JUGAL KISHORE vs STATE
- Court
- Rajasthan High Court
[2026:RJ-JP:31172]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
(1) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5786/1995
CNR: RJHC020003461995 | URN: CW / 3953U / 1995
Jugal Kishore son of Girdhari Lal aged about 65 years, resident
of Dhani Poonchla Wali, Neemkathana, District Sikar.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. Land Acquisition Officer (S.D.O.), Neemkathana.
3. Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment
Corporation (RIICO), Udyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, C-Scheme,
Jaipur.
----Respondents
Connected With
(2) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 257/1996
CNR: RJHC020004201996 | URN: CW / 471U / 1996
1. Amar Singh aged about 75 years
2. Ramu since deceased through his legal heirs:
2/1 Dadki wife of Ramu;
2/2 Gokul Chand Yadav son of Ramu;
2/3 Mahaveer Yadav son of Ramu;
2/4 Babu Lal Yadav son of Ramu;
2/5 Pappu Yadav son of Ramu;
2/6 Mainpal Yadav son of Ramu;
All residents of Dhani Poonchla Wali, Neem Ka Thana, District
Sikar.
3. Bihari, aged about 65 years
All sons of Raghunath, residents of Dhani Poonchla Wali, Neem
Ka Thana, District Sikar.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Rajasthan through Chief Secretary, Government
of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Land Acquisition Officer (SDO), Neem Ka Thana.
3. Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment
Corporation (RIICO), Udyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, C-Scheme,
Jaipur.
----Respondents
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(2 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
(3) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 258/1996
CNR: RJHC020004211996 | URN: CW / 472U / 1996
1. Banwari since deceased through his legal heir:
1/1 Kailash Chand son of Late Banwari
2. Harchand since deceased through his legal heirs:
2/1 Liladhar
2/2 Mohan Lal
2/3 Balvir
All sons of Late Harchand
3. Harchand since deceased through his legal heirs:
3/1 Radhey Shyam
3/2 Madan Lal
3/3 Prabhu Dayal
3/4 Satvir
All sons of Late Mohar Singh
4. Banshi
5. Prahlad
6. Jhabar since deceased through his legal heirs:
6/1 Rohitashwa
6/2 Jaspal Singh
6/3 Mahipal
All sons of Late Jhabar
7. Dayal Chand
8. Sher Singh
All residents of Dhani Poonchla Wali, Neem Ka Thana, District
Sikar.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. Land Acquisition Officer (SDO), Neem Ka Thana.
3. Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment
Corporation (RIICO), Udyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, C-Scheme,
Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Petitioners : Mr. Madhusudan Singh Rajpurohit
Advocate & Mr. Harshit Bansal
Advocate.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(3 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
For Respondents : Mr. Virendra Lodha, Senior Counsel
assisted by Mr. Ankit Rathore
Advocate, Ms. Ritika Naruka
Advocate.
Mr. Sachin Rathore Advocate on
behalf of Mr. S.S. Naruka Additional
Advocate General.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments :: 27.07.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved :: 27.07.2026
Whether the full judgment or only
the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement :: 12.08.2026
1. The petitioners in the above writ petitions have
questioned the legality, validity and propriety of notification dated
09.11.1993 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (for short, ‘the Act of 1894’) and declaration dated
19.06.1995 issued under Section 6 thereof, whereby the
respondents have sought to acquire the petitioners’ land situated
at Dhani Poonchla Wali, Village and Tehsil Neemkathana, District
Sikar for extension and development of the industrial area of
Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment
Corporation Limited (for short ‘RIICO’).
2. Since common questions of fact and law arise for
consideration in these three writ petitions and the pleadings,
issues involved as well as the reliefs claimed are substantially
similar, they were heard together with the consent of learned
counsel appearing for the parties and are being decided by this
common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the facts are
being noticed from S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5786/1995, unless
the context otherwise requires.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(4 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
3. The facts, in brief, as pleaded in the writ petition are
that the petitioner is the khatedar and occupier of land measuring
0.51 hectare comprised in Khasra No.364/4 situated at Dhani
Poonchla Wali, Village and Tehsil Neemkathana, District Sikar.
According to the petitioner, although the revenue record describes
the land as Banjar (barren land), the land has long been treated
as Abadi and continuously being used for residential purposes.
Permanent residential houses, out-houses and other constructions
have existed over the land for several years. Only a negligible
portion of the land is occasionally used for agricultural operations.
4. It has further been pleaded that before initiation of the
acquisition proceedings, the Sub-Divisional Officer concerned
directed the Tehsildar, Neemkathana to conduct a preliminary
survey regarding the status of the lands proposed to be acquired.
Pursuant thereto, the Tehsildar submitted a report dated
25.01.1993 recording, inter alia, that the petitioner's land
comprised residential houses over a substantial portion, while the
remaining land was partly barren and partly agricultural.
According to the petitioner, the said report clearly acknowledged
the residential character of the land.
5. It is the case of the petitioner that despite the aforesaid
factual position emerging from the official survey itself, the State
Government issued notification dated 09.11.1993 under Section 4
of the Act of 1894 proposing acquisition of approximately 21.50
hectares of private khatedari land for expansion of the industrial
area of RIICO. The notification specifically stated that the
acquisition was being undertaken for RIICO and at its expense.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(5 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
6. Upon learning about the proposed acquisition, the
petitioner submitted detailed objections under Section 5A of the
Act of 1894 before the Land Acquisition Officer. It was specifically
asserted that the petitioner's land constituted residential Abadi
and acquisition thereof would render the petitioner and his family
homeless. It was also objected that several suitable Banjar and
Barani lands adjoining the existing industrial area were available
for expansion and therefore, there was no necessity to acquire
residential properties situated on the northern side of the
industrial area.
7. The petitioner has further pleaded that although the
Land Acquisition Officer, while considering the objections under
Section 5A of the Act of 1894, recommended release of certain
parcels of land from acquisition and thereafter made a further
recommendation for exclusion of additional lands, the petitioner's
land continued to be retained within the acquisition proceedings
without assigning any cogent reason to distinguish the case of the
petitioner.
8. The petitioner has further averred that the State
Government thereafter issued declaration dated 19.06.1995 under
Section 6 of the Act of 1894 declaring that the land was required
for RIICO. According to the petitioner, the declaration came to be
published subsequently in the newspaper.
9. The petitioner has also pointed out that the existing
industrial area is situated on one side of the State Highway
connecting Sikar and Kotputli. The petitioner's land, however, falls
within the abadi of Dhani Poonchla Wali adjoining the municipal
limits of Neemkathana. Between the existing industrial area and
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(6 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
the petitioner's land lie Khasra Nos.362, 364/1 and 365
comprising pasture land, cremation ground and a well
respectively. He emphasised that none of these intervening
khasras have been acquired.
10. It has thus been contended that the respondents have
sought to acquire isolated residential pockets situated beyond the
intervening lands while leaving the intervening public utility lands
untouched. According to the petitioner, such acquisition neither
results in a planned extension of the industrial area, nor bears any
rational nexus with the proposed object of industrial expansion.
11. The petitioner has also pleaded that adjoining the
existing industrial area, particularly towards the southern and
western sides, extensive Banjar and Barani lands were available,
which were comparatively cheaper and more suitable for industrial
expansion. Nevertheless, without recording any reason, the
authorities selected residential Abadi lands situated on the
northern side of the industrial area. It has also been averred that
an electricity transmission line is passing through the adjoining
khasras, which is also a negative factor for the feasibility of
establishing industrial units over the acquired land. It is contended
that no technical or planning study was undertaken before
selecting the petitioner's land. The petitioner has further pleaded
that neither any environmental study, nor any planning exercise
preceded the acquisition and the authorities failed to consider the
adverse consequences which industrial development in close
proximity to the residential Abadi would have upon the inhabitants
of the locality.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(7 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
12. It has also been pleaded that the notifications disclose
acquisition "for RIICO and at its expense" and therefore, ought to
have complied with the procedure prescribed under Part VII of the
Act of 1894, but such provisions have not been followed by the
respondents.
13. On the basis of above, it was prayed that the
notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894,
insofar as they relate to the petitioner's land, be declared illegal
and quashed and the respondents be restrained from proceeding
further with the acquisition.
14. Reply to the writ petition has been filed on behalf of the
respondents opposing the writ petition. The respondents do not
dispute that the petitioner's land forms part of Khasra No.364/4
measuring 0.51 hectare. They also do not dispute the issuance of
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894. The
principal defence raised by the respondents is that RIICO is a
Government Company owned and controlled by the State
Government and, therefore, acquisition of land for establishment
or expansion of an industrial area constitutes acquisition for a
public purpose. According to the respondents, the provisions
contained in Part VII of the Act of 1894 governing acquisition for
companies are wholly inapplicable. The respondents have further
pleaded that a proper survey of the area had been conducted
before initiation of acquisition proceedings and that the land
proposed to be acquired formed a contiguous extension of the
existing industrial area. It has been denied that the selection of
land was arbitrary or irrational.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(8 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
15. In relation to the petitioner's objections under Section
5A of the Act of 1894, the respondents have pleaded that the
objections were duly considered by the Sub-Divisional Officer cum
Land Acquisition Officer, who submitted his report recommending
acquisition of the petitioner's land after recording that acquisition
would not adversely affect the petitioner. It is contended that the
objections were found to be devoid of merit and, therefore, stood
rightly rejected.
16. It has further been pleaded that the declaration under
Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was duly issued and published in
accordance with law and all statutory requirements prescribed
under the Act of 1894 stood fully complied with. The respondents
have denied all allegations regarding mala fides, colourable
exercise of power, non-application of mind and violation of
constitutional rights and have prayed for dismissal of the writ
petition.
17. As a matter of fact, it would be relevant to refer that
earlier all the above writ petitions came to be dismissed vide
orders dated 02.08.2006 and 05.01.2007 passed by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court, solely on the ground that alleged
award dated 20.06.1997 was passed during the pendency of the
writ petition. Thereafter, feeling aggrieved, the petitioners
preferred D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1252/2006, 1253/2006
and 616/2008 before the Division Bench of this Court. The
Division Bench initially while issuing notices passed interim orders
dated 21.11.2006 to the effect that if residential houses existed
on the land in question then the petitioners shall not be disposed
therefrom. Ultimately, the DB Special Appeals were disposed of
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(9 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
vide order dated 19.02.2018 passed by the Division Bench of this
Court, whereby the writ petitions were remanded back to the
Single Judge for deciding the same afresh.
18. Copy of alleged award dated 20.06.1997 was placed by
learned counsel for the parties before this Court during the course
of arguments. Since the award is an undisputed document and
earlier also at the instance of learned counsel for the respondents,
it was relied by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at the time of
order of dismissal of the writ petitions vide orders dated
02.08.2006 and 05.01.2007, this Court took the same on record.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while reiterating
the contents of the writ petitions, submits that the respondents
have proceeded with the acquisition in a wholly arbitrary manner
by selecting residential Abadi land despite the admitted availability
of Banjar and Barani lands in the same vicinity. It is contended
that the Tehsildar's own report acknowledged the existence of
permanent residential houses upon the petitioner's land, yet the
authorities ignored the same while proceeding with the
acquisition.
20. It has further been argued that the enquiry under
Section 5A of the Act of 1894 has been reduced to a mere ritual.
The objections specifically pointing out the residential character of
the land, existence of alternative lands, absence of planning
rationale and irrational exclusion of intervening khasras have not
been objectively considered. According to the learned counsel, the
recommendation of the Land Acquisition Officer merely records
conclusions without discussing the objections raised by the
petitioner or assigning any reasons for their rejection.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(10 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
21. Learned counsel has further argued that the record
itself demonstrates that similarly situated parcels were
recommended for release from acquisition, yet the petitioner's
land alone was retained without any rational basis. Such
discriminatory treatment vitiates the entire decision-making
process.
22. Learned counsel has also argued that the impugned
proceedings disclose complete absence of objective satisfaction by
the respondent-Government, thereby rendering the declaration
under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 legally unsustainable.
23. In addition to above, it has also been submitted by
learned counsel for the petitioners that even otherwise in the
present matter although during the pendency of the writ petitions,
an award dated 20.06.1997 was passed by the Land Acquisition
Officer in respect of other land included in declaration under
Section 6 of the Act of 1894, yet in the award itself it has been
mentioned that the compensation has not been assessed for the
petitioners, hence, the aforesaid award cannot be treated as
legitimate award in respect petitioners. Learned counsel for the
petitioners argued that under the circumstances, where
declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued on
19.06.1995 and was later on published in newspapers on
14.07.1995, and till date no award has been passed by the Land
Acquisition Officer in respect of land in question, consequence of
such omission would entail result of lapsing of proceedings in view
of explicit provisions of Section 11A of the Act of 1894.
24. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon
judgments delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(11 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai
& Others, (2005) 7 SCC 627, Raghbir Singh Sehrawat vs.
State of Haryana & Others, (2012) 1 SCC 792, Kamal
Trading Private Limited (now known as Manav Investment
& Trading Company Limited) vs. State of West Bengal &
Others, 2012 (2) SCC 25, Women’s Education Trust &
Another vs. State of Haryana & Others, (2013) 8 SCC 99,
Gurbinder Kaur Brar & Another vs. Union of India & Others,
(2013) 11 SCC 228 and Lajja Ram & Others vs. Union
Territory, Chandigarh & Others, (2013) 11 SCC 235.
25. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the
respondents submits that acquisition of land for expansion of the
industrial area of RIICO constitutes acquisition for a public
purpose. It is contended that RIICO being a Government
Company, the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act of 1894
are wholly inapplicable.
26. Learned counsel has further submitted that the
question regarding suitability of land falls within the exclusive
domain of the acquiring authority and judicial review cannot
extend to substituting the Court's opinion for that of the
Government. It is argued that once objections under Section 5A of
the Act of 1894 were considered and rejected and the Government
was satisfied regarding the public purpose, the acquisition cannot
be interfered with merely because the petitioner suggested
availability of some other land. It has further been submitted that
every mandatory requirement prescribed under the Act of 1894
has been duly complied with and no case warranting interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution is made out.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(12 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
27. In order to counter argument raised on behalf of the
petitioners claiming lapsing of the acquisition proceedings, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that such
ground has not been pleaded in the writ petitions and otherwise
also, in the present writ petitions since stay order dated
15.01.1996 was passed to the effect that status quo as obtaining
on that day shall be maintained by the parties, therefore, the
respondents were prevented from passing award by determining
compensation in respect of land in question. Therefore, provisions
of Section 11A of the Act of 1894 would not be attracted so as to
lapse the acquisition proceedings. However, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents could not dispute
that the above stay order dated 15.01.1996 came to an end soon
after the writ petitions were earlier dismissed by Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court vide orders dated 02.08.2006 and 05.01.2007.
28. Learned Senior Counsel vehemently argued that even
otherwise petitioners in the present cases were holding only 2.04
hectares land out of total land measuring 21.50 hectares sought
to be acquired. Other land holders have not challenged the
acquisition proceedings and have accepted the compensation
awarded to them. Hence, where substantial portion of the area in
question has already formed the industrial area of the RIICO,
therefore, deacquiring petitioners land would cause hurdles in
smooth establishment and functioning of the industrial area.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents
relied upon Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation,
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 (for short ‘the Act of 2013’) and also placed reliance
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(13 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
upon Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Indore
Development Authority vs. Manoharlal & Others, (2020) 8
SCC 129.
29. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon
perusal of the pleadings and material available on record, this
Court finds that the principal challenge raised by the petitioners
rests upon alleged violation of the provisions of the Act of 1894 as
well as arbitrary exercise of the State's power of eminent domain.
30. Needless to observe that the State undoubtedly
possesses the authority to acquire private property for a lawful
public purpose. Such power, however, is neither unbridled, nor
unfettered, rather is regulated by the statutory safeguards
incorporated in the Act of 1894 and Article 300A of the
Constitution of India, which ordains that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law. Therefore,
although the Court ordinarily does not sit in appeal over the
subjective satisfaction of the Government regarding the need for
acquisition, it is always open to judicial scrutiny whether the
decision-making process is fair, reasonable, and free from
arbitrariness.
31. The Act of 1894 prescribes a carefully structured
procedure before a citizen can be deprived of his property. Section
4 of the Act of 1894 contemplates a preliminary notification
expressing the Government's intention to acquire land. Upon
publication of such notification, every person interested in the land
is conferred a statutory right under Section 5A of the Act of 1894
to object to the proposed acquisition. The District Collector is
obliged to afford an opportunity of hearing, consider each
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(14 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
objection objectively, submit his recommendations together with
the entire record to the appropriate Government and thereafter,
the Government is required to independently apply its mind before
issuing a declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894.
32. The legislative intent underlying Section 5A of the Act
of 1894 is quite significant. It constitutes the only opportunity
available to a landholder to demonstrate that his property ought
not to be acquired either because the land is unsuitable,
unnecessary, already put to a particular use, or because
alternative lands are available which would equally satisfy the
public purpose. The provision, therefore, acts as an important
check upon arbitrary exercise of the power and ensures that
acquisition is founded upon objective satisfaction rather than
administrative convenience.
33. The importance of the enquiry under Section 5A of the
Act of 1894 has repeatedly been emphasised by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. In Munshi Singh & Others vs. Union of India,
(1973) 2 SCC 337 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court described the
opportunity under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 as a "just and
wholesome opportunity" available to every person interested in
the land proposed to be acquired. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that the statutory right under Section 5A of the Act of
1894 is intended to enable the landholder to convince the
authorities that the proposed acquisition is either unnecessary or
inappropriate and that such opportunity cannot be reduced to a
mere empty formality. Relevant part of the judgment is quoted
here:
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(15 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
“ 7. Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome
principle that a person whose property is being or is
intended to be acquired should have a proper and
reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities
concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that
person should not be made. We may refer to the
observation of this court in Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of
U.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1217] that the right to file objections
under Section 5- is a substantial right when a person's
property is being threatened with acquisition and that right
cannot be taken away as if by a side wind. Sub-section (2)
of Section 5-A makes it obligatory on the Collector to give
an objector an opportunity of being heard. After hearing all
objections and making further inquiry he is to make a report
to the appropriate Government containing his
recommendation on the objections. The decision of the
appropriate Government on the objections is then final. The
declaration under Section 6 has to be made after the
appropriate Government is satisfied, on a consideration of
the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-
A(2). The legislature has, therefore, made complete
provisions for the persons interested to file objections
against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their
objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers
have been conferred on the appropriate Government to
dispense with the provisions of Section 5-A: [See Section
17(4) of the Acquisition Act.]”
34. Again, in Union of India & Others vs. Mukesh Hans,
(2004) 8 SCC 14 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the
right available under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 is a substantial
and valuable right and cannot be lightly taken away. It has been
held that the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act of 1894
constitutes the only meaningful safeguard available to a citizen
against compulsory deprivation of property and, therefore, the
statutory procedure deserves strict adherence. The Apex Court
observed as under:
“ 35. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that the limited
right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A
of the Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an
empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be
taken away for good and valid reason and within the
limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. The
object and importance of Section 5-A inquiry was noticed by
this Court in the case of Munshi Singh v. Union of India
[(1973) 2 SCC 337] wherein this Court held thus: (SCC p.
342, para 7)
“7. Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome
principle that a person whose property is being or is
intended to be acquired should have a proper and
reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities
concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that
person should not be made. … The legislature has,
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(16 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
therefore, made complete provisions for the persons
interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition
and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of
urgency that special powers have been conferred on the
appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of
Section 5-A:”
35. The legal position was explained with greater clarity in
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai
& Others (supra) , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
Section 5A of the Act of 1894 confers a valuable right upon the
land owner and the hearing contemplated thereunder must be
real, effective and meaningful. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that the formation of opinion by the Government must
necessarily be preceded by due application of mind to the relevant
material and rejection of irrelevant considerations. It was further
observed that where the statutory safeguard under Section 5A of
the Act of 1894 is rendered illusory, the entire acquisition
proceedings become vulnerable to judicial review. It would be
appropriate to refer following paragraphs of the above judgment:
“ 6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a
valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought
to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its
power of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right of
property of a person by acquiring the same but the same
must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation
therefor must be paid.
8. The conclusiveness contained in Section 6 of the Act
indisputably is attached to a need as also to the purpose and
in this regard ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the court is
limited but it is equally true that when an opportunity of
being heard has expressly been conferred by a statute, the
same must scrupulously be complied with. For the said
purpose, Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act must be read
conjointly. The court in a case, where there has been total
non-compliance or substantial non-compliance with the
provisions of Section 5-A of the Act, cannot fold its hands
and refuse to grant a relief to the writ petitioner. Sub-
section (3) of Section 6 of the Act renders a declaration to
be a conclusive evidence. But when the decision-making
process itself is in question, the power of judicial review can
be exercised by the court in the event the order impugned
suffers from well-known principles viz. illegality, irrationality
and procedural impropriety. Moreover, when a statutory
authority exercises such enormous power it must be done in
a fair and reasonable manner.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(17 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
9. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an
effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion
as regards the public purpose as also suitability thereof must
be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration
of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The
State in its decision-making process must not commit any
misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A
of the Act confers a valuable important right and having
regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the
Constitution it has been held to be akin to a fundamental
right.
16. However, considerations of the objections by the owner
of the land and the acceptance of the recommendations by
the Government, it is trite, must precede a proper
application of mind on the part of the Government. As and
when a person aggrieved questions the decision-making
process, the court in order to satisfy itself as to whether one
or more grounds for judicial review exist, may call for the
records whereupon such records must be produced. The writ
petition was filed in the year 1989. As noticed hereinbefore,
the said writ petition was allowed. This Court, however,
interfered with the said order of the High Court and remitted
the matter back to it upon giving an opportunity to the
parties to raise additional pleadings.
17. Contention of Mr Chaudhari to the effect that for long
the additional ground relating to non-application of mind on
the part of the State had not been raised and, thus, it might
not be necessary for the State to file a counter-affidavit,
does not appeal to us. When rule nisi was issued, the State
was required to produce the records and file a counter-
affidavit. If it did not file any counter-affidavit, it may,
subject to just exceptions, be held to have admitted the
allegations made in the writ petition.
18. In view of the fact that the action required to be taken
by the State Government is distinct and different from the
action required to be taken by the Collector; when the
ultimate order is in question it was for the State to satisfy
the court about the validity thereof and for the said purpose
the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of a Collector cannot be
held to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of
law. The job of the Collector in terms of Section 5-A would
be over once he submits his report. The Land Acquisition
Collector would not know the contents of the proceedings
before the State and, therefore, he would be incompetent to
affirm an affidavit on its behalf.
19. Furthermore, the State is required to apply its mind not
only on the objections filed by the owner of the land but also
on the report which is submitted by the Collector upon
making other and further enquiries therefor as also the
recommendations made by him in that behalf. The State
Government may further inquire into the matter, if any case
is made out therefor, for arriving at its own satisfaction that
it is necessary to deprive a citizen of his right to property. It
is in that situation that production of records by the State is
necessary.
26. Yet again in Mohinder Singh Gill [(1978) 1 SCC 405] this
Court observed : (SCC p. 417, para 8)
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(18 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
“8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a
statutory functionary makes an order based on certain
grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so
mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh
reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise.
Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the
time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get
validated by additional grounds later brought out. We
may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J.
in Gordhandas Bhanji [AIR 1952 SC 16] :”
29. The Act is an expropriatory legislation. This Court in
State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma [AIR 1966 SC 1593]
observed that in such a case the provisions of the statute
should be strictly construed as it deprives a person of his
land without consent. [See also Khub Chand v. State of
Rajasthan [AIR 1967 SC 1074] and CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P)
Ltd. [(2004) 1 SCC 597] ]
There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in a case of this
nature due application of mind on the part of the statutory
authority was imperative.”
36. The observations of the Supreme Court in Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Others
(supra) are of considerable significance. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court observed that although the right to property is no longer a
fundamental right, Article 300A of the Constitution of India confers
constitutional protection against arbitrary deprivation of property.
Consequently, while exercising statutory power of compulsory
acquisition, the authorities are expected to exhibit fairness,
transparency and objective application of mind. A mechanical or
ritualistic disposal of objections under Section 5A of the Act of
1894 does not satisfy the mandate of law.
37. Similar principles were reiterated in Dev Sharan &
Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2011) 4 SCC
769 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that objections
relating to availability of alternative land, comparative hardship
and suitability of the proposed site are relevant considerations
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(19 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
which deserve objective examination by the acquiring authority.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that failure to consider such
objections vitiates the decision-making process itself. It was
further observed that the Government cannot merely rely upon
the recommendation of the Collector but must independently
apply its mind before issuing a declaration under Section 6 of the
Act of 1894. It was held thus:
“ 23. In DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable
Trust v. State of Haryana [(2003) 5 SCC 622], this Court
construed the statute on Town Planning Law and held: (SCC
p. 635, para 41)
“41. Expropriatory statute, as is well known, must be
strictly construed.”
The same principle has been reiterated subsequently by a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v.
B.E. Billimoria [(2003) 7 SCC 336] in the context of ceiling
law. (See SCC para 22 at p. 347 of the Report.)
25. In the background of the aforesaid discussion, this
Court proceeds to examine the scope of a person's right
under Section 5-A of the Act.
26. Initially, Section 5-A was not there in the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 but the same was inserted long ago by
the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1923 vide Section 3
of Act 38 of 1923.
27 [Ed.: Para 27 corrected vide Official Corrigendum
No. F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2011 dated 16-3-2011.]. The
history behind insertion of Section 5-A, in the Act of 1894
seems to be the basis of a decision of the Division Bench of
the Calcutta High Court in J.E.D. Ezra v. Secy. of State for
India [(1902-03) 7 CWN 249 (Cal)]. In that case, the
properties of Ezra were sought to be acquired under the pre-
amended provision of the Act for expansion of the offices of
Bank of Bengal. In challenging the said acquisition, it was
argued that the person whose property is going to be taken
away should be allowed a hearing on the principles of
natural justice. However the Judges found that there was no
such provision in the Act. (See CWN p. 269.)
28. In order to remedy this shortcoming in the 1894 Act, an
amendment by way of incorporation of Section 5-A was
introduced on 11-7-1923. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons for the said amendment is as follows:
“The Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 does not provide
that persons having an interest in land which it is
proposed to acquire, shall have the right of objecting to
such acquisition; nor is the Government bound to
enquire into and consider any objections that may
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(20 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
reach them. The object of this Bill is to provide that a
Local Government shall not declare, under Section 6 of
the Act, that any land is needed for a public purpose
unless time has been allowed after the notification
under Section 4 for persons interested in the land to
put in objections and for such objections to be
considered by the Local Government.”
(Gazette of India, Part V, dated 14-7-1923, p. 260.)
The said amendment was assented to by the Governor
General on 5-8-1923 and came into force on 1-1-1924.
29. The importance and scheme of Section 5-A was
construed by this Court in several cases. As early as in
1964, this Court in Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Govt. [AIR
1964 SC 1217] speaking through K.N. Wanchoo, J. (as His
Lordship then was) held: (AIR p. 1222, para 13)
“13. … The right to file objections under Section 5-A is a
substantial right when a person's property is being
threatened with acquisition and we cannot accept that
that right can be taken away as if by a side wind….”
In that case the Court was considering the importance of
rights under Section 5-A vis-à-vis Section 17(1) and Section
17(1-A) of the Act. (See AIR para 13 at p. 1222 of the
Report.)
30. The same view has been reiterated by another three-
Judge Bench decision of this Court in Munshi Singh v. Union
of India [(1973) 2 SCC 337]. In SCC para 7 of the Report
this Court held that Section 5-A embodies a very just and
wholesome principle of giving proper and reasonable
opportunity to a landloser of persuading the authorities that
his property should not be acquired. This Court made it clear
that declaration under Section 6 has to be made only after
the appropriate Government is satisfied on a consideration
of the report made by the Collector under Section 5-A. The
Court, however, made it clear that only in a case of real
urgency the provision of Section 5-A can be dispensed with.
(See SCC para 7 at p. 342 of the Report.)
31. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai [(2005) 7 SCC 627] this Court held that the right
which is conferred under Section 5-A has to be read
considering the provisions of Article 300-A of the
Constitution and, so construed, the right under Section 5-A
should be interpreted as being akin to a fundamental right.
This Court held that the same being the legal position, the
procedures which have been laid down for depriving a
person of the said right must be strictly complied with.”
38. In Radhy Shyam(Dead) through LRs & Others vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2011) 5 SCC 553 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering several foreign judicial
precedents concerning the right to fair hearing emphasised that
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(21 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
the enquiry contemplated under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 is
not an idle formality but constitutes the only statutory safeguard
available to a land owner before compulsory acquisition. It was
held as under:
“ 40. Before adverting to the precedents in which Section 5-
A has been interpreted by this Court, it will be useful to
notice development of the law relating to the rule of hearing.
In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of
Works [(1863) 14 CB (NS) 180] the principle was stated
thus: (ER p. 420)
“… even God himself did not pass [a] sentence upon
Adam before he was called upon to make his defence.
‘Adam’ (says God), ‘where art thou? Hast thou not
eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou
shouldest not eat?’.”
Therein the District Board had brought down the house of
the plaintiff's (Cooper), because he had failed to comply with
the Metropolis Local Management Act. The Act required the
plaintiff to notify the Board seven days before starting to
build the house. Cooper argued that even though the Board
had the legal authority to tear his house down, no person
should be deprived of their property without notice. In spite
of no express words in the statute the Court recognised the
right of hearing before the plaintiff's house built without
permission was demolished in the exercise of statutory
powers. Byles, J. stated: (Cooper case [(1863) 14 CB (NS)
180] , ER p. 420)
“… although there are no positive words in a statute
requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice
of the common law [shall] supply the omission of the
legislature.”
41. Perhaps the best known statement on the right to be
heard has come from Lord Loreburn, L.C. in Board of
Education v. Rice [1911 AC 179 (HL)] where he observed:
(AC p. 182)
“Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they
have not originated, the practice of imposing upon
departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or
determining questions of various kinds. … In such cases
… they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both
sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone who
decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to
treat such a question as though it were a trial. … They
can obtain information in any way they think best,
always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties
in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any
relevant statement prejudicial in their view.”
42. In Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40] Lord Reid
emphasised on the universality of the right to a fair hearing
whether it concerns the property or tenure of an office or
membership of an institution.
In O'Reilly v. Mackman [(1983) 2 AC 237 (CA & HL)] Lord
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(22 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
Diplock said that the right of a man to be given a fair
opportunity of hearing, what is alleged against him and of
presenting his own case is so fundamental to any civilised
legal system that it is to be presumed that Parliament
intended that failure to observe the same should render null
and void any decision reached in breach of this requirement.
43. In Lloyd v. McMahon [1987 AC 625] Lord Bridge said:
(AC pp. 702 H-703 B)
“My Lords, the so-called rules of natural justice are not
engraved on tablets of stone. To use the phrase which
better expresses the underlying concept, what the
requirements of fairness demand when any body,
domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a
decision which will affect the rights of individuals
depends on the character of the decision-making body,
the kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or
other framework in which it operates. In particular, it is
well established that when a statute has conferred on
any body the power to make decisions affecting
individuals, the courts will not only require the procedure
prescribed by the statute to be followed, but will readily
imply so much and no more to be introduced by way of
additional procedural safeguards as will ensure the
attainment of fairness.”
44. In the United States, principles of natural justice usually
find support from the due process clause of the Constitution.
The extent of due process protection required is determined
by a number of factors; first the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
77. From the analysis of the relevant statutory provisions
and interpretation thereof by this Court in different cases,
the following principles can be culled out:
(i) Eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign to
take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for
public use. To put it differently, the sovereign is entitled to
reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the
State including private property without its owner's consent
provided that such assertion is on account of public exigency
and for public good—Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spg.
and Wvg. Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791], Charanjit Lal
Chowdhury v. Union of India [1950 SCC 833] and Jilubhai
Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp (1) SCC
596].
(ii) The legislations which provide for compulsory acquisition
of private property by the State fall in the category of
expropriatory legislation and such legislation must be
construed strictly— DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational
Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana [(2003) 5 SCC
622]; State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria [(2003) 7 SCC
336] and Dev Sharan v. State of U.P. [(2011) 4 SCC 769]
(iii) Though, in exercise of the power of eminent domain, the
Government can acquire the private property for public
purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory taking of
one's property is a serious matter. If the property belongs to
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(23 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
economically disadvantaged segment of the society or
people suffering from other handicaps, then the court is not
only entitled but is duty-bound to scrutinise the
action/decision of the State with greater vigilance, care and
circumspection keeping in view the fact that the landowner
is likely to become landless and deprived of the only source
of his livelihood and/or shelter.
(iv) The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the
State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without
complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the
Act. A public purpose, however laudable it may be does not
entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions because
the same have the effect of depriving the owner of his right
to property without being heard. Only in a case of real
urgency, can the State invoke the urgency provisions and
dispense with the requirement of hearing the landowner or
other interested persons.”
39. In the case of Raghbir Singh Sehrawat (supra) ,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that the appropriate
Government cannot act merely as a rubber stamp upon the report
submitted by the Collector (Land Acquisition Officer). The
statutory obligation casts an independent duty upon the
Government to examine the recommendations, consider the
objections and thereafter arrive at its own satisfaction before
issuing the declaration under Section 6. The satisfaction
contemplated by the statute must, therefore, be real and founded
upon objective consideration of the entire record. Observations
made by the Apex Court in following paragraphs are worth
noticeable:
“ 39. In this context, it is necessary to remember that the
rules of natural justice have been ingrained in the scheme of
Section 5-A with a view to ensure that before any person is
deprived of his land by way of compulsory acquisition, he
must get an opportunity to oppose the decision of the State
Government and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire
the particular parcel of land. At the hearing, the objector can
make an effort to convince the Land Acquisition Collector to
make recommendation against the acquisition of his land.
He can also point out that the land proposed to be acquired
is not suitable for the purpose specified in the notification
issued under Section 4(1). Not only this, he can produce
evidence to show that another piece of land is available and
the same can be utilised for execution of the particular
project or scheme.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(24 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
40. Though it is neither possible nor desirable to make a list
of the grounds on which the landowner can persuade the
Collector to make recommendations against the proposed
acquisition of land, but what is important is that the
Collector should give a fair opportunity of hearing to the
objector and objectively consider his plea against the
acquisition of land. Only thereafter, he should make
recommendations supported by brief reasons as to why the
particular piece of land should or should not be acquired and
whether or not the plea put forward by the objector merits
acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by
the Collector must reflect objective application of mind to
the objections filed by the landowners and other interested
persons.”
40. Similarly, in the case of Kamal Trading Private
Limited (now known as Manav Investment & Trading
Company Limited) (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that formation of opinion for arriving at satisfaction by the
appropriate Government under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 must
be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of
relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. Hearing given to
the person must be effective one and not a mere formality. The
recommendation of Land Acquisition Officer must indicate
objective considerations. Following paragraphs of the above
judgments deserves reference:-
“ 14. It must be borne in mind that the proceedings under
the LA Act are based on the principle of eminent domain and
Section 5-A is the only protection available to a person
whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is a minimal
safeguard afforded to him by law to protect himself from
arbitrary acquisition by pointing out to the authority
concerned, inter alia, that the important ingredient, namely,
“public purpose” is absent in the proposed acquisition or the
acquisition is mala fide. The LA Act being an expropriatory
legislation, its provisions will have to be strictly construed.
15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is
necessary to enable the Collector to deal effectively with the
objections raised against the proposed acquisition and make
a report. The report of the Collector referred to in this
provision is not an empty formality because it is required to
be placed before the appropriate Government together with
the Collector's recommendations and the record of the case.
It is only upon receipt of the said report that the
Government can take a final decision on the objections. It is
pertinent to note that declaration under Section 6 has to be
made only after the appropriate Government is satisfied on
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(25 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
the consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector
under Section 5-A(2). As said by this Court in Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. [(2005) 7 SCC 627], the appropriate
Government while issuing declaration under Section 6 of the
LA Act is required to apply its mind not only to the
objections filed by the owner of the land in question, but
also to the report which is submitted by the Collector upon
making such further inquiry thereon as he thinks necessary
and also the recommendations made by him in that behalf.”
41. Equally significant are the observations made by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Usha Stud and
Agricultural Farms Private Limited & Others vs. State of
Haryana & Others, (2013) 4 SCC 210, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, after taking into consideration earlier judgments, observed
as under:
“ 30. The ratio of the aforesaid judgments is that Section 5-
A(2), which represents statutory embodiment of the rule of
audi alteram partem, gives an opportunity to the objector to
make an endeavour to convince the Collector that his land is
not required for the public purpose specified in the
Notification issued under Section 4(1) or that there are other
valid reasons for not acquiring the same. That section also
makes it obligatory for the Collector to submit report(s) to
the appropriate Government containing his
recommendations on the objections, together with the
record of the proceedings held by him so that the
Government may take appropriate decision on the
objections. Section 6(1) provides that if the appropriate
Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any,
made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2) that particular
land is needed for the specified public purpose then a
declaration should be made. This necessarily implies that the
State Government is required to apply mind to the report of
the Collector and take final decision on the objections filed
by the landowners and other interested persons. Then and
then only, a declaration can be made under Section 6(1).”
42. While taking the procedure contemplated in Section 5-A
of the Act of 1894 as akin to the rule of audi alteram partem and
underlying the necessity of effective hearing and objective
consideration by the Land Acquisition Officer, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Women’s Education Trust & Another (supra), has
held as under:
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(26 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
“ 5. The principles which can be culled out from the
abovenoted judgments are as under:
5.1. The rule of audi alteram partem engrained in the
scheme of Section 5-A of the Act ensures that before
depriving any person of his land by compulsory acquisition,
an effective opportunity must be given to him to contest the
decision taken by the State Government/competent authority
to acquire the particular parcel of land..
5.2. Any person interested in the land, which has been
notified under Section 4(1) of the Act, can file objections
under Section 5-A(1) and show that the purpose specified in
the notification is really not a public purpose or that in the
guise of acquiring the land for a public purpose the
appropriate Government wants to confer benefit upon private
persons or that the decision of the appropriate Government
is arbitrary or is vitiated due to mala fides.
5.3. In response to the notice issued by the Land Acquisition
Collector under Section 5-A(2) of the Act, the objector can
make all possible endeavours to convince the Land
Acquisition Collector that the acquisition is not for a public
purpose specified in the notification issued under Section
4(1); that his land is not suitable for the particular purpose;
that other more suitable parcels of land are available, which
can be utilised for execution of the particular project or
scheme.
5.4. The Land Acquisition Collector is duty-bound to
objectively consider the arguments advanced by the objector
and make recommendations, duly supported by brief
reasons, as to why the particular piece of land should or
should not be acquired and whether the plea put forward by
the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the
recommendations made by the Land Acquisition Collector
should reflect objective application of mind to the entire
record including the objections filed by the interested
persons.
5.5. The Land Acquisition Collector is required to submit his
report and the recommendations to the State Government
along with the record of proceedings to enable the latter to
take final call on the desirability, propriety and justification
for the acquisition of the particular parcel(s) of land.
5.6. The declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act can be
issued only if the appropriate Government, on an objective
application of mind to the objections filed by the interested
persons including the landowners and the report of the Land
Acquisition Collector, is satisfied that the land is needed for
the particular purpose specified in the notification issued
under Section 4(1) of the Act.
6. It is unfortunate that despite repeated judicial
pronouncements, the executive authorities entrusted with
the task of acquiring private land for any specified public
purposes have time and again exhibited total lack of
seriousness in the performance of their duties under the
statute. Often they do not comply with the mandate of
Section 5-A of the Act, which is sine qua non for making a
valid declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. This batch of
appeals is illustrative of the malady that has afflicted the
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(27 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
State authorities who are keen to acquire private lands in the
name of planned development of various urban areas, but do
not bother to comply with the relevant statutory provisions
and the rules of natural justice.”
43. This Court finds that the similar principles have been
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Gurbinder
Kaur Brar & Another (supra), Surinder Singh Brar & Others
vs. Union of India & Others, (2013) 1 SCC 403 and Lajja
Ram & Others (supra).
44. The aforesaid principles unmistakably establish that
although the Court ordinarily does not interfere with the subjective
satisfaction of the Government regarding public purpose, it is
nevertheless required to examine whether the satisfaction itself is
the result of objective consideration of relevant material. If
relevant circumstances have been ignored or if statutory
objections have been rejected without due consideration, judicial
review is not only permissible but becomes necessary to preserve
the rule of law.
45. The petitioners have come out with a case that once
the acquisition is for a company (RIICO), compliance with the
provisions contained in Part VII of the Act of 1894 becomes
mandatory and since no agreement contemplated under Sections
39 to 42 was executed, the entire acquisition deserves to be
quashed. However, upon a careful examination of the statutory
provisions, this Court is unable to accept the said contention.
Section 3(cc) of the Act of 1894 defines the expression
"Corporation owned or controlled by the State", while Section 3(e)
of the Act of 1894, which defines the expression "Company",
expressly excludes a Government Company referred to in clause
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(28 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
(cc). Thus, the legislative scheme itself draws a clear distinction
between an ordinary company and a Government Company owned
or controlled by the State. RIICO is admittedly a Government
Company incorporated under Section 617 of the Companies Act,
1956 and wholly owned and controlled by the State Government.
The respondents have specifically pleaded this fact in their reply
and the same has not been disputed by the petitioner. Once RIICO
answers the description of a Government Company, it stands
excluded from the definition of "Company" occurring in Section
3(e) of the Act of 1894. This Court is, therefore, of the considered
opinion that the challenge raised by the petitioner on alleged non-
compliance of Part VII of the Act of 1894 cannot be accepted.
46. However, the legality of the acquisition, therefore, has
still to be tested on the touchstone of fairness of the decision-
making process, objective consideration of the objections
preferred by the petitioners and the existence of genuine
application of mind by the acquiring authorities.
47. At the outset, this Court may observe that expansion of
an industrial area undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate public
purpose. However, it is equally well settled, that mere existence of
a public purpose does not confer an unfettered discretion upon the
State to acquire any land with following the procedure established
by law.
48. The material placed before this Court discloses that
prior to issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act of
1894, the Tehsildar, Neemkathana was directed by the competent
authority to conduct a preliminary survey regarding the nature
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(29 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
and status of the lands proposed to be acquired. Pursuant thereto,
a report dated 25.01.1993 came to be submitted. A careful
reading of the said report reflects about the existence of
residential houses over a substantial portion of the land while the
remaining portion was described as partly barren and partly
agricultural. Thus, the acquiring authorities were fully conscious,
even before initiation of acquisition proceedings, that the land in
question substantially formed part of the residential Abadi of
Dhani Poonchla Wali. Once such material was available before the
authorities, it became incumbent upon the Land Acquisition Officer
to objectively consider whether acquisition of an existing
residential settlement was indispensable for expansion of the
industrial area or whether equally suitable alternative lands were
available which would adequately serve the same public purpose
with lesser displacement and hardship. The petitioner, while filing
objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894, specifically invited
the attention of the Land Acquisition Officer to these very
circumstances. These objections were directly related to the
necessity, suitability and rationality of selecting the petitioner's
land and therefore, deserved objective consideration. Surprisingly,
however, the report submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer
rejecting the petitioner's objections merely records the conclusion
that acquisition would not adversely affect the petitioner and that
the objections were baseless. The report is conspicuously silent on
the principal issues raised by the petitioner. This court finds that
there is no discussion whatsoever regarding the existence of
residential houses. There is no finding regarding the availability or
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(30 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
otherwise of alternative Banjar and Barani lands. There is no
consideration of the intervening khasras admittedly left outside
acquisition. There is no explanation as to why residential Abadi
alone deserved acquisition while similarly situated lands came to
be excluded.
49. The report, therefore, reflects only the conclusion and
not the reasons which persuaded the authority to arrive at such
conclusion. It is settled that reasons constitute the soul of every
administrative decision affecting valuable civil rights.
50. Equally significant is another aspect emerging from the
record. It is an admitted position that while considering the
objections, the Land Acquisition Officer himself recommended
release of certain parcels of land. Subsequently, by another
communication dated 16.03.1995, he further proposed release of
additional lands. Once such exemption was granted in respect of
similarly situated land, it became imperative for the authority to
disclose why the petitioner's residential land was treated
differently despite the material indicating residential occupation.
The record, however, is completely silent on this aspect.
51. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Darius
Shapur Chenai & Others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that consideration under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 cannot
be an empty formality and that the Government is required to
objectively consider the report before arriving at satisfaction under
Section 6 of the Act of 1894. It was emphasised that formation of
opinion without proper consideration of relevant material renders
the acquisition vulnerable.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(31 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
52. Likewise, in Dev Sharan & Others (supra) , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically recognised that objections
pointing out existence of residential houses, comparative hardship
and availability of alternative lands are relevant objections which
cannot be brushed aside mechanically. Failure to deal with such
objections vitiates the acquisition.
53. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case,
this Court finds that every objection which required serious
consideration has either remained unanswered or has been
disposed of by recording bald conclusions unsupported by reasons.
No material has been placed before this Court to explain the
planning rationale behind such selective acquisition. Neither
Section 5A report, nor the declaration under Section 6 of the Act
of 1894, nor the reply filed before this Court furnishes any
explanation.
54. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances
leads this Court to conclusion that the statutory enquiry under
Section 5A of the Act of 1894 was not conducted in the manner
prescribed in the mandatory provisions of the Act of 1894. It is
settled preposition of law that land acquisition laws are
expropriatory in nature, hence, are required to be construed
strictly. This court finds that the objections of the petitioner were
not examined in the manner contemplated by law. Relevant
considerations remained ignored while conclusions unsupported by
reasons came to be recorded. Consequently, the recommendation
submitted to the Government did not provide a legally sustainable
foundation for formation of satisfaction under Section 6 of the Act
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(32 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
of 1894. Such infirmity vitiates the decision-making process as
well as the entire acquisition proceedings.
55. In the present case, the infirmity does not lie in the
existence of a public purpose; it lies in the absence of a fair and
reasoned decision-making process. The enquiry under Section 5A
of the Act of 1894, which constitutes the only statutory
opportunity available to the petitioner before compulsory
acquisition, has been reduced to an empty ritual. Such an
approach is contrary to the legislative intent underlying Section 5A
of the Act of 1894 and inconsistent with the constitutional
guarantee embodied in Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
56. This Court is, therefore, satisfied that the declaration
under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 is vitiated by non-application of
mind and failure to consider relevant material. Once the very
foundation upon which the Government arrived at its satisfaction
stands vitiated, the consequential declaration cannot be sustained.
57. Now coming to the ground raised by the petitioners
that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of operation
of Section 11A of the Act of 1894, this court finds that although
such ground was not pleaded in the writ petition, but this ground
being related to pure question of law, can be permitted to be
raised, on the basis of undisputed facts, during the arguments
also. It is not in dispute that the declaration under Section 6 of the
Act of 1894 was issued on 19.06.1995 and was thereafter
published in the newspapers on 14.07.1995. Section 11A of the
Act of 1894 mandates that an award under Section 11 of the Act
of 1894 is required to be made within a period of two years from
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(33 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
the date of publication of the declaration. In the absence of an
award within the prescribed period, the acquisition proceedings
are rendered ineffective by operation of law, subject to the
exclusion contemplated by the statutory provision in respect of
any period during which the proceedings were stayed by an order
of the Court.
58. In the present case, although an award dated
20.06.1997 was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect
of certain land covered by the declaration under Section 6 of the
Act of 1894, the award itself records that compensation in respect
of the land belonging to the petitioners had not been assessed.
Thus, merely because an award came to be passed in respect of
some other parcels of land covered by the same declaration, the
same cannot, in law, be treated as an award in respect of the
petitioners’ land.
59. The submission of the respondents that the award
dated 20.06.1997 should be regarded as sufficient compliance
with Section 11 of the Act of 1894, therefore, cannot be accepted.
The substance of the statutory requirement is not the mere
existence of a document styled as an “award”, but a lawful
determination of the compensation payable in respect of the land
sought to be acquired. Where the authority itself records that
compensation in respect of a particular land has not been
assessed, such document cannot be treated as an effective award
qua that land merely by virtue of its nomenclature or because the
land happens to be included in the same declaration.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(34 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
60. The further defence of the respondents is that an
interim order dated 15.01.1996 was operating in the writ
petitions, whereby the parties were directed to maintain status
quo as obtaining on that date, and consequently the Land
Acquisition Officer was prevented from passing an award in
respect of the petitioners' land. It is true that the period during
which the acquisition proceedings are stayed by an order of the
Court has to be excluded while computing the period prescribed
under Section 11A of the Act of 1894. However, the benefit of
such exclusion can operate only for the period during which the
restraint imposed by the Court actually continued to operate.
61. In the present case, admittedly, the writ petitions were
earlier dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide orders dated
02.08.2006 and 05.01.2007. The respondents have not disputed
that the interim order dated 15.01.1996 ceased to operate upon
dismissal of the writ petitions. Thus, even assuming that the
period during which the aforesaid interim order remained
operative is liable to be excluded, the respondents cannot claim an
indefinite exclusion of time thereafter. Once the interim protection
came to an end, there was no legal impediment preventing the
competent authority from completing the acquisition proceedings
in accordance with law.
62. The subsequent filing of intra-court appeals by the
petitioners does not advance the case of the respondents. The
Division Bench, vide order dated 19.02.2018, ultimately remanded
the matters to the learned Single Judge for fresh consideration.
Significantly, there is nothing on record to demonstrate that, after
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(35 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
the interim order dated 15.01.1996 ceased to operate, any further
order of this Court restrained the respondents from making an
award in respect of the petitioners' land. The respondents,
therefore, cannot rely upon an interim order which had already
ceased to operate for explaining the continued failure to make an
award thereafter.
63. More importantly, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate that, after cessation of the interim order, any award
determining compensation in respect of the petitioners' land was
ever made within the period permissible under Section 11A of the
Act of 1894. The award dated 20.06.1997, on its own terms, does
not determine compensation in respect of the petitioners' land.
Consequently, the statutory requirement remained unfulfilled
insofar as the petitioners' land is concerned.
64. The object underlying Section 11A of the Act of 1894 is
to ensure that acquisition proceedings do not remain pending
indefinitely after issuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the
Act of 1894. The Legislature has prescribed a definite outer limit
for making an award and has attached a specific consequence to
failure on the part of the acquiring authority to adhere to that
mandate. Once the statutory period expires without a valid award,
the acquisition proceedings cannot be kept alive merely on the
basis of an earlier declaration or by treating an award relating to
other parcels of land as sufficient compliance in respect of the land
of a person whose compensation was admittedly not determined.
65. It is also relevant that the petitioners had approached
this Court at the relevant point of time and the acquisition
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(36 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
proceedings were subjected to judicial scrutiny. The Division
Bench, while ultimately remanding the matters for fresh
consideration, did not hold that the respondents had acquired an
indefeasible right to continue the acquisition notwithstanding their
failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 11A
of the Act of 1894. Thus, the mere pendency of the litigation or
the fact that the matters were ultimately remanded cannot, by
itself, revive an acquisition which had otherwise ceased to subsist
by operation of the statute.
66. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the
considered view that the award dated 20.06.1997 cannot be
treated as a valid award in respect of the petitioners' land,
particularly when the award itself records that compensation in
respect thereof had not been assessed.
67. Accordingly, the acquisition proceedings initiated in
respect of the petitioners' land are held to have lapsed by
operation of Section 11A of the Act of 1894.
68. As regards the contention of the respondents that the
petitioners hold only 2.04 hectares out of the total acquired area
of 21.50 hectares, whereas other landowners have accepted
compensation and the acquired land has substantially been
utilised for establishment of the industrial area, cannot be
accepted. This court observes that the legality of acquisition qua
the petitioners' land has to be examined independently, and the
acceptance of compensation or failure to challenge the acquisition
by other landowners cannot validate an otherwise unlawful
acquisition.
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(37 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
69. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radhy Shyam(Dead)
through LRs & Others (supra) , has categorically held that legal
and constitutional rights of an aggrieved landowner cannot be
denied merely because other landowners have not challenged the
acquisition or have accepted the compensation. The same
principle squarely applies to the present case. Para 87 of the
judgment lays down as under:
“ 87. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents that the Court may not annul the impugned
acquisition because land of other villages had already been
acquired and other landowners of Village Makaura have not
come forward to challenge the acquisition of their land
cannot be entertained and the Court cannot refuse to
protect the legal and constitutional rights of the appellants
merely because the others have not come forward to
challenge the illegitimate exercise of power by the State
Government. It is quite possible that others may have, due
to sheer poverty, ignorance and similar handicaps not been
able to avail legal remedies for protection of their rights, but
that cannot be made the basis to deny what is due to the
appellants.”
70. Equally untenable is the contention raised by the
respondents that the remaining acquired land has been utilised for
establishment of the industrial area cannot validate an acquisition
which has otherwise become unsustainable in law. Administrative
inconvenience or alleged hindrance in the functioning of the
industrial area cannot override the statutory rights of the
petitioners. The respondents cannot derive advantage from their
own failure to complete the acquisition proceedings in accordance
with law. The contention, therefore, deserves to be rejected.
71. Reliance placed by the Respondents upon Section 24 of
the Act of 2013 and upon judgment in the case of Indore
Development Authority (supra) has no applicability in the facts
and circumstances of the case, hence, the argument of learned
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
(38 of 38)
[2026:RJ-JP:31172] [CW-5786/1995]
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents based
thereupon is also not sustainable in the eye of law.
72. Consequently, the writ petitions deserve to succeed and
the same are hereby allowed. Notifications dated 09.11.1993
issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
declarations dated 19.06.1995 issued under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 insofar as they relate to the petitioners’
lands measuring 0.51 hectare each comprised in Khasra
Nos.364/4, 364/3 and 364/5 respectively situated at Dhani
Poonchla Wali, Village and Tehsil Neemkathana, District Sikar, are
hereby quashed and set aside. It is also held that the acquisition
proceedings initiated vide above notifications also stood lapsed by
virtue of operation of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. The respondents are restrained from proceeding further
with the acquisition of the petitioners aforesaid land pursuant to
the impugned notifications.
73. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
74. Office is directed to place a copy of this judgment on
record of each connected writ petition.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI
(D.B. SAW/616/2008 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
(Uploaded on 12/08/2026 at 12:34:25 PM)
(Downloaded on 12/08/2026 at 01:32:52 PM)
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)