M/S Madan Lal Tarsem Chand vs Thandu Singh
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND
HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
143
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M)
Date of decision: 16.11.2026
M/s Madan Lal Tarsem Chand ...Petitioner
Versus
Thandu Singh
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEERJA K. KALSON
Present:- Mr. Chetan Bansal, Advocate for the petitioner.
NEERJA K. KALSON, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner, who is the complainant before the learned Trial Court,
has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS'),
to assail the order dated 25.09.2026 (Annexure P-1), passed by the learned
Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ratia, District Fatehabad, whereby its
application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') (corresponding to Section 348 BNSS),
seeking comparison of the disputed signatures appearing on cheque Ex. C-1
with those of the respondent-accused appearing on the judicial order sheets,
and permission to examine a handwriting expert for the said purpose, has
been dismissed.
2. The controversy emanates from a complaint instituted by the
petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,
wherein the respondent disputed the signatures appearing on cheque Ex. C-1
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -2-
and raised a defence of forgery. In order to substantiate the said defence, the
respondent sought permission to examine a handwriting expert, which was
granted by the learned Trial Court vide order dated 12.12.2025.
3. Pursuant thereto, the respondent examined DW-1, the Registry Clerk,
Tehsil Ratia, who produced the original record pertaining to registered
document No. 3392 dated 20.12.2017, the certified copy whereof was
exhibited as Ex. D-1. Thereafter, DW-2, Paras Malik, a handwriting expert,
was examined, who furnished his opinion upon comparing the disputed
signatures on cheque Ex. C-1 with the signatures appearing on Ex. D-1.
4. Subsequently, the petitioner moved an application dated 03.04.2026
(Annexure P-5) under Section 311 Cr.P.C., seeking further comparison of the
disputed signatures with those of the respondent appearing on the judicial
order sheets of the present proceedings. The principal grievance was that
DW-2 had undertaken the comparison on the basis of a photocopy of Ex. D-1,
without considering the signatures subsequently appended by the respondent
on the judicial record. The petitioner, therefore, sought permission to examine
a handwriting expert in additional evidence for undertaking such comparison.
5. The application was contested by the respondent on the premise that
the disputed signatures had already been subjected to expert examination and
that no sufficient justification existed for directing a fresh comparison.
6. Upon consideration of the rival submissions and the material
available on record, the learned Trial Court dismissed the application vide the
impugned order dated 25.09.2026. The learned Magistrate observed that Ex.
D-1 was a document anterior to the issuance of the disputed cheque, the
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -3-
original record whereof had been produced through the concerned official.
The signatures appearing thereon, therefore, constituted an available standard
for comparison. It was further noticed that the petitioner had failed to
demonstrate why the signatures appearing on the subsequent judicial order
sheets would furnish a more appropriate or reliable basis for comparison. As
regards the objection concerning reliance upon a photocopy, the learned Trial
Court observed that the same could be considered while appreciating the
evidentiary worth of the expert opinion, but did not, by itself, necessitate a
fresh examination.
7. The petitioner has questioned the legality and propriety of the
aforesaid order, principally contending that the signatures appearing on the
judicial order sheets constitute additional material which ought to be
subjected to expert examination. It is urged that refusal to permit such
comparison has deprived the petitioner of an effective opportunity to
controvert the defence of forgery raised by the respondent.
8. Having considered the submissions and examined the material
available on record, the question which arises for consideration is whether the
proposed additional expert examination was essential for the just decision of
the case and whether the discretion exercised by the learned Trial Court in
declining such examination warrants interference by this Court.
9. The scope and ambit of Section 311 Cr.P.C. (corresponding to
Section 348 BNSS) are well settled. The provision confers wide powers upon
a criminal Court to summon any person as a witness, examine any person in
attendance though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine a
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -4-
witness already examined, at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other
proceeding. While the first part of the provision is enabling and discretionary,
the latter part casts an obligation upon the Court to exercise such power where
the evidence appears essential for the just decision of the case. The breadth of
the power, however, does not dispense with the necessity of its judicious
exercise. The existence of jurisdiction to receive additional evidence must
remain distinct from the justification for its exercise in a given case.
10. In Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and another , (2013) 14
SCC 461 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the principles
governing Section 311 Cr.P.C., emphasised that the paramount consideration
is whether the evidence sought to be brought on record is essential for
arriving at a just decision. The provision is intended to facilitate the discovery
of truth and prevent a failure of justice; nevertheless, the discretion conferred
thereunder must be exercised with circumspection and upon a reasoned
assessment of necessity.
11. The aforesaid principle has recently been reiterated by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in K. P. Tamilmaran v. State by Deputy Superintendent of
Police, 2025 INSC 576, wherein, while examining the scope of Section 311
Cr.P.C., it was observed that the provision comprises two distinct limbs: the
first conferring discretion upon the Court to summon or recall a witness, and
the second imposing a mandatory obligation where such evidence appears
essential for a just decision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further emphasised
that the power may be exercised at any stage of the proceedings, even after
closure of evidence, and that the necessity of examining a witness must be
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -5-
determined with reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each
case. The legislative object, therefore, is not to confer an unqualified
entitlement upon a litigating party to seek successive evidentiary
opportunities, but to ensure that no evidence essential to a just adjudication is
excluded.
12. The governing principle, therefore, is not merely whether the
proposed evidence may be relevant, useful or capable of lending further
support to a party's case, but whether its reception is essential for a just
adjudication. Equally, the mere existence of evidence on a particular aspect
does not constitute an absolute bar against further examination where its
essentiality is otherwise demonstrated. The statutory discretion must
consequently be exercised upon an assessment of the necessity of the
proposed evidence, rather than upon the mere desire of a party to reinforce or
controvert an existing evidentiary position.
13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the disputed signatures
appearing on cheque Ex. C-1 have already been subjected to expert
examination. The respondent, having denied their execution, examined DW-
2, Paras Malik, who furnished his opinion upon comparison with the
signatures appearing on Ex. D-1. The controversy concerning the authorship
of the signatures has, therefore, not remained unexplored, nor is this a case
where expert evidence on the disputed question is altogether absent.
14. Of particular relevance is the nature and chronology of the document
employed for comparison. Ex. D-1 pertains to a registered document dated
20.12.2017, the original record whereof was produced through DW-1, the
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -6-
Registry Clerk from the concerned office, and its certified copy was exhibited
in evidence. The source of the document was thus identifiable and traceable to
an official record. Moreover, the signatures appearing thereon predate the
issuance of the disputed cheque and the emergence of the controversy
concerning its execution. While such anteriority does not confer any
conclusive superiority upon those signatures, it constitutes a relevant
circumstance in assessing their suitability as standards for comparison.
15. Conversely, the signatures appearing on the judicial order sheets were
appended during the pendency of the proceedings, after the dispute had
arisen. Such signatures are neither inherently inadmissible nor unsuitable for
comparison merely on account of their subsequent execution. Nevertheless,
their presence on the judicial record does not, without more, establish their
superior reliability or render their examination indispensable. The learned
Trial Court, having considered the circumstances attending both sets of
signatures, found that the petitioner had not demonstrated any cogent reason
necessitating a further comparison. Such an assessment cannot be
characterised as arbitrary merely because an alternative standard of
comparison was available.
16. The further objection concerning reliance by DW-2 upon a photocopy
of Ex. D-1 also requires consideration. Undoubtedly, the nature and quality of
the material supplied to a handwriting expert have a bearing upon the
reliability of the resulting opinion. A comparison undertaken on the basis of a
photocopy may, depending upon the quality of reproduction and the
characteristics sought to be examined, suffer from limitations which cannot be
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -7-
overlooked. However, an infirmity affecting the probative worth of an
existing expert opinion does not, ipso facto , establish the necessity of
directing another expert examination. The former pertains to appreciation of
evidence, whereas the latter is governed by the statutory requirement of
essentiality.
17. In this context, reference may appropriately be made to Murari Lal v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme
Court explained the principles governing the appreciation of handwriting-
expert evidence. An expert opinion is required to be evaluated in the light of
the reasons furnished in its support and the other evidence available on
record. The expert does not adjudicate the controversy; the ultimate
determination remains within the province of the Court. The Court must
independently assess the reasoning underlying the opinion and the weight
which such evidence deserves in the circumstances of the case.
18. Consequently, the opinion furnished by DW-2 does not acquire any
conclusive or binding character merely because it has been brought on record.
The petitioner remains at liberty to question its evidentiary worth on all
grounds permissible in law, including the nature of the material employed for
comparison, the methodology adopted by the expert and the reasons
supporting his conclusions. Significantly, the learned Trial Court has
expressly left the objection concerning reliance upon a photocopy to be
considered at the stage of appreciation of evidence. The refusal to direct
further examination, therefore, does not foreclose the petitioner's right to
challenge the reliability of the existing expert opinion.
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -8-
19. Tested on the touchstone of the principles reiterated in K. P.
Tamilmaran (supra), the present case does not disclose circumstances
attracting the mandatory limb of Section 311 Cr.P.C. The disputed signatures
on cheque Ex. C-1 have already been subjected to expert examination, and the
petitioner has not demonstrated how their further comparison with signatures
appearing on the judicial order sheets is essential for a just determination of
the controversy. The mere availability of an additional standard of
comparison, without any demonstrated necessity for its examination, does not
render the existing evidentiary material inadequate. The learned Trial Court
has, therefore, not foreclosed adjudication of the disputed issue, but has
declined a further evidentiary exercise upon finding insufficient justification
for the same.
20. Undoubtedly, the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must be exercised
in furtherance of a fair trial and the discovery of truth. However, its
invocation must be founded upon the necessity of the proposed evidence and
not merely upon a party's desire to supplement the existing record. The
statutory discretion must be exercised in a manner which secures a just
adjudication without permitting avoidable prolongation of the proceedings.
21. The learned Trial Court has considered the relevant circumstances,
including the earlier expert examination, the source and chronology of the
signatures employed as standards, the subsequent nature of the signatures
appearing on the judicial record and the objection concerning reliance upon a
photocopy. The reasons assigned bear a rational nexus to the question arising
for determination. Merely because another view may also be possible does
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -9-
not furnish sufficient justification for this Court to substitute its discretion for
that of the learned Trial Court, particularly when the impugned order does not
disclose any patent illegality, perversity or disregard of a material
circumstance.
22. It also deserves emphasis that rejection of the application does not
amount to acceptance of the respondent's defence that the signatures
appearing on cheque Ex. C-1 are forged. Their genuineness remains a matter
for adjudication upon appreciation of the entire evidence. Neither the opinion
of DW-2 nor the observations recorded in the impugned order can be
regarded as conclusive of that issue. The learned Trial Court shall
independently evaluate the evidence, the applicable statutory presumptions,
the defence raised by the respondent and the evidentiary worth of the expert
opinion, strictly in accordance with law.
23. Viewed in the aforesaid perspective, this Court finds that the learned
Trial Court has exercised its discretion upon consideration of the material
circumstances and has furnished reasons germane to the refusal of further
comparison. The petitioner has failed to establish that the proposed expert
examination with reference to the signatures appearing on the judicial order
sheets was essential for the just decision of the case, or that refusal thereof has
occasioned any demonstrable failure of justice. The impugned order,
therefore, does not warrant interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction
of this Court.
24. Consequently, finding no merit in the present petition, the same is
hereby dismissed. The order dated 25.09.2026 (Annexure P-1), passed by the
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRM-M-64904-2026 (O&M) -10-
learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ratia, dismissing the petitioner's
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., is upheld.
25. It is, however, clarified that the observations made herein are
confined to the adjudication of the present petition and shall not be construed
as an expression of opinion on the genuineness or otherwise of the disputed
signatures or upon the merits of the complaint. The learned Trial Court shall
decide the matter independently, on the basis of the evidence available on
record and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation made
herein concerning the comparative suitability of the signatures or the
evidentiary worth of the expert opinion.
26. Considering that the complaint pertains to the year 2020, the learned
Trial Court shall endeavour to conclude the proceedings expeditiously, in
accordance with law.
16.11.2026 (NEERJA K. KALSON)
shweta
JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No
SHWETA
2026.11.19 18:08
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document