upon performance of the Aana
ceremony, she was sent back to her matrimonial home.
Thereafter, on various occasions, she used to visit her
parental home. Whenever she came to her parental home, she
used to complain about the conduct and behaviour of her in-
laws, namely, her father-in-law, mother-in-law and husband,
who used to taunt her by alleging that she was not doing the
household work properly and was eating food without
contributing anything. She was also harassed by telling her
that instead of sitting idle, she could have gone to pick up
waste papers or should bring money from her parental home.
She was also frequently beaten by her in-laws and was
subjected to further harassment by taunting her that she had
not given birth to a male child. Lastly, she had visited her
Page 2 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
parental home on 19.02.2007 to attend the baby-shower
ceremony of the complainant's daughter-in-law. At that time
also, she complained about the continuous harassment and ill-
treatment meted out to her by her in-laws.
2.1 Thereafter, on 10.05.2007, the complainant's son, namely,
Hitesh, received a telephone call from Satellite Police Station
informing him that his sister, Meenaben, had committed
suicide by hanging herself with a sari from a ceiling fan. They
were thereafter called to the Police Station. After the post-
mortem examination was conducted, an FIR came to be
registered being C.R. No. I-373/2007 for the above mentioned
offences.
2.2 During the course of investigation, sufficient evidence
was found against the accused persons. Accordingly, they
were arrested and a charge-sheet was filed before the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate. Since the offences were exclusively
triable by the Court of Sessions, after complying with the
provisions of Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
the case was committed to the Court of Sessions under
Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and charges
were framed against the accused vide Exh. 8.
2.3 Before the Trial Court, the accused persons pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried. Before the Trial Court, the
prosecution examined, in all, eight witnesses and produced
and relied upon twelve documentary evidences in support of
the depositions of the prosecution witnesses.
Page 3 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
2.4 At the conclusion of the trial, after hearing the learned
advocates appearing for both sides, the Trial Court held that
the respondents-accused were not guilty of the offences
punishable under Sections 306, 498-A and 114 of the IPC and
Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, and
accordingly acquitted them of the aforesaid offences.
2.5 Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and
order of acquittal, the complainant has filed present Criminal
Appeal No.65 of 2016 and the State has filed present Criminal
Appeal No.1128 of 2015.
3. Heard Ms. Jyoti Bhatt, learned APP for the appellant in
Criminal Appeal No.1128 of 2012. Mr. R.J. Goswami, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.65
of 2016 is not remained present. Learned counsel Kshitij Amin
appearing for the respondent No.1 in Criminal Appeal
No.1128 of 2015 has filed sick-note. As per the Gujarat High
Court Rules 1993, sick-note or leave-note is not entertained in
Criminal Matters. Therefore, in absence of learned counsel for
the respondent accused the appeals are decided.
4. Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court, while
passing the impugned judgement and order, failed to
appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution in its true and
proper spirit and thus, the Trial Court has committed serious
error of law and on facts. The learned APP has further
contended that the marriage span between the deceased and
the present respondent is less than 7 years and therefore, the
Trial Court ought to have resumed against the respondents
Page 4 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
under the provision of Section 113A and B of the Indian
Evidence Act and therefore, also the impugned judgment and
order of acquittal is erroneous and bad in law and the same
requires to be set aside and appeals deserve to be allowed.
Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court failed to
consider the facts of the case and the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses in its true and proper spirit.
4.1 Learned APP has further submitted that the Trial Court,
while acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against
them, has not assigned any cogent or convincing reasons and
has clearly erred in acquitting the accused. Learned APP has
further submitted that the impugned judgment of acquittal is
contrary to the evidence on record, based on erroneous
appreciation of material evidence, and has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice. The findings recorded by the Trial
Court are perverse and unsustainable in law, thereby calling
for interference by this Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
4.2 Learned APP has further submitted that the Trial Court
has materially erred in holding that the prosecution has failed
to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the findings
recorded by the trial Court were therefore perverse, illegal,
and contrary to the evidence on record.
4.3 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court has erred
both on facts and in law in recording the order of acquittal,
having failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary
evidence available on record. Learned APP urges before the
Court that present appeals may be allowed and the impugned
Page 5 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
judgment and order of acquittal may be quashed and set
aside.
5. Mr. R. J. Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant in Criminal Appeal No.65 of 2016 is not present
therefore contentions raised in the memo of appeal are
considered.
6. It appears that vide order dated 6.8.2026 both the appeals
stands abated qua respondent Nos. 2 and 3 therefore, now
present appeals survive only qua respondent No.1.
7. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order passed by
the Trial Court and the evidence recorded by the Trial Court
and the contention raised by the learned APP as well as the
contention raised by original complainant in the memo of
appeal, the only issues that arises for consideration before
this Court are as under:-
Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal?
Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of
law or fact?
Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
suffers from any illegality or perversity?
8. In view of the above-stated submissions and upon perusal of
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as the
evidence recorded by the Trial Court, it is appropriate to first
examine the facts of the case. The complainant stated that his
daughter, Meenaben, was married to accused Ravindrabhai
Page 6 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
Kantilal Chauhan on 27.05.2003. After the marriage, she
resided with the accused and his family. Initially, she stayed
at her matrimonial home for 4–5 days and thereafter returned
to her parental home. After about one year, following the
Aana ceremony, she was sent back to her matrimonial home.
It was alleged that thereafter, whenever Meenaben visited her
parental home, she complained of harassment and ill-
treatment by her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law.
They allegedly taunted her for not performing household work
properly, demanded money from her parental home, subjected
her to physical and mental cruelty, and taunted her for not
giving birth to a male child. She last visited her parental home
on 19.02.2007 to attend a baby-shower ceremony, where she
again complained of continuous harassment.
9. On 10.05.2007 the complainant's son, Hitesh, received a
telephone call from Satellite Police Station informing him that
Meenaben had committed suicide by hanging herself with a
sari from a ceiling fan. The family was thereafter called to the
Police Station. Following the post-mortem examination, an
FIR being C.R. No. I-373/2007 was registered for the alleged
offences.
10. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of
acquittal, it appears that the prosecution has examined eight
witnesses. Out of these witnesses, PW-1, being the Post-
Mortem Doctor, has specifically deposed before the Court that
no external or internal injuries were found on the body of the
deceased. In light of the allegations made by the complainant,
PW-3, and in support thereof, PW-4, being the eldest son of
Page 7 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
the complainant, has deposed before the Trial Court.
However, though the prosecution had cited the younger son
and the mother of the deceased as witnesses, for the reasons
best known to the prosecution, neither of them was examined
before the Trial Court.
11. From the minute examination of the evidence of PW-3
and PW-4, it appears that they have not regard with the truth
and they are not telling the true and correct facts before the
Trial Court. In his evidence the PW-3 deposed as under:-
“15. Naginbhai P. Chauhan is not related to me in any manner. I
am not aware of any person named Naginbhai P. Chauhan serving
at Satellite Police Station, nor do I know him. At the time when the
incident occurred, none of my relatives was serving at Satellite
Police Station. When I had fixed the marriage of my daughter
Meenaben with the accused Ravind, I had sent an invitation card to
Kantibhai Ramjibhai Chauhan. If the said invitation card is shown
to me, I can identify whether it is the same invitation card. In the
said invitation card, under the heading “Snehaadhin,” at Sr. No. 3
on the right-hand side, the name of Naginbhai P. Vaghela is
mentioned. It is true that Naginbhai P. Vaghela was serving at
Satellite Police Station. As the original invitation card is being
produced by the defence, the same is produced and exhibited at
Exhibit 34. This Naginbhai P. Vaghela is the son of my paternal
uncle and is, therefore, my cousin brother.
12. Even in the same breath, the complainant has
completely contradicted himself and has deposed falsely
before the Court on oath regarding his cousin brother, who
was serving at the Satellite Police Station, within whose
jurisdiction the incident occurred. Initially, the complainant
stated before the Court that he did not know Naginbhai P.
Waghela and that he had no relation with him. However, in
the very same paragraph, in the last line, he admitted that
Naginbhai P. Waghela was his cousin brother. When it was
put to him that Naginbhai was also an invitee mentioned in
Page 8 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
the invitation card as the cousin brother of the complainant,
he admitted that, yes, Naginbhai was his cousin brother. He,
however, denied having any knowledge as to whether
Naginbhai was serving as a police constable at the Satellite
Police Station.
13. In the same manner, his son, Prakash Waghela, examined
as PW-4, also denied the aforesaid facts. He went to the
extent of stating that Naginbhai was not his real relative and
that he was merely residing in their vicinity and, therefore, he
was referring to him as an uncle. Though his father had stated
that Naginbhai was an invitee mentioned in the invitation card
and was his cousin brother, Prakash Waghela, PW-4,
completely denied these facts. PW-4 further deposed
regarding the minor Trusha, who was immediately admitted to
Sanjeevani Hospital by his father and other family members
and remained admitted as an indoor patient for at least seven
days during the course of treatment. Neither the complainant
nor PW-4 visited the hospital to take care of the minor.
Thereafter, the custody of the minor was taken by the
complainant and his family members, and at present, she is in
the custody of the complainant and his family members.
14. Even the deposition of PW-7, who was also a cousin
brother of the complainant, is material in this regard. From
the cross-examination of these witnesses, their conduct is
clearly revealed. Their depositions contain material
contradictions, omissions and inconsistencies, and they have
not stated the true and correct facts before the Court on oath.
15. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Trial Court, while
Page 9 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
appreciating the evidence of these witnesses, has elaborately
considered their depositions and conduct in paragraphs 10 to
21 of the judgment. The Trial Court has recorded cogent
reasons as to how the witnesses had deposed inconsistently
and had not stated the true facts before the Court.
Furthermore, PW-5, namely Ganesh Bhikhabhai Parekh, who
was a neighbour of the respondent and was working as a
photographer, was present at the time of the Srimant
ceremony, as he had been engaged to take photographs of the
ceremony. He deposed on oath before the Court that all the
family members of the deceased were happily participating in
and enjoying the Srimant ceremony solemnized at the
relevant place and that PW-4 was present throughout the
ceremony. However, PW-4 adopted a completely different
stand before the Court and stated that he had immediately left
the place within a few minutes and that he did not remember
anything about the ceremony. The photographs of the
ceremony were shown to him and questions were put to him
with regard to the same. Despite this, he failed to state the
true and correct facts before the Court.
16. Therefore, considering the conduct and depositions of PW-
3, PW-4 and PW-7, the Trial Court rightly concluded that
these witnesses had not maintained regard for the truth, had
not stated the true and correct facts, and had attempted to
exaggerate the allegations. Material omissions and
contradictions were also duly proved during their cross-
examination. Under such circumstances, the Trial Court was
fully justified in assigning the reasons recorded in the
judgment and in appreciating their evidence with due caution.
Page 10 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
17. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
depositions of PW-3, PW-4 and PW-7 are accepted in their
entirety, their evidence does not inspire sufficient confidence
with regard to the basic ingredients necessary to constitute
offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498-A read with
Section 107 of the IPC. There is no cogent evidence on record
to establish that, soon before the death of the deceased, she
had communicated with any of the family members regarding
any alleged ill-treatment, harassment or quarrel with the
respondents. In the absence of any cogent, reliable and
clinching evidence produced by the prosecution, the
allegations and charges against the respondent were rightly
disbelieved by the Trial Court.
18. So far as the presumption under Sections 113-A and 113-B
of the Indian Evidence Act is concerned, even for drawing
such a presumption, the prosecution must first establish the
foundational facts by producing reliable evidence showing the
existence of cruelty, harassment, provocation, instigation or
abetment attributable to the respondents. In the present case,
no such foundational facts have been established by the
prosecution.
19. On the contrary, the evidence on record indicates that the
deceased intended to undergo a beauty-parlour course, which
was not accepted by the husband. The reason stated by the
respondent was that, considering the ill health and tender age
of their minor daughter, who was only about two to three
months old, it was not advisable for the deceased to undertake
Page 11 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
such a course at that stage and that she should wait until the
child had grown up. The mere fact that the respondent did not
agree with the deceased on this issue cannot, by itself,
constitute instigation, provocation, abetment or cruelty
sufficient to attract the provisions of Sections 306, 498-A and
107 of the IPC.
20. In above circumstances, the Trial Court rightly considered
the entire evidence on record and, from paragraph 22
onwards, recorded its conclusions and ultimately passed the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the
respondent.
21. As the present appeal now survives only qua Respondent
No. 1, it is respectfully submitted that the prosecution has
failed to establish its case against the said respondent beyond
reasonable doubt. The evidence adduced by the prosecution is
not of such quality as would warrant interference with the
well-reasoned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the
Trial Court. The Trial Court has, therefore, rightly extended
the benefit of doubt to the respondent.
22. It is well settled that, in order to establish an offence
punishable under Sections 306 and 498-A read with Section
107 of the IPC, the prosecution must establish, by cogent and
reliable evidence, some positive act, omission, instigation or
conduct on the part of the accused which has a proximate
nexus with the alleged offence. Mere allegations, conjectures
or differences between the parties, without proof of the
requisite ingredients of the offences, cannot be sufficient to
sustain a conviction.
Page 12 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
23. Unless and until the prosecution establishes such
foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt, no adverse
presumption can be drawn against the respondent. In the
present case, the prosecution has failed to discharge that
burden. Consequently, the Trial Court has rightly appreciated
the evidence, extended the benefit of doubt to the respondent,
and passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
24. So far as section 498-A of 306 IPC and 113 of Evidence
Act is concerned, it is also appropriate to refer the decision of
this Court in cases of State Of Gujarat Versus Ashvinbhai
Naginbhai Tandel reported in 2025 (0) GUJHC 20677, State
Of Gujarat Versus Bhaveshbhai Manilalbhai Patel reported in
2025 (2) GLR 923, State Of Gujarat Versus Haji Haroon
Meman reported in 2026 (0) GUJHC 7002 as well as the
decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Ramesh
Kumar Versus State Of Chhattisgarh reported in 2001 (9) SCC
618 and Ram Pyarey Versus State Of Uttar Pradesh reported
in 2025 (6) SCC 820. Even, so far as the statutory
presumption under Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian
Evidence Act is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
recently held that before such a presumption can be drawn,
there must be at least some cogent material or evidence
giving rise to an inference against the accused. In the absence
of even the slightest evidence on record from which such an
inference can reasonably be drawn against the respondents
regarding the commission of the alleged offences, the
statutory presumption cannot be invoked.
Page 13 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
25. There is neither direct nor indirect evidence produced by
the prosecution to establish that any act or conduct on the
part of the present respondent had driven the deceased to
such an extent that she was left with no alternative but to take
the extreme step of committing suicide. Therefore, under the
circumstances, the trial Court has rightly passed the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal. No infirmity,
illegality, or perversity is found in the impugned judgment and
order of acquittal. Hence, the present appeals are devoid of
merits and deserve to be dismissed.
26. On perusal of the record of the appeals, it transpires that
the respondent-accused has established his innocence before
the Trial Court and that, after due appreciation of the oral as
well as documentary evidence and other material placed on
record, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal. The findings recorded by the
Trial Court are just, proper and in accordance with the settled
principles of law and, therefore, no interference is warranted
by this Court.
27. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate
Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the
Page 14 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.
28. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal
against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not
ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the
approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at
by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which
would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below.
However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by
the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on
record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a
just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find
out whether the accused are connected with the commission
of the crime with which he is charged.
29. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly
paragraph Nos. 42 and 43 , which was subsequently re-
Page 15 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State
of Bihar and another , reported in [ 2022] 3 SCC 471 ,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general
principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph
No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex
Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 =
(2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the trial Court.
30. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169 , wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20
and 21 as under:-
“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general
principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs.
State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court
while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The
principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
Page 16 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High
Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and
weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the
Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of
guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal
against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High
Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses
and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly
finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their
testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the
jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the
brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal,
resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing
the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial
Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
31. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly
appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the
present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on
record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore,
the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record.
32. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it
Page 17 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026
R/CR.A/65/2016 (GJHC240521002016) JUDGMENT DATED: 31/08/2026
clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any
error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record
and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled
against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it
clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the trial Court is sustainable and both the appeals are
liable to be dismissed.
33. In view of the above, both the appeals are devoid of
merits and deserve to be dismissed. Resultantly, both the
appeals dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail
bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings of both the
Appeals be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.
Sd/-
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
SURESH SOLANKI
Page 18 of 18
Uploaded by SURESH SOLANKI(HC00208) on Mon Sep 07 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 07 15:54:46 IST 2026