SRI M D BANNIMARAD vs THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

TH
DATED THIS THE 8 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

AND

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

WRIT APPEAL NO.100273 OF 2022 (S-R)

BETWEEN:

SRI. M.D. BANNIMARAD,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LR’S.

SMT. GOURAMMA MARITAMMAPPA BANNIMARAD,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD,
NO.52, SRI GOURI FLOURA PARK,
AMARGOL, HUBBALLI, DIST: DHARWAD.

1.

Digitally signed by
RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
2. SMT. ANNAPURAN RAVIKUMAR KAJAGAR,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT: GAULGANJIKOPPA,
GAUDAR ONI, DHARWAD.

3. SRI. SHANKAR MARITAMMAPPA BANNIMARAD,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
NO.52, SRI GOURI FLOURA PARK,
AMARGOL, HUBBALLI, DIST: DHARWAD,
INSANE, R/BY APPELLANT NO.5.

4. SMT. RENUKA SHIVAYOGI KOTABAGI,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD,

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R/AT: MAIN ROAD, MORAB,
TQ: NAVALGUND, DIST: DHARWAD.
5. SRI. MAHANTESH
S/O. MARITAMMAPPA BANNIMARAD,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
OCC: LECTURER,
R/AT: NO.52, SRI GOURI,
FLOURA PARK, AMARGOL,
HUBBALLI, DIST: DHARWAD.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. MRUTYUNJAY TATA BANGI, ADVOCATE)

AND:

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
KARNATAKA STATE KHADI AND
VILLAGE INDUSTRIES BOARD,
NO.10, JASMA BHAVAN ROAD,
BENGALURU - 52.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. G.N. KADEMANI, ADVOCATE)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE THE ORDER
PASSED BY THIS HON’BLE COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO.68327/2010 DATED 25-02-2022 IN AND DISMISS THE
WRIT PETITION BY ALLOWING THE PRESENT WRIT APPEAL
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

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ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA)
1. The family of one M.D. Bannimarad, who is no
more, stands before us, calling in question the order of the
learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.68327 of 2010
dated 25.02.2022, by which the challenge to the imposition
of penalty against the petitioner comes to be rejected.
2. Heard Muthunjay Tata Bangi, learned counsel

appearing for the appellants, and Shri G.N. Kademani,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
3. The facts adumbrated are as follows:
3.1 The appellant, at the relevant point in time, was

working as a District Officer, having been initially
appointed as Auditor-cum-Inspector in the Karnataka
State Khadi and Village Industries Board. Owing to
certain allegations with regard to margin money
(subsidy), for the period between 1998 to 2002, the
allegations sprang against the appellant.

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3.2 The allegation resulted in two proceedings: one, a
departmental enquiry, and the other, a criminal case
being registered for offences punishable under Sections
13(1)(a) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
3.3 In both these proceedings, the result is divergent. The
criminal trial ends up in an acquittal in favour of the
petitioner and the departmental enquiry results in
imposition of punishment of recovery of the alleged
misappropriated amount of ₹8,85,000/-.
3.4 The judgment of acquittal in the criminal trial as on
today become final. The imposition of penalty of
recovery of ₹8,85,000/- was called in question before
the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge
proceeds on a footing that the penalty imposed upon
the petitioner is not the recovery but compulsory
retirement from service and rejects the petition on the
score that the judgment in a criminal trial would not
have any bearing on a departmental enquiry that is
conducted against the petitioner, by following the

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judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sashi
Bhusan Prasad v. Inspector General, Central
1
Industrial Security Force & Ors.
3.5 It is this that has driven the appellant before us in the
subject appeal.
4. The learned counsel Shri Mrutyunjay Tata Bangi,
appearing for the petitioner, would take this Court through
the order of the learned Single Judge and the order of the
Criminal Court acquitting the petitioner. The submission is
that, the criminal trial ended in acquittal not on the benefit
of doubt, but the prosecution was not able to prove the
guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, as there was no evidence
of tampering or otherwise, as is observed by the concerned
Court in Special C.C. No.46 of 2008.
5. The learned counsel would then take this Court

through the findings in the departmental enquiry to
demonstrate that the punishment imposed upon the

1
Civil Appeal No.7130 of 2009, dated 01.08.2019

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employee was not compulsory retirement but recovery of
an amount of ₹8,85,000/-.
6. The learned Single Judge frames the entire
judgment on the score that a penalty of compulsory
retirement was imposed upon the writ petitioner, while it
was not. Therefore, would submit that, in the light of the
judgment of the Criminal Court, the family of the petitioner
would become entitled to the family pension and other
terminal benefits of the employee.
7. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent would vehemently refute the submission in
contending that the criminal trial and a departmental
enquiry are on a different footing. The evidence that is
required in a departmental enquiry is preponderance of
probability and, on such preponderance of probability, the
writ petitioner, has been held guilty and recovery of an
amount of ₹8,85,000/- is imposed upon him.

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8. He would admit the fact that the penalty
imposed upon the writ petitioner was not compulsory
retirement but was recovery of the said amount. He would
seek to place reliance upon the very judgment that is relied
upon by the learned Single Judge while rejecting the
petition.
9. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and
have perused the material on record.
10. The incident that triggered registration of two
proceedings against the petitioner is one that happened
between 1998 to 2002, which was concerning margin
money or subsidy money payable to the beneficiaries under
the Khadi Grama Udyog Scheme.
11. The criminal case was handed over to the CBI

and the departmental enquiry was conducted against him
by the State.

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12. In Special C.C. No.46 of 2008, on assessment of
complete documents and evidence before it, the Criminal
Court comes to conclude that the guilt has not been proved
beyond all reasonable doubt. The reasons so rendered by
the Criminal Court to acquit the writ petitioner are as
follows:
102. According to PW121 Kamarulla Basha,
Branch Manager, State Bank of Mysore, as per the
direction of AGM conducted internal investigation in
State Bank of Mysore, Nangali regarding the
irregularaties. He testifies that in 13 accounts subsidy
was received that amount was not credited to the
account of the beneficiaries, it was diverted to some
account, he enquired the beneficieris who told him that
they have not used subsidy amount.
103. On appreciating the above evidence this
court could arrived to the conclusion that the subsidy
amounts had not paid to the beneficieries perhaps such
amount was deposited as FD, in the name of three
Gramodhyoga Sanghas, based on the said FDR’s the
bank has provided the financial accommodation. Based
on above facts it is very difficult to arive into the
conclusion that the financial loss had caused to the
bank, this court could not trace the element of fraud,
therefore it is very difficult to arrive in to the conclusion
of the cheating. The accused-manager took care to
secure the loan by FDR therefore this court could not
trace the element of fraud, even through the said
financial accommodation the accused-manager did not
cause any monitory loss to the bank to say that he had
cheated the bank. The entire evidence on the record

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would not give the clue of the combination of all the
accused for causing the monitory loss to the bank. No
doubt some of loanees had denied their availing of the
loan facilities, their evidence could not be believed
since there are sufficient materials on record to believe
the availment of such loan. There is no clear evidence
on the record to show that the accused induced the
bank to provide the financial accommodation. No doubt
there are some irregularities in the above loan
transactions. The law is well settlled that if the
mensrea is traced in the conduct of the accused in
causing monitory loss to the bank one could draw the
inference of the cheating, in the obsence of such
mensrea no inference could be drawn regarding the
cheating. In view of the above circumstances this court
could not arrive into the conclusion that the accused in
furtherence of the criminal conspiracy caused the
monitory loss to the bank on inducing the bank to
sustain such loss leading to cheat the bank.
104. No doubt there is sufficient evidence on the
record to prove that A1 and A6 are the managers of
the bank, they allowed 13 beneficieres to enjoy the
loan facilities. There is evidence on the record to
believe that the bank has received the subsidy from the
KVIB., the FDR’s were created and based on the said
FDR’s the loan facilities were accorded to the members
of the Gramodhyoga Sangha. The evidence on the
record would prove the custody of the public money
with A1 and A6 while they allowed the financial
accommodation to the members of the Gramodhyoga
Sangha no inference could be drawn that the funds
were mis-appropriated to say that they commit the
criminal breach of trush.
105. The evidence of the record would not prove
that A1 and A6 in furtherance of their criminal
conspiracy forged the letters and causes to disappear

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certain evidence. Therefore on appreciation of the
entire evidence on the record this court could not arrive
in to the conclusion that A1 and A6 commit the criminal
breach of trush and they causes the disappearance of
the evidence. Consequently these points are answered
in negative.
106. Point No.8: The duty is on the prosecution
to prove that A1, A6 being the party to the criminal
conspiracy with A2 to A5, A7 to A15 during 20-6-1998
to 20-6-2002 in furtherance of their criminal
conspiracy, they being public servant functioning as
Branch Managers, State Bank of Mysore Nangali by
corrupt and illegal means obtained themselves
pecuniary advantages by misconducting and abusing
their position as public servants causing loss to the
Bank and KVIB to the extent of Rs.11,92,800/- +
Rs.17,70,000/- = Rs.29,62,800/-. While this court
appreciating the evidence for recording the findings to
the point Nos.2 to 7 observe that the evidence on the
record is not sufficient to prove that the accused had
cheated the bank and A1 and A6 were committed the
criminal breach of trust perhaps record the findings
that no inference could be drawn that the accused have
caused loss to the bank and KVIB to the extent of
Rs.11,92,800/- + 17,70,000 = 29,62,800/-, therefore
no inference could be drawn that A1 and A6 by abusing
their position as a public servant by corrupt and illegal
means allowed such pecuniary advantages to
themselves. Once again on having the careful glance to
the entire evidence on the record this court could not
record the finding that A1 and A6 have misconducted
as contemplated under section 13 (1)(c) and (d) r/w
13(2) of prevention of curruption act, consequently the
instant point is answered in negative.
107. Point No.9:- No doubt, according to the
Criminal Jurisprudence, the duty is rest on the

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prosecution not only to prove the guilt of the accused,
but also to prove such guilt beyond all reasonable
doubt. Here, in the instant case the prosecution did not
placed sufficient evidence, the evidence on the record
to prove the combination of the accused witn an
intention to forge the document, their making use of
the forged documents as genuine, their cheating the
bank and KVIB, their misappropriating the funds
consequently committing the breach of trush and also
causing to disappear the evidence. This court could also
not find sufficient evidence to prove that A1 and A6
being public servants by abusing their position of public
servant by currept and illegal means availed pecunairy
advantages to themselves. While this court could not
record the findings of point No.2 to 8 in favour of the
prosecution even taking the remaining evidence on the
record putting them to the appreciation could not arrive
in to the conclusion that the prosecution could able to
prove the case against the accused beyond all
reasonable doubts, consequently the instant point is in
answered in negative.”
108. Point No.10:- See final order;
O R D E R
Acting under Section 235 (1) Cr.PC A1 to A15 are
acquited for the offence punishable U/Sec.120-B r/w
468, 471, 420, 409, 201 IPC, besides A.1 and A6 are
acquited for the offence punishable U/sec.Sec.409 IPC
and U/Sec.13 (1)(c) and (d) r/w 13(2) of Prevention of
Corruption Act 1988.
A1 to A15 are on bail, their bail bonds are stand
cancelled.
MO1 to MO16 are ordered to be destroyed after
the appeal period is over.”

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13. The Criminal Court holds that, based on the

evidence that is produced before it, it is very difficult to
arrive at a conclusion that financial loss had been caused to
the bank. The Criminal Court could not trace an element of
fraud; therefore, it was very difficult to arrive at a
conclusion of cheating.
14. The entire evidence on record did not give the
clue of combination of all the accused for causing monetary
loss to the bank. The Court thus acquits the petitioner on
all the grounds, including that the evidence on record would
not prove that A1 to A6, in furtherance of the criminal
conspiracy, forged the letters and caused disappearance of
evidence.
15. Therefore, on the appreciation of the entire
evidence, it was held that the prosecution has failed to
prove the guilt of the writ petitioner beyond all reasonable
doubt.

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16. In the departmental enquiry, the penalty is
imposed against all the accused A1 to A6. The penalty so
imposed is as follows:
"DzÉÃ±À"

1. (C) ²æÃ PÉ.£ÁgÁAiÀÄt ¸Áé«Ä, C©üªÀÈ¢Þ C¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ, PÉÃAzÀæ PÀbÉÃj,
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß PÀ£ÁðlPÀ £ÁUÀjÃPÀ ¸ÉÃªÁ ¤AiÀÄªÀÄ
(ªÀVÃðPÀgÀt, ¤AiÀÄAvÀæt ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÉÄÃ®ä£À«)1957 gÀ ¤AiÀÄªÀÄ 8 (vi)
gÀr ªÀÄAqÀ½AiÀÄ ¸ÉÃªÉ¬ÄAzÀ PÀqÁØAiÀÄªÁV ¤ªÀÈwÛUÉÆ½¸À®Ä
DzÉÃ²¸À¯ÁVzÉ.
(D) F «ZÁgÀuÉAiÀÄ°è zÀÄgÀÄ¥ÀAiÉÆÃUÀªÁVzÉ JAzÀÄ PÀAqÀÄ§A¢gÀÄªÀ MlÄÖ
CAZÀÄ ºÀt gÀÆ.17.70 ®PÀë (gÀÆ¥Á¬Ä ºÀ¢£ÉÃ¼ÀÄ ®PÀëzÀ J¥ÀàvÀÄÛ
¸Á«gÀUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀiÁvÀæ)UÀ¼À ¥ÉÊQ gÀÆ.8.85 ®PÀë (gÀÆ¥Á¬Ä JAlÄ ®PÀëzÀ
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AiÀÄªÀgÀ£ÀÄß PÀqÁØAiÀÄªÁV ¤ªÀÇwÛUÉÆ½¹gÀÄªÀ ¥ÀjuÁªÀÄªÁV CªÀjUÉ
ªÀÄAqÀ½AiÀÄÄ ¤AiÀÄªÀiÁ£ÀÄ¸ÁgÀ ¥ÁªÀw¸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄªÀ PÀqÁØAiÀÄ ¤ªÀÈwÛ
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DzÉÃ²¸À¯ÁVzÉ.
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ºÀÆqÀÄªÀÅzÀÄ.
2. (C) ²æÃ.JA.r §¤ßªÀÄgÀzï, f¯Áè SÁ¢ UÁæªÉÆÃzÉÆåÃUÀ C¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ
(¤ªÀÈvÀÛ), gÀªÀjAzÀ zÀÄgÀÄ¥ÀAiÉÆÃUÀªÁVgÀÄªÀ ªÀÄAqÀ½AiÀÄ CAZÀÄ ºÀt
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jÃvÀå ªÀ¸ÀÆ®Ä ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä DzÉÃ²¸À¯ÁVzÉ.

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(D) ¹©L ¸ÀA¸ÉÜAiÀÄ°è vÀ¤SÁ ºÀAvÀzÀ°ègÀÄªÀ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ CAwªÀÄ DzÉÃ±ÀPÉÌ
M¼À¥ÀlÄÖ ²æÃ.JA.r §¤ßªÀÄgÀzï EªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ Qæ«Ä£À¯ï ªÉÆPÀzÀÝªÉÄ
ºÀÆqÀÄªÀÅzÀÄ.
F DzÉÃ±ÀªÀÅ, DzÉÃ±ÀªÀ£ÀÄß eÁjUÉÆ½¹zÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ¢AzÀ eÁjUÉ §gÀÄvÀÛzÉ.”

17. Against the petitioner, it is not compulsory
retirement. Against the petitioner, it is recovery of
₹8,85,000/- from out of the pension of the petitioner or as
arrears of land revenue.
18. Based upon the said two, the departmental
enquiry and the criminal trial, the petitioner approaches
this Court in Writ Petition challenging the order passed
imposing penalty of recovery in Writ Petition No.68327 of
2010. This comes to be rejected by the learned Single
Judge.
19. The learned Single Judge proceeds on a footing
that the writ petitioner was imposed penalty of compulsory
retirement and not recovery. As the preamble on which the
learned Single Judge frames order in the writ petition is
that the deceased petitioner was compulsorily retired from

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service and a sum of ₹8,85,000/- was ordered to be
recovered from his retirement benefits.
20. While it is not the case, who was compulsorily
retired was accused No.1 and not the petitioner. The
petitioner was only imposed penalty of recovery of an
amount of ₹8,85,000/-.
21. The petitioner dies during the subsistence of the
writ petition. The writ petition comes to be dismissed,
notwithstanding the fact of the acquittal in the criminal trial
being brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge.
22. While the learned Single Judge was right in
following the judgment that prevailed at that relevant point
in time with regard to the findings in the criminal trial not
becoming applicable to the findings in the departmental
enquiry, that was in the year 2019. Much water has flown
in the judicial thought by the judgments rendered by the
Apex Court after math of the judgment in the case of Sashi

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Bhusan Prasad (supra) , which is relied on by the learned
Single Judge.
23. The issue whether the acquittal in the criminal
trial has any bearing or otherwise is considered by this
nd
Bench in W.P. No.104210 of 2022, dated 22 September
2026, wherein it is held as under:
“9. The issue now would be whether on the
acquittal of the petitioner in the said criminal case,
the departmental inquiry pursuant to which the
petitioner has imposed the said penalty requires to
be interfered or otherwise. Jurisprudence is replete
with the judgments of the Apex Court on the issue,
both of non-interference and of interference, when
the issue is the same. The answer lies in the
elucidation of law by the Apex Court.
10. The Apex Court in few of the cases has
declined to interfere and in few has interfered and
obliterated departmental enquiry on the ground of
acquittal by the competent Court in the criminal
case.
CASES WHERE THE APEX COURT HAS DECLINED TO
INTERFERE:
11.1. The Apex Court in the case of KARNATAKA
POWER TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LIMITED v. C.
2
NAGARAJU has held as follows:
“.... .... ....
9. Acquittal by a criminal court would
not debar an employer from exercising the
power to conduct departmental proceedings

2
2019 SCC OnLine SC 1192

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in accordance with the rules and regulations.
The two proceedings, criminal and
departmental, are entirely different. They
operate in different fields and have different
objectives. [ Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd. , (2005) 7 SCC 764: 2005 SCC (L&S) 1020] In
the disciplinary proceedings, the question is
whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as
would merit his removal from service or a lesser
punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the
criminal proceedings, the question is whether the
offences registered against him under the PC Act
are established, and if established, what sentence
should be imposed upon him. The standard of
proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing
inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly
distinct and different. [ State of Rajasthan v. B.K.
Meena , (1996) 6 SCC 417: 1996 SCC (L&S) 1455]
… … …
13. Having considered the submissions
made on behalf of the appellant and Respondent 1,
we are of the view that interference with the order
of dismissal by the High Court was unwarranted. It
is settled law that the acquittal by a criminal court
does not preclude a departmental inquiry against
the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority
is not bound by the judgment of the criminal
court if the evidence that is produced in the
departmental inquiry is different from that
produced during the criminal trial. The object
of a departmental inquiry is to find out
whether the delinquent is guilty of
misconduct under the conduct rules for the
purpose of determining whether he should be
continued in service. The standard of proof in a
departmental inquiry is not strictly based on the
rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which
is based on the evidence before the inquiry
officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which
is different from the evidence available to the
criminal court, is justified and needed no
interference by the High Court.”

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11.2. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
3
KARNATAKA v. UMESH holds as follows:
“.... .... ....
16. The principles which govern a
disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which
apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an
offence punishable under the criminal law, the
burden lies on the prosecution to establish the
ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable
doubt. The accused is entitled to a
presumption of innocence. The purpose of a
disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to
enquire into an allegation of misconduct by
an employee which results in a violation of
the service rules governing the relationship of
employment. Unlike a criminal prosecution
where the charge has to be established
beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary
proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be
established on a preponderance of
probabilities. The rules of evidence which
apply to a criminal trial are distinct from
those which govern a disciplinary enquiry.
The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
does not debar the employer from proceeding
in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction.”
11.3. The Apex Court in the case of
DIRECTOR MARKETING OF AGRICULTURAL v.
4
D.KHASIM SAHEB , has held as follows:
".... .... ....
5. Learned counsel for the respondent relied
upon the two judgments of this Court in the case of
G.M.Tank vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2006 (5)
SCC 446 and in the case of Ram Lal vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2024(1) SCC 175,
respectively.

3
2022 SCC OnLine SC 345
4
SLP © No.22224/2023 decided on 13-02-2025

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6. We however, completely disagree with the
findings of the High Court on this important aspect.
Merely because the respondent has been
acquitted by a Criminal Court that alone
would not result in his reinstatement in
service when he has been dismissed from
service after a departmental proceeding. This
is for the simple reason that the standard of
proof and the appreciation of evidence in a
departmental proceeding is entirely different
from that in a Criminal Court of law. Whereas
in a Criminal Court the prosecution has to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, in
departmental proceedings, the prosecution
has to only prove its case on preponderance
of probabilities, for which there was enough
evidence for the purposes of a departmental
enquiry.
7. There is long-line of judgments of this
Court reiterating this position of law starting with
Union of India vs Bihari Lal Sidhana (1997) 4 SCC
385, The Deputy Inspector General of Police and
Ors. vs S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598 and
Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited
vs. C. Nagaraju and Ors. (2019) 10 SCC 367
8. Under these circumstances, we
totally disagree with the finding of the
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court. Consequently, we allow this appeal and
set aside the order dated 02.05.2023 of the
Andhra Pradesh High court."
CASES WHERE THE APEX COURT HAS
OBLITERATED DEPARTMENTAL PROCEEDINGS
ON ACCOUNT OF ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL
CASES:
12.1. The Apex Court in the case of RAM LAL
5
v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN holds as follows:
".... .... ....

5
(2024) 1 SCC 175

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12. However, if the charges in the
departmental enquiry and the criminal court are
identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses
and circumstances are one and the same, then the
matter acquires a different dimension. If the Court
in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the
criminal proceeding was after full consideration of
the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution
miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in
judicial review can grant redress in certain
circumstances. The Court will be entitled to
exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it
concludes that allowing the findings in the
disciplinary proceedings to stand will be
unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will
turn on its own facts. (See G.M. Tank v. State of
Gujarat [ G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat , (2006) 5
SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] , State Bank of
Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao [ State Bank of
Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao , (2008) 15 SCC 657 :
(2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 489] and S. Samuthiram
[ State of T.N. v. S. Samuthiram , (2013) 1 SCC 598
: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S)
229] .)
Discussion
Validity of the disciplinary proceeding —
Question 1
13. A brief analysis of the facts of the case
is essential. The origin of this dispute, which does
not inspire confidence at all, is as follows. The
appellant's cousin Shravan Lal (PW 4 in the
departmental enquiry and PW 6 in the criminal
case), deposed as under before the enquiry officer:
“Stated on enquiry that about 13 months
ago, I was operating engine at well. On that day
at about 3.00 p.m., Ramlal after drinking liquor,
came at well and switched off the engine.
Thereafter, Ramlal abused me and scuffled with
me and said that today I will operate the engine
and you cannot do anything to me. I have
received job by fooling the Government. When I
enquired him that how you did that, then, Ramlal

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told me that I have received job by altering my
date of birth as 21-4-1972 in my marksheet,
whereas, my date of birth was 21-4-1974.
Thereafter I went to school and enquired about
this fact, whereupon I came to know that his
date of birth was 21-4-1974 . Due to this reason,
I produced an application before the
Superintendent of Police, Ajmer and made one
report to the Commandant, 9th Battalion, RAC,
Tonk and I also made one report to the Hon'ble
Chief Minister and one report to DIG, RAC,
Rajasthan, Jaipur….”
(emphasis supplied)
14. A FIR was registered on 2-9-2002. A
charge-sheet in the departmental proceeding was
issued on 2-4-2003. It will be relevant to extract
the two charges in the disciplinary proceedings:
“ Charge 1:
In the year 1991, an application for
appointment on the post of Constable was made by
you, along with which, marksheet of 8th pass issued
by Government Secondary School, Tiloniya (Ajmer),
bearing Roll No. 323 and Admission No. 2314, in
which, your date of birth was mentioned as 21-4-
1974, but you by altering it to 21-4-1972,
fraudulently got recruited on the post of Constable.
Charge 2:
As a result of altering your date of birth from 21-
4-1974 to 21-4-1972 in the marksheet issued by the
Government Secondary School, Tiloniya (Ajmer),
Crime No. 183/02 under Sections 420, 467, 468,
471IPC was registered against you in PS Mandor,
District Jodhpur.”
15. Five witnesses were examined in the
departmental enquiry, namely, PW 1 Jagdish
Chand, Principal in Government Secondary School,
Village Tiloniya, PW 2 Bhawani Singh (Constable
who was tasked to bring the school records), PW 3
Karan Sharma, who was Circle Officer and had
recorded the statement of Shravan Lal; PW 4

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Shravan Lal and PW 5 Raj Singh who conducted
the investigation of the criminal case.
16. The evidence of PW 5/Raj Singh, as set
out in the enquiry report taken as it is, is
significant since he clearly disproved the charge.
He stated the following in the cross-examination
before the enquiry officer:
“Raj Singh you conducted investigation of
Crime No. 102 and sent the copy to
Commandant, 9th Battalion, RAC, Tonk, what
documents you sent along with the same — The
documents which were sent by me were copy of
FIR, copy of charge-sheet which was submitted
in the court and statements of witnesses
recorded during the investigation and
documents; whose photocopies were also given
to the accused.
Whether you had sent the copies of
statements recorded in the aforesaid case to the
Commandant — I did not send the copies to
Commandant Sahab.
Which officer had submitted the charge-
sheet, order of result in the court — the then
SHO of PS Mandor, District — Jodhpur City,
namely, Shri Ram Pratap submitted result of
investigation, order and charge-sheet against the
accused, in the court.
During the investigation, you had
recorded statements of Dharmendra Kumar Jatav
and Jairam Gurjar, did you record more
statements and whether you would identify the
copies of those statements — Yes, I recorded the
statement of witnesses as it is. And I am
producing herewith the statements of both the
aforesaid witnesses.
Whether those have been written by
yourself — Yes, those statements have been
written by me, which are Ext. D-1 and Ext. D-2.
In Ext. D-1, I recorded statement of Teacher,
namely, Rakishan Dev Murari on A to B part and
I filled the marksheet of Ramlal, wherein, date of
birth of Ramlal is mentioned as 21-4-1972 in C to
D part, which has been written as per the

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dictation of Checking Teacher Ramkishan Dev
Murari.
Date of birth of 21-7-1972 mentioned on
E to F part, was not mentioned in deliberate
manner, in fact, same has been written due to
the human error, whether you are agree with this
statement — This statement is correct, whereas,
at the time of filling up form for recruitment in
Police RAC, Ramlal could enclose TC of 9th Pass,
and he was studying in 10th class.”
17. Thereafter, referring to Ext. D-2
(statement of Jairam Gurjar), he deposed as
under:
“Similarly, in Ext. D-2, on A to B part, you
have shown me the photocopy of 8th class
marksheet of Ramlal s/o Shri Tejuram
Chaudhary, r/o Tiloniya, on which, signatures of
it's issuer i.e. Teacher, namely, Shri Dharmendra
Kumar, Ramkishan Dev Murari and Headmaster
Shri Vishnu Miyani are mentioned. I am
acquainted with their signatures.”
18. Most importantly dealing with the 8th
class marksheet of the appellant, which formed the
basis for his application seeking appointment as
Constable, PW 5/Raj Singh stated as under:
“The 8th class marksheet of Ramlal
enclosed in the documents, which is Ext. P-3 ,
(sic) in which, whether any alteration has been
found in the date of birth anywhere, and whether
date of birth has been mentioned as 21-4-1972
therein — Yes, no alteration has been made in
the marksheet of 8th class and date of birth is
21-4-1972.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. It is very clear from the above that no
alteration was found in the appellant's 8th class
marksheet (which forms part of the enclosed
documents sent to the Commandant) and the date
of birth mentioned on it was 21-4-1972. Reference
to ‘P-3’ in the above extract appears to be a
mistake. The charge-sheet and documents

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enclosed were Exts. P-12/1 to P-12/12. The
defence also exhibited the original 8th class
marksheet separately as Ext. D-3, as is clear from
the chart of exhibits set out in the enquiry report.
20. The enquiry officer, after setting out the
depositions of the witnesses, set out the chart of
the “P” series exhibits and the exhibits of the
delinquent, namely, the “D” series, and without
any further discussion or marshalling of the
evidence recorded the following with regard to
Charge 1:
“On perusal of statement of
witnesses, namely, PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW
4, PW 5 and Exts. P-1 to P-12, it is clear that
correct date of birth of delinquent Constable
was 21-4-1974. When, delinquent Constable
submitted application for recruitment on the
post of Constable, at that time, he did not
complete the age of 18 years, therefore, due
to the apprehension of rejection of his
application due to the less age, delinquent
Constable has altered his date of birth as
21-4-1972 from 21-4-1974, therefore,
Charge 1 stands proved.
Delinquent Constable has also passed
10th class, whose marksheet is Ext. P-4, in
which, his date of birth is mentioned as 21-4-
1974.”
21. Insofar as Charge 2 was concerned, it
was merely noticed that challan had been filed in
the criminal case as on 28-2-2004, the date of
enquiry report, and that the trial had not
concluded.
22. In the operative part of the enquiry
report under the head, “conclusions”, there is no
reference to the 8th class marksheet, (which was
part of the enclosed documents sent by Constable
Raj Singh with the charge-sheet) or to Ext. D-3
(the original 8th class marksheet) exhibited by the
defence. There is also no reference to the
statement of Raj Singh PW 5 in the enquiry, who
had acknowledged that there was no alteration in

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the marksheet of the 8th class. What is referred to
in the chart of exhibits are letter of Jagdish Chand
(Ext. P-1); the duplicate marksheet of 8th class
issued by Jagdish Chand (Ext. P-2); the statement
of Shravan Lal (Ext. P-3); 10th class marksheet of
Secondary Education Board Rajasthan, Ajmer (Ext.
P-4); preliminary enquiry dated 16-10-2002 by
Circle Officer, Kishangarh (Ext. P-5); FIR No.
183/2000 (Ext. P-6); application submitted by Ram
Lal for recruitment to the post of Constable (Ext. P-
7); letter of appointment dated 8-11-1991 (Ext. P-
8); verification letter filed by Ramlal (Ext. P-9);
appointment order dated 16-12-1991 (Ext. P-10);
letter of Government School Tiloniya (Ext. P-11);
and charge-sheet dated 24-4-2003 (Ext. P-12).
23. It is very clear that relevant and
material evidence being, the deposition of PW
5/Raj Singh; the marksheet of 8th class of the
appellant (enclosed to the charge-sheet) and the
original marksheet independently marked as Ext.
D-3 by the defence have been completely left out
in the discussion and consideration. Inference has
been drawn about the proof of the charges by
ignoring crucial, relevant and material evidence
which had come on record. The evidence of PW 5
Raj Singh and the marksheet enclosed in the
documents annexed to the charge-sheet and the
original marksheet marked as Ext. D-3, were
materials having a direct bearing on the charge.
The disciplinary authority has merely
reiterated the reasoning in the enquiry report.
Equally so are the findings of the appellate
authority. It is well settled that if the findings
of the disciplinary authorities are arrived at
after ignoring the relevant material the court
in judicial review can interfere. It is only to
satisfy ourselves to this extent, that we have
scrutinised the material to see as to what was
reflected in the record. We are satisfied that
the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated and
deserve to be quashed.
24. In this scenario, we are inclined to
accept the explanation given by the appellant that

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overwriting in the application form was only due to
correction of an inadvertent error. As long as the
original 8th standard marksheet reflected his date
of birth as 21-4-1972 and there is no correction or
manipulation in that document, the appellant
cannot be penalised.
Effect of acquittal in the criminal proceeding
— Question 2
25. With this above background, if we
examine the criminal proceedings the following
factual position emerges. The very same witnesses,
who were examined in the departmental enquiry
were examined in the criminal trial. Jagdish
Chandra, Bhawani Singh, Shravan Lal, Raj Singh
and Karan Sharma were examined as PW 2, PW 3,
PW 6, PW 9 and PW 13 respectively at the criminal
trial. Apart from them, eight other witnesses were
also examined. The gravamen of the charge in the
criminal case was that the appellant had submitted
an application for recruitment along with his
marksheet and he, by making alteration in his date
of birth to reflect the same as 24-4-1972 in place
of 21-4-1974, and obtained recruitment to the post
of Constable.
26. Though the trial court convicted the
appellant under Section 420IPC, the appellate
court recorded the following crucial findings while
acquitting the appellant:
“…Mainly the present case was based on
the documents to this effect whether the date of
birth of accused is 21-4-1972 or 21-4-1974. Ext.
P-3 is original marksheet, in which, the date of
birth of accused has been shown as 21-4-1972
and same has also been proved by the witnesses
examined on behalf of the prosecution . Whatever
the documents have been produced before the
court regarding the date of birth of 21-4-1974
are either the letters of Principal or are duplicate
TC or marksheets. Neither the prosecution has
produced any such original documents in the
subordinate court to this effect that when the
admission form of accused was filled, what date
of birth was mentioned by the accused in it, what

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was the date of birth in Roll Register of School,
what date of birth was mentioned by accused in
the examination form of Secondary, and nor
after bringing the original records from the
witnesses concerned, same were got proved in
the evidence. In these circumstances, this fact
becomes doubtful that date of birth of the
accused was 21-4-1974, and the accused is
entitled to receive its benefit. In the considered
opinion of this Court, the conviction made by the
learned subordinate court merely on the basis of
oral evidence and letters or duplicate documents,
is not just and proper. It is justifiable to acquit
the accused.
Resultantly, on the basis of aforesaid
consideration, the present appeal filed by the
appellant-accused is liable to be allowed.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. What is important to notice is that the
Appellate Judge has clearly recorded that in the
document Ext. P-3 — original marksheet of the 8th
standard, the date of birth was clearly shown as
21-4-1972 and the other documents produced by
the prosecution were either letters or a duplicate
marksheet. No doubt, the Appellate Judge says
that it becomes doubtful whether the date of birth
was 21-4-1974 and that the accused was entitled
to receive its benefit. However, what we are
supposed to see is the substance of the judgment.
A reading of the entire judgment clearly
indicates that the appellant was acquitted
after full consideration of the prosecution
evidence and after noticing that the
prosecution has miserably failed to prove the
charge (see S. Samuthiram [ State of T.N. v. S.
Samuthiram , (2013) 1 SCC 598: (2013) 1 SCC
(Cri) 566: (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] ).
28. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and
“honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not
to be understood as magic incantations. A court of
law will not be carried away by the mere use of
such terminology. In the present case, the
Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the

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original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-
4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the
witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution.
The conclusion that the acquittal in the
criminal proceeding was after full
consideration of the prosecution evidence and
that the prosecution miserably failed to prove
the charge can only be arrived at after a
reading of the judgment in its entirety. The
Court in judicial review is obliged to examine
the substance of the judgment and not go by
the form of expression used.”
The Apex Court in the afore-narrated cases
holds where the criminal and departmental
proceedings rest on substantially the same chargers,
witnesses, evidence and circumstances, and the
criminal Court has fully considered the evidence and
found the prosecution case to have failed, the
findings in the disciplinary proceedings can be
interfered with, if not interfered, it would become
unjust, unfair and oppressive. The Apex Court also
holds that expressions like ‘benefit of doubt’ and
‘honourably acquitted’, used in the judgments are
not to be understood as magical incantations and the
Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the
substance of the judgment and not to be swayed
away in the form used.
12.2. The Apex Court later in the case of
MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF
6
BIHAR has held as follows:
".... .... ....
47. While an acquittal in a criminal case
does not automatically entitle the accused to
have an order of setting aside of his dismissal
from public service following disciplinary
proceedings, it is well-established that when
the charges, evidence, witnesses, and
circumstances in both the departmental

6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 890

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inquiry and the criminal proceedings are
identical or substantially similar, the situation
assumes a different context. In such cases,
upholding the findings in the disciplinary
proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and
oppressive. This is a position settled by the
decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since
reinforced by a decision of recent origin in
Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan .
48. To assess the degree of similarity
between the charges, evidence, witnesses, and
circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal
proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the
materials placed before the Court where such an
issue arises. However, we regret, absence of the
departmental file has disabled us from looking into
the same.
49. Notwithstanding the above, a plain
reading of the materials available on record
only reveals that charge no. 1 in the
disciplinary closely resembled the allegations
in the criminal proceedings. In fact, the
disciplinary proceedings were initiated based
on the written complaint of the informant.
50. The judgment acquitting the appellant
reveals that the prosecution “miserably failed to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt” as both
the informant and PW-2 refused to identify the
appellant in court. This discussion confirms that the
appellant's acquittal was based not on mere
technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held
that terms like “benefit of doubt” or “honourably
acquitted” should not be treated as formalities. The
Court's duty is to focus on the substance of the
judgment, rather than the terminology used.
51. That apart, it is noteworthy that in
course of the inquiry PW-2 had also declined
to identify the appellant during cross-
examination, and the informant was not
called as a witness in the disciplinary
proceedings. This sort of creates a parallel

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between the circumstances in both the
criminal and disciplinary proceedings.
52. Besides, the appellant's case is
strengthened by the principle of adverse
inference. It can be reasonably inferred that
the respondents deliberately withheld the
scanned copy of the departmental file, which
was essential for us to assess whether the
charges, witnesses, evidence, and
circumstances in both the criminal and
departmental proceedings were substantially
similar or identical, likely due to concerns
over the potential adverse consequences.
53. In light of the preceding discussion and
the adverse presumption that is available to be
drawn, we hold that the finding of the appellant
being guilty of charge no. 1 cannot be sustained
following his acquittal in the criminal proceedings,
which seem to have involved substantially similar
or identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and
circumstances.”
The Apex Court again reiterates that the
acquittal in a criminal case cannot automatically
entitle the accused to have the order in the
departmental enquiry to be set aside. If the
charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in
both the departmental inquiry and the criminal
proceedings are identical, the Court should not
hesitate to quash the order of dismissal. This
judgment is rendered on 23-04-2025 and
the judgment in KHASIM SAHEB ( supra ) is
rendered on 13-02-2025.
12.3. A Division Bench of this Court also
considers an identical issue in the case of SRI
7
CHIDANANDA v. THE UPALOKAYUKTA and holds
as follows:
".... .... ....

7
Writ Appeal No.1168 of 2025, decided on 30-06-2026

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13. At the same time the Supreme Court has
carved out a limited exception to the aforesaid
rule. In G. M. Tank vs State of Gujarat and
Others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 44 which has
been followed in Ram Lal vs State of Rajasthan
and Others reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175 and
Maharana Pratap Singh vs The State of Bihar
and Others reported in Civil Appeal No.
5497/2025, DD 23.04.2025 it has been held
that where charges, witnesses, evidence, and
circumstances in the criminal trial and the
departmental enquiry are identical or substantially
similar, and the Criminal Court records a clear
acquittal on merits after completely disbelieving
the prosecution case, it may be unjust, unfair and
oppressive to sustain the disciplinary punishment,
particularly where the enquiry is founded on no
additional or independent evidence.
14. Equally, the Supreme Court in the case
of State of Karnataka and Another vs Umesh
reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563 , reiterated that the
departmental proceedings are independent of the
criminal prosecution, and that misconduct is to be
assessed on the standard of preponderance of
probabilities. It was held at paragraph Nos.17 to
24 as under :
" 17. In a judgment of a three-Judge Bench of
this Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh
[(1977) 2 SCC 491], V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. set out the
principles which govern disciplinary proceedings as
follows: (SCC p. 493, para 4)
“ 4. It is well settled that in a domestic
enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of
evidence under the Evidence Act, 1872 may not
apply. All materials which are logically probative
for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no
allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has
reasonable nexus and credibility . It is true that
departmental authorities and Administrative
Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such
material and should not glibly swallow what is
strictly speaking not relevant under the Evidence
Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite
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taken through case-law and other authorities by
counsel on both sides. The essence of a
judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of
extraneous materials or considerations and
observance of rules of natural justice. Of
course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity
or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of
independence of judgment vitiate the
conclusions reached, such finding, even
though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be
held good. However, the courts below
misdirected themselves, perhaps, in
insisting that passengers who had come in
and gone out should be chased and brought
before the tribunal 4 (2022) 6 SCC 563
before a valid finding could be recorded. The
“residuum” rule to which counsel for the
respondent referred, based upon certain
passages from American Jurisprudence does not
go to that extent nor does the passage from
Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The
simple point is, was there some evidence or was
there no evidence — not in the sense of the
technical rules governing regular court
proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as
men of understanding and worldly wisdom will
accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of
evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic
tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any
evidence in support of a finding is certainly
available for the court to look into because it
amounts to an error of law apparent on the
record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of
Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is
some evidence which has relevance to the charge
levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we
are unable to hold that the order is invalid on
that ground.”
(emphasis in original and supplied )
These principles have been reiterated in subsequent
decisions of this Court including State of Rajasthan
v. B.K.Meena [(1996) 6 SCC 417]; Krishnakali Tea
Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh
[(2004) 8 SCC 200; Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd. [(2005) 7 SCC 764] and CISF v. Abrar
Ali [(2017) 4 SCC 507].

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18. In the course of the submissions, the
respondents placed reliance on the decision in Union
of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar [(2009) 12 SCC 78].
In that case, six charges were framed against the
respondent. One of the charges was that he
demanded a commission of 1% for paying the
railway staff. The enquiry officer found all the six
charges proved. The disciplinary authority agreed
with those findings and imposed the punishment of
reversion to a lower rank. Allowing the petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court
observed that there was no evidence to hold that he
was guilty of the charge of bribery since the
witnesses only said that the motive/reason for not
making the payment could be the expectation of a
commission amount. The respondent placed reliance
on the following passages from the decision: (SCC
pp. 85 & 87, paras 21 & 31)
“ 21. Such a serious charge of
corruption requires to be proved to the
hilt as it brings both civil and criminal
consequences upon the employee
concerned. He would be liable to be
prosecuted and would also be liable to
suffer severest penalty awardable in such
cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of
quasi-criminal nature was required to be
proved beyond the shadow of doubt and
to the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere
probabilities.
*
31. … wherein it has been held that the
punishment should always be proportionate to
the gravity of the misconduct. However, in a
case of corruption, the only punishment is
dismissal from service. Therefore, the charge
of corruption must always be dealt with
keeping in mind that it has both civil and
criminal consequences.”
19. The observations in para 21 of Gyan
Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand
Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78] are not the ratio
decidendi of the case. These observations were
made while discussing the judgment of the High
Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in the
subsequent passages of the judgment, where the
test of relevant material and compliance with natural
justice as laid down in Rattan Singh [State of

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Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491] was
reiterated: (Gyan Chand Chattar case [(2009) 12
SCC 78], SCC p. 88, paras 35-36)
“ 35. … an enquiry is to be conducted against
any person giving strict adherence to the statutory
provisions and principles of natural justice. The
charges should be specific, definite and giving details
of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No
enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry
has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not
subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or
unreasonable, nor the same should be based on
conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in
proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part
of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct.
36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the
respondent appears to be the outcome of anguish of
superior officers as there had been an agitation by the
railway staff demanding the payment of pay and
allowances and they detained the train illegally and
there has been too much hue and cry for several hours
on the railway station. The enquiry officer has taken
into consideration the non-existing material and failed
to consider the relevant material and finding of all
facts recorded by him cannot be sustained in the eye
of the law .”
(emphasis supplied)
On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the
above decision that there was no relevant material to
sustain the conviction of the respondent since there
was only hearsay evidence where the witnesses
assumed that the motive for not paying the railway
staff “could be” corruption. Therefore, the standard
that was applied by the Court for determining the
validity of the departmental proceedings was whether
( i ) there was relevant material for arriving at the
finding; and ( ii ) the principles of natural justice were
complied with.
20. In Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn.
Ltd.v. C. Nagaraju [(2019) 10 SCC 367], this Court
has held: (SCC p. 371, para 9)
“9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not
debar an employer from exercising the power to
conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with
the rules and regulations. The two proceedings,
criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They
operate in different fields and have different
objectives. In the disciplinary proceedings, the

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question is whether the respondent is guilty of such
conduct as would merit his removal from service or a
lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the
criminal proceedings, the question is whether the
offences registered against him under the PC Act are
established, and if established, what sentence should
be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the
mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and
trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and
different.”
21. The Court also held that: (C. Nagaraju
case [Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v.
C. Nagaraju, (2019) 10 SCC 367], SCC p. 372, para
13)
“13. Having considered the submissions made
on behalf of the appellant and Respondent 1, we are of
the view that interference with the order of dismissal
by the High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law
that the acquittal by a criminal court does not preclude
a departmental inquiry against the delinquent officer.
The disciplinary authority is not bound by the
judgment of the criminal court if the evidence that is
produced in the departmental inquiry is different from
that produced during the criminal trial. The object of a
departmental inquiry is to find out whether the
delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct
rules for the purpose of determining whether he
should be continued in service. The standard of proof
in a departmental inquiry is not strictly based on the
rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is
based on the evidence before the enquiry officer in the
disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the
evidence available to the criminal court, is justified and
needed no interference by the High Court.”
22. In the exercise of judicial review, the
Court does not act as an appellate forum over
the findings of the disciplinary authority. The
court does not reappreciate the evidence on
the basis of which the finding of misconduct
has been arrived at in the course of a
disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise
of judicial review must restrict its review to
determine whether:
( i ) the rules of natural justice have
been complied with;
( ii ) the finding of misconduct is based
on some evidence;

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( iii ) the statutory rules governing the
conduct of the disciplinary enquiry
have been observed; and
( iv ) whether the findings of the
disciplinary authority suffer from
perversity; and
( v ) the penalty is disproportionate to
the proven misconduct.
23. However, none of the above tests for
attracting the interference of the High Court
were attracted in the present case. The
Karnataka Administrative Tribunal having
exercised the power of judicial review found no
reason to interfere with the award of
punishment of compulsory retirement. The
Division Bench of the High Court exceeded its
jurisdiction under Article 226 and trenched
upon a domain which falls within the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. The
enquiry was conducted in accordance with the
principles of natural justice. The findings of the
enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority
are sustainable with reference to the evidence
which was adduced during the enquiry. The
acquittal of the respondent in the course of the
criminal trial did not impinge upon the
authority of the disciplinary authority or the
finding of misconduct in the disciplinary
proceeding.
24. For these reasons, we allow the appeals
and set aside the impugned judgment and order of
the High Court of Karnataka at the Kalaburagi Bench
dated 29-11-2017 in Umesh v. State of Karnataka
[2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4973]. The petition instituted
by the respondent under Article 226 of the
Constitution shall stand dismissed. The finding of
misconduct and the punishment of compulsory
retirement are restored."
15. The Apex Court in Umesh (supra)
observed that the recovery of tainted money
established in the departmental enquiry may, by
itself, be sufficient to sustain the finding of
misconduct, notwithstanding the acquittal of the

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employee in the criminal case. The Apex Court held
that in the exercise of judicial review, the court
does not act as an appellate forum over the
findings of the disciplinary authority. The Court
does not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of
which the findings of misconduct has been arrived
at in the course of the disciplinary enquiry and the
Court in exercise of the judicial review must
restrict its review to determine whether:
(i) the rules of natural justice have been
complied with;
(ii) the finding of misconduct is based on
some evidence;
(iii) the statutory rules governing the
conduct of disciplinary enquiry have
been observed; and
(iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary
authority suffer from perversity; and
(v) the penalty is disproportionate to the
proven misconduct.
16. Similarly in Karnataka Power
Transmission Corporation Limited vs C.
Nagaraju and Another reported in (2019) 10
SCC 367 , the Supreme Court observed that the
acquittal by Criminal Court does not automatically
invalidate or bar disciplinary proceedings on the
same allegations. The disciplinary authority is not
bound by a criminal acquittal, where the evidence
produced in the departmental enquiry is different
from that produced at the criminal trial, since two
proceedings differ in objective, procedure and
standard of proof, (proof beyond reasonable doubt
versus preponderance of probabilities). It was held
that M. Paul Anthony vs Bharat Gold Mines
Limited reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 and
G.M.Tank (supra) - permitting the departmental
action to be set aside on the strength of the
acquittal - is attracted only where the evidence in
both proceedings is identical and the Criminal

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Court has recorded an honourable acquittal on
merits by wholly disbelieving the prosecution case.
17. In Union of India and Others vs Gyan
Chand Chattar reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78
which also was taken note by the Supreme Court in
Umesh 's case, wherein it was held that the
departmental enquiry must be founded on specific,
definite and clear charges supported by proper
evidence; findings cannot rest on vague charges,
hearsay conjecture or surmise. There is a
distinction between suspicion and proof. Charges
involving corruption, given their quasi-criminal
character and civil/criminal consequences, must be
proved "to the hilt". While corruption, once proved,
warrants no sympathy and permits no punishment
short of dismissal, an enquiry that fails to establish
the charge with real evidence cannot sustain a
major penalty.
18. In the instant case, the appellant cannot
derive any benefit from the exception carved out
by the Supreme Court in G.M Tank, Ram Lal and
the other subsequent decisions. The acquittal
recorded by the Criminal Court was not
founded upon a categorical finding that the
prosecution case of demand and acceptance
of illegal gratification was false. On the
contrary, the acquittal rested on the benefit
of doubt arising from certain contradictions in
the trap evidence and the loan defence having
been held probable, and not upon any
categorical finding that the demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification was false.
In particular, weight was given to the
admissions elicited from PW1 during his cross
examination wherein he admitted that he had
borrowed Rs.1,500 from the appellant and
that the amount paid on the date of trap was
towards the repayment of the said hand loan.
On that basis the Criminal Court extended the
benefit of doubt to the accused.
19. The departmental enquiry, however,
after considering the very same admissions,

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expressly rejected them. The enquiry officer
held that the complainant's evidence in
examination-in-chief and the complaint - Ex.
P1 consistently established the demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification, that the
admissions made during cross-examination
were an afterthought and appeared to have
been made for extraneous reasons, and the
defence of repayment of a hand loan was
inherently improbable and unsupported by
any independent material.
20. Consequently, the enquiry officer
concluded that the amount received by the
appellant constituted an illegal gratification with
respect to the three pending applications. The
enquiry findings are also supported by evidence
relating to the trap proceedings. The complainant
lodged a complaint before the Lokayukta alleging
demand of Rs.1,500 as an illegal gratification.
Pursuant thereto, the Lokayukta Police secured two
independent panch witnesses, conducted the pre-
trap formality by smearing three currency notes of
Rs.500 each with phenolphthalein powder. The
Lokayukta Police prepared the entrustment
mahazar and entrusted the complainant to hand
over the tainted currency only upon demand. The
shadow witness accompanied the complainant.
After the pre-arranged signal was given, the
Lokayukta Police entered the office, recovered the
tainted currency from the right pocket of the
appellant’s trousers, conducted the hand wash test
which turned pink, and seized the relevant records.
The chemical examination report confirmed the
presence of phenolphthalein on the hand washes,
the recovered currency notes and trousers worn by
the appellant. These circumstances were
accepted by the enquiry officer as
corroborative to the complainant's version
and sufficient to establish misconduct on
preponderance of probabilities."
The Division Bench holds that if the criminal
Court records clear acquittal on merits after
completely disbelieving the prosecution case, it

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would be unjust and unfair to sustain the disciplinary
punishment. It now becomes germane to notice
what the other High Courts have held in identical
circumstances.
12.4. The High Court of Calcutta in a judgment
rendered on 19-05-2025 in the case of ASIM
8
KUMAR PAUL v. UNION OF INDIA has held as
follows:
".... .... ....
12. It thus appears to us that the charges,
the evidence, the witnesses and the circumstances
in both the departmental enquiry and the criminal
proceeding are identical or substantially similar. At
his juncture, the moot question arises for our
consideration is as to whether on account of such
similarity, the finding of the enquiry authority,
appellate authority, revisional authority as well as
of the Tribunal in the impugned judgment can be
allowed to be sustained following the acquittal of
the writ petitioner/ original applicant in criminal
appeal. At this juncture, if we look to the reported
decision of Maharana Pratap Singh (Supra), we
find that the Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding
the said Civil Appeal framed four numbers of issues
as reveals from paragraph no. 25 of the said
reported decision. For better understanding we
propose to quote paragraph 25 of the reported
decision of MaharanaPratap Singh ( Supra ) in
verbatim and the same is reproduced hereinbelow:
“25. The issues for determination that
emerge for decision are:
(i) Whether due process was followed in
dismissing the appellant from service and
whether his dismissal from service is justified, on
facts and in the circumstances, that have
unfolded before us?
(ii) Whether, in light of the facts,
evidence, witnesses, and circumstances of the

8
WP.CT 75 OF 2010

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case, the charges in the criminal proceedings are
substantially identical to those in the
departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal
in the criminal case would render the findings in
the disciplinary proceedings vulnerable?
(iii) Whether the impugned judgment,
which allowed the appeal of the respondents and
dismissed the writ petition of the appellant,
deserves to be upheld?
(iv) Whether the appellant is entitled to
any relief, should the aforesaid questions be
answered in his favour?”
.... .... ....
14. Keeping in mind the proposition of law
as decided in the case of MaharanaPratap Singh
( Supra ) , if we look to the factual aspects as
involved in the instant writ petition, it appears to
us that the charges as framed against the
delinquent in the enquiry proceeding are
almost similar to the charges as framed in the
criminal proceeding and the evidence and the
witnesses and the circumstances of both the
enquiry proceeding and criminal proceeding
are either identical or substantially similar.
We have also noticed that apart from the
charge of mala fide and fraudulent act of the
delinquent thereby attracting contravention
of the Rule 3(1) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the said
Rule, no other independent charge was
framed in the said disciplinary proceeding
alleging culpable negligence on the part of
the writ petitioner in discharging his duty. It
thus appears to us that on account of passing
of the judgment of acquittal in the
aforementioned criminal appeal the findings
of the enquiry authority, appellate authority
as well as the revisional authority cannot be
allowed to stand."

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12.5. The High Court of Orissa in the case of
9
ABHAY BEHERA v. STATE OF ODISHA has held
as follows:
".... .... ....
4.4. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-47 & 50 of the
decision in the case of Maharana Pratap
Singh has held as follows:-
“ 47. While an acquittal in a criminal case
does not automatically entitle the accused to
have an order of setting aside of his dismissal
from public service following disciplinary
proceedings, it is well-established that when
the charges, evidence, witnesses, and
circumstances in both the departmental inquiry
and the criminal proceedings are identical or
substantially similar, the situation assumes a
different context. In such cases, upholding
the findings in the disciplinary proceedings
would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This
is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank
(supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent
origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan31.
xxx xxx xxx
50. The judgment acquitting the
appellant reveals that the prosecution
"miserably failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt" as both the informant and
PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in
court. This discussion confirms that the
appellant's acquittal was based not on mere
technicalities. In Ram Lal ( supra ), this Court held
that terms like "benefit of doubt" or "honourably
acquitted" should not be treated as formalities.
The Court's duty is to focus on the substance of
the judgment, rather than the terminology
used.”
4.5. This Court in Para-20 of the decision in the case of
Banshidhar Bariki has held as follows:-
“20. To substantiate the
aforementioned charge, the inquiry officer, as

9
W.P.(C) No.11239 decided on 12-05-2026

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has been stated above has examined the same
set of witnesses, whose version has been
clearly discarded by a judicial finding by the
Court of Addl. Sessions Judge. The important
aspect of this matter is the plea of alibi taken
by the respondent, which has been
established by him by cogent evidence and
believed by the trial court. If the plea of alibi is
believed by the trial Court in the judgment
dated 26.11.2018, which has attained the
finality, the entire genesis of the case is
washed away on facts. Therefore, it could be
safely inferred that departmental proceedings
and their conclusion are based on “no evidence”.
The learned Single Judge has rightly relied
upon numerous judgments to un-justify the
departmental action taken against the
respondent. It is no gain saying that the
judgment relied upon by the learned Single
Judge is apt in the fact scenario of the present
case. The eventual conclusion drawn by the
learned Single Judge, setting aside the
departmental action against the respondent
cannot be faulted with on law as well as
facts. Therefore, this is clearly not a case for
interference by this Court”.
4.6. Reliance was also placed to a decision of this
Court passed on 18.09.2025 in W.P.(C) No.27964
of 2024.
4.7 . It is accordingly contended that the
proceeding initiated in Gajapati District Proceeding
No.14 of 2012 be quashed.
5 . Mr. S. Das, learned Addl. Standing Counsel
for the State on the other hand contended
that since the proceeding is at the stage of the
2nd show cause if some time will be allowed the
proceeding will be finalized in accordance with law.
5 . 1 . It is also contended that since the factum of
proof so required to be followed in a
departmental proceeding is different from
criminal proceeding, the order of acquittal passed
in the criminal proceeding has got no binding
effect with regard to conduct of the
disciplinary proceeding.

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5 . 2 . It is accordingly contended that if two
months’ time will be allowed the proceeding will be
disposed of.
6 . Having heard learned counsel appearing for
the Parties and considering the submissions
made, this Court finds that the proceeding in
question was initiated against the Petitioner vide
Gajapati District Proceeding No.14 of 2012 inter
alia with the following charges:-
“CHARGE
Sri Abhay Behera, Ex.IIC R. Udayagiri PS, in
Gajapati district now Inspector in Koraput
district is charged with gross misconduct in
that:-
During his incumbency as IIC, R. Udayagiri
P.S., in
Gajapati district, Berhampur Vigilance PS Case
No. 51 dt.30.11.10 u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e)
P.C. Act. 1988 has been registered. During
investigation it was found that during his
period of service from 1.1.2001 to 5,3.2010
he has acquired and possessed
disproportionate assets in his name and in
the name of his family members worth of
` 11,32,821.54.
He was found to have acquired movable
properties such as Laptop, TV, Hero Honda
Pleasure Motor Cycle, Computer, Inverter with
batteries, Philips Stereo etc. and immovable
properties relating to purchase of plots and
construction of building as found during
house search on 5.3.2010. He has not
obtained any permission nor sent any
intimation to his authority regarding
acquisition of properties in his name and in
the name of his family members as required
u/s 21 and 21(3) of Odisha Govt. Servant's
Conduct Rule, 1959.
That Sri Behera has not submitted any property
statement to his authority during his service
period as required under Rule 21 of Govt.
Servant Conduct Rule 1959. As such, Sri Behera

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failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion
of duty, decorum of conduct and committed
misconduct in violation of Rule 3 and Rule
21 of Odisha Govt. Servant's Conduct Rules,
1959.
He is therefore, directed to show cause by
31.10.2012 as to why he shall not be suitably
dealt with in the event of the charges being
held to be proved against him.
Any representation that he may wish to
make in this regard will be duly considered by
the authority competent to pass final order
before passing such orders.
Director General of Police & Inspector
General of Police, Odisha, Cuttack”.
6 . 1 . It is also found that Petitioner faced the
criminal proceeding in Berhampur Vigilance P.S.
Case No.51, dtd. 30.11.2010 corresponding to GR
Case No.53 of 2010 (V) in the file of learned
Special Judge, (Vigilance), Berhampur. In the
said vigilance proceeding Petitioner was
acquitted of the charges vide judgment
dtd.30.01.2014 under Annexure-1.
6.2. Since the charges in both the
proceeding are same and Petitioner has
been acquitted in the criminal proceeding
vide judgment under Annexure-1, placing
reliance on the decisions as cited (supra), this
Court is of the view that further
continuance of the disciplinary proceeding
is not to the interest of the Petitioner and will
be an abuse of the process of Court. Not only
that on the face of the submission of the
enquiry report since 31.02.2014, the
proceeding is yet to be disposed of."
12.6. The High Court of Patna in the case of
SUSHIL KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF
10
BIHAR has held as follows:

10
CWJC No.11480 of 2017 decided on 03-09-2026

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".... .... ....
19. Nonetheless, this Court is cognizant of
the settled position of law that mere acquittal in a
criminal trial does not, ipso facto, entitle a
delinquent employee to reinstatement, since the
standard of proof and the nature of enquiry in a
departmental proceeding are materially different
from those governing a criminal trial. However, by
appreciating the material facts and circumstances
of the given case at hand, it is imperative to
adduce the governing principles of law by way of
the following judicial pronouncements.
.... .... ....
22. Answering the said question, and
reaffirming the ratio in G.M. Tank (supra), the
Supreme Court held, in substance, that while
a mere acquittal in a criminal case does not
by itself entitle an employee to have his
dismissal set aside, where the charges,
evidence, witnesses and circumstances in the
departmental and criminal proceedings are
identical or substantially similar, upholding a
contrary finding of guilt in the departmental
enquiry would be unjust, unfair and
oppressive.
The Court further held that expressions
such as "benefit of doubt" and "honourable
acquittal" are not to be treated as mere
formalities or labels — the duty of the Court is
to look to the substance of the judgment of
acquittal, and not merely to the terminology
employed therein.
The Supreme Court also held that failure on
the part of the State to produce the complete
departmental enquiry file, when specifically called
upon to do so, attracts an adverse inference under
Section 114 (g), of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
.... .... ....

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28 . In view of the aforesaid facts and
circumstances and the governing principles of law
enunciated hereinabove, this Court finds it
appropriate to hold that the enquiry purportedly
conducted afresh, pursuant to the order dated
23.10.2006 (Annexure-3), was not, in substance, a
fresh enquiry, but a mere continuation, in form, of
the earlier vitiated proceeding, inasmuch as, no
witness was examined afresh and the petitioner
was denied any real opportunity of cross-
examination.
Further, the departmental proceeding
and the criminal prosecution arose out of the
same occurrence and were founded on
substantially overlapping factual allegations.
29. It is needless to state that the
petitioner was acquitted in Sessions Trial No.
28 of 1999 by judgment dated 09.08.2016.
The said acquittal, arising out of the same
occurrence, is a relevant circumstance to be
taken into account while examining the
sustainability of the departmental action.
30. Having regard to the fact that the
departmental proceeding and the criminal
prosecution arose of the same occurrence,
and, more importantly, that the fresh
departmental enquiry was conducted without
independently recording the evidence of the
departmental witnesses and without
according the Petitioner an effective
opportunity of cross-examination, the
impugned departmental actions cannot be
sustained in law."
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
In RAM LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN the Apex Court
held that acquittal in a criminal case does not
automatically nullify disciplinary proceedings . An
exception arises where the charges, evidence, witnesses and
surrounding circumstances in the criminal trial and
departmental enquiry are identical or substantially the same.
If, after considering the entire prosecution evidence, the

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criminal Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish
the charge, the Court exercising judicial review may interfere
with the disciplinary punishment where allowing it to stand
would be unjust, unfair and oppressive . On facts, the
disciplinary authority had ignored crucial evidence, including
the original mark sheet and the Investigating Officer's evidence
showing that there was no alteration in it. The departmental
findings were therefore vitiated. Significantly, the Court held
that expressions such as “benefit of doubt” and
“honourably acquitted” are not magic incantations ; the
substance of the judgment of acquittal, rather than the
terminology employed, must determine its effect.
In MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR,
the Apex Court reiterated RAM LAL and G.M. TANK. While
criminal acquittal ordinarily does not result in automatic setting
aside of a dismissal imposed departmentally, the position
changes where the charges, evidence, witnesses and
circumstances are identical or substantially similar . In
that situation, sustaining a contrary departmental finding may
become unjust, unfair and oppressive. The Court found a close
similarity between the principal departmental charge and the
criminal accusation. The informant and another material
witness had failed to identify the appellant in the criminal trial,
resulting in an acquittal that was not merely technical. Similar
evidentiary infirmities existed in the departmental enquiry. The
non-production of the departmental file also justified an
adverse inference. Consequently, the finding of guilt on charge
No.1 was held unsustainable.
In SRI CHIDANANDA v. THE UPALOKAYUKTA , the
Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court recognised the
limited exception carved out in G.M. TANK, RAM LAL and
MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH: where the criminal trial and
departmental enquiry rest upon identical or substantially similar
charges, witnesses, evidence and circumstances, and the
criminal Court acquits the employee on merits after disbelieving
the prosecution case, continuation of the departmental
punishment may become unjust and oppressive, particularly
when the enquiry contains no additional or independent
evidence . At the same time, relying on STATE OF KARNATAKA
V. UMESH, the Court emphasised that departmental
proceedings are ordinarily independent and misconduct is
tested on the preponderance of probabilities , not proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
On the facts considered by the Division Bench, however,
the exception was held inapplicable: the criminal acquittal
arose from contradictions in the trap evidence and a probable

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hand-loan defence, whereas the enquiry officer independently
evaluated the material and relied upon the trap proceedings,
recovery of tainted currency and phenolphthalein evidence.
In STATE OF KARNATAKA v. UMESH, it states the
general rule on the other side of the spectrum. Criminal and
departmental proceedings operate in different fields , with
different purposes and standards of proof. An acquittal
therefore does not, by itself, disturb a departmental finding.
Judicial review is not an appeal on facts, and the High Court
cannot reappreciate departmental evidence merely because
another view is possible. Its scrutiny is essentially confined to
whether natural justice was followed, whether there was some
evidence , whether the governing rules were observed,
whether the findings suffer from perversity and whether the
punishment is disproportionate. On the facts, the Apex Court
restored the punishment of compulsory retirement, because the
departmental findings were supported by evidence
notwithstanding the criminal acquittal.
In KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION
CORPORATION LTD. v. C. NAGARAJU, the Apex Court held
that an acquittal by a criminal Court neither bars nor
automatically invalidates departmental proceedings. The two
proceedings differ in object, procedure, rules of evidence
and standard of proof . More importantly, where the evidence
produced in the departmental enquiry is different from that
considered in the criminal trial, the disciplinary authority is not
bound by the acquittal. The G.M. TANK/M. PAUL ANTHONY
principle is attracted only in the exceptional situation, where
the evidentiary foundation of both proceedings is substantially
identical and the prosecution case has failed on merits.
In UNION OF INDIA V. GYAN CHAND CHATTAR, the
Apex Court emphasised that a departmental enquiry must
proceed upon specific and definite charges and relevant
evidence . Findings cannot rest upon conjecture, surmise or
mere suspicion. The enquiry must be fair and objective, and
material evidence cannot be ignored. Although certain
observations in the case referred to corruption charges being
required to be proved “to the hilt”, UMESH subsequently
explained that those observations were not the ratio of GYAN
CHAND CHATTAR. The controlling test remains whether there
was relevant material supporting the finding and whether
principles of natural justice were complied with.
In ASIM KUMAR PAUL v. UNION OF INDIA, following
MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH, the Calcutta High Court found that
the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in

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the departmental and criminal proceedings were identical or
substantially similar. There was no separate or independent
departmental charge capable of surviving the criminal acquittal.
Consequently, once the criminal appeal resulted in acquittal,
the findings of the enquiry authority, appellate authority and
revisional authority founded upon the same material could not
be permitted to stand.
In ABHAY BEHERA v. STATE OF ODISHA, the Orissa
High Court applied MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH to a
departmental proceeding arising from allegations of
disproportionate assets. The petitioner had already been
acquitted in the corresponding vigilance prosecution. Since the
charges in both proceedings were found to be the same , the
Court held that further continuation of the disciplinary
proceeding would not serve the petitioner's interest and would
amount to an abuse of process , particularly when the
proceeding had remained pending for an extraordinary period
despite submission of the enquiry report.
In SUSHIL KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR, the
Patna High Court reiterated that mere criminal acquittal does
not ipso facto confer a right to reinstatement because
departmental and criminal proceedings employ different
standards of proof. Applying G.M. TANK, RAM LAL and
MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH, however, it held that where both
proceedings arise from the same occurrence and
substantially overlapping allegations , the acquittal
becomes a material circumstance in examining the
sustainability of departmental action. The case had an
additional infirmity: the purported fresh departmental enquiry
was not genuinely fresh, since witnesses were not examined
afresh and the employee was denied an effective opportunity of
cross-examination. The departmental action was therefore held
unsustainable.
COLLECTIVE RATIO:
13. On a conspectus of the judgments
quoted hereinabove, what unmistakably
emerges is that an acquittal in a criminal
prosecution does not, ipso facto , wash away
the penalty imposed in a departmental
proceeding. Quashment of a departmental
penalty cannot be an automatic sequel to an
order of acquittal. Much would depend upon
the facts obtaining in each case and, more

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particularly, upon whether the charge, the
substratum of allegations, the evidence, the
witnesses and the documents in the criminal
trial and the departmental enquiry are the
same or substantially the same. It is only when
the two proceedings travel on substantially
identical terrain that an acquittal in the
criminal prosecution may cast its shadow upon
the sustainability of the departmental penalty.
14. Equally, where the acquittal is on
merits, the mere phraseology employed by the
criminal Court—whether the accused is
acquitted by extending the “benefit of doubt”
or because the prosecution failed to establish
guilt “beyond reasonable doubt”—cannot, by
itself, become the determinative factor for
sustaining or setting aside a departmental
penalty. The substance of the acquittal must
prevail over its semantics. The Court must look
beyond the label and examine the evidence, the
witnesses and the foundation upon which both
proceedings rested. The issue, therefore, must
necessarily turn upon the peculiar facts of each
case.”
24. If the elucidation of law by the Apex Court is
pitted to the facts obtaining in the case at hand, what
would unmistakably emerge is that the non-sustenance of
the penalty that is imposed upon the petitioner, more so in
the light of the fact that the findings in the criminal court
was that there is no loss caused, there is no tampering of
records, there is no conspiracy to defraud or cheat.

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25. These are the cases where the CBI had
investigated into the allegations against the petitioner and
several others.
26. In the light of the judgments of the Apex Court,
the unmistakable inference would be the obliteration of the
order of penalty that was imposed against the writ
petitioner.
27. The writ petitioner is now no more and the legal
representatives are on record. In that light, the terminal
benefits that accrued to the employee, now deceased
M.D. Bannimarad, shall be settled in favour of the family of
the deceased.
28. For the aforesaid reasons, the following
ORDER
(i) The writ appeal is allowed.
(ii) The order dated 25.02.2022 passed in W.P.
No.68327 of 2010 by the learned Single
Judge, is set aside.

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(iii) The imposition of penalty against the writ
petitioner, now deceased, of an amount of
₹8,85,000/- stands obliterated.
(iv) The family of the deceased shall now
become entitled to entire terminal benefits,
which shall be settled within twelve (12)
weeks from the date of receipt of the copy
of this order.
Ordered accordingly.

Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE

Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
VNP/CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1