Md. Kamruddin vs Devi Dayal Saini

$~20
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 03.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010836822025
+ RC.REV. 334/2025, CM APPL. 67758/2025 (Stay) & CM
APPL. 14035/2026 (Stay of execution proceeding)

MD. KAMRUDDIN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anil Hooda and Mr.
Satendra Singh Baghel,
Advocates.

versus

DEVI DAYAL SAINI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ashish Sehrawat along
with Mr. Kapil Yadav, Mr.
Aakash Seth, Mr. Nikhil Yadav,
Mr. Varun, Mr. Ravi, Ms.
Shweta and Mr. Sahil,
Advocates.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

1. The present Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi
1
Rent Control Act, 1958 , read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil
2
Procedure, 1908, seeks to assail the Order dated 16.05.2025 , passed
by the learned Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller, South
3
District, Saket Courts, New Delhi , in the Eviction Petition, being

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
RC
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4
RC ARC 18/2023 , titled “Devi Dayal Saini v. Md. Kamruddin”.
2. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned RC dismissed the
Application of the Petitioner seeking Leave to Defend and,
consequently, passed an Eviction Order in respect of tenanted
premises, being Shop No. 2, Front side, Ground Floor, 272/A,
5
Masjid Moth, near Udai Park, Delhi .
BRIEF FACTS:
3. The Respondent, being the Landlord, instituted the Eviction
Petition seeking eviction of the Petitioner, being the Tenant, from the
Subject Premises. He pleaded that the Subject Premises are bona fide
required for his grand-daughter, a practicing Advocate, who wishes to
open her own office, and that no other reasonably suitable
accommodation is available for the purpose.
4. The Petitioner filed an Application seeking Leave to Defend.
He contended, inter alia, that he had been a tenant in the Tenanted
Shop since 20.02.1988, and that he had paid a sum of Rs. 65,000/- as
pagdi at the inception of the tenancy, on account of which the monthly
rent was only Rs. 400/-, instead of Rs.1141/-.
5. The Petitioner further contended that the Respondent had other
suitable accommodation available, inter alia , the rear portion of the
ground floor and the upper floors of the same building, being 272/A,
6
Masjid Moth, near Udai Park, Delhi , as well as other properties,
and that the Eviction Petition had been filed only to re-let the Subject
Premises at a higher rent.
6. By the Impugned Order, the learned RC found that the
relationship of landlord and tenant stood admitted, that the bona fide

4
Eviction Petition
5
Subject Premises
6
Subject Building
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requirement of the Respondent stood established, and that no other
reasonably suitable accommodation was available. The learned RC,
therefore, held that the Petitioner had failed to raise any triable issue,
thus dismissed the Application seeking Leave to Defend, filed by the
Petitioner, and passed an Eviction Order.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT:
7. At the outset, this Court deems it necessary to notice that, vide
Order dated 31.10.2025, after hearing learned counsel then appearing
for the Petitioner, this Court, not being convinced on merits, issued
Notice in the present Petition, limited only to the aspect of the time
that could be granted to the Petitioner for the purpose of vacating the
Subject Premises.
8. Notwithstanding the aforesaid limited Notice, learned counsel
presently appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, seeks to argue the
present matter afresh on merits today. He submits that he was not the
counsel when the Order dated 31.10.2025 was passed, and that he
should, therefore, be given the liberty to argue the matter.
9. This Court expresses its strong disapproval of the aforesaid
conduct. A litigant cannot, by the simple expedient of changing his
counsel, seek to wipe the slate clean and reopen what stands
concluded. A fresh engagement of counsel neither revives the right to
address arguments on merits that have already been heard and
considered, nor entitles the new counsel to treat the earlier hearing as
though it never took place. Such a course is clearly not the correct
manner in which a counsel should proceed, once notice has been
confined to a limited aspect after the matter has been heard.
10. Nonetheless, solely in the interest of justice and so that the
Petitioner may have no grievance of not having been heard, this Court
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has proceeded to hear learned counsel for the Petitioner on merits. It
is, however, made clear that this indulgence shall not be construed as a
precedent for, or approval of, the course so adopted.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner confined
his submissions to two aspects, namely, the availability of alternative
accommodation with the Respondent and the payment of pagdi by the
Petitioner.
12. On the first aspect, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits
that sufficient alternative accommodation was available with the
Respondent for the alleged requirement of his grand-daughter, and
that this aspect has not been appreciated by the learned RC correctly.
13. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Subject
Building, in which the Subject Premises is situated, comprises a
ground floor and three upper floors. It is submitted that the
Respondent has as many as four premises in the subject building, as
also a property bearing No. 272, Masjid Moth, i.e. , in the same area in
which the Subject Premises is located, which could suitably fulfill the
bona fide need espoused by the Respondent.
14. Learned counsel for the Petitoner submits that aforesaid
properties were although specifically enumerated by the Petitioner in
their Application seeking Leave to Defend, filed before the learned
RC, however, this aspect did not receive the due consideration it
should have, and the learned RC proceeded to dismiss the Application
without examining the suitability of these premises.
15. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contends that the requirement
of the grand-daughter is merely a pretext, and that the real object of
the Respondent is to evict the Petitioner, who has been running a
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mechanic's workshop from the Subject Premises since the year 1988,
and to re-let it at a higher rent of about Rs. 12,500/- per month.
16. Elaborating upon the second contention, learned counsel for the
Petitioner submits that, at the inception of the tenancy on 20.02.1988,
the Petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 65,000/- to the Respondent as pagdi .
He submits that it is on account of this payment that the monthly rent
was fixed at only Rs. 400/-, instead of Rs. 1141/-.
17. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submit that the
Respondent acknowledged the payment of said pagdi at a meeting
held at his residence on 16.03.2024, the transcript and recording of
which were placed on record before the learned RC along with the
Application seeking Leave to Defend. It is contended that the plea
relating to pagdi , though specifically taken by the Petitioner in their
Application seeking Leave to Defend, has not been dealt with by the
learned RC. The Impugned Order is, therefore, said to be liable to be
set aside.
18. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent fairly submits, at the outset, that although the Respondent
had sought time to file a Reply to the present Petition on earlier
occasions, however, no Reply has been filed to the present Petition
until the present day since only limited Notice had been issued by this
Court.
19. Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that the Petitioner
has admitted the ownership of the Respondent and the relationship of
landlord and tenant, and has admittedly been paying rent to the
Respondent. He is, therefore, estopped from questioning the title of
the Respondent.
20. It is submitted that the alleged payment of pagdi is specifically
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denied and finds no mention in the Rent Agreement. It is submitted
that the said plea, in any event, concerns only the rate of rent and has
no bearing on the Landlord-Tenant Relationship between the parties.
21. As regards suitable alternative accommodation, learned counsel
would submit that the grand-daughter of the Respondent is a
practicing advocate in the Delhi, and she requires an independent
office for her practice. It is further submitted that the Tenanted Shop is
the only premises on the ground floor with direct access from the main
road, and that it is a trite law that tenant cannot dictate to the landlord
which of his premises is suitable for his requirement.
22. Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that, in any event,
this plea has already been taken before the learned RC and was duly
considered in the Impugned Order. It is submitted that the Petitioner is
merely seeking to re-argue the very points already raised before and
considered by the learned RC, which is impermissible in the limited
revisional jurisdiction of this Court. It is accordingly prayed that the
present Petition warrants dismissal.
ANALYSIS:
23. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material available
on record, including the Impugned Order.
24. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
25. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
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7
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
8 9
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
26. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
10
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
11
Grover .
27. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate

7
(1998) 8 SCC 119
8
(2014) 9 SCC 78
9
(2022) 6 SCC 30
10
2024:DHC:9322
11
2025:DHC:11285
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jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

28. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra) , a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) ,
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
29. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
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30. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
31. Prior to embarking on the exercise of determination of the lis on
the basis of the submissions made, this Court would discuss the Order
dated 31.10.2025 and the limited Notice issued therein. The same
reads as follows:-
“ 7. After some arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner/
tenant seeks, and is granted, a period of one week, without
prejudice to the rights and contentions of the petitioner/ tenant
and as a matter of abundant caution, to seek instructions qua the
feasible time period within which the petitioner/ tenant would
vacate the subject premises and hand over the possession thereof
to the respondent/ landlord, along with the terms of payment qua
user and occupation charges for the aforesaid period before the
next date of hearing.
8. Upon the petitioner/ tenant taking requisite steps within a
period of one week, issue notice to the respondent/ landlord qua
the limited aspect indicated above.”
(Emphasis supplied)

32. This Court is of the opinion that purely on the ground that by an
earlier order, Notice had been issued limited to the time sought for
vacation of the premises, the matter should have not been permitted to
be re-argued and should have been dismissed on that ground alone.
33. Nonetheless, as already mentioned hereinbefore, at the cost of
judicial time, and only to dispel any notion of injustice, the matter is
being examined on merits. Before adverting to the facts of the present
case, and in order to place the ensuing discussion in its proper
perspective, this Court deems it apposite to extract the relevant
portions of the Impugned Order, which read as under:
“ 17. Landlord-Tenant Relationship: As far as the landlord-tenant
relationship is concerned, the respondent has not disputed that he is
a tenant in the Tenanted Shop or that the petitioner is the owner of
the Tenanted Shop. He has further admitted that he has been paying
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rent to the petitioner. However, he has taken an objection as to the
rate of rent claiming that monthly rent is only Rs. 400/- instead of
Rs. 1141/-, as stated by petitioner. Nevertheless, landlord-tenant
relationship stands admitted. The same is also supported by the rent
agreement and rent receipts placed on record.
18. Accordingly, it can be stated that the petitioner is the
owner/landlord of the Tenanted Shop and the respondent is a tenant
in the said premises. Thus, the first ingredient of landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties in the present case, stands
established.
*
23. Though the respondent has stated that there is space available in
the rear portion of the Tenanted Shop as well as on 1st & 2nd floor
of the premises for opening the law office, petitioner has denied the
same, and filed site Plan in support thereof. Even otherwise, it is
not for the tenant to dictate which premises will be best suited for
the landlord's requirement. The Tenanted Shop is on the front-side
having access from the main road, whereas all other alternatives
suggested by the respondent are at the rear or on 1st & 2nd floor,
which cannot be considered as alternatively suitable to an office on
the ground floor with entrance from the main road.
24. Also, it is not for the tenant to dictate that the landlord be asked
to seek eviction of his other tenants from shop no. 1, 3 and 4 as it is
again landlord's choice as to which tenanted premises is most
suitable for him. Guidance is sought from the case of Kanhaiya Lal
Arya v. Mohd. Ehshan , wherein it is held that:
„The law with regard to eviction of a tenant from the suit
premises on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord
is well settled. The need has to be a real one rather than a
mere desire to get the premises vacated. The landlord is
the best judge to decide which of his property should be
vacated for satisfying his particular need. The tenant has
no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord
should get vacated for his need alleged in the suit for
eviction.‟
25. Respondent has further stated that petitioner wants to get the
premises evicted with an intention to harass and humiliate the
respondent and to let out the same at a higher rent to someone else.
The said apprehension is already taken care of by Section 19 of
DRC Act which provides that if the requirement of landlord is not
bona fide; he abuses the process of the court; obtains an order of
eviction; and subsequently lets out the property or sells the same,
tenant can apply for restitution under Section 19 of the DRC Act.
Thus, the second and third ingredients also stand established.”
(Emphasis supplied)

34. A perusal of the aforesaid portion of the Impugned Order makes
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it apparent that insofar as the relationship of landlord and tenant is
concerned, there is absolutely no dispute. As recorded in Paragraph
No. 17 of the Impugned Order, the Petitioner has not disputed that he
is a tenant in the Subject Premises or that the Respondent is its owner,
and has admitted the payment of rent to the Respondent. The only
point which the Petitioner seeks to canvass by the aspect of pagdi is
that, because a sum of Rs. 65,000/- was allegedly paid in the year
1988, the rent fixed was lower, and a sum of Rs. 400/- per month,
instead of Rs. 1,141/-, was being paid. Nowhere has the Petitioner
denied the relationship of landlord and tenant on this basis.
35. It is trite in law that, at this stage, the scrutiny that can be
accorded by this Court can only be with respect to the three broad
parameters that need to be established in matters of the present nature.
The first relating to the landlord-tenant relationship, second relating to
the bona fide requirement and third with respect to the alternate
suitable accommodation.
36. Thus, even assuming for a moment that the plea relating to
pagdi has not been specifically dealt with by the learned RC, the same
would be of no avail to the Petitioner. The plea, even if accepted at its
highest, goes only to the quantum of rent. It has no bearing upon the
relationship of landlord and tenant, which stands admitted, or on the
bona fide requirement of the Respondent and the availability of
alternative accommodation.
37. Furthermore, Section 5(2)(a) of the DRC Act prohibits any
person from claiming or receiving, in consideration of the grant,
renewal or continuance of a tenancy, any sum by way of premium or
pagdi in addition to the rent. The payment of pagdi being prohibited
by the statute itself, the Petitioner cannot, on the premise of such
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alleged payment, assert any right to resist an eviction order passed on
the ground of bona fide requirement. The DRC Act thus does not
recognize the payment of pagdi as a lawful incident of a tenancy.
38. The plea with respect to padgi , therefore, does not give rise to
any triable issue, and the learned RC cannot be faulted on this count.
39. As regards the contentions relating to the aspect of suitable
alternative accommodation not being considered by the learned RC,
this Court is unable to agree with it.
40. A perusal of Paragraph No. 23 of the Impugned Order reveals
that the learned RC has specifically considered the alternative spaces
suggested by the Petitioner, namely , the rear portion of the ground
floor and the first and second floors of the building. The learned RC
has found these spaces unsuitable for the requirement set up by the
Respondent, having regard to the fact that the Tenanted Shop is
situated on the front side of the building, with direct access from the
main road, whereas the other spaces are either located at the rear or on
the upper floors. The distinction drawn by the learned RC between the
suitability of the Tenanted Shop and the alternative spaces suggested
by the Petitioner is founded on the nature and location of the premises
and cannot be said to suffer from any manifest infirmity warranting
interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
41. Similarly, insofar as the availability of other shops in the same
building, stated to be in the occupation of other tenants, is concerned,
the learned RC has dealt with this objection in Paragraph No. 24 of the
Impugned Order. Relying upon the settled principle that it is for the
landlord to determine which of his premises would best serve his bona
fide requirement, the learned RC has declined to accept the
Petitioner’s contention that the Respondent ought to seek eviction of
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the tenants occupying Shop Nos. 1, 3 and 4 instead. The choice of the
premises from which the landlord seeks eviction cannot ordinarily be
dictated by the tenant, so long as the requirement pleaded is bona fide
and the premises sought are reasonably suited to such requirement. No
infirmity is, therefore, discernible in the approach adopted by the
learned RC in this regard.
42. The third objection urged by the Petitioner pertains to the
apprehension that the Respondent intends to secure eviction of the
Petitioner with the ulterior motive of subsequently re-letting the
Tenanted Shop at a higher rate of rent. This aspect has also been
expressly dealt with by the learned RC in Paragraph No. 25 of the
Impugned Order, wherein recourse has been made to the statutory
safeguard provided under Section 19 of the DRC Act. The said
provision adequately addresses the contingency of a landlord
obtaining possession on the ground of bona fide requirement and
thereafter, without fulfilling such requirement, re-letting or otherwise
dealing with the premises in a manner contrary to the statutory
mandate. The apprehension so expressed, therefore, does not, by itself,
furnish a ground to discredit the bona fide requirement pleaded by the
Respondent or to resist the Eviction Order.
43. This Court, in light of the foregoing discussion, is of the
considered view that the Petitioner, in substance, seeks a re-
appreciation of the material on record so that a different conclusion
may be reached. However, this Court, in exercise of its limited
revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, cannot
re-open the issue on facts or substitute its own view for that of the
learned RC, in the absence of any error apparent on the face of the
record, perversity or jurisdictional infirmity.
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44. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no such
error apparent on the face of the record, perversity or jurisdictional
infirmity in the Impugned Order warranting the interference of this
Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
DECISION:
45. Accordingly, the present Petition, being sans merit is,
dismissed.
46. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in aforementioned terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J
NOVEMBER 3, 2026/nd/DJ

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