Surendra Deo vs Board Of Revenue At Allahabad And 7 Others

Reserved on 10.08.2026
Delivered on 03.09.2026
AFR
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - B No. - 2988 of 2025
Surendra Deo
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Board of Revenue at Allahabad and 7 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Abhishek Kumar, Ashish Kumar
Gupta
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Ayush Srivastava, Bhupendra
Kumar Tripathi, C.S.C., Nagesh
Kumar Dwivedi, Pradeep Verma,
Sushil Kumar Srivastava
Court No. - 51
HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J.
1. Heard Sri Abhishek Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner,
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State respondent
nos.1, 6 and 7, Sri Pradeep Verma, learned counsel for the respondent
no.4, and Sri Amit Gupta, holding brief of Sri B. K. Tripathi, learned
counsel for the respondent no.8, Gaon Sabha.
2. The petitioner, has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India principally seeking a writ in the
nature of prohibition restraining the Board of Revenue, Uttar Pradesh,
Prayagraj, arrayed as respondent no.1, from proceeding with Revision

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No. REV/1549/2025, Rajendra Deo and others Vs. State of U.P. and
others, instituted under Section 210 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code,
2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). The petitioner has also
assailed the order dated 20.05.2025 passed by respondent no.1 in the
said revision, whereby the revision has been entertained, the record has
been summoned and the operation of the judgment and decree dated
22.06.2022, passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pindra, District
Varanasi in proceedings under Section 116 of the Code, has been stayed
and the parties have been directed to maintain status quo.
3. The relevant averments and the relief sought in the writ petition
disclose that the principal grievance of the petitioner is that the
revisional authority has assumed a jurisdiction which, according to him,
is not available where the decree is appealable under Section 207 of the
Code.
4. The facts, so far as they are necessary for deciding the controversy
raised in the present writ petition, are that the petitioner and the private
respondents are co-sharers in the land comprised in Khata No. 418 and
other holdings situated in village Badagaon, Pargana Kolasla, Tehsil
Pindra, District Varanasi. That the property is joint ancestral property
and on account of disputes relating to division and separate enjoyment of
the respective shares, he instituted proceedings under Section 116 of the
Code. The petitioner claimed one-third share in the holding and claimed
an oral family settlement which was reduced in writing on 21.05.2011.
The memorandum of family settlement was also made part of the record.
5. The case was initially registered as Suit No. 1596 of 2020 and
subsequently allotted Case No. 02327 of 2020/Computerized Case No.
T202014700202327. The petitioner asserts that the contesting
respondents entered appearance and filed a written statement admitting
the share claimed by him and agreeing to division of the holding. A

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preliminary judgment and decree is stated to have thereafter been passed
on 17.08.2020 determining the respective shares.
6. The petitioner further states that pursuant to the preliminary
decree, the kurra/lots was prepared and the coloured map was submitted
on 16.06.2022. The final judgment and decree was passed on
22.06.2022, on the basis of the preliminary decree and the lots placed
before the Sub-Divisional Officer.
7. The private respondents thereafter filed an application for
restoration/recall against the decree dated 22.06.2022. The restoration
application was filed on 28.11.2023. During the pendency of that
application, the contesting respondents instituted Revision No.
REV/1549/2025 before the Board of Revenue under Section 210 of the
Code.
8. The Board of Revenue, by order dated 20.05.2025, summoned the
record, issued notice and stayed the effect and operation of the decree
dated 22.06.2022, besides directing the parties to maintain status quo.
The petitioner challenges this order principally on the ground that the
Board had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision at all.
9. It further appears from the pleadings that the restoration
application filed by the contesting respondents came to be dismissed by
the court of first instance on 09.06.2025, on the ground of the pendency
of the revision.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the entire
revisional proceeding before respondent no.1 is without jurisdiction. The
submission proceeds principally on the statutory scheme governing
proceedings under Section 116 of the Code. It is urged that the final
judgment and decree passed in a suit for division of holding is a final
decree and is appealable under the provisions contained in Section 207

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read with the Third Schedule to the Code. Therefore, the essential
jurisdictional condition in Section 210 that the suit or proceeding must
be one “in which no appeal lies”, is not satisfied.
11. Learned counsel has further submitted that Section 210, as it
presently stands, cannot be invoked in a case where an appeal lies
against the order or decree sought to be revised. The expression “in
which no appeal lies” is, according to learned counsel, a condition
precedent to the assumption of revisional jurisdiction and not merely a
procedural consideration which may be examined after the revision has
been entertained.
12. Learned counsel has placed particular emphasis upon the fact that
the impugned order dated 22.06.2022 is a final decree in proceedings
under Section 116, and submits that the statutory appellate hierarchy
cannot be bypassed by invoking Section 210. It is contended that if the
decree is appealable, the Board of Revenue cannot assume revisional
jurisdiction over it.
13. An important submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner, and
one which requires consideration in the context of Section 209(h), is that
the respondents cannot overcome the appellate remedy merely by
describing the decree as “exparte”. Learned counsel has invited the
attention of the Court to the precise language of Section 209. It is
submitted that although the opening words of Section 209 state that,
notwithstanding Sections 207 and 208, “no appeal shall lie against any
order or decree” falling within the enumerated categories, clause (h)
itself qualifies the category by providing “where order has been passed
exparte or by default.”
14. Learned counsel submits that the statutory bar under Section
209(h) is, therefore, not attracted merely because an unsuccessful party
subsequently alleges that the decree was exparte. The decree must, in

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fact, be one which was passed exparte or by default. According to
learned counsel, the petitioner’s case throughout has been that the
private respondents had appeared in the proceedings, had filed their
written statement and had participated in the proceedings leading to the
preliminary and final decrees. The question whether their appearance or
consent was genuine, whether the Vakalatnama was valid, or whether
any fraud was committed cannot be assumed in favour of the
respondents at the threshold.
15. Learned counsel has thus urged that if the decree is found to be a
decree passed after participation of the parties and not exparte or by
default, Section 209(h) would have no application and the appeal
contemplated by Section 207 would remain available. In such
circumstances, according to learned counsel, Section 210 cannot be
invoked.
16. It has also been submitted that the expression “no appeal lies” in
Section 210 must be determined by reference to the decree as it actually
exists and not by reference to an allegation made subsequently by a party
seeking to challenge it. The petitioner therefore seeks a prohibition
against the Board from proceeding further with Revision No.
REV/1549/2025.
17. Learned counsel has further submitted that the Board, by the order
dated 20.05.2025, has not merely issued notice but has stayed the final
decree and directed status quo, thereby exercising substantive
jurisdiction in a matter which, according to the petitioner, is outside the
revisional jurisdiction of the Board. The prayer is consequently that the
Board be restrained from proceeding further and the record of the
revision be consigned.
18. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the contesting
respondents has opposed the writ petition. The principal submission is

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that the petitioner is seeking to read Section 207 in isolation and is
overlooking the overriding provision contained in Section 209. Section
209 commences with the non obstante expression “Notwithstanding
anything contained in Sections 207 and 208” and declares that no appeal
shall lie against the categories of orders and decrees specified therein.
19. Learned counsel for the respondent no.4, has specifically relied
upon Section 209(g) and Section 209(h). It is submitted that clause (g)
covers an order or decree passed by the Court or officer with the consent
of the parties, while clause (h) covers an order or decree passed exparte
or by default. The submission is that if the decree dated 22.06.2022 falls
within either of these statutory categories, the general appellate remedy
under Section 207 is expressly excluded.
20. Learned counsel submits that the first proviso to Section 209(h)
provides a specific remedy to a person aggrieved by an exparte or
default order to seek its setting aside within thirty days. The existence of
that remedy, according to learned counsel, reinforces the legislative
intent that an appeal is not contemplated against an order which is
actually exparte or by default.
21. Learned counsel has submitted that the private respondents have
specifically pleaded that their appearance before the Sub-Divisional
Officer was manufactured and that the decree was obtained through a
false or unauthorised appearance and purported consent. The counter-
affidavit alleges, amongst other things, that the Vakalatnama relied upon
before the trial court did not bear the signatures of the respondents and
that the respondents had not authorised the appearance attributed to
them. It is also alleged that the proceedings concerning the kurra phaat
were not conducted in the manner asserted by the petitioner.
22. Learned counsel, however, submits that these allegations are not
being raised merely as allegations of fraud in the abstract. They are

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relied upon to demonstrate why the decree cannot be treated as an
ordinary consensual and contested decree for purposes of Section 207.
According to the respondents, the revision has been filed precisely
because the circumstances in which the decree came to be passed are
under challenge.
23. In support of the submission regarding Section 209(h), learned
counsel for the contesting respondent has relied upon the judgment
passed by this Court in the case of Smt. Shusma Devi and another v.
State of U.P. and others, Matters Under Article 227 No. 2393 of 2023,
Neutral Citation No. 2023:AHC-LKO:54133. It is submitted that in that
case this Court recognised that Section 209(h) specifically bars an appeal
where the order has been passed ex parte or by default and held, in the
circumstances of that case, that the revision was maintainable.
24. Reliance has also been placed upon Sukhmi Lal v. State of U.P.
and others, Writ-C No. 9708 of 2022, decided on 04.01.2023, Neutral
Citation No. 2023:AHC-LKO:798, in which, according to the
respondents, the Court left it open to the aggrieved party to pursue recall
of an ex parte/default order or revision under Section 210.
25. Learned counsel has further relied upon Chhabilal Yadav v. State
of U.P. and others, Writ-C No. 4212 of 2023, Neutral Citation No.
2023:AHC-LKO:36263, to submit that in a matter involving an ex parte
order, the availability of a remedy under Section 209(h) does not
preclude consideration of a revision under Section 210. The judgment, as
placed before the Court, directed that a revision, if filed, could be
considered and decided in accordance with law after affording
opportunity of hearing to the parties.
26. Learned counsel has next relied upon Sampat v. State of U.P.
through Collector, Balrampur and others, Writ-C No. 6526 of 2021,
AIRONLINE 2021 ALL 554, wherein, according to the respondents, an

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order obtained on the basis of a fraudulently manufactured “not pressed”
endorsement was considered in the context of Sections 209(g) and
209(h), and revision was held maintainable. The proposition relied upon
is that an order passed on misrepresentation and without hearing the
affected party may fall outside the appellate remedy contemplated by
Section 207.
27. Learned counsel has also relied upon Shiv Shankar v. Board of
Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad and others, Writ-B No. 34091 of 2014,
Neutral Citation No. 2014:AHC:129455, referring to the settled principle
that fraud vitiates judicial acts and that an order obtained by fraud may
be challenged through an appropriate legal proceeding. Reliance has also
been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
cases of A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Government of A.P. and
others, (2007) 4 SCC 221, and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath,
(1994) 1 SCC 1, for the broader proposition concerning the effect of
fraud upon judicial orders.
28. Learned counsel has further submitted that the pendency of the
restoration application before the court of first instance did not bar the
respondents from approaching the revisional authority. For this
proposition reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and
another, AIR 2005 SC 626, followed by a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in the case of Lalita Devi v. State of U.P. and others, Neutral
Citation No. 2020:AHC-LKO:12801, the submission being that where
two remedies are otherwise available and there is no statutory
prohibition against their simultaneous pursuit, the mere filing of one
remedy does not necessarily extinguish the other.
29. It has finally been urged on behalf of the contesting respondents
that the allegations concerning fraud, consent, the Vakalatnama, the

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preparation of the kurra and the nature of the decree are matters which
should be examined by the competent statutory forum and that the
petitioner cannot secure a prohibition by inviting this Court to decide
those matters in the present writ proceedings.
30. Having considered the rival submissions and the material placed
on record, the principal question which arises for consideration is not
whether the decree dated 22.06.2022 is ultimately valid or invalid, nor
whether the allegations of fraud or consent made by the respondents are
correct. The question is narrower: whether the petitioner has established
such a patent and total absence of jurisdiction in the Board of Revenue
that a writ of prohibition ought to be issued restraining it from
proceeding with Revision No. REV/1549/2025.
31. For deciding this question, Sections 207, 209 and 210 of the Code
assume significance.
32. Section 207 provides for a first appeal against a final order or
decree passed in any suit, application or proceeding specified in Column
2 of the Third Schedule. Section 208 provides for a second appeal in the
circumstances specified therein. The statutory scheme therefore
ordinarily provides an appellate hierarchy in respect of specified final
orders and decrees.
33. Section 210, however, is differently structured. It empowers the
Board or the Commissioner to call for the record of any suit or
proceeding decided by a subordinate Revenue Court “in which no appeal
lies”, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality or
propriety of the order, provided one of the jurisdictional circumstances
enumerated in clauses (a), (b) or (c) exists.
34. The significance of the expression “in which no appeal lies”
occurring in Section 210 has been explained by this Court in Mohd.

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Muslim v. State of U.P., 2025 (166) RD 1. The judgment explains that
the statutory scheme contemplates, as a condition precedent to the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction, a suit or proceeding decided by a
subordinate Revenue Court in which no appeal lies. The decision also
emphasises the distinction between the conditions giving rise to
revisional jurisdiction and the grounds upon which that jurisdiction may
thereafter be exercised. It states that the maintainability of a revision
under Section 210 depends upon cumulative satisfaction of the statutory
requirements, including that the impugned order must be one in respect
of which no appeal lies.
35. Thus, the petitioner's submission that the words “in which no
appeal lies” constitute a jurisdictional requirement is correct as a matter
of statutory construction. But the conclusion which the petitioner seeks
to draw from that proposition requires further examination.
36. Section 209 is headed “Bar against certain appeals.” It begins with
a non obstante clause and provides:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 207 and 208,
no appeal shall lie against any order or decree—”
followed by clauses (a) to (h), including clause (g), relating to
an order or decree passed with the consent of parties, and
clause (h), relating to an order where has been passed ex-parte
or by default. The first proviso enables an aggrieved party to
move an application for setting aside an order passed ex parte
or by default within thirty days.
37. The opening words of Section 209 are undoubtedly wide. They
give the provision overriding effect notwithstanding Sections 207 and
208. But that does not mean that each of the clauses operates without
reference to the conditions contained in the particular clause.

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38. Clause (h) is materially different from a provision which simply
declares that no appeal shall lie against all orders of a specified
description. The legislature has used the words “where order has been
passed exparte or by default.” The bar under clause (h), therefore,
necessarily depends upon the order or decree having the character
contemplated by the clause.
39. Consequently, the legal position cannot be stated as broadly as that
every final decree passed in a Section 116 proceeding is necessarily
appealable notwithstanding Section 209(h). Such a proposition would
render clause (h) nugatory. The non obstante clause in Section 209
makes the specified categories an exception to the general appellate
remedy under Sections 207 and 208.
40. Equally, however, the converse proposition cannot be accepted,
namely, that merely because a party alleges that a decree was exparte,
the decree thereby becomes an order within Section 209(h).
41. There is a distinction between the ‘statutory character of an order’
and an ‘allegation regarding that character’. Section 210 can be invoked
only where the statutory condition that no appeal lies is satisfied. The
respondents' assertion that the decree was ex parte may furnish the basis
for invoking Section 209(h), but the assertion itself is not synonymous
with the establishment of the fact.
42. This distinction assumes considerable importance in the present
case because the parties are at issue on precisely this question.
43. The petitioner asserts that the private respondents participated in
the proceedings, filed a written statement and consented to division of
the holding. The respondents dispute this and allege, inter alia, that the
appearance attributed to them was unauthorised and that the
Vakalatnama relied upon before the court below was not executed by

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them. The counter-affidavit specifically questions the genuineness of the
Vakalatnama and the circumstances in which the written statement and
subsequent proceedings were conducted.
44. The respondents have further questioned the manner in which the
kurra phaat was prepared and allege that the petitioner obtained an undue
advantage in the partition. These allegations are strongly denied by the
petitioner. The pleadings thus disclose a substantial factual dispute
concerning the very circumstances in which the decree dated 22.06.2022
came to be passed.
45. This Court does not propose to decide that controversy. It shall not
record any finding at this stage as to whether the respondents actually
appeared before the Sub-Divisional Officer, whether the Vakalatnama
was genuine, whether the written statement was duly authorised, whether
there was consent, whether the consent was obtained by fraud or
misrepresentation, whether the decree was passed ex parte or by default,
or whether the kurra phaat and lots were prepared and finalised in
accordance with law.
46. These questions may ultimately bear upon the applicability of
Section 209(g) or Section 209(h), but they cannot appropriately be
determined in the present writ petition merely for the purpose of
deciding whether a writ of prohibition should issue.
47. The decision relied upon by the respondents in Smt. Shusma Devi
(supra) is consistent with the statutory proposition that where an order is
in fact ex parte or by default, Section 209(h) bars an appeal and revision
under Section 210 may consequently be maintainable. The judgment,
however, does not warrant the proposition that an allegation of ex parte
proceedings is itself sufficient to establish the statutory bar.

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48. Similarly, the decisions in Sukhmi Lal (supra) and Chhabilal
Yadav (supra) recognise the availability of appropriate statutory
remedies in cases involving exparte/default orders. They do not require
this Court, in a proceeding for prohibition, to adjudicate a disputed
question as to whether the underlying order was actually exparte.
49. The decision in Sampat (supra) also cannot be read as dispensing
with the necessity of establishing the factual foundation for the operation
of Section 209(g) or (h). It concerned an order which was challenged on
the ground of misrepresentation and fraud, and the Court considered the
consequences flowing from the circumstances established in that case.
Its relevance here is confined to the proposition that an order obtained by
circumstances falling within Section 209(g)/(h) may stand outside the
appellate remedy and consequently be amenable to revision.
50. Another decision of this Court in the case of Ritesh Agrawal v.
Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, 2024 (163) RD 1, also requires to be
understood in its factual setting. That case concerned an interim order
passed in proceedings under Section 116 whereby the parties were
directed to maintain status quo. The Court held that the particular order
fell within Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and was therefore appealable under Section 207; consequently, the
revision under Section 210 was held not maintainable.
51. The said decision, therefore, does support the general proposition
that where an appeal lies, the condition in Section 210 is not satisfied.
But it does not establish that Section 209(h) can never apply to a final
decree. In Ritesh Agrawal (supra), the character of the particular interim
order was examined and the Court found an appellate remedy. The
present case is different because the respondents invoke the specific
exception contained in Section 209(h) and the applicability of that
exception itself is disputed.

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52. The statutory position may thus be summarised in the following
manner. Section 207 provides the general appellate remedy against
specified final orders and decrees. Section 209 creates statutory
exceptions to that appellate remedy notwithstanding Sections 207 and
208. Section 210, in turn, operates where the proceeding is one in which
no appeal lies and the further conditions prescribed by that section are
satisfied.
53. Accordingly, a final decree passed in proceedings under Section
116 cannot be said to be outside Section 210 merely because, viewed in
isolation, it is a final decree against which Section 207 ordinarily
provides an appeal. If the decree falls within Section 209(g) or Section
209(h), the legislative bar against appeal becomes relevant.
54. But that does not mean that the Board can conclusively establish
its jurisdiction merely by accepting an allegation that the decree was
consensual, exparte or by default. The Board has to examine the
statutory objection as to maintainability in the light of the record and the
rival pleadings.
55. The question whether the decree dated 22.06.2022 was actually
passed exparte or by default, within the meaning of Section 209(h), is
therefore material. The language of Section 209(h) does not permit the
Court to dispense with that inquiry.
56. The same is true of Section 209(g). If the decree was in fact
passed with the consent of the parties, the statutory bar under clause (g)
would have to be considered. If consent is disputed, the factual and legal
foundation for invoking clause (g) would have to be examined by the
competent forum.
57. The Court therefore declines to accept either extreme position
advanced before it. The petitioner's proposition that a final decree in a

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Section 116 proceeding is necessarily appealable in all circumstances
and can therefore never be revised under Section 210 is too broad
because it ignores Section 209. The respondents' proposition that the
revision is conclusively maintainable merely because they allege that the
decree was exparte or fraudulently consented to is equally too broad
because the applicability of Section 209(g) or (h) depends upon the
underlying facts.
58. The nature of the present writ jurisdiction also assumes
significance. The petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition. Such a writ is
preventive and is ordinarily issued where the subordinate court or
tribunal is proceeding wholly without jurisdiction or proposes to exercise
a jurisdiction which the law does not confer upon it.
59. In the present case, the petitioner has not demonstrated a situation
in which the absence of revisional jurisdiction is so patent that no further
examination by the statutory authority is permissible. The Board has
been approached under Section 210 on the specific premise that, having
regard to Section 209(g) and/or Section 209(h), no appeal lies against the
decree in question.
60. Whether that premise is ultimately correct is a matter which the
Board is competent to consider in the first instance. This Court would
not be justified in issuing prohibition by itself deciding the disputed
question whether the decree was exparte, by default or consensual.
61. The principle stated in Mohd. Muslim (supra) is instructive in this
regard. Section 210 contains both the condition which gives rise to
revisional jurisdiction and the grounds upon which such jurisdiction may
be exercised. The existence of the former must be established, but the
present writ petition does not require this Court to finally pronounce
upon that disputed factual foundation when the statutory authority is
already seized of the revision.

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62. The Court is also not persuaded to accept the submission that the
filing of the restoration application before the Sub-Divisional Officer, by
itself, renders the revision incompetent. The authorities relied upon by
the respondents, including Bhanu Kumar Jain (supra) and Lalita Devi
(supra), were cited for the proposition that the existence of another
remedy does not necessarily exclude a remedy otherwise available in
law where there is no statutory prohibition against pursuing both. That
question, however, need not be finally decided in the present writ
petition because the principal issue remains the statutory requirement in
Section 210 that no appeal should lie.
63. The general principle that fraud may vitiate a judicial order does
not, by itself, answer the statutory question whether Section 209(g) or
Section 209(h) applies to the particular decree.
64. It is consequently neither necessary nor appropriate for this Court
to enter into the allegations made by the respondents concerning the
alleged unauthorised Vakalatnama, manufactured appearance, alleged
false consent, the family settlement, the preparation of the kurra, the
allotment of particular portions of land, or the alleged conduct of the
parties before or after the decree. These matters are expressly left open.
65. In particular, nothing in this judgment shall be construed as
holding that the decree dated 22.06.2022 was passed exparte or by
default within the meaning of Section 209(h). Equally, nothing in this
judgment shall be construed as holding that the decree was passed with
the consent of the parties within the meaning of Section 209(g).
66. The Court also does not express any opinion upon the allegations
that the Vakalatnama was fictitious, that the written statement was
unauthorised, that the proceedings were manipulated, that the kurra
phaat was illegal or that the petitioner procured an unfair allotment.

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Those matters are the subject of controversy before the statutory forums
and shall be dealt with by the authority competent to decide them.
67. What follows from the above discussion is that the petitioner has
not established the patent and total absence of jurisdiction which alone
would justify interdiction of the pending statutory proceeding by a writ
of prohibition.
68. At the same time, this Court considers it appropriate to clarify that
the refusal to issue prohibition is not a declaration that Revision No.
REV/1549/2025 is finally maintainable. The Board of Revenue shall
independently consider the preliminary objection regarding
maintainability in the light of Sections 207, 209(g), 209(h) and 210 of
the Code.
69. In doing so, the Board shall consider whether the decree dated
22.06.2022 is, on the basis of the record, an order or decree against
which an appeal lies under Section 207 or whether, by reason of the
actual circumstances in which it was passed, the case falls within Section
209(g) or Section 209(h). Only thereafter shall the Board proceed to
examine the other requirements of Section 210.
70. This course is also consistent with the legislative structure.
Section 210 does not confer an unrestricted appellate jurisdiction upon
the Board. It is a revisional jurisdiction conditioned by the statutory
requirement that no appeal lie and by the jurisdictional circumstances
specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c).
71. The Court therefore does not accept the petitioner's prayer that the
Board should be prohibited from even examining Revision No.
REV/1549/2025. The petitioner may, however, raise before the Board all
objections available to him regarding the applicability of Section 209,

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the existence of an appellate remedy and the fulfillment of the conditions
of Section 210.
72. The Board shall decide those objections in accordance with law
and on the basis of the record, without being influenced by any
observation made in the present judgment.
73. For the reasons aforesaid, the petitioner has failed to establish that
respondent no.1, Board of Revenue, Uttar Pradesh, Prayagraj, is
proceeding in Revision No. REV/1549/2025 in a manner which is
demonstrably and wholly without jurisdiction so as to warrant issuance
of a writ of prohibition.
74. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of with the following
directions:
(i) The prayer for issuance of a writ of prohibition restraining respondent
no.1 from proceeding with Revision No. REV/1549/2025 is rejected.
(ii) The Board of Revenue shall consider and decide, in accordance with
law, the objection regarding maintainability of the revision, including the
applicability of Sections 209(g), 209(h) and 210 of the U.P. Revenue
Code, 2006.
(iii) While considering Section 209(h), the Board shall bear in mind that
the statutory bar against an appeal under that clause is attracted where
the order or decree has in fact been passed exparte or by default. The
mere assertion of a party that the order was exparte shall not, by itself,
be treated as conclusive of the question.
(iv) Similarly, the applicability of Section 209(g) shall be determined
upon consideration of whether the order or decree was in fact passed
with the consent of the parties.

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(v) Nothing contained in this judgment shall be construed as a finding
that the judgment and decree dated 22.06.2022 was passed exparte, by
default or with the consent of the parties.
(vi) No finding is recorded by this Court upon the allegations of fraud,
misrepresentation, unauthorised appearance, genuineness or otherwise of
the Vakalatnama or written statement, validity of the family settlement,
preparation or validity of the kurra phaat/lots, allotment of particular
parcels, or any alleged manipulation of the proceedings before the Sub-
Divisional Officer.
(vii) All such questions are expressly left open for consideration by the
competent authority in the pending statutory proceedings.
(viii) The Board of Revenue shall decide the question of maintainability
and thereafter the revision, if found maintainable, strictly in accordance
with law and after affording due opportunity of hearing to all concerned
parties, within a period of six months from the date of the production of
the certified copy of this order.
(Arun Kumar, J.)
September 03, 2026
Ashok Kr.
Digitally signed by :-
ASHOK KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad