India International Convention And Exhibition Centre Limited vs Larsen And Toubro Limited

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 07.05.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 01.07.2026

+ ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026, CAV 212/2026, I.A. 12734/2026
(Stay), I.A. 12735/2026 (For lengthy list of dates) & I.A.
12736/2026 (Seeking permission to file arbitration documents
in a compact disc or pen drive)


INDIA INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AND
EXHIBITION CENTRE LIMITED .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. N. Venkatraman, ASG
along with Mr. K.R.
Sasiprabhu, Mr. Debesh Panda,
Mr. Vinayak Maini, Mr. Tushar
Bhardwaj and Ms. Vidhatri
Deoli, Advocates.

versus

LARSEN AND TOUBRO LIMITED .....Respondent

Through: Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi,
Mr. Akhil Sibal and Mr. Kunal
Tandon, Senior Advocates
along with Mr. Avishkar
Singhvi, Ms. Anuradha
Mukherjee, Mr. Ajay Sawhney,
Mr. Kapil Arora, Mr. Manmeet
Singh, Ms. Palak Nagar, Mr.
Aviral Singhal, Mr. Kartik
Sharma, Ms. Priyansha, Ms.
Sugandh Shahi and Ms. Divya
Prabha Singh, Advocates.


Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 1 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
1. With the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the
parties, the present Appeal was taken up for final hearing at the stage
of admission itself. Having heard the parties extensively, the Appeal is
being finally disposed of by this judgment.
2. The present Appeal has been preferred under Section 37(2)(b)
1
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , assailing the Order
2
dated 03.04.2026 , passed by the learned Majority Arbitral
3
Tribunal in an Application preferred under Section 17 of the A&C
Act during the pendency of Arbitral proceedings between the
Appellant, India International Convention and Exhibition Centre
4 5
Limited , and the Respondent, Larsen & Toubro Limited .
3. Learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal, by the Impugned Order,
directed the Appellant to release amounts aggregating to
approximately Rs. 227,18,46,552/- in favour of the Respondent within
a period of six weeks in respect of Stage Payments SP-69 and SP-70
as an interim measure, while declining certain other reliefs sought in
the said application. It is further noted that one of the learned
Members of the Arbitral Tribunal rendered a dissenting opinion,
taking a contrary view with respect to the grant of interim monetary
relief.

1
A&C Act
2
Impugned Order
3
Majority Arbitral Tribunal
4
IICECL
5
L&T
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 2 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

4. Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Appellant has preferred
the present Appeal, contending, inter alia , that the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal has, at an interim stage, granted substantive
monetary relief in favour of the Respondent notwithstanding the fact
that the underlying disputes remain contested and are yet to be finally
adjudicated upon.
5. Before proceeding further, this Court deems it appropriate to
take note of the reliefs sought by the Respondent herein, who was the
Claimant before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, in its application filed
under Section 17 of the A&C Act. The said application formed the
subject matter of adjudication in the Impugned Order. It is pertinent to
note that the prayers originally sought in the said application were
subsequently amended. Such an amendment was carried out after the
learned Arbitral Tribunal had already conducted a partial hearing on
the application in its original form. The amended prayers, as
ultimately pressed and considered by the learned Arbitral Tribunal,
read as under:
―i. Injunct the Respondent from acting upon letter dated October 26,
2024 bearing no. 1938 issued by the Respondent's Engineer
recommending release of 'NIL' payment on account of alleged
negative (disputed) variations;
ii. Injunct the Respondent from withholding and/or appropriating
certified lawful dues upto SP 70 to the tune of INR
438,95,64,957.69 (Indian Rupees Four Hundred Thirty Eight
Crores Ninety Five Lakhs Sixty Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Fifty Seven and Sixty Nine Paise only) contrary to the
provisions of the Contract and direct a release INR
438,95,64,957.69 (Indian Rupees Four Hundred Thirty Eight
Crores Ninety Five Lakhs Sixty Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Fifty Seven and Sixty Nine Paise only) to the
Claimant;
iii. Direct the Respondent to follow the terms of the Contract and
certify Stage Payments to the tune of INR 126,09,58,087.31
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 3 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

pending certification upto SP 70 which values are carried forward
in SP 71;
iv. After certification of INR 126,09,58,087.31 , the Respondent be
directed to release the payment in accordance with the terms of
the Contract;
ν. Direct the Respondent to refrain from unilaterally deducting a sum
of INR 6,27,47,890/- (Indian Rupees Six Crores Twenty Seven
Lakhs Forty Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Only)
from SP 68 towards alleged negative variations;
vi. Any other order or direction that this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem
fit in the interest of justice.‖

BRIEF FACTS:
6. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts germane to the
institution of the present Appeal are as follows:

(a) The Appellant is a Special Purpose Vehicle constituted under
the aegis of the Government of India for the development and
management of the India International Convention and Expo
6
Centre Project at Dwarka, New Delhi .
(b) It is noted that the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor
Development Corporation Limited, a company established by
the Government of India, had issued a Request for
7
Qualification-cum-Proposal on 16.10.2017 for the selection
8
of Engineering, Procurement and Construction contractors
for detailed design, construction, testing and commissioning of
the Project on an EPC basis.
(c) Pursuant to the RFQ&P issued for execution of the Project on
an EPC basis, the Respondent, an EPC contractor engaged in
execution of large-scale infrastructure projects, emerged as the

6
Project
7
RFQ&P
8
EPC
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 4 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

successful bidder and, consequently, a Contract dated
9
30.01.2018 came to be executed between the parties.
(d) Under the said Contract, the Respondent was entrusted with the
detailed design, construction, testing and commissioning of
Phase-I works of the Project on a lump-sum basis.
(e) The contractual arrangement contemplated stage-wise payments
to be released upon certification by an independent Engineer
appointed under the Contract, namely , AECOM India Pvt.
10 11
Ltd . , through Interim Payment Certificates and stage-wise
payments upon verification and certification of work executed
by the Respondent.
(f) During the course of execution of the Project, disputes arose
between the parties concerning various aspects of contractual
performance, including change in scope of work, delay in
completion of the Project and extension of time, withholding of
payments, GST-related claims and costs allegedly incurred on
account of force majeure events.
(g) A principal dispute also arose with respect to certain works
which, according to the Appellant, formed part of the
Respondent's original contractual scope but remained
unexecuted, resulting in adjustments towards negative
variations under the Contract. The Respondent, however,
disputed the same and contended that such works did not form
part of its original contractual obligations and were beyond the
agreed scope of work.

9
Contract
10
AECOM
11
IPC
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 5 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

(h) In an attempt to resolve the disputes relating to the alleged
negative variations and scope of work, the parties entered into
conciliation proceedings on multiple occasions. However, the
same did not fructify, and the disputes between the parties
remained unresolved.
(i) Consequently, Arbitration came to be invoked, wherein the
Respondent raised claims aggregating approximately Rs. 3000
crores against the Appellant.
(j) The Appellant contested the said claims and, in turn, raised
counterclaims aggregating approximately Rs. 1056 crores, inter
alia , on account of negative change in scope and
liquidated/delay damages.

(k) During the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, disputes
further arose concerning the release of payments under stage-
wise payments, namely , SP-68, SP-69 and SP-70.
(l) The Appellant maintained that adjustments and withholding of
amounts under the said certifications were contractually
permissible on account of alleged negative variations and
unexecuted works, whereas the Respondent contended that the
certified amounts could not be withheld. Though certain
amounts stood certified under the said stage payments, their
release remained subject to reconciliation and adjustments
arising out of the disputes between the parties.
(m) In the aforesaid backdrop, the Respondent preferred an
Application under Section 17 of the A&C Act before the
learned Arbitral Tribunal seeking interim reliefs, inter alia , for
release of certified amounts, restraint against withholding and
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 6 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

deductions, and consequential interim directions concerning the
disputed stage payments.
(n) The said Application was subsequently amended to include
subsequent certifications and developments during the arbitral
proceedings.
(o) The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal, by way of the
Impugned Order, partly allowed the Application and directed
the release of amounts aggregating to approximately Rs.
227,18,46,552/- in respect of SP-69 and SP-70, while declining
reliefs in respect of certain other stage payments. The learned
Minority Member also rendered a dissenting opinion.
(p) Aggrieved by the said directions, the Appellant has preferred
the present Appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the A&C Act
against the Impugned Order passed by the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
12
7. Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of
the Appellant would, at the outset, submit that the Impugned Order
suffers from a fundamental jurisdictional error since the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section
17 of the A&C Act, has granted substantive monetary relief under the
guise of an interim protective measure.
8. It would be contended that the jurisdiction under Section 17 of
the A&C Act is essentially preservative and protective in nature and

12
ASG
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 7 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

cannot be exercised in a manner that effectively results in a
determination of disputed monetary claims.
9. Learned ASG would place his reliance upon Khurana
13
Educational Society (Regd.) v. Smt. Shashi Bala and RCCIVL-
14
RKIPL LLP v. RCC Infraventures Ltd. & Ors. to contend that the
jurisdiction under Section 17 thereof cannot be employed to prejudge
contentious issues or fasten substantive monetary liability where the
underlying entitlement itself remains seriously disputed.
10. Learned ASG would submit that the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal, by directing release of approximately Rs. 227.18 crores in
favour of the Respondent, has effectively granted a portion of the very
monetary relief claimed in the Arbitration, despite pleadings not being
complete and evidence yet to be led.
11. It would be contended that the disputes between the parties
involve serious questions of fact and contractual interpretation
concerning the effect of Engineer certifications, the treatment of
alleged negative variations, the scope of obligations under the
Contract and the permissibility of withholding and adjustments, all of
which require adjudication upon a full-fledged consideration of
pleadings and evidence. He would submit that the Impugned Order
thus partakes the character of a partial final adjudication and renders
the trial on those issues substantially academic. It would further be
contended that if any direction for payment of disputed monetary
claims could at all be passed prior to final adjudication, the same

13
2026 SCC OnLine Del 1986
14
2025 SCC OnLine Del 7306
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 8 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

could only be by way of an interim award under Section 31(6) of the
A&C Act and not under Section 17 thereof.
12. He would submit that such an exercise itself presupposes a clear
and unequivocal admission on the standard analogous to Order XII
15
Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , which is wholly
absent in the present case. Reliance in this regard would be placed
16
upon Evergreen Land Mark (P) Ltd. v. John Tinson & Co. (P) Ltd.
to contend that where liability itself remains seriously disputed, no
order directing payment or deposit can be granted as an interim
measure.
13. Learned ASG would further submit that the Impugned Order
grants, in substance, a mandatory direction for payment and therefore
attracts a higher threshold than an ordinary interim injunction. It
would be contended that Samir Narain Bhojwani v. Aurora
17
Properties and Investments recognises that such relief requires the
establishment of a strong case for trial and not merely an arguable
prima facie case.
14. Learned ASG would further submit that the Respondent had
failed to establish any urgency warranting the exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 17 of the A&C Act. Learned ASG would further
contend that the Impugned Order proceeds upon an erroneous
understanding of the requirement of irreparable injury. It would be
submitted that the Respondent seeks relief purely monetary in
character and any eventual prejudice suffered by it is adequately
compensable by damages and contractual interest.

15
CPC
16
(2022) 7 SCC 757
17
(2018) 17 SCC 203
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 9 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

15. It would further be submitted that the Respondent itself has
asserted completion of the Project and therefore the plea that non-
release of the disputed amounts would adversely impact cash flows or
execution of works is inherently inconsistent.
16. He would, while placing reliance upon Dalpat Kumar v.
18
Prahlad Singh and Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. DPC
19
Engineering Project Pvt. Ltd. , contend that financial inconvenience
or business hardship cannot by itself constitute irreparable injury so as
to justify the grant of interim relief.
17. Learned ASG would submit that the Impugned Order
effectively rewrites the contractual framework agreed between the
parties. It would be contended that under the Contract, the Engineer
functions as an independent authority for the purposes of certification
and determination of stage payments. According to the Appellant, the
Engineer had certified no net payable amount in favour of the
Respondent under Stage Payments SP-68, SP-69, SP-70 and SP-71,
and revised SP-68 itself reflected a negative value of approximately
Rs. 621 crores. It would be submitted that the Engineer's certifications
constituted the contractual basis for adjustment and withholding of
amounts and continued to remain operative at all material times.
18. Learned ASG would further submit that the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal, while directing payment under SP-69 and SP-70,
selectively relied upon portions of the underlying certifications while
disregarding the express qualifications and caveats forming part
thereof. It would be submitted that the said certifications were

18
(1992) 1 SCC 719
19
2011 SCC OnLine Del 4378
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 10 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

expressly made subject to reconciliation and adjustments arising out
of negative variations and contractual determinations. However,
despite such qualifications, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal has
treated the same as creating an unconditional obligation to make
payment.
19. It would further be submitted that the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal has not stayed or suspended the operation of the underlying
Stage Payment Certificates, particularly SP-68 and SP-71, which
continue to remain operative, and therefore, the directions issued by
the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal effectively alter the contractual
mechanism agreed between the parties.
20. Learned ASG would further submit that the Respondent itself
had acknowledged the possibility of adjustments under the contractual
framework, and reference in this regard is made to the Minutes of
20
Meeting dated 17.02.2024 . It would be contended that the
Respondent cannot now contend that the amounts reflected in SP-69
and SP-70 stood completely insulated from any reconciliation or set-
off exercise.
21. Learned ASG would further contend that the findings recorded
by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal suffer from inherent
inconsistencies and a lack of reasoning. It would be submitted that
while the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal found no prima facie
case in respect of SP-68 and SP-71, it simultaneously proceeded to
hold that a prima facie case existed in relation to SP-69 and SP-70
without assigning any cogent basis for such distinction, therefore, it
would be contended that the said findings are irreconcilable,

20
MoM
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 11 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

particularly when SP-69 and SP-70 derive their effect from and are
intrinsically linked with revised SP-68.
22. Learned ASG would further submit that the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal has failed to appropriately consider the Appellant's
case on the balance of convenience. It would be contended that the
Respondent has already received substantial payments under the
Contract and, on the Appellant's own case, has in fact received
amounts in excess of what is contractually payable. Learned ASG
would submit that the risk of irreversible prejudice to the Appellant in
the event the disputed sums are released and the Appellant ultimately
succeeds in arbitration has not been examined at all.
23. Learned ASG would further submit that the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal has undertaken an impermissible exercise akin to a
mini-trial at an interlocutory stage by entering into issues concerning
the interpretation of contractual provisions, Engineer certifications and
competing claims of entitlement and in view thereof, it would be
submitted that such an exercise transgresses the limited scope of
jurisdiction under Section 17 of the A&C Act, and effectively
prejudges issues which properly fall for final adjudication in
arbitration.
24. Learned ASG would also submit that the Impugned Order
suffers from serious procedural irregularities since several preliminary
objections raised by the Appellant, including objections concerning
the maintainability of the proceedings under Section 17 of the A&C
Act, have neither been appropriately considered nor adjudicated. It
would be contended that several contractual provisions, documentary
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 12 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

material and submissions advanced on behalf of the Appellant have
either remained unaddressed or have been selectively considered.
25. Learned ASG would further submit that the process leading to
the pronouncement of the Impugned Order demonstrates a complete
lack of collegiality amongst learned members of the Arbitral Tribunal.
26. It would be contended that despite the dissenting member
having recorded substantial disagreement with the proposed
reasoning, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal proceeded without
adequately addressing the concerns reflected therein. Learned ASG
21
would submit that Muthu Construction - Salem v. Union of India
22
and R. Venkataramaiah v. Southern Railway recognise that once
parties consciously submit themselves to adjudication by an Arbitral
Tribunal, meaningful deliberation amongst all members forms an
integral component of a fair adjudicatory process and any departure
therefrom impacts the principles of equality of arms and natural
justice.
27. In view of the aforesaid, learned ASG would submit that the
Impugned Order suffers from jurisdictional excess, procedural
irregularity, perversity and patent inconsistencies and therefore
warrants interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction
under Section 37 of the A&C Act and is liable to be set aside.
28. Per contra , the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Respondent would submit that the present Appeal proceeds on an
erroneous understanding of both the nature of the Impugned Order and
the scope of appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the A&C Act. It

21
2026 SCC OnLine Mad 524
22
2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2036
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 13 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

would be contended that the Impugned Order has been passed under
Section 17 of the A&C Act and is merely interlocutory in nature,
being subject to variation, modification and final adjudication by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal itself.
29. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that, as recognised in
Worldwindow Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Warehousing
23 24
Corporation and RK Associates Hoteliers v. NHAI , the scope of
interference under Section 37 of the A&C Act remains limited, and
this Court would not substitute its own view merely because another
interpretation may be possible.
30. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the principal
premise of the Appellant's challenge proceeds on an incorrect
assumption that the amounts directed to be released by the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal constitute disputed amounts. It would be
contended that the amounts directed to be released under SP-69 and
SP-70 are stage-wise payments which had already undergone the
contractual certification mechanism and stood admitted and payable
under the Contract. It would be submitted that under Clause 19.3.3 of
the Contract, once payments stand certified, deductions arising out of
changes in scope or withdrawal of works do not affect stage payments
unrelated thereto and therefore such admitted amounts cannot be
withheld by setting them off against disputed claims and
counterclaims pending adjudication.
31. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that under the
contractual framework, AECOM functions as an independent

23
2021 SCC OnLine Del 5099
24
2026 SCC OnLine Del 212
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 14 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

Engineer and the amounts under SP-69 and SP-70 had already
undergone verification and certification before being recommended
for release.
32. It would be contended that the recommendations made by the
Engineer were unconditional insofar as release of payment was
concerned, and the caveat attached thereto merely contemplated future
accounting adjustments depending upon the eventual adjudication of
disputes and did not qualify the recommendation for release itself. It
would further be submitted that the Impugned Order itself, while
discussing the contractual framework and the stage payment
mechanism, records a similar understanding at Paragraph 112 thereof.
33. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the disputes
concerning negative variations themselves form the principal dispute
pending adjudication before the learned Arbitral Tribunal and
continue to remain seriously contested between the parties. It would
be contended that the Appellant seeks to equate admitted liabilities
with unadjudicated counterclaims and thereby justify withholding of
payments otherwise found payable under the Contract.
34. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that unadjudicated
claims and counterclaims cannot be placed at par with admitted
liabilities and therefore the Appellant cannot unilaterally determine
liability and adjust disputed claims against amounts already certified
and payable.
35. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that assurances
had also been furnished on behalf of the Appellant before the learned
Arbitral Tribunal regarding the release of certified payments. In
support thereof, reliance would be placed upon the Procedural Order
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 15 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

dated 15.05.2024, wherein the learned Arbitral Tribunal records the
statement made on behalf of the Appellant that steps would be taken
to ensure that running account bills pending for certification are
processed and that payments certified as due to the Respondent are
released.
36. It would be contended that the certifications under SP-69 and
SP-70 arose in the backdrop of the aforesaid assurance, and therefore,
the Appellant cannot now justify the continued withholding of the
same amounts. It would further be submitted that the Respondent had
never furnished any assurance or affirmation permitting the Appellant
to release lesser amounts after effecting unilateral set-offs, as sought
to be contended on the basis of the MoM.

37. Learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the
Appellant's submission that interim monetary relief cannot be granted
under Section 17 of the A&C Act is contrary to settled principles.
38. It would be submitted that Section 17(1)(ii)(e) of the A&C Act
itself empowers the learned Arbitral Tribunal to pass such interim
measures as may appear just and convenient, and Brace Iron and
25
Steel Private Limited v. Tata Steel BSL Limited and Supertrack
26
Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Friends Motel Pvt. Ltd . recognise that directions
involving payment of money are not alien to the jurisdiction under
Section 17 thereof where entitlement or admission stands sufficiently
crystallised.
39. Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal has not finally adjudicated disputed claims

25
2020 SCC OnLine Del 3975
26
2017 SCC OnLine Del 11662
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 16 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

but has merely directed release of amounts already admitted and
certified under the contractual framework.
40. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal, after an exhaustive consideration of the
pleadings, contractual provisions and rival contentions, has arrived at
a finding that the balance of convenience lies in favour of the
Respondent and has extensively considered the question as to whether
interim monetary relief could be granted under Section 17 of the A&C
Act.
41. It would be contended that the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal has rightly observed that the consequences flowing from
continued withholding of the amounts assume significance, and
therefore the exercise of discretion by the learned Arbitral Tribunal
cannot be interfered with merely because another view may also be
possible.
42. Learned Senior Counsel would further seek to distinguish the
judgments relied upon by the Appellant by contending that RCCIVL-
RKIPL LLP (supra) concerned amounts which themselves formed
part of disputed claims, unlike the present case, where the sums
directed to be released had already crystallised through the contractual
certification mechanism.
43. It would further be submitted that Khurana Educational
Society (supra) arose in the context of mesne profits and therefore has
no application to the present controversy, whereas Dalpat Kumar
(supra) was rendered in a different statutory context and cannot be
mechanically applied to the present proceedings, as all the judgments
relied upon by the appellant are distinguishable as chalk and cheese .
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 17 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

44. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the
Appellant's challenge on the ground of absence of collegiality
amongst learned members of the Arbitral Tribunal is misconceived. It
would be contended that the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal had
engaged in deliberative consultation and had shared draft opinions
with the dissenting member, pursuant to which discussions and
meetings were also held.
45. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the allegation of
absence of consultation is therefore contrary to the record. It would be
further submitted that the dissenting member had not merely
expressed disagreement with the ultimate decision of the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal but had proceeded to make observations
regarding the functioning of the Majority itself, and therefore, the
Appellant cannot rely upon the dissenting opinion to contend that the
adjudicatory process itself stood vitiated.
46. In view of the aforesaid, learned Senior Counsel would submit
that the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal has merely directed the
release of admitted and certified amounts and has not finally
adjudicated disputed claims or determined the rights of parties.
Accordingly, it would be contended that no case for interference under
Section 37 of the A&C Act is made out and the present Appeal is
liable to be dismissed.

:
ANALYSIS
47. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and, with
their assistance, carefully perused the record of the present Appeal,
including the pleadings and the Impugned Order passed by the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 18 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

48. This Court considers it apposite, at the outset, to delineate the
scope and ambit of appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the A&C
Act, particularly in the context of interference with interlocutory
orders rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the A&C
Act. The contours of such jurisdiction are necessarily circumscribed,
for the legislative scheme underlying the A&C Act evinces a clear
intent to accord primacy to the autonomy of the arbitral process and to
minimise judicial intervention, save in narrowly tailored situations
expressly contemplated by statute.
49. A plain reading of Section 37 of the A&C Act reveals that the
provision merely enumerates the categories of orders that are
amenable to appellate scrutiny; it does not, in express terms, define
the breadth or intensity of such scrutiny. Equally, the statute is
conspicuously silent as to the parameters governing the Court’s
exercise of appellate power while examining an order passed by the
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the A&C Act. This legislative
silence is neither accidental nor inconsequential; rather, it signifies
that the appellate jurisdiction is intended to be supervisory and
corrective in nature, and not an avenue for rehearing the matter on the
merits or substituting the discretionary determination of the Arbitral
Tribunal with that of the Court. For the sake of completeness, Section
37 of the A&C Act is reproduced hereunder:
“Section 37. Appealable orders . — (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal
shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the
Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of
the Court passing the order, namely:
(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;
(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 19 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under
section 34.
(2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral
tribunal—
(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or subsection
(3) of section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section
17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under
this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any
right to appeal to the Supreme Court.‖
(emphasis supplied)

50. At this juncture, this Court finds it apposite to delineate the
contours and ambit of the jurisdiction exercisable under Section 37 of
the A&C Act, as expounded by this Court in Indo Spirits v. Pernod
27
Ricard India Pvt Ltd and Ors , which reads as follows:
― 16 . At the outset, this Court notes that it is fully conscious of the
limited scope of appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of the
A&C Act. The legislative intent underlying Section 5 of the A&C
Act mandates minimal judicial interference in arbitral proceedings.
17. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in NHAI v. HK Toll Road
(P) Ltd. has reiterated that an appellate court does not ordinarily
interfere with discretionary orders passed by an Arbitral Tribunal.
Interference is justified only where such discretion has been
exercised arbitrarily, perversely, or in disregard of settled principles
governing the grant or refusal of interim relief. The appellate court
is not expected to substitute its own view merely because another
view is possible; rather, it must confine itself to examining whether
the Arbitral Tribunal adhered to settled legal principles. The
relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
― 56. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments show that the
appellate court while exercising powers/jurisdiction under
Section 37 of the 1996 Act and more particularly under
Section 37(2)( b ) of the 1996 Act has to keep in mind the
limited scope of judicial interference as prescribed under
Section 5 of the 1996 Act. Section 5 of the 1996 Act
clearly reflects the legislative intent to minmize judicial
interference in the arbitration process. Unlike the appeals
under other statutes, the appeals under the 1996 Act
against the orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal are
subject to strict and narrow grounds. The 1996 Act aims at

27
2026 SCC OnLine Del 674
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 20 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

minimal court involvement, thereby to uphold the
autonomy and efficiency of the arbitration process.
13
(Reference: paras 64, 66, 68-70 of Dinesh Gupta case ).
57. The appellate court is not required to substitute its
views with the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal which
is a reasonable or a plausible view except where the
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or where the AT has
ignored the settled principles of law. In fact, the whole
purpose to bring the 1996 Act is to give supremacy to the
discretion exercised by the AT. The appellate court is not
required to interfere in the arbitral orders especially a
decision taken is at an interlocutory stage. The appellate
court is only required to see the whether the AT has
adhered to the settled principles of law rather than
reassessing the merits of the AT's reasoning.
58. A coordinate Bench of this Court in Tahal Consulting
Engineers India (P) Ltd . [2023 SCC OnLine Del 2069]
case has observed as under: (SCC OnLine Del paras 36
and 38)
― 36. L&T Finance lays emphasis on the need of the
appellate court to bear in mind the basic and
foundational principles of the Act and that being of
judicial intervention being kept at the minimal. It
also correctly finds that the power conferred by
Section 37(2)( b ) is not to be understood as being at
par with the appellate jurisdiction which may
otherwise be exercised by courts in exercise of their
ordinary civil jurisdiction. This clearly flows from
the foundational construct of the Act which
proscribes intervention by courts in the arbitral
process being kept at bay except in situations clearly
contemplated under the Act or where the orders
passed by the Arbitral Tribunal may be found to
suffer from an evident perversity or patent illegality.
∗∗∗
38. It would thus appear to be well settled that the
powers under Section 37(2)( b ) is to be exercised and
wielded with due circumspection and restraint. An
appellate court would clearly be transgressing its
jurisdiction if it were to interfere with a
discretionary order made by the Arbitral Tribunal
merely on the ground of another possible view being
tenable or upon a wholesome review of the facts the
appellate court substituting its own independent
opinion in place of the one expressed by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The order of the Arbitral Tribunal would
thus be liable to be tested on the limited grounds of
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 21 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

perversity, arbitrariness and a manifest illegality
only.‖
59. To sum up, it is clear that in view of the limited
judicial interference, the appellate court has to exercise its
power only if the arbitral order suffers from perversity,
arbitrariness and a manifest illegality.‖
18. A similar exposition of law is found in World Window
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Central Warehousing Corpn , wherein it
has been held that the scope of interference under Section 37 of the
A&C Act against orders passed under Section 17 is extremely
limited. The Co-ordinate Bench emphasized that Interlocutory
Orders of an Arbitral Tribunal are inherently tentative and
protective in nature, subject to modification at the stage of final
award. Judicial restraint operates with even greater vigour at the
interlocutory stage, as unwarranted interference may impede the
arbitral process itself. The relevant portion of the said judgment
reads as follows:
― 66. The scope of interference, in appeal, against orders
passed by arbitrators on applications under Section 17 of
the 1996 Act is limited. This Court has already opined in
Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta , 2020 SCC OnLine Del
2099, Augmont Gold (P) Ltd. v. One97 Communication
Ltd. , (2021) 4 HCC (Del) 642] and Sanjay
Arora v. Rajan Chadha , (2021) 3 HCC (Del) 654, that
the restraints which apply on the court while examining a
challenge to a final award under Section 34 equally apply
to a challenge to an interlocutory order under Section
37( ii )( b ). In either case, the court has to be alive to the fact
that, by its very nature, the 1996 Act frowns upon
interference, by courts, with the arbitral process or
decisions taken by the arbitrator. This restraint, if
anything, operates more strictly at an interlocutory stage
than at the final stage, as interference with interlocutory
orders could interference with the arbitral process while it
is ongoing, which may frustrate, or impede, the arbitral
proceedings.
67. Views expressed by arbitrators while deciding
applications under Section 17 are interlocutory views.
They are not final expressions of opinion on the merits of
the case between the parties. They are always subject to
modification or review at the stage of final award. They do
not, therefore, in most cases, irreparably prejudice either
party to the arbitration. Section 17 like Section 9 is
intended to be a protective measure, to preserve the
sanctity of the arbitral process. The pre-eminent
consideration, which should weigh with the arbitrator
while examining a Section 17 application, is the necessity
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 22 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

to preserve the arbitral process and ensure that the parties
before it are placed on an equitable scale. The
interlocutory nature of the order passed under Section 17,
therefore, must necessarily inform the court seized with an
appeal against such a decision, under Section 37.
Additionally, the considerations which apply to Section 34
would also apply to Section 37( ii )( b ).‖
(emphasis supplied)

51. To augment the aforesaid position, it is apposite to refer to the
decision of a Co-Ordinate Bench in Dinesh Gupta and Others v
28
Anand Gupta and Others , wherein the scope of appellate
interference under the A&C Act has been succinctly delineated as
follows:
― 71. Section 37 is, in a sense, a somewhat peculiar provision as,
against the decision of the arbitrator, it provides for a first appeal,
as well as a second appeal, to the High Court. Sub-section (1)
provides for an appeal, to the High Court, from the decision of the
Section 34 Court, before which the final award has, in the first
instance, been tested. Sub -section (2), on the other hand, provides
for a first appeal, against interlocutory orders of the arbitral tribunal
under Section 16 or Section 17. There is, necessarily, a qualitative
difference between these two challenges, though both would lie to
the High Court. The challenge under Section 37(1), which is
directed against a final award of the arbitrator/arbitral tribunal, is
akin to a second appeal, as was observed by this Court in M.T.N.L.
v. Fujitsu India Pvt. Ltd .. The challenge under Section 37(2), on
the other hand, is directed against the decision of the arbitral
tribunal and has therefore, in my opinion, necessarily to conform to
the discipline enforced by Section 5. It would, therefore, be
improper for a Court to treat an appeal, under Section 37(2) of the
1996 Act, as akin to an appeal under the CPC, or as understood in
ordinary - or extraordinary - civil law. An appeal against an order
by an arbitrator, or by an arbitral tribunal, is an appeal sui generis,
and interference, by the Court, in such appeals, has to be
necessarily cautious and circumspect.
72. This position would stand especially underscored where the
order, under challenge, is discretionary in nature. Orders of
arbitrators, or Arbitral Tribunals, which are amenable to appeal,
under Section 37 (2), have, statutorily, to have been issued either
under Section 16(2) or (3) or under Section 17. Section 16(2) and

28
2020 SCC OnLine Del 2099
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 23 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

16(3), essentially, deal with rulings on the jurisdiction and
authority of the arbitral tribunal, to arbitrate. Any order, passed
under either, or both, of these provisions has, therefore, necessarily
to partake of a purely legal character. Such an order would not,
ordinarily, be discretionary in nature.‖
(emphasis added)

52. Having outlined the limited scope of interference under Section
37(2)(b) of the A&C Act, this Court also deems it apposite to briefly
advert to the nature and ambit of the jurisdiction exercisable by an
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the A&C Act. The contours of
such power, being interlocutory and equitable in character, warrant
consideration before this Court proceeds to examine the rival
submissions on merits. The law in this regard has been succinctly
enunciated by the Co-Ordinate Bench in Dinesh Gupta and Others
(supra), wherein the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction exercisable
under Section 17 of the A&C Act were examined in detail.
53. The said judgment clarifies that the power of an Arbitral
Tribunal to grant interim measures under Section 17(1) is analogous
and co-extensive with that of a civil court while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 9 of the A&C Act, and consequently, the
well-established principles governing the grant of interim
injunctions, including those embodied in Order XXXIX of the CPC,
would equally guide the exercise of such power. The relevant
observations as made in Dinesh Gupta and Others (supra) are
reproduced hereunder:
―Section 17(1), and applicability of Order XXXIX, CPC, thereto
73. As against this, orders which are appealable under Section
37(2)(b) are orders granting, or refusing to grant, interim measures
under Section 17. Section 17(1), for its part, reads thus:
― 17. Interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunal .-
(1) A party may, during the arbitral proceedings, apply to
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 24 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

the arbitral tribunal – (i) for the appointment of a guardian
for minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of
arbitral proceedings; or
(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any
of the following matters, namely:—
(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods
which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;
(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;
(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any
property or thing which is the subject-matter of the
dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may
arise therein and authorizing for any of the aforesaid
purposes any person to enter upon any land or building
in the possession of any party, authorizing any samples
to be taken, or any observation to be made, or
experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or
expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or
evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a
receiver;
(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear
to the arbitral tribunal to be just and convenient,
and the arbitral tribunal shall have the same power for
making orders, as the court has for the purpose of, and in
relation to, any proceedings before it.‖
74. The concluding caveat, in Section 17(1), makes it abundantly
clear that the power of an arbitrator, to grant interim measures,
under Section 17(1), is analogous and equivalent to the power of a
Court, to pass such orders. Section 9 of the 1996 Act grants co-
equal jurisdiction, worded in identical terms, on the Court, to pass
interim orders, concluding with a parallel caveat, to the effect that
―the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has
for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it‖.
75. The scope and ambit of Section 9, especially in the light of this
concluding caveat, was examined by the Supreme Court in Arvind
Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Kalinga Mining Corporation and
Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd. .
In Arvind Constructions Co. (P) Ltd.29, it was held thus (in para 15
of the report):
―The argument that the power under Section 9 of the Act
is independent of the Specific Relief Act or that the
restrictions placed by the Specific Relief Act cannot
control the exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act
cannot prima facie be accepted. The reliance placed on
Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja, (2004) 3
SCC 155 in that behalf does not also help much, since
this Court in that case did not answer that question
finally but prima facie felt that the objection based on
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 25 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act may not stand in the
way of a party to an arbitration agreement moving the
court under Section 9 of the Act. The power under
Section 9 is conferred on the District Court. No special
procedure is prescribed by the Act in that behalf. It is
also clarified that the court entertaining an application
under Section 9 of the Act shall have the same power for
making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to
any proceedings before it. Prima facie, it appears that the
general rules that governed the court while considering
the grant of an interim injunction at the threshold are
attracted even while dealing with an application under
Section 9 of the Act. There is also the principle that
when a power is conferred under a special statute and it
is conferred on an ordinary court of the land, without
laying down any special condition for exercise of that
power, the general rules of procedure of that court would
apply. The Act does not prima facie purport to keep out
the provisions of the Specific Relief Act from
consideration. … we may indicate that we are prima
facie inclined to the view that exercise of power under
Section 9 of the Act must be based on well-recognized
principles governing the grant of interim injunctions and
other orders of interim protection or the appointment of a
Receiver.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
76. In Adhunik Steels Ltd., P.K. Balasubramanyan , J. (who had
also authored Arvind Constructions Co. (P) Ltd.), after a somewhat
longer and more detailed discussion, reiterated the position that ―it
would not be correct to say that the power under Section 9 of the
Act is totally independent of the well known principles governing
the grant of interim injunction that generally governed the courts in
this connection‖.
77. The principles governing Order XXXIX of the CPC have,
therefore, also to guide the Court, while granting interim protection
under Section 9(1), or the arbitrator, while granting such protection
under Section 17(1), of the 1996 Act.‖
(emphasis supplied)

54. The scope of Section 17 of the A&C Act has also been
discussed by a Co-Ordinate Bench in Indian Railway Catering &
29
Tourism Corpn. Ltd. v. Sujata Hotel (P) Ltd. , which reads as under:
― 21. The aforesaid provision confers powers akin to those vested

29
2022 SCC OnLine Del 4478
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 26 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

upon the Court by virtue of Section 9 except that in case of the
latter, the Court stands vested with the authority to direct interim
measures being taken before, during or for that matter even after
the Arbitral proceedings have come to a close and culminated in
the making of an award. As would be evident from a reading of
Section 17, the interim measures are concerned with the
preservation of goods which may form the subject matter of
arbitration, securing any amounts which may be in dispute, the
detention, preservation or inspection of property, the appointment
of a receiver and directing such other interim measures of
protection as may appear to the Arbitral Tribunal to be just and
convenient.
22. As would be evident from the decisions on which reliance was
placed by the claimant itself, the power conferred by Section 17
upon the Arbitral Tribunal is essentially akin to the powers vesting
in a court to grant an interim prohibitory or mandatory injunction.
Section 17 in any case cannot be construed as either conferring a
power on the Arbitral Tribunal to either render an interim award or
to grant one of the final reliefs which may be sought by a claimant.
One of the principal considerations which courts and tribunals
weigh in mind while considering the question of grant of interim
protection, is to be wary of passing orders which amount to the
grant of final reliefs that may be claimed by parties. However, and
as would be manifest from the aforesaid recital of facts as well as
the direction which was ultimately framed by the Arbitral Tribunal
in the present case, it is exactly that basic and underlying principle
governing the grant of interim injunction which has been evidently
ignored and violated by the Arbitral Tribunal.‖
(emphasis added)

55. Having outlined the scope and ambit of interference under
Section 37 of the A&C Act, as well as the nature and extent of the
jurisdiction exercisable by an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17
thereof, this Court deems it apposite, at this stage, to reproduce the
relevant findings and reasoning recorded by the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal in the Impugned Order while granting the reliefs in
question. Since the validity and correctness of the said findings lie at
the heart of the present challenge, it is considered necessary to set out
the material portions of the Impugned Order to facilitate a proper
appreciation of the issues arising for consideration and for the sake of
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 27 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

ready reference. The relevant extracts from the Impugned Order are
reproduced hereunder:
“FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL:
80. This Tribunal has heard the matter in detail and perused the
pleadings made by the parties, documents filed and judicial
precedents relied upon in their support.
*
82. It is the case of the Respondent that the reliefs sought for by the
Claimant cannot be given by way of an interim injunction by
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17. It is for the reasons that if the
Arbitral Tribunal allows the application and directs the Respondent
to make payment of amount certified in the Interim Payment
Certificates as claimed by the Claimant, the Arbitral Tribunal
would inevitably and finally be deciding the issues/disputed sums
which form part of the counter claim of the Respondent.
*
84. Since, the prayer remains the same even in the Amended
Application except revising the figures of certified & uncertified
dues, the Respondent states, that relief sought for can only be
granted by the Arbitral Tribunal if it decides the issue and passes
an 'interim award' U/Sec. 31(6) of the Act and not otherwise.
Further, the Respondent submitted that even under Sec. 31(6) an
'interim award' directing the Respondent to make payment of
amounts certified under the Interim Payment Certificates, can only
be passed if the Arbitral Tribunal finds that there is an unqualified,
unequivocal 'admission' made by the Respondent of the nature as
contemplated under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.
*
87. Having carefully considered the submission made by the
Respondent in light of the prayer made by the Claimant, this
Tribunal is of the view that the Respondent's preliminary objection
regarding maintainability of application U/Sec.17 cannot be
accepted and deserves to be rejected for the following reasons:
i. The distinction & difference, which the Respondent has
tried to make, on the powers of the Tribunal while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 17 and Section 31, is
not supported by the language of both the Sections, which
is clear, in as much as existence of power to pass an
"interim award" U /Sec. 31, does not take away the power
of the Tribunal to order any "interim measure" U/sec. 1 7.
The power U/Sec. 17 has neither been made subject to
provisions of Section 31 or any other provision of the Act.
ii. As evident from its title, Section 31 deals with "Form and
Contents" of Arbitral award and prescribes "How, Where
and When" of passing of arbitral awards. It does not deal
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 28 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

with "Power" or "Authority'' or "Jurisdiction" of the
Tribunal to pass or not pass any award or order. Whereas,
Section 17 deals with power of Tribunal to pass an order
of interim measure of protection, either in form of an
"injunction" or in any other form as may appear to be ''just
and convenient", if the party so applies and the Tribunal
so finds.
iii. In this way, the two Sections i.e. Section 31 and Section
17 operate in different fields, without there being any
overlapping. The fact that under Section 31 the Tribunal is
empowered to make an interim award on matter in respect
of which it may make a final award, does not in any
manner, curtail or whittle down the power of the Tribunal
to pass an order of interim measure of protection, either as
injunction or otherwise, on a matter in respect of which it
may make a final award.
iv. There appears to be no reason to hold that ''interim
measures'' shall not pertain to matters which are capable
of being dealt with by the Tribunal either by passing
"interim award" or "final award”. If it is so held, then the
liberty given to the parties to apply to the Tribunal for an
interim measure of protection and consequent power of
Tribunal to pass such an order would be taken away and
Section 17 will be left completely redundant.
v. Further, an important difference between the two sections
is that, while an interim measure U /sec. 17 may be
modified, cease to operate or be vacated at any time before
passing of the final award, an "interim award" issued U
/Sec. 31 (6) on the other hand, attains finality vis-à-vis the
subject matter of dispute and cannot be revisited by the
Tribunal at the time of passing final award. It may simply
subsume in the final award and becomes part of it unless
set aside by a superior court.
*
89. Whether the present case warrants issuance of an interim
measure of protection u/Sec. 17 and whether the facts and
circumstances of this case justify passing of such an order directing
payment of amount under the Interim Payment Certificates by the
Respondent to the Claimant is a separate issue, which shall be dealt
with independently by this Tribunal on the merits of this
Application. But that is not to say that this Tribunal cannot
examine this issue and pass an order U /Sec. 17 of the Act.
90. Section 17 uses the phrase "interim measures of protection" and
includes, both, "interim injunction" U/Sec. 17(1)(ii)(d) and "such
other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Tribunal
to be just and convenient" u/Sec. 17(1)(ii)(e), thereby making it
clear that powers of the Tribunal are not restricted to issuing
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 29 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

injunctions, but also extend to any other interim measures if it
appears to be just and convenient to the Tribunal.
91. Therefore, the Claimant's application for interim relief U / Sec.
17, the case of the Claimant can be examined from both points of
view i.e. Section 17(1)(ii)(d) to issue 'interim injunction' and/or
Section 17(l)(ii)(e) to issue 'any other interim measure of
protection if it appears to be just and convenient' to the Tribunal.
92. In this quest, while the Tribunal analyses whether the
Claimant's case justifies passing of an "interim injunction", the
Tribunal is required to bear in mind the underlying principles of
passing an 'interim injunction' which guide the Courts while
exercising similar power U / Sec. 9, such as the provisions of Order
XXXVIII & Order XXXIX and not Order XII Rule 6.
93. As regards, the reliance placed by the Respondent on the
decision of Zenit Metaplast (2009) 10 SCC 388 and Samir Narain
Bhojwani (2018) 17 SCC 203, these decisions lay down a general
proposition that an order of mandatory injunction at interlocutory
stage should be passed only upon satisfaction of all essential
factors such as prima fade case, balance of convenience and
irreparable harm, so as to preserve a status quo or restore status
quo if altered.
94. While this Tribunal agrees with the principle laid down by
these judgments; the prayer made by the Claimant calls for issuing
both mandatory as well as prohibitory injunction and this Tribunal
cannot accept the submission of the Respondent that if this
Tribunal injuncts the Respondent from adjusting/withholding the
certified dues under interim payment certificates on account of re-
conciliation of contract price due to negative variations, then it will
not be restoring a status quo which existed when this arbitration
began.
95. Therefore, this Tribunal deems it fit to proceed to examine the
application made by the Claimant on both Section l 7(l)(ii)(d) to
issue 'interim injunction' and/or Section l 7(l)(ii)(e) to issue 'any
other interim measure of protection if it appears to be just and
convenient' to the Tribunal. While examining the merits of the
application from the point of view of an interim injunction, the
Tribunal would examine the case of the Claimant on the following
aspects.

WHETHER IT IS A PRIMA FACIE CASE
96. The Claimant has submitted that the facts and circumstances
surrounding the present matter, satisfies the threshold of a 'prima
facie' case. For this purpose, the Claimant has relied upon the
provisions of the Contract, the conduct of the Respondent, as
evinced by some letters & correspondences exchanged between
them and the conduct of the Respondent before this Tribunal. The
Claimant also draws support from some judicial precedents which
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 30 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

have held that disputed sums cannot be permitted to be
adjusted/withheld from admitted amount liable to be paid by one
party of the contract to the other.
97. The Respondent has on the other hand negatived the
submission made by the Claimant by submitting that a prima facie
case can only be said to be made out, if it does not involve detailed
interpretation of the contract to determine the rights & liabilities of
the parties and when there appears to be an unambiguous,
unqualified and uncontested admission or acknowledgment of the
claim by the Respondent.
98. It is thus submitted by the Respondent, that in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the Respondent has acted purely
in terms of the Contract which permits the Respondent to
adjust/withhold payments liable to be made to the Claimant under
IPCs and that the IPCs have been specifically caveated/ subjected
to right of the Respondent to seek reconciliation of the overall
contract price. In this way, the Respondent pleads that there is no
admission and no prima facie case either.
99. Additionally1 the Respondent states that the adjudication of the
claims raised by the Claimant in this application is intricately
connected with Respondent's Counter-Claims and therefore it
cannot be considered as a prima facie case established by the
Claimant, unless the counter-claims are first adjudicated and
rejected by the Tribunal. It is the submission of the Respondent that
an adjudication of the claims made in this application is only
possible with the help of evidence at the stage of trial and that this
Tribunal must not endeavor to do so at this stage.
100. In examining whether a case 1s prima facie or not, the
Tribunal is required to take a view on such facts which do not
require to be proved by the Claimant/ Applicant, with the help of
any evidence. Such facts may be in the form of provisions of
contract between the parties, the communications exchanged
between the parties or the conduct of the parties before the
Tribunal.
101. While this Tribunal agrees with the precedents relied upon by
the Respondent that an exercise which would require the Tribunal
to draw an interpretation of the terms of contract or derive meaning
out of correspondences between the parties, should ideally be not
done at the stage of determining whether it is a prima facie case or
not and that such an exercise would be required to be done at the
trial of the suit/ claim, with the help of evidence.
102. However, at the same time, it must be appreciated that a
Tribunal cannot take any view, leave aside prima facie view,
without referring to the relevant provisions of Contract or to the
correspondences between the parties. The line between what is and
what is not, a prima facie case, is not easily discernible and to
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 31 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

arrive at either conclusion, the Tribunal cannot be prohibited from
looking at the contract or correspondences between the parties.
103. The Tribunal does not agree with the submission made by the
Respondent that order of "interim injunction" U /Sec. 17(1)(ii)(d),
can only be passed if there is a unqualified clear "admission" on the
part of the Respondent. None of the judicial precedents relied upon
by the Respondent have held that an 'interim measure of protection
in the form of interim injunction' can be passed by the Tribunal
only on an 'admission'.
104. To restrict itself in looking for an ―admission or
―acknowledgment‖, whether unequivocal/unambiguous in the
correspondences or conduct of the Respondent, would amount to
taking a restricted view of prima facie case. Therefore, there may
be cases, wherein without there being any 'admission' on part of the
Respondent, the Claimant may still display a prima facie case for
grant of interim injunction.
105. Keeping the aforesaid in mind, since the parties are asserting
rights and liabilities qua each other based on the provisions of the
Contract, it is pertinent to refer to the relevant provisions of the
Contract. From a bare reading of the provisions of the Contract the
following appears:
i. The Contact stipulates a fixed Price for the Scope of work
stipulated therein; however, it also permits any Change in
of Scope of the Contract (modification, addition or
deletion) (Clause 13.1) and lays down that one of a
Change of Scope can be brought about is when directed to
be done by the Employer by giving a notice to Contractor
(Clause 13.2.1).
ii. Consequently, such Change of Scope (negative or positive)
results in a change of Contract Price (decrease or increase)
if the parties mutually agree to the valuation of such
Change in Scope (Clause 13.2.2).
iii. If the parties don't agree to valuation of any Change in
Scope, Employer can direct the Contractor to proceed to
perform the works under Change of Scope order at the
rates & valuation done by it, till the matter of valuation is
resolved in accordance with dispute resolution clause
(Clause 13.2.4). In any case, total value of all Change of
Scope orders cannot exceed ten percent of Contract Price
(Clause 13.4.2).
iv. As regards payment to be made to the Contractor, the
contract provides a mechanism (Clause 19.3) for release
of payment to the Contractor in stages, on basis of a
statement to be submitted by the Contractor g1v1ng
details of the work done and amount payable thereof
(Clause 19.4).
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 32 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

v. Within 7 days of receipt of stage payment statement from
the Contractor, the Engineer is required to make a broad
valuation of such stage payment statement and
recommend release of 75% of such broad value
determined by it, as 'part payment', till the time the
Engineer issues an 'Interim Payment Certificate'. (Clause
19.5.1)
vi. Within 28 days of receipt of stage payment statement
from the Contractor, the Engineer is required to determine
and deliver the 'Interim Payment Certificate', certifying the
amount due and payable to Contractor, after adjusting
payment already released to Contractor against the said
statement. (Clause 19.5.2) Here the Engineer shall
specify if any amount is deducted from the stage
payment statement and the reasons thereof
vii. The grounds on which the Engineer may make a
deduction from the stage payment is specified in Clause
19.5.4., which gives 4 grounds for enabling Engineer to
withhold from payment such amount. These grounds are:
(a) value of work which contractor failed to perform in
accordance with Agreement and the Engineer had notified
to the Contractor (b) cost of rectification work, if not done
in accordance with contract (c) non-compliance or non-
conformances and (d) deduction due to safety score as per
Audit rating. In either case, the Engineer is required to
records its reasons for doing so. The format of Interim
Payment Certificate, which the Engineer has been issuing,
has specifically provided for such grounds and reasons in
support thereof.
viii. However, the Contract provides that any reduction in
overall contract price due to negative change in scope
brought about in the manner stipulated in the Contract.,
shall not affect the amount payable to contactor for any
stage which is not affected by such change of scope
(Clause 19.3.3).
ix. In case of difference of opinion as to valuation of any
stage, the Engineer's view prevails and interim payment
shall be made to the Contractor on this basis, without
prejudice to right of Contractor to raise a dispute on the
certified amount (Clause 19.5.3). Therefore, the receipt of
certified payment by a Contractor does not indicate the
acceptance of valuation to stage payment done by
Engineer.
x. Similarly, any payment made by Employer to Contractor
in accordance with the direction of the Engineer, shall not
be deemed to indicate the acceptance, approval, consent or
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 33 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

satisfaction of the Employer, with the work performed by
the Contractor. (Clause 19.5.5).
xi. Regardless, the Employer shall pay to Contractor any
amount due under any payment certificate, within 35 days
from the date when the Contractor submitted statement to
Engineer. If the Engineer does not issue an IPC within
time, the Employer is liable to make payment to
Contractor as per the Statement submitted by Contractor
to Engineer. (Clause 19.9.1) and in event failure of
Employer to make payment an interest is required to be
paid (Clause 19.9.2).
xii. Although, the Employer's Engineer has the power to
make a correction or modification to any previous interim
payment certificate which may have been issued by it.
(Clause 19.18) However, a failure to issue an Interim
Payment Certificate by the Engineer within 60 days after
receiving the Stage Payment Statement from the
Contractor has been deemed to be a default on the part of
the Employer (Clause 23.2.1.) giving a right to the
Contractor to terminate the Contract.
xiii. As regards, claims of the Employer against the
Contractor, the Contract provides that if the Employer
considers itself as entitled to any payment from Contractor
under any Clause of this Agreement, the Employer shall
give a notice of its intention. to the Contractor 20 days
before making the recovery and the Employer shall take
into consideration the representation made by the
Contactor before making any recovery. (Clause 19.19)
xiv. Clause 12 titled as "Completion Certificate", provides for
"Set-off of Contactor's Liabilities" wherein it mentions
that the Employer shall have right to deduct or set-off the
expenses incurred or likely to be incurred by it or any
claim under this Agreement, from or against any amount
payable to contractor under this agreement including
retention money and proceeds of performance guarantee.
(Clause 12. 7)
106. This being the mechanism stipulated in the contract for
determining contract price, change of scope and stage payments,
this Tribunal prima facie finds that the following can be understood
from the bare perusal of the Contract:
i. The Contract provides for a Change of Scope Notice
followed by an order of Change of Scope, so as to make
any reduction/ addition in the Contract Price. If the parties,
do not agree, the Employer can even issue a Change of
Scope order and direct the Contractor to undertake the
work at the rate stipulated therein. However, the
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 34 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

cumulative value of all the Change of Scope orders cannot
exceed 10% of Contract Price.
ii. While a payment made by the Employer to the Contractor
doesn't indicate acceptance, approval, consent or
satisfaction of the Employer with the work performed by
the Contractor. However, the Employer does not have a
right to withhold the stage payment for such work, when
once the stage payment statement is certified by the
Engineer.
iii. Similarly, receipt of certified payment by the Contractor
doesn't indicate the acceptance of the Claimant to the
valuation made by the Engineer. However, since the
Engineer's valuation is binding on both parties, the only
right which the Contractor has is to raise a dispute as to
valuation and get the same resolved in accordance with
dispute resolution clause.
iv. The Engineer's authority to make 'adjustment' to the
amount recommended in the interim payment certificate is
only to the extent of the amount of money already paid to
Contractor pertaining to the said interim stage payment
statement, however, if any deduction is made from the
IPC, the reasons for deduction shall be provided in the
IPC.
v. That the Engineer has a right to make 'deductions' from the
Stage Payment certificate on the grounds of failure of
contractor to execute items of work in accordance with the
Contract under Clause 19.5.4. However, "reconciliation of
contract price on account of items of negative variations"
is not one of the grounds which is contemplated by Clause
19.5.4.
vi. "Re-conciliation of contract price by taking into negative
variations", is not specifically deal with by the Contract. It
can either be done on basis of Change of Scope Orders or
eventually at the time of final payment.
vii. The process of Change in Scope and reduction in
Contract Price have been kept separate from the process of
Interim Payment, as can be seen from Clause 19.3.3 which
states that the payment for any stage shall not be affected
by an overall reduction in Contract price, if the reasons for
such reduction does not affect such stage.
107. In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the Respondent
has right to deny the amount of certified stage payment on basis of
any dispute which is not pertaining to works perforn1ed under the
relevant stage. The increase, decrease in contract price, resulting
from a change in scope order, can only impact payment for such
stages, which are affected by the change in scope and not
otherwise.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 35 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

108. Most importantly, it is not yet established by the Respondent
whether the items of work referred in letter dated 10.04.2024 are
indeed negative variations or not. In fact, the Respondent has
pleaded that the withholding/ adjustment sought to be done is on
the grounds of "breach of contractual" obligations done by the
Claimant. Whereas the interim payment certificates and the letter
accompanying the certificates mention that withholding/
adjustment is due to 'reconciliation of contract price by taking into
account negative variation to scope of contract.
109. In the Counter Claim filed by the Respondent as well as in the
Reply to the Claimant's Application, the Respondent has pleaded
that 82 items of work, the non-performance/refusal of which
amounts to negative variations, will have an effect of reduction in
contract price. The same is evident from the following pleadings
made by the Respondent in its reply to the Claimant's Application
U /Sec. 17:
i. "Counter claims towards the Change in Scope Orders with
negative cost variation in the SOD & CC have been filed
under Clause 13.2 of the Contract.'' (See Para 60, Page
32 of Reply to Application U/Sec. 17 filed by
Respondent)
ii. “…L&T has time and again opted to wriggle out of its
clear specifications under the Contract by either not doing
the work as specified in the Contract or by refusing to
submit necessary documents for IICC to process
appropriate Change of Scope order with negative cost
variations to L&T. " (See Para 56, Page 31 of Reply to
Application U / Sec. 17 filed by Respondent)
110. Whereas, at the same time the Respondent has also pleaded
that the 82 items of work on account of which the Engineer has
recommended withholding/ deduction/ set-off from Stage payment
under Clause 19.5.4. amount to "breach of contractual obligations"
by the Claimant. The same is evident from the following averments
made by the Respondent in the reply filed by the Respondent to the
Claimant's Application U /Sec. 17:
1. " ... have been rightfully withheld on account of breaches
committed by L&T in the performance of the obligation
under the Contract". (See Para 15, Page 10 of Reply to
Application U/Sec. 17 filed by the Respondent)
2. " ... For reasons set out elaborately in the SOD & CC,
IICC reiterates that L&T failed to complete the works
under the Contract as per the scheduled completion dates
and remained in continued breach by not completing the
work even as per the extended timelines. » (See Para 19,
Page 11 of Reply to Application U/Sec. 17 filed by the
Respondent)
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 36 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

3. "As is evident from a plain reading of Clause 12. 7 and
Clause 19. 5. 4 above, IICC has a contractual right to set
off amounts, whether they have already been incurred or
whether they shall accrue to the account of IICC. The only
requirement for the right to set-off to be triggered is that
the costs/ expenses that have been incurred or are likely to
incur are a direct result of the breaches of L&T, which in
this case, is beyond dispute." (See Para 32, Page 30 of
Reply to Application U /Sec. 17 filed by the
Respondent)
4. "..that L&T was in breach of Contract, and IICC has a
right to retain, recover and set-off the amounts accruing
as a result of such breach." (See Para 52. Page 29 of
Reply to Application U/Sec. 17 filed by the
Respondent)
5. "Therefore, IICC states that interim relief, the grant of
which is discretionary, ought not to be granted to a party
which is in breach of the Contract" (See Para 57, Page 31
of Reply to Application U /Sec. 17 filed by Respondent)
6. "IICC states that L&T has been in breach of Contract by
repeatedly failing to adhere to the timelines set out under
the Contract and by not adhering to the scope of work
under the Contract." (See Para 81, Page 42 of Reply to
Application U/Sec. 17 filed by IICC)
111. Therefore, whether the items of work on account of which the
Respondent denies the entitlement of Claimant are negative
variations to the Contract resulting in reduction in contract price or
breach of contract resulting in claim for damages, is itself not made
clear by the Respondent. In fact, the issue of negative variations to
contract price is a part of counter-claim by Respondent which has
not yet been adjudicated.
112. Tribunal is of the prima fade view, that regardless of whether
they are negative variations resulting in reduction in contract price
or they are breach of contractual obligations resulting in claim for
damages, it is clear that what the Respondent is seeking to do is to
adjust/withhold/ set-off its unadjudicated claims, from the certified
stage payments which the Claimant is otherwise fully entitled to
receive in the scheme of the Contract.
113. The Tribunal has further examined the correspondences and
letters exchanged between the parties, which is prima facie display
of their conduct, so as to examine whether it can be said that a
prima facie case has been established by the Claimant.
114. The Claimant pleads that it has a strong case for grant of
interim relief on the basis of the following documents:
i. Stage Payment Certificate 68 (towards work done by the
th
Claimant from 0 1 Nov 2023 to 30 April 2024) issued by
the Engineer certifying a value of work done as Rs.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 37 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

142,91,11,212/-. The SP-68 was however issued along
with a letter dated 26.10.2024 by which the Engineer
recommended the Respondent to release 'NIL' payment to
Claimant under Clause 19.5.2. of the Contract, due to
pending re-conciliation of contract price after taking into
account the amount of negative variation notified to
Contractor by Respondent vide its letter dated 10.04.2024.
ii. Stage Payment Certificate 69 (towards work done by the
st
Claimant from 01 May 2024 to 10th July 2024) issued by
the Engineer certifying a value of work done as Rs.
51,42,98,785/-. This SP-69 was however issued along with
a letter dated 15.01.2025 by which the Engineer
recommended the Respondent to release payment of Rs.
51,42,98,785/- to Claimant under Clause 19.5.2. of the
Contract, subject to re-conciliation of contract price after
taking into account amount of negative variation notified
to Contractor by Respondent vide its letter dated
10.04.2024.
iii. Stage Payment Certificate 70 (towards work done by the
th st
Claimant from 11 July 2024 to 31 Jan 2025) issued by
the Engineer certifying a value of Rs. 179, 17,95, 170 / -.
This SP-70 was however issued with a letter dated
28.03.2025 by which the Engineer recommended the
Respondent to release payment of Rs. 179,17,95,170/- to
Claimant under Clause 19.5.2. of the Contract, subject to
re-conciliation of contract price after taking into account
amount of negative variation notified to Contractor by
Respondent vide its letter dated 10.04.2024.
115. At this stage it is also pertinent to note that, the SP-68 which
was initially issued by the Engineer on 26.10.2024, has
subsequently been revised. The revised SP-68 was issued with a
letter dated 15.01.2025, but served on the Claimant only on
09.04.2025. In the revised SP-68, the Engineer has certified the
stage with a negative value of Rs. - 621,57,64,619/- after
considering all items resulting in negative change of scope till
15.11.2024 (i.e. till date of filing of Statement of Defence &
Counter-Claim by Respondent). In that way, SP-68 earlier certified
for work done at Rs. 142,91,11,212/- was completely wiped out of
existence.
116. Although this Tribunal would rather work out the rights of
parties on the basis of provisions of the contract and the documents
contemplated by the contract such as stage payment certificates and
not mere correspondences. However, it will be too rash to ignore
the letters accompanying the certificates which convey the
intention of the parties and hence this Tribunal deems it fit to
proceed to analyze the effect of the Stage Payment Certificates in
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 38 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

reference with the letters accompanying them and the provisions of
the Contract.
117. As regards the SP- 68 initially issued by the Engineer ( at Page
69 to 72 of the Application dated 14.11.2024 filed by the
Claimant), while the Engineer certified an amount of Rs. 142, 91,
11,212/ - to be payable to Claimant for works done under that
stage, the certificate itself did not bear any caveat or note
qualifying the release of such payment. It was only in the letter
dated 26.10.2024, when the Engineer mentioned that the payment
against certified amount is subject to reconciliation of contract
price after taking into account amount of negative variation notified
to Contractor by Respondent vide its letter dated 10.04.2024. The
Engineer consequently recommended 'NIL' for release of balance
payments under Clause 19. 5. 2. of the Contract.
118. Therefore, while the work done by the Claimant pertaining to
that stage is not denied or disputed by the Engineer, the sole reason
for recommending release of 'NIL' payment is the reduction in
contract price by negative variations to scope of contract. In the
subsequently revised certificate for SP-68, the Engineer has gone
one step ahead and valued the negative variations to the contract,
resulting in a negative value of stage at Rs. 621,57,64,619/-.
119. Such action by the Engineer will need to be justified on the
basis of the Contract existing between the Claimant and the
Respondent. Considering the scheme of the contract between the
parties, as stipulated by Clause 19. 3.3, a reduction in contract price
will have no bearing on a stage payment, unless the stage is directly
impacted by a reduction in scope of the contract. Further, in the
present case, the Tribunal notes that the Respondent has neither
issued any order for Change of Scope nor demonstrated why it has
particularly chosen SP-68 only for giving effect to reduction in
contract price by all items of negative variations.
120. It is a fact that from Stage Payment 1 to Stage Payment 68, the
Respondent did not reduce the contract price by any item of
negative variations and all stage payments were duly paid by the
Respondent. It is also a fact that the dispute regarding items of
negative variations and whether the scope of contract can be
reduced on their account first arose between the parties in 2019 and
from 2019 to 26.10.2024 none of stage payments were withheld/
adjusted by the Engineer /Respondent on account of such items of
negative variations.
121. From perusal of letters, starting from 10.01.2024 upto
19.04.2025, as filed by the Claimant itself (i.e. Annexure 1 to 13 of
the Application dated 14.11.2024 and Annexure 1 to 10 of the
Amendment Application dated 30.04.2025) it is apparent that the
issue of adjustment/withholding of further payment to Claimant
was being disputed and had undergone several rounds of
discussions and conciliation right from the year 2020. Therefore
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 39 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

although the Respondent had agitated or disputed the right of the
Claimant to receive payment under certified stage payment
certificates, it had never done so earlier and it has done so for the
first time at the time of certified stage payment 68 onwards.
122. It thus appears abnormal and inexplicable to us as to why the
Respondent suddenly chose SP-68 for giving effect to all items of
negative variations, especially, when there was no consensus
between the parties and when the same was already a subject
matter of dispute which is presently pending arbitration before this
Tribunal.
123. The Tribunal further finds that the adjustment/withholding has
been done by the Respondent unilaterally at this stage, when
admittedly the contract is still ongoing and has not been terminated.
In terms of the Contract, a re-conciliation of contract price by
taking into account effect of negative variations in scope of
contract, if any, should be an exercise which should be done either
by issuing necessary change of scope orders or eventually at the
time of Final Payment under Clause 19.13.1, after taking into
account any excess interim payment(s) which according to the
Respondent, it 'Was not liable to make but has still made. This
Tribunal therefore holds that such an exercise by the Engineer at
the stage of interim payments is pre-mature and prima facie
arbitrary.
124. Further, in contradiction to its own earlier approach, the
Engineer has certified SP 69 & 70 ( at Page. 16 & Pg. 54 of the
Amendment Application dated 29.04.2025 filed by the Claimant
respectively) with an amount of Rs. 51,42,98,785/- and Rs. 179,
17,95, 170/- respectively . Here, although the Engineer has caveated
the certificate by mentioning that the payment against certification
is subject to re-conciliation of contract price after taking into
account amount of negative variation notified to Contractor by
Employer vide its letter dated 10.04.2024, however the letters
accompanying the SP 69 & SP 70 dated 16.01.2025 & 28.03.2025
respectively, do not recommended any withholding or adjustment
or release of NIL balance payment. Rather the letters recommend
the release of certified amounts of Rs. 51,42,98,785/- in SP 69 and
Rs. 179,17,95,170 / - in SP 70.
125. It was in these circumstances therefore, the Claimant in its
Application for Amendment dated 29.04.2025, sought to amend the
prayer made by it in the original Application dated 14.11.2024. In
the amended application, the Claimant stated that by virtue of
certification of SP-69 by Respondent or.:. 15.01.2025 & SP-70 on
28.03.2025, an amount of Rs. 236,19,59,081/- has been certified by
the Respondent cumulatively (Rs.48,00,51,352/ - for SP 69+Rs.
188,19,07,729/- for SP-70) which can be released to Claimant.
126. However, this Tribunal also notes that at Para 15 of its
Amendment Application, the Claimant stated that there are some
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 40 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

discrepancies in SP-69 & SP-70 leading to "higher certified value
in favour of Claimant" , and that the Claimant is relying only on
"admitted certified dues". The Claimant however has not
specified as to what were the discrepancies, what was its effect on
the certified value and the correct certified dues to which it was
entitled to.
127. Upon a closer look, this Tribunal finds that a higher certified
value was only in SP-69 where the Engineer has certified Rs.
51,42,98,785/- whereas, the claimed amount was only Rs.
48,00,51,352/-. As regards, SP-70, while the claimed amount was
Rs. 188,19.07.729/-. the Engineer has certified only Rs.
179,17,95,170/-. Thus, seen the statements made by the Claimant
in Para, 4, 10 and 15 of its amendment application regarding the
quantum of certified amounts, are partly true. Resultantly, the total
certified amount after considering SP-69 & SP-70 cumulatively
should be Rs. 227,18,46,522/- (i.e. Rs. 48,00,51,352 for SP-69 +
Rs. 179,17,95,170/- for SP-70) and not Rs. 236,19,59,081/- as
sought for by the Claimant.
128. We thus find that the Claimant's prayer that the amount of
"certified dues" would need to be increased by the amount 236
Crores i.e. from 202 Crore to 438 Crore and the amount of
"uncertified dues" would consequently stand reduced from 362
Crore to 126 Crore, is factually incorrect.
129. Another aspect which is noteworthy is as follows. In its
Amendment Application, the Claimant has not accounted for the
effect which the revised SP-68 dated 15.01.2025 (received by
Claimant on 09.04.2025), would have on the overall amounts of
uncertified/ certified dues.
130. It is important for the reasons that, the earlier SP -68 dated
26.10.2024 had certified a positive value of Rs. 142,91,11,212/-,
although recommended release of 'NIL', whereas, the revised SP 68
dated 15.01.2025 has certified a negative value of (negative)
Rs.621,57,64,619/-. Therefore, the prayer made by the Claimant
seeking relief on basis of the earlier certified SP-68 for the value of
Rs. 142,91,11,212/-is wrong because of substitution of SP-68 with
the revised one with a negative value of Rs. 621,57,64,619/-.
131. It is noteworthy, that neither the Claimant nor the Respondent
has not put forth any submission regarding the revision of SP 68
and its overall impact on figures of certified and uncertified dues
mentioned in the prayer of the amendment application. The
Claimant has only stated that the revision to SP-68 has been done
by Respondent to belatedly improve upon their case and as an
st
afterthought consequent to 1 Tranche of hearings of this Arbitral
Tribunal (between 31.03.2025, 01.04.2025 and 02.04.2025).
132. Having gone through the correspondences and the provisions
of the Contract, this Tribunal is convinced that the Claimant has a
prima facie case in its favour.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 41 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

WHETHER THERE IS BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE
133. While analyzing the case of the Claimant from the point of
view of convenience which may be caused to Claimant by grant of
injunction against Respondent or conversely the inconvenience
which may be caused to Claimant by withholding injunction
against Respondent, this Tribunal deems it fit to examine the case
on aspects of nature of contract between the parties, current status
of work under the contract and the payments made so far.
134. As regards the nature of contract, the Tribunal notes that
Contract between the parties is a 'lumpsum' contract where on the
basis of scope of project, a valuation of time and cost is done by the
contractor and a bid is submitted.
135. In the scheme of a lump-sum contract, the contractor bears a
heavier financial risk than the Employer, in terms of time value of
money i.e. if the contractor finishes work early, the contract price
will have more time value than if the contractor finishes work in
delay. Therefore in a lump-sum contract which stipulates a
mechanism of payment in stages after certification of each stage by
an Engineer, the payment of stage payments within time assumes
vital importance as compared to any other form of contract.
136. Keeping this in mind, when this Tribunal examines the facts
from the point of view of progress of the work done by the
Claimant under the Contract, it finds that the project was
inaugurated and handed over to the Respondent on 17.09.2023 and
has since then hosted several big national and international events.
It is the case, of the Respondent that there are several items of work
(snag items/punchlist items) which are yet to be completed without
which it cannot be considered that the Project is fully complete and
therefore a Completion Certificate has not yet been granted to the
Claimant.
137. Although the Claimant admits that there are certain works
(snag items/punchlist items) which are yet to be completed,
however such works are minor as per the Claimant. Therefore, the
fact remains that the Claimant has already gathered necessary
resources and is ready and willing to perform the incomplete works
(snag items/punchlist items) and the project is functional to the
extent that it can host events. The Claimant is thus awaiting a
Completion Certificate from the Respondent.
138. It is also relevant to note here that although the Respondent
was contemplating the withholding/reduction/ set-off of values of
items of negative variations from the IPCs since 2019-20, the
Responde11t admittedly did not do so until SP-68 on 26.10.2024.
Therefore, in the scheme of the contract is almost sudden and
arbitrary, because the Claimant's IPCs till SP-65 were never
withheld on account of alleged negative variations resulting in
overall reduction in contract price.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 42 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

139. In terms of the payment made so far, this Tribunal finds that
the Original Contact Price of 2791 Crore underwent an overall
increase by around 153-167 Crore and resultantly, the Contract
price stood increased to 2950-2958 Crore. Out of the admitted
revised Contract Price, an amount of around 2354- 2383 Crore has
been paid to the Claimant till date. Meaning thereby that around
80% of the Contract Price has been paid to the Claimant and the
around 20% remains to be paid.
140. At this stage even if this Tribunal ignores the fact that by
virtue of the Claims made by the Claimant and Counter-Claims
made by the Respondent in the present arbitration proceedings, the
Contract price is likely to increase or decrease by around 700 to
800 Crores, it is clear that the Claimant remains underpaid even the
admitted Contract price.
141. Therefore, on an overall consideration of the nature of
contract, the status of completion of project vis-à-vis the amount of
payment done to the Claimant and the Claims and Counter-Claims
present pending adjudication of this Tribunal, this Tribunal is of the
view that the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the
interim relief to the Claimant.

WHETHER THERE IS IRREPARABLE INJURY /HARM
142. As regards, the aspect of Irreparable Harm, the Respondent
submitted that an order of interim protection cannot be issued in
case wherein the only harm or injury contemplated by the
Applicant is monetary loss. The Claimant submitted, that this
cannot be accepted as a general proposition in all cases. The
Claimant submitted that Order XXXIX Rule 10 itself contemplates
a direction for payment of money by one party to the other and
therefore there may be circumstances, wherein an interim
injunction directing payment of money by one party to other may
be necessary and that there cannot be a straightjacket formula for
considering irreparable loss.
*
144. Therefore, all the aforementioned decisions relied upon by the
Respondent are to be read in the light of the facts of those cases
and none of them have laid down a law applicable in rem that in
claims of money, a Court/Tribunal can never pass an order of
interim injunction directing payment/part-payment of
money by one party to the other. The only factor laid down is if the
loss can be compensated by way of damages, the loss/harm cannot
be considered as irreparable.
*
146. Therefore, this Tribunal is of the considered view that
'irreparability' of harm is not to be assessed from the point of view
of the subject matter of dispute or claim i.e. monetary or non-
monetary. Rather, it is to be assessed from the point of view of the
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 43 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

consequence which are likely to fall on the Claimant if the relief is
denied in the circumstances of the case.
147. For a project like the one at hand, cash flow is not only a
fundamentally critical requirement, but any breach of that
obligation, cast upon the Respondent, has the potential of
jeopardizing the completion of the project. This is evident from a
plain reading of Clause 4.1.3 (d) of the Contract which mandates
release of the payment due and certified by the Engineer for the
work done by the Claimant. The said Clause 4.1.3(d) reads as
under:
"4.1.3. The Employer shall provide to the Contractor:
###
(d) Ensure release of timely payments, advances, extra item
approvals."
148. It is clear from the scheme of the Contractual provisions and
the letter and spirit thereof, that any breach of the Respondent's
obligation to release the amounts due and payable would not only
be illegal but it could also have the effect of preventing the
Claimant from completing the project in accordance with the terms
of the Contract. There is no gainsaying that an irreparable injury on
account of such a breach will be implicit in the consequences
flowing from the same, especially when the breach will bring the
project to a grinding halt and resultantly cause an irreparable injury
to the Claimant, both, in terms of frustrating the contract itself and
also in terms of loss of reputation and the ability of the Claimant to
undertake other works. Superadded to all this is the fact that even
when the Respondent has held as many as 258 events at the Project
facility and has been taking commercial benefits of the works
undertaken by the Claimant, it has not so far issued the completion
certificate in favour of the Claimant.
149. This is apart from the fact that according to the Claimant it has
been paid only 79.6% of the total contract value so far and the
Claimant feels that it has spent an amount of around 4822 Crores
upto now, as against the original contract price of 2791 Crores. The
decisions of the Delhi High Court in Brace Iron & Steels Case
(Supra) and Supertrack Hotels Pvt. Ltd's Case (Supra) clearly
support the Claimant's contention that merely because the
protection which the Claimant prays for is in the nature of direction
for payment of a monetary sum due to it, does not mean that a
refusal of any such direction cannot cause an irreparable injury to
justify the issue of specific direction. Suffice it to say that refusal of
payment of certified amounts in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, lead to an irreparable injury to the
Claimant, warranting an appropriate direction to prevent any such
injury and resultant miscarriage of justice on the Court.
150. While it may be a normal practice that injunctions are not
granted where there is no irreparable injury to the party seeking
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 44 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

injunction in matters involving money, because, parties can always
be compensated later on by awarding interest, including penal
interest. However, it must be realized that this rule of practice is
not meant to perpetrate injustice. Businesses, especially large ones
require a constant flow of finances to keep projects going, once the
flow is interrupted, it will certainly lead to an irreparable injury.
Further, the dimensions of the Contract require the Claimant to
depend upon third parties to undertake works and make necessary
payments depending upon the payments received from the
Respondent.
151. Therefore, in the specific circumstances of the present case,
the likelihood of an irreparable injury cannot be denied and this
Tribunal accordingly holds that the Claimant's case satisfied this
aspect for grant of an interim relief.

CONCLUSION
152. Seen from the point of view of the power of this Tribunal to
pass an order of interim injunction U /Sec. 17 (l)(ii)(d) of the Act,
this Tribunal is of the view that although a prima facie case is made
out in respect of some claims (SP-69 & SP-70), however at the
same time a prima facie case is not made out in respect of other
claim (SP-68 & SP-71). Therefore, even though this Tribunal has
come to a conclusion that the balance of convenience lies in favour
of Claimant and an irreparable injury is likely to occur if injunction
is not granted, however, this Tribunal is of the view that all the
relief s prayed for by the Claimant cannot be justified and therefore
an order of injunction in terms of all the prayer is not warranted
and thus the prayer made by the Claimant is denied.
153. We must make it clear that the aspect "balance of
convenience" relates to the comparative convenience inter se the
parties to the dispute and it is a judicially evolved principle on
which the grant of an 'interim injunction' u/Sec. 17(1)(ii)(e) of the
Act depends. However, it is not to be confused with the word
"convenience" which appears in Section 17(1)(ii)(e).
154. The term "convenience" appearing in Section 17(l)(ii)(e)
relates to the power of the Tribunal in the given facts and
circumstances of a case, which gives the Tribunal a power to pass
any order of interim relief, other than those stipulated in Sec. 17
(l)(ii)(a) to (d).
155. This Tribunal finds that m the specific facts and circumstances
of this case, considering the fact that the progress of the project,
which is iconic and of national importance, should not be impeded
in any manner and at the same time the Claimant shouldn't suffer
financial constraints in completing the said project, this Tribunal is
required to pass an interim order of relief. Therefore, for protecting
the interest of both the parties as well as the subject matter of
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 45 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

dispute, this Tribunal deems it "just and convenient" to pass the
following interim orders U /Sec. 17(1)(ii)(e) of the Act:
i. The Application filed by the Claimant for amending its
Application U / Sec. 17 of the Act, is allowed.
ii. The Respondent shall make payment of Rs. 48,00,51,352/-
certified in SP 69 and Rs. 179,17,95,170/- certified in SP
70 to the Claimant within a period of 6 weeks from the
date of this order.
ii. The dispute regarding impact of reduction 1n overall
contract price by value of alleged negative variations
(whether principally agreed between the parties or not) on
certification of work in SP-68 at Rs. 142, 91, 11,212 /- or
Rs. 621,57,64,619/-, will be decided by this Tribunal after
the parties have lead their evidence.
156. We further make it clear, that the observations of this Tribunal
while deciding this application U/ Sec.17 are taken on a prima
facie view and will be subject to the findings after the evidence is
finally heard.‖

56. A careful reading of the aforesaid extracts from the Impugned
Order reveals that the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal first
addressed the Appellant's preliminary objection regarding the
maintainability of the Respondent's application under Section 17 of
the A&C Act. The Appellant had contended that the relief sought by
the Respondent, namely , a direction for payment of amounts certified
under the IPCs, could not be granted by way of an interim measure
and would effectively amount to a final adjudication of disputed
claims.
57. Rejecting the said objection, the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal held that the power to grant interim measures under Section
17 of the A&C Act is independent of, and distinct from, the power to
render an interim award under Section 31(6) of the A&C Act. Having
held the application to be maintainable, the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal proceeded to examine the Respondent's entitlement to
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 46 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

interim relief on merits by applying the well-settled principles
governing the grant of interim protection.
58. Accordingly, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal undertook
an elaborate examination of the existence of a prima facie case, the
balance of convenience, and the likelihood of irreparable injury. Upon
finding each of these requirements to be satisfied in favour of the
Respondent, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal, by way of the
Impugned Order, directed the Appellant to release an aggregate
amount of approximately Rs. 227,18,46,522/- towards Stage Payments
SP-69 and SP-70 within a period of six weeks as an interim measure
of protection, while declining certain other reliefs claimed by the
Respondent.

59. However, before examining the correctness, legality, and
propriety of the aforesaid directions, and before considering whether
the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal could have exercised its
jurisdiction under Section 17 of the A&C Act in the manner it did, this
Court considers it necessary to closely scrutinise the reasoning
adopted by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal while applying the
aforesaid threefold test. Since the Impugned Order proceeds
substantially on the basis of the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal's
findings regarding the existence of a prima facie case, the balance of
convenience, and the likelihood of irreparable injury, it becomes
necessary to independently assess the nature and extent of the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal's examination on each of these aspects.
60. Such an exercise is essential not only for determining whether
the conclusions ultimately arrived at by the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal are sustainable in law, but also for evaluating whether the
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 47 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

relief granted under the guise of an interim measure remained within
the permissible contours of Section 17 of the A&C Act.
61. While examining whether a prima facie case existed in favour
of the Respondent herein, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal
undertook a detailed examination of the relevant contractual
provisions governing the relationship between the parties, the
pleadings exchanged between them, the contemporaneous
correspondence, and the overall factual matrix surrounding the
dispute. Upon such consideration, the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal concluded that no prima facie case was made out in respect
of SP-68; however, a strong prima facie case existed in relation to SP-
69 and SP-70. The underlying reasoning adopted by the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal while arriving at the said conclusion,
though not exhaustive, may be summarised as follows:
(a) A prima facie case does not require an unequivocal admission
by the Appellant. The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal
rejected the argument that interim relief can only be granted
where there is a clear acknowledgment of liability. A prima
facie case may exist even in the absence of any admission if the
contractual framework and surrounding circumstances indicate
a probable entitlement.
(b) The Contract distinguishes between interim stage payments and
disputes regarding overall contract price adjustments. The
contractual scheme provides separate mechanisms for ( i )
certification and payment of stage-wise work executed and ( ii )
adjustments arising from changes in scope or reductions in
contract price. These processes are not intended to be conflated.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 48 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

(c) Certified stage payments cannot ordinarily be withheld for
disputes unrelated to the particular stage of work certified. Once
the Engineer certifies work executed under a stage payment
certificate, the Employer's right to withhold payment is limited
to the grounds specifically enumerated in the Contract.
(d) The grounds for deduction under Clause 19.5.4 of the Contract
do not include reconciliation of contract price due to alleged
negative variations. The Contract permits deductions only on
specified grounds such as defective work, rectification costs,
non-compliance, or safety-related issues. Adjustment on
account of disputed negative variations is not expressly
contemplated.

(e) Any reduction in contract price arising from changes in scope
must ordinarily be implemented through the contractual change-
of-scope mechanism or at the stage of final account settlement.
The Appellant had not demonstrated compliance with this
contractual process before withholding certified payments.
(f) The Appellant's position was internally inconsistent. At some
places, it characterised the disputed items as " negative
variations " leading to a reduction in contract price, while
elsewhere it described them as breaches of contractual
obligations giving rise to damages. The learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal found that even the basis of the withholding
remained unclear and unadjudicated.
(g) The Appellant was effectively attempting to set off
unadjudicated claims against certified amounts otherwise
payable to the Respondent herein. Whether the alleged claims
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 49 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

were characterised as damages or reductions in scope, they had
not yet been determined and therefore could not prima facie
justify withholding certified payments.
(h) The Engineer's treatment of SP-68 appeared inconsistent with
the contractual framework. Although the work executed under
that stage was certified, payment was withheld solely on
account of alleged negative variations, despite no corresponding
change-of-scope orders having been issued.
(i) The Appellant's conduct departed from its own long-standing
practice. For several years, despite disputes regarding negative
variations, all prior stage payments had been processed and
paid. The sudden decision to impose adjustments beginning
with SP-68 appeared unusual and unexplained.
(j) The timing and manner of the withholding suggested
arbitrariness. The Appellant sought to implement disputed
reductions while the contract was still subsisting and before the
underlying disputes had been adjudicated, even though such
reconciliation could appropriately be undertaken through
change-of-scope orders or at the final payment stage.
(k) The treatment of SP-69 and SP-70 further weakened the
Appellant's case. While the Engineer attached caveats regarding
future reconciliation, it nevertheless certified the amounts and
recommended their release, indicating inconsistency in the
Appellant's approach.
(l) The revised SP-68 raised serious questions that required
adjudication at trial. The transformation of a previously
certified positive amount into a substantial negative value
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 50 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

reinforced the existence of a live dispute rather than
conclusively establishing the entitlement of the parties.
(m) Taken together, the contractual provisions, certified payment
certificates, correspondence between the parties, and the
Appellant's inconsistent conduct demonstrated a credible and
arguable entitlement in favour of the Respondent herein.
(n) Accordingly, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal concluded
in favour of the Respondent herein and held that it had
established a sufficient prima facie case for the purposes of
seeking interim protection.
62. Having arrived at the conclusion that a prima facie case existed
in favour of the Respondent herein in respect of SP-69 and SP-70, the
learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal proceeded to examine the second
limb of the well-settled triple test, namely , whether the balance of
convenience lay in favour of the grant of interim relief.
63. For this purpose, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal
considered the nature of the contractual arrangement, the stage and
status of completion of the project, the payment position between the
parties, and the practical consequences likely to ensue from either
granting or refusing the relief sought. Upon such consideration, the
learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal held that the balance of
convenience favoured the Respondent herein. The underlying
reasoning adopted in this regard, though not exhaustive, may be
summarised as follows:
(a) The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal considered the nature of
the contract, the status of completion of the project, and the
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 51 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

payment position between the parties to determine where the
balance of convenience lay.
(b) Since the Contract is a lump-sum contract, the contractor bears
substantial financial risk associated with delays and the time
value of money. Consequently, the timely release of certified
stage payments is of critical importance under the contractual
framework.
(c) The project has already been substantially completed,
inaugurated, and handed over to the Appellant, and has hosted
several national and international events. This demonstrates that
the project is functional and has achieved its intended
commercial purpose.

(d) Although certain snag or punch-list items remain incomplete,
the Respondent herein has acknowledged their existence,
expressed readiness and willingness to complete them, and
awaits issuance of the Completion Certificate. The remaining
works are not of such a nature as to render the project non-
functional.
(e) The Appellant had been aware of and raising concerns
regarding alleged negative variations since 2019-2020, yet it
continued to process and release payments under earlier IPCs.
The decision to begin withholding payments only from SP-68
onwards appeared sudden, inconsistent, and prima facie
arbitrary.
(f) A significant portion of the contract price has already been
admitted and paid, with approximately 80% of the revised
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 52 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

contract value having been released. Nevertheless, around 20%
of the admitted contract value remains unpaid.
(g) Even without considering the parties' competing claims and
counterclaims, which may ultimately alter the contract value by
several hundred crores, the Respondent herein appears to have
not yet received the entirety of the admitted contract price.
(h) The withholding of certified payments, therefore, places a
greater immediate financial burden on the Respondent herein,
particularly in the context of a lump-sum contract where cash
flow and timely payment are integral to the contractual bargain.
(i) On the other hand, the Appellant's interests remain protected
because its claims and counterclaims are already pending
adjudication before the learned Arbitral Tribunal and can be
appropriately determined in the arbitral proceedings.
(j) Considering the advanced stage of project completion, the
readiness of the Respondent herein to complete residual works,
the substantial unpaid portion of the admitted contract price,
and the pendency of the parties' competing claims, the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the balance of
convenience favoured granting interim relief to the Respondent
herein.
64. The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal thereafter proceeded to
examine the third and final requirement governing the grant of interim
relief, namely , whether denial of relief would result in irreparable
injury to the Respondent herein.

65. While undertaking this exercise, the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal distinguished the authorities relied upon by the Appellant
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 53 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

and substantially accepted the line of reasoning advanced on behalf of
the Respondent herein. Upon an assessment of the contractual
framework, the nature of the project, and the consequences of
continued withholding of certified payments, the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the requirement of irreparable injury
stood satisfied. The broad reasoning adopted by the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal in this regard, though not exhaustive, may be
summarised as follows:
(a) The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal rejected the Appellant's
contention that interim relief can never be granted in disputes
involving monetary claims. It held that there is no absolute rule
prohibiting interim directions for payment merely because the
relief sought is monetary in nature.
(b) The correct test is not whether the underlying claim concerns
money, but whether denial of relief would cause consequences
that cannot be adequately remedied later through damages or
interest.
(c) Judicial precedents relied upon by the Appellant only establish
that where a loss is fully compensable by damages, the injury is
not irreparable; they do not prohibit interim monetary relief in
all circumstances.
(d) Irreparable harm must be assessed from the practical impact of
withholding relief on the Respondent herein, rather than from
the nature of the claim itself.
(e) In the context of a large infrastructure project, continuous cash
flow is fundamental to the performance of the contract. Timely
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 54 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

payment is not merely a financial obligation but an essential
contractual requirement necessary for completion of the project.
(f) The Contract itself recognises the critical importance of timely
payments by expressly obligating the Respondent herein to
ensure prompt release of certified amounts and approvals
necessary for project execution.
(g) Failure to release certified payments has the potential to disrupt
or halt project execution, thereby frustrating the contractual
arrangement and causing consequences that cannot be fully
compensated through a later monetary award.
(h) The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal considered that
withholding payments could adversely affect the Respondent's
business operations, reputation, and capacity to undertake or
complete ongoing and future projects, resulting in injury
extending beyond mere financial loss.
(i) The Appellant had already derived substantial commercial
benefit from the project, including hosting numerous events at
the facility, while continuing to withhold payments and not
issuing the Completion Certificate, thereby exacerbating the
prejudice to the Respondent herein.
(j) The Respondent herein asserted that it had incurred expenditure
substantially exceeding the original contract value while
receiving only a portion of the amounts it claimed were due,
demonstrating the serious financial impact of continued non-
payment.

(k) The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal accepted the principle
that refusal to release certified and contractually payable
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 55 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

amounts, in the peculiar facts of the case, could itself result in
irreparable injury, notwithstanding that the relief sought is
monetary.
(l) While courts ordinarily avoid granting injunctions in money
claims because delayed payments can often be compensated
through interest, that principle is a rule of practice and cannot
be applied mechanically where doing so would cause
substantial injustice.
(m) Large commercial projects depend on uninterrupted funding
and payments to contractors, subcontractors, and other third
parties. Interruption of this financial flow may produce
consequences that cannot later be cured merely by an award of
damages or interest.
(n) Considering the scale of the project, the contractual obligation
of timely payment, the Respondent's dependence on continuing
cash flow, and the potential disruption to project completion
and business reputation, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal
concluded that denial of relief would likely cause irreparable
injury to the Respondent herein.
(o) Accordingly, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal held that
the requirement of irreparable harm was satisfied and that
interim protection was warranted.
66. Having examined the three well-settled requirements governing
the grant of interim relief, namely , the existence of a prima facie case,
balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable injury, the
learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal proceeded to determine the nature
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 56 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

and extent of relief that could appropriately be granted under Section
17 of the A&C Act.
67. The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal concluded that although
the Respondent herein had succeeded in establishing the aforesaid
requirements in certain respects, such findings did not automatically
justify the grant of all reliefs sought in the application.
68. The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal observed that a
distinction was required to be maintained between claims that stood
prima facie established and claims that remained seriously disputed
and would require adjudication upon evidence.
69. While the amounts certified under SP-69 and SP-70 were found
to be prima facie payable and capable of forming the basis of an
interim measure, the disputes pertaining to SP-68 and SP-71 involved
contentious questions concerning alleged negative variations,
revisions to certified values, and competing contractual
interpretations, all of which could only be conclusively determined
after the parties had led evidence. Consequently, the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal declined to grant the entirety of the relief claimed by
the Respondent herein.
70. At the same time, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal held
that the circumstances of the case warranted the grant of an interim
measure under Section 17(1)(ii)(e) of the A&C Act on the ground that
such a course was ― just and convenient ‖. Taking into account the
nature and national importance of the project, the need to ensure that
its progress and completion remained unaffected, and the perceived
financial prejudice likely to be caused to the Respondent herein on
account of continued withholding of certified amounts, the learned
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 57 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

Majority Arbitral Tribunal fashioned what it considered to be a
balanced interim arrangement.
71. Accordingly, the Appellant was directed to release the amounts
certified under SP-69 and SP-70 within a period of six weeks, while
the dispute relating to SP-68, including the impact of the alleged
negative variations and reduction in the overall contract price, was
expressly left open for determination after the parties had led evidence
during the arbitral proceedings.
72. Upon a consideration of the reasoning adopted by the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal, this Court is of the view that, quite apart
from the correctness of the individual conclusions ultimately reached
by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal, certain inherent
inconsistencies appear to permeate the foundational parameters
applied by it while granting the impugned reliefs.
73. This Court finds that there exists an apparent disconnect
between some of the principles recognised by the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal and the manner in which those principles were
ultimately applied to the facts of the case. Certain findings recorded
by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal also appear, at least prima
facie , to be difficult to reconcile with one another. It is these broad
inconsistencies in the reasoning process, rather than a mere
disagreement with the conclusions reached, that warrant closer
scrutiny by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under
Section 37 of the A&C Act.
74. This Court is conscious of the settled principle that an Arbitral
Tribunal enjoys considerable procedural autonomy and discretion
while conducting arbitral proceedings and while considering
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 58 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

applications seeking interim measures under Section 17 of the A&C
Act. Equally, judicial interference with orders passed by an Arbitral
Tribunal must remain limited and must not degenerate into a re-
appreciation of the entire matter as if the Court were exercising
original jurisdiction.
75. Nevertheless, the duty of this Court does not end with mere
deference to the Tribunal's discretion. This Court is equally obligated
to ensure that such discretion has been exercised upon sound legal
principles and within the confines of the jurisdiction vested in the
Tribunal by law. The intensity of judicial scrutiny may vary
depending upon the nature of the jurisdiction being exercised.
76. While the scope of examination under Section 11 of the A&C
Act operates in an altogether different sphere, and the jurisdiction
under Section 34 of the A&C Act remains narrow and circumscribed,
the appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the A&C Act permits a
comparatively broader examination to the extent necessary to correct
jurisdictional errors, legal infirmities, or manifestly erroneous
approaches adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal.
77. It is equally well settled that the mere possibility of another
view being taken on the same set of facts is not, by itself, a sufficient
ground for interference even in proceedings under Section 37 of the
A&C Act. However, having regard to the peculiar facts of the present
case and the reasoning reflected in the Impugned Order, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal
has, ex facie , travelled beyond the permissible limits governing the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 17 of the A&C Act and has
committed errors which warrant examination by this Court.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 59 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

78. At this stage, it is necessary to clarify that this Court is not
required to undertake a threadbare analysis of every observation,
finding, or factual determination recorded by the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal. Nor is it expected to reassess the merits of the rival
claims as would be undertaken at the stage of final adjudication.
79. The exercise before this Court is confined to examining whether
the broad and determinative foundations upon which the impugned
directions have been issued are legally sustainable and consistent with
the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal while passing
the Impugned Order. It is the legality of the underlying approach,
rather than the correctness of each factual conclusion, that falls for
consideration before this Court.

80. As noticed hereinabove, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Dinesh Gupta and Others (supra) has explained that the concluding
portion of Section 17(1) of the A&C Act makes it abundantly clear
that the powers conferred upon an Arbitral Tribunal to grant interim
measures are intended to be analogous to the powers exercisable by a
civil court while granting similar reliefs. The said principle finds
reflection in Section 9 of the A&C Act as well, which confers co-
extensive powers upon courts to grant interim measures and concludes
with an identical stipulation that the court shall possess the same
powers as are available in relation to proceedings before it.
81. At the same time, this Court finds considerable force in the
observations made by another Coordinate Bench in Indian Railway
Catering & Tourism Corpn. Ltd. ( supra ), wherein it was held that
although the powers under Section 17 of the A&C Act are akin to
those exercised by courts while granting interim prohibitory or
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 60 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

mandatory injunctions, such powers cannot be construed as
authorising an Arbitral Tribunal to render, under the guise of interim
protection, what is in substance an interim award or a grant of final
relief. One of the cardinal principles governing the grant of interim
relief is that courts and tribunals must remain cautious against issuing
directions which effectively confer upon a party the very substantive
relief that is ultimately sought in the arbitral proceedings.
82. Similarly, while examining an order passed under Section 17 of
the A&C Act directing payment of mesne profits in Khurana
Educational Society (supra) , this Court emphasised that an Arbitral
Tribunal must satisfy the settled triple test before granting any
substantial interim relief. This Court also took note of the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Evergreen Land Mark Pvt. Ltd.
( supra ), wherein it was held that an Arbitral Tribunal cannot, under
the guise of granting interim protection under Section 17 of the A&C
Act, direct payment or deposit of disputed monetary amounts where
the very liability to pay remains seriously contested and is yet to be
adjudicated. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions
necessarily guide the exercise of powers under Section 17 of the A&C
Act and require the Tribunal to remain circumspect while dealing with
disputed monetary claims. The relevant portions of Evergreen Land
Mark Pvt. Ltd. ( supra ) are reproduced hereunder:
― 10. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the dispute is with
respect to the rental amount for the period between March 2020 to
December 2021, for which the Arbitral Tribunal has directed the
appellant to deposit while passing the order by way of an interim
measure on the applications under Section 17 of the Arbitration
Act. The liability to pay the lease rental for the period between
March 2020 to December 2021 is seriously disputed by the
appellant by invoking the force majeure principle contained in
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 61 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

Clause 29 of the lease agreement.
11. It is the case on behalf of the appellant that for a substantial
period there was a total closure due to lockdown and for the
remaining period the appellant was allowed with 50% capacity and
therefore, the force majeure principle contained in Clause 29 shall
be applicable. When the same was submitted before the Arbitral
Tribunal, no opinion, even a prima facie opinion on the aforesaid
aspect was given by the Arbitral Tribunal. In para 39, it is observed
that ―it would not be fair at this stage of the proceedings, where
evidence is yet to be adduced by the parties in support of their rival
contentions on the issues that arise, to record any definitive opinion
on the import and effect of the force majeure clause (Clause 29)
contained in the lease deed‖. Therefore, applicability of the force
majeure principle contained in Clause 29 is yet to be considered by
the Arbitral Tribunal at the time of final adjudication.
12. Hence, the liability to pay the rentals for the period during
lockdown is yet to be adjudicated upon and considered by the
Tribunal. Therefore, no order could have been passed by the
Tribunal by way of interim measure on the applications filed under
Section 17 of the Arbitration Act in a case where there is a serious
dispute with respect to the liability of the rental amounts to be paid,
which is yet to be adjudicated upon and/or considered by the
Arbitral Tribunal. Thus, no such order for deposit by way of an
interim measure on applications under Section 17 of the
Arbitration Act could have been passed by the Tribunal.‖
(emphasis added)

83. This Court is unable to accept any absolute proposition that an
Arbitral Tribunal, while exercising powers under Section 17 of the
A&C Act, can never grant interim relief involving payment of money.
There may indeed be circumstances where the principles underlying
Order XXXIX Rule 10 of the CPC become relevant.
84. The said provision contemplates a situation where the subject
matter of the proceedings is money or some other property capable of
delivery and a party admits that such money or property belongs or is
due to another. In such circumstances, a court may direct the deposit
or delivery of the admitted amount or property. The same principle
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 62 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

may, in an appropriate case, inform the exercise of powers by an
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the A&C Act.
85. Thus, where the liability is admitted or where the entitlement is
otherwise undisputed, the Tribunal may direct release or delivery of
such amount as an interim measure.
86. However, it is equally important to recognise that neither a
court nor an arbitral tribunal can undertake a detailed fact-finding
exercise at the interim stage so as to effectively determine disputed
questions that properly fall for adjudication at trial. The principles laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Evergreen Land Mark Pvt.
Ltd. ( supra ) caution against precisely such an approach.
87. Where the very basis of liability remains seriously contested
and requires examination of contractual provisions, evidence, rival
factual assertions, and competing claims, interim proceedings cannot
be converted into a mechanism for granting substantive monetary
relief that effectively prejudges issues awaiting final determination.
88. In the present case, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal, after
examining certain contractual clauses, correspondence exchanged
between the parties, and the surrounding factual circumstances,
concluded that no prima facie case existed in respect of SP-68, while
holding that a prima facie case stood established in relation to SP-69
and SP-70.
89. However, a closer examination of the reasoning adopted in the
Impugned Order reveals an apparent inconsistency. On the one hand,
the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal expressly acknowledged that
the disputes arising from the revised SP-68, including the alleged
negative variations and their impact upon the contract price, could
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 63 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

only be resolved after a full examination of evidence and therefore
required adjudication at trial.
90. On the other hand, while recognising that the same dispute
concerning negative variations formed the very basis of the
Appellant's case, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal proceeded to
hold that the amounts certified under SP-69 and SP-70 constituted
dues that were prima facie payable and directed their release.
91. Whether the dispute relating to negative variations, reduction in
contract price, and entitlement to set-off was severable from the
certification and payment of SP-69 and SP-70, and whether the
learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal could have directed payment of
those amounts while simultaneously holding that the foundational
dispute required adjudication upon evidence, is an aspect that falls for
closer scrutiny by this Court.
92. This Court also takes note of the procedural background in
which the application under Section 17 of the A&C Act came to be
considered by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal. It is a matter of
record that the Statement of Claim was filed by the Respondent before
the learned Arbitral Tribunal in July 2024.
93. Thereafter, following the communication dated 26.10.2024
issued by the Engineer in relation to SP-68, the Respondent herein
preferred an application under Section 17 of the A&C Act even before
the Statement of Defence came to be filed by the Appellant.
Subsequently, the Appellant filed its Statement of Defence, reply to
the Section 17 application, and its Counter-Claim. Further pleadings
were also exchanged by the parties in relation thereto, whereafter the
learned Arbitral Tribunal proceeded to hear the said application.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 64 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

94. In the interregnum , further developments took place. Between
January and March 2025, certifications in respect of SP-69 and SP-70
came to be issued by the Engineer, albeit accompanied by caveats to
the effect that payment against the certified amounts was subject to
reconciliation of the Contract Price. Thereafter, in May 2025, the
Engineer revised SP-68 and reflected a negative value of Rs.
621,57,64,619/- on account of alleged negative variations.
95. In view of these subsequent developments, the Respondent
amended its Section 17 application so as to incorporate claims
pertaining to SP-69 and SP-70. The Appellant, in turn, filed its reply
to the amended application and additional pleadings were exchanged
between the parties.

96. It is also a matter of record that, after extensive hearings
spanning several sittings, the learned Arbitral Tribunal reserved orders
on the Section 17 application. Thereafter, by the Impugned Order
dated 03.04.2026, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal granted
substantial interim relief in favour of the Respondent in respect of SP-
69 and SP-70.
97. It is further a matter of record that towards the end of 2025, the
Respondent amended its Statement of Claim so as to incorporate
subsequent developments that had occurred after the filing of the
original Statement of Claim in July 2024. It is therefore significant to
note that when the learned Arbitral Tribunal considered the claims
relating to SP-69 and SP-70 in the context of the Section 17
application proceedings, there were admittedly no pleadings
concerning those claims in the original Statement of Claim or the
original Statement of Defence.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 65 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

98. Consequently, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal proceeded
to interpret the contractual provisions and determine the prima facie
entitlement of the parties substantially on the basis of the pleadings
exchanged in the Section 17 proceedings themselves. While declining
to finally adjudicate upon the effect of the revised SP-68 and treating
the same as an issue requiring trial and evidence, the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal simultaneously concluded that the amounts reflected
in SP-69 and SP-70 constituted prima facie payable sums.
99. This approach appears to give rise to an inherent inconsistency.
While the revised SP-68, which reflected substantial negative
variations and a corresponding reduction in the contract price, was
held to involve disputed questions requiring adjudication upon
evidence, the claims arising out of SP-69 and SP-70, despite having
been certified subject to similar caveats concerning reconciliation of
the Contract Price, were treated as constituting prima facie payable
amounts capable of being directed to be released at the interim stage.
100. Without entering into the correctness of the contractual
interpretation undertaken by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal
while recording a prima facie finding in favour of the Respondent,
this Court is, at the very least, of the view that the conclusion that
there existed a selective prima facie admission in respect of SP-69 and
SP-70, while simultaneously disregarding the implications of the
revised SP-68 and the negative variation claims arising therefrom, was
not warranted.
101. In the facts of the present case, the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal could well have deferred consideration of all such
interconnected Stage Payment Certificates to final adjudication,
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 66 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

particularly when they emanated from the same factual matrix and
contractual framework.
102. Be that as it may, and even proceeding on a demurrer by
accepting, for the purposes of the present discussion, the prima facie
findings recorded by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal, this Court
is nevertheless unable to concur with the conclusions arrived at by the
learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal on the issues of balance of
convenience and irreparable injury. In the considered opinion of this
Court, the reasoning adopted by the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal while examining these two essential requirements of interim
relief does not withstand closer scrutiny and is not borne out by the
factual matrix as recorded in the Impugned Order itself. Consequently,
even assuming that the Respondent herein had succeeded in
establishing a prima facie case, the findings returned by the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal on the remaining two limbs of the well-
settled triple test cannot be sustained.
103. Upon a careful examination of the Impugned Order, it appears
that the observations recorded by the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal on these two requirements are internally inconsistent and
cannot comfortably coexist.
104. While examining the question of balance of convenience, the
learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal observed that the Contract was a
lump-sum contract under which the contractor bore substantial
financial risks associated with delays and the time value of money,
thereby rendering timely release of certified stage payments of critical
importance. Simultaneously, however, the learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal also recorded that the Project had already been substantially
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 67 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

completed, inaugurated and handed over to the Appellant and had
become operational. The learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal further
noted that only certain residual snag or punch-list items remained to
be completed and that the Respondent had expressed its readiness and
willingness to complete the same. The learned Majority Arbitral
Tribunal additionally observed that approximately 80% of the revised
Contract Price had already been paid to the Respondent and that only
the remaining portion remained outstanding. On these considerations,
the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the balance of
convenience lay in favour of granting interim relief to the Respondent.
105. In the opinion of this Court, the aforesaid reasoning does not
appear to be entirely harmonious. On the one hand, the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal recorded that the overwhelming portion of
the work stood completed, the Project had already been inaugurated
and operationalised, and a substantial portion of the Contract Price
had already been released. On the other hand, it proceeded to hold that
immediate release of the disputed amounts was necessary to preserve
the cash flow required for completion of the Project.
106. This Court is unable to discern how, in such circumstances, the
balance of convenience could be said to decisively favour the
Respondent and not the Appellant, particularly when the Appellant's
case was founded upon substantial claims arising from alleged
negative variations, and when even the Engineer's certifications in
respect of SP-69 and SP-70 were expressly made subject to
reconciliation of the Contract Price. The Impugned Order does not
adequately explain why, in the face of such disputed and unresolved
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 68 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

claims, the comparative inconvenience was considered to lie solely on
one side.
107. It is well settled that the test of balance of convenience requires
the Court or Tribunal to undertake a comparative assessment of the
hardship, prejudice and inconvenience likely to be suffered by each
party depending upon whether interim relief is granted or refused. The
inquiry is not directed towards determining the ultimate merits of the
dispute but towards identifying the course that would occasion the
least injustice pending final adjudication. If the prejudice likely to be
suffered by the applicant upon refusal of relief outweighs the
prejudice likely to be caused to the respondent by its grant, the
balance of convenience is said to lie in favour of the applicant. The
underlying objective is to preserve fairness, maintain the status quo
where appropriate, and protect the subject matter of the proceedings
until the rights of the parties are finally determined.
108. However, in the present case, when the findings recorded in the
Impugned Order are examined in their entirety, this Court finds that
the conclusion reached by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal on
the aspect of balance of convenience does not appear to be fully
supported by the factual premises recorded by it.
109. Similarly, while examining the requirement of irreparable
injury, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal rejected the contention
of the Appellant that interim monetary relief can never be granted. It
was observed that the authorities relied upon by the Appellant merely
establish that where a loss is capable of being fully compensated by
damages, such loss cannot be regarded as irreparable.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 69 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

110. Proceeding further, the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal held
that in the context of a large infrastructure project, continuous cash
flow is fundamental to the performance of the Contract and that timely
payment constitutes an essential contractual obligation. It was further
observed that non-release of certified payments had the potential to
disrupt or halt execution of the Project, thereby frustrating the
contractual arrangement and causing consequences incapable of being
adequately compensated by a subsequent monetary award. The
learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal additionally reasoned that
continued withholding of payments could adversely affect the
Respondent's business operations, commercial reputation and ability
to undertake future projects. Similar reasoning permeates the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal's analysis under the head of irreparable
injury.
111. In the considered opinion of this Court, these findings do not sit
comfortably with the observations recorded by the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal while examining the balance of convenience.
Having itself recorded that the Project had substantially been
completed, that the facility had already been inaugurated and
operationalised, and that nearly 80% of the Contract Price had already
been released, it becomes difficult to reconcile the conclusion that
withholding of the disputed amounts would jeopardise completion of
the Project or result in irreparable consequences incapable of
compensation.
112. It is trite that irreparable injury refers to a harm which cannot be
adequately remedied, compensated or repaired by an award of
damages, monetary compensation or any other legal remedy at a later
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 70 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

stage. The expression does not signify a loss that is literally incapable
of repair; rather, it denotes a loss of such a nature that subsequent
compensation would be insufficient to restore the aggrieved party to
the position it would have occupied had the injury not occurred.
Courts and Tribunals therefore examine the likely consequences of
refusing interim relief and assess whether such consequences would
result in prejudice incapable of effective redress after final
adjudication, including loss of reputation, goodwill, business
opportunities, disruption of operations, or frustration of the very
purpose of the contractual relationship.
113. In the considered opinion of this Court, the reasoning adopted
by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal, particularly on the issues of
balance of convenience and irreparable injury, does not adequately
satisfy the aforesaid principles in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
114. It is pertinent to note that the Impugned Order grants substantial
monetary relief under Section 17(1)(ii)(e) of the A&C Act, namely ,
" such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the
Arbitral Tribunal to be just and convenient ".
115. The remaining provisions contained in Section 17(1)(i) and
Section 17(1)(ii)(a) to (d) of the A&C Act are generally directed
towards the preservation and protection of the subject matter of the
arbitration through various means. Nevertheless, in the present case,
the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal invoked Section 17(1)(ii)(e)
thereof to direct payment of substantial sums in favour of the
Respondent.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 71 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

116. In the considered opinion of this Court, and at the cost of
repetition, it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that an
Arbitral Tribunal is wholly denuded of the power to grant monetary
relief while exercising jurisdiction under Section 17(1)(ii)(e) of the
A&C Act. However, where such relief is granted, the Arbitral
Tribunal must satisfy a considerably higher threshold than that
ordinarily applicable to measures intended merely to preserve or
protect the subject matter of the arbitration.
117. Section 17(1)(ii)(e) of the A&C Act is undoubtedly couched in
broad language and may, in certain respects, confer powers wider than
those traditionally exercised under Order XXXIX of the CPC.
However, the width of the provision cannot justify its routine
invocation for directing payment of disputed monetary claims. Such
power must be exercised sparingly and only upon strict satisfaction of
the requirements governing interim relief.
118. In the considered opinion of this Court, the learned Majority
Arbitral Tribunal failed to satisfy that heightened threshold, more
particularly in relation to the requirements of balance of convenience
and irreparable injury.
119. The dispute in the present case arises out of a complex
contractual matrix involving substantial claims, counterclaims, alleged
negative variations, revisions of certified values, and competing
interpretations of the contractual framework. Even the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal itself acknowledged that the dispute
concerning SP-68 could not be determined without a detailed
examination of evidence. In such circumstances, and particularly
bearing in mind the principle underlying the decision of the Hon'ble
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 72 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

Supreme Court in Evergreen Land Mark Pvt. Ltd. ( supra ), the grant
of substantial monetary relief in respect of SP-69 and SP-70 at the
interim stage was not warranted.
120. At this juncture, this Court considers it necessary to clarify that
the controversy presently before it does not concern the ultimate
contractual entitlement of either party. Whether the amounts reflected
in SP-69 and SP-70 constitute admitted dues; whether the Appellant
was entitled to effect deductions on account of alleged negative
variations; whether the Minutes of Meetings support the Appellant's
case; whether the Procedural Order dated 15.05.2024 operates in the
manner suggested by the Respondent; and whether the Engineer's
certifications bear the effect attributed to them by either side, are all
issues that form part of the arbitral reference itself and require detailed
examination on merits.
121. These issues remain pending adjudication before the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. Any expression of opinion by this Court on the
correctness of the rival contractual interpretations would inevitably
trench upon matters reserved for final determination and may
prejudice the arbitral proceedings themselves.
122. Consequently, as already noted hereinabove, this Court
consciously refrains from entering into the merits of the rival
contractual interpretations advanced by the parties. Nevertheless, this
Court remains duty-bound to examine whether the findings recorded
by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal are sustainable on the face
of the record. Upon such examination, this Court is constrained to
hold that the findings do not meet the threshold required for the grant
of the monetary relief directed under the Impugned Order.
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 73 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

123. This Court reiterates that there can be no dispute with the
proposition that the grant of monetary relief at an interim stage is not
entirely alien to arbitral jurisdiction. Equally, however, the expression
" just and convenient " appearing in Section 17(1)(ii)(e) of the A&C
Act cannot be construed in isolation, divorced from the statutory
context in which it occurs. The said expression derives its colour from
the preceding words " interim measure of protection ", and therefore,
the width of the power remains intrinsically linked to preservation and
protection pending adjudication. Where, as in the present case, the
learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal chooses to grant substantial
monetary relief instead of merely preserving or protecting the subject
matter of the arbitration, the order must satisfy a correspondingly
higher threshold of scrutiny.
124. It is not the Respondent's case that the relief sought was
directed towards preservation of any specific subject matter of the
arbitration or protection of any identifiable fund. The relief sought and
granted was essentially monetary in nature. Such relief, as a general
rule, requires greater caution, particularly where the underlying
entitlement itself remains the subject matter of serious dispute.
125. This Court further notes that the question of urgency and
irreparable prejudice, as emphasised by the Appellant through reliance
upon Dalpat Kumar ( supra ) and Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd.
( supra ), assumes considerable significance. While the Respondent has
contended that continued withholding of amounts adversely affects its
financial interests, the findings recorded in the Impugned Order itself
indicate that the execution phase of the Project had substantially
attained completion. In such circumstances, the degree of urgency
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 74 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

ordinarily justifying immediate interim intervention does not appear to
emerge with sufficient force.
126. In order to sustain the Impugned Order, the Respondent has
sought to place reliance upon various additional circumstances.
However, in the considered opinion of this Court, such submissions
do not materially assist the Respondent. For instance, reliance upon
the Procedural Order dated 15.05.2024 appears misplaced, particularly
when the said order preceded the issuance of SP-69 and SP-70 and
does not even find substantive consideration in the Impugned Order
itself. The correctness of an order, like in the present case, must stand
or fall on the reasons contained therein. Consequently, subsequent
attempts to justify the Impugned Order on grounds not forming part of
its reasoning cannot cure the vulnerabilities inherent in the order itself.

CONCLUSION:
127. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the Impugned Order passed by the learned
Majority Arbitral Tribunal is unsustainable in law and is liable to be
set aside.
128. Accordingly, the present Appeal is allowed, and the Impugned
Order passed by the learned Majority Arbitral Tribunal is hereby set
aside.
129. It is, however, clarified that the observations contained in the
present judgment are confined solely to adjudication of the present
Appeal and shall not be construed as any expression on the merits of
the disputes pending before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, including
the claims, counterclaims, issues relating to negative variations,
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 75 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50

contractual entitlements, adjustments, certifications, or any other
matter arising in the arbitral proceedings, all of which shall be decided
independently and uninfluenced by any observations made herein.
130. The present Appeal, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
131. No order as to Costs.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JULY 01, 2026/sm/jk
Signature Not Verified
ARB. A. (COMM.) 35/2026 Page 76 of 76
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.07.2026
16:27:50