Sh N K Gupta & Ors. vs Mukul Gundhi

$~76
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 27.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010479342026
+ RC.REV. 383/2026
SH N K GUPTA & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. S.K. Nanda, Advocate.

versus

MUKUL GUNDHI .....Respondent
Through: Nemo.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

CM APPL. 73600/2026 (Seeking early hearing on behalf of the
Petitioner no.5)

1. The present Application has been filed under Section 151 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [“ CPC ”], seeking early hearing of the
matter.
2. For the reasons as stated in the Application, the same is allowed
and the matter is taken up for hearing today.
3. The present Application stands disposed of in the above terms.
RC.REV. 383/2026
4. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [“ DRC Act ”], read with Section 151 of
the CPC, assailing the Order and Judgment dated 15.05.2026
[“ Impugned Order ”] passed by the learned Additional Rent
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RC.REV. 383/2026 Page 1 of 11

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

Controller-02, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi [“ Learned
ARC ”], in Eviction Petition bearing RC/ARC No. 478252/11, titled as
“Mukul Gundhi v. Sheela Gupta (since deceased) through Lrs” , by
which the Respondent herein has been held entitled for the recovery of
the tenanted premises i.e., portion consisting of four rooms, kitchen,
bath and store and two WCs situated on the first floor, forming part of
property no. 4593-A, No. 9, Darya Ganj, New Delhi - 110002
[“ Subject Premises ”].
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners assails
the Impugned Order on the limited ground of availability of suitable
alternative accommodation with the Respondent. It is contended that
the Respondent is possessed of Property No. 1588, Dariba Kalan,
Delhi, comprising commercial shops on the ground floor and
residential accommodation on the first floor, consisting of three
bedrooms, stores, a kitchen and a toilet, which is alleged to be lying
vacant and suitable for his use. It is, thus, contended that the aforesaid
accommodation is sufficient to meet the Respondent’s requirement
and, consequently, the Impugned Order directing the eviction of the
Petitioners from the Subject Premises is unwarranted.
6. No other submissions were advanced by the learned counsel for
the Petitioners.
ANALYSIS:
7. This Court has heard learned counsel for the Petitioners and,
with his able assistance, perused the Impugned Order, the present
Petition and the other relevant material placed on record.
8. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioners, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
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RC.REV. 383/2026 Page 2 of 11

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
9. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
1
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
2 3
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
10. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
4
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
5
Grover .
11. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive

1
(1998) 8 SCC 119
2
(2014) 9 SCC 78
3
(2022) 6 SCC 30
4
2024:DHC:9322
5
2025:DHC:11285
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RC.REV. 383/2026 Page 3 of 11

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

12. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra) , a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) ,
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
13. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
14. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioners against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
15. For a proper adjudication of the issue concerning the
availability of alternative accommodation, it would be apposite to
reproduce the relevant findings recorded by the learned ARC in the
Impugned Order, which are as follows:
“62. It is further alleged by respondent that the petitioner has
concealed the fact and ownership of property no.1588, Dariba
Kalan, Delhi which consists of commercial shop/s on the ground
floor apart from residential accommodation at first floor
comprising of three bedrooms, stores, kitchen, toilet etc. which is
lying vacant and at his disposal and more than enough than the
property at Bazar Guliyan where petitioner is presently residing.
63. Per contra it is submitted on behalf of petitioner that said
property no.1588, Dariba Kalan, Delhi comprises of only one shop
on ground floor which is owned by Sh. Ram Singh and same is
occupied by a tenant M/s Pyare Lal Surender Kumar. Same has
been reiterated by PW-2 in evidence affidavit Ex.PW2/A who has
further placed on record copy of receipt for payment of property
tax w.r.t. property no.1586-1588, Dariba Kalan, Delhi-06 which is
Ex.PW2/7 (OSR) along with copy of property tax bill which is Ex.
PW2/8 (OSR). Further placed on record copy of counter foil of rent
receipt which is Ex. PW2/9 (OSR) issued to M/s Pyarelal Surender
Kumar by Sh. Ram Singh. Hence, it shows that said shop is already
in occupancy of that tenant and same cannot be used by petitioner
for bonafide need. Anyways petitioner is in bonafide requirement
of residential space. Respondent has failed to bring on record any
oral or documentary evidence to prove her averments. Nothing
contradictory came out in cross-examination of PW-1 and PW-2 as
well.
*
70. Even otherwise it is also a settled law that mere availability of
other alternate accommodation is itself not the decisive factor for
denial of eviction proceedings by the landlord, more so, since there
are various factors like the size, location, access, purpose, viability,
safety concerns, football, and/or like, amongst others which have/
are to be taken into consideration while dealing with the aspect of
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RC.REV. 383/2026 Page 5 of 11

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

availability of alternate suitable accommodation. Reliance is placed
upon case titled Shiv Sarup Gupta v Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta
(1999) 6 SCC 222.
71. Moreover, it can be observed that it is not for the tenant to
dictate to the landlord that how he should meet or fulfill his
requirement. In this regard reference can be also made to the
judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi titled as Sudesh Kumar
Soni & Ors. Vs. Prabha Khanna & Ors. 153 (2008) DLT 652 it
was observed that: -
“24. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to
dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust
himself without getting possession of the tenanted
premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the
requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make
an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have
adjusted himself.
25. Suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the
landlord and his family members and on the basis of the
circumstances including their profession, vocation, style of
living, habits and background. Landlord is the best judge
of his residential requirement”.
72. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta AIR
1999 SC 2507, at pg-2512 in para 14 & 15 , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that: -
“14. The availability of an alternate accommodation with
the landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in
occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be
evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of
another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all
respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse
bearing on the finding as to bonafides of the landlord if he
unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to
satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance
would enable the Court drawing an inference that the need
of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of
the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural.
Secondly, another principal ingredient of Clause (e) of
Sub-section (1) of Section 14 which speaks of non-
availability of any other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied.
Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to
exist as available than the court has to ask the landlord
why he is not occupying such other available
accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may
convince the court that the alternate residential
accommodation though available is still of no
consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to
satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in
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RC.REV. 383/2026 Page 6 of 11

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an
alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of
the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in
comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the
landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of
the landlord and his family members would be relevant
fact Ors. While considering the totality of the
circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession
or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their
style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom
they come.”
73. In the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs Firm Prem
Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534 , it was observed as under: -
“It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge
of his requirement for residential or business purpose and
he has got complete freedom in the matter, (See: Prativa
Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan , [1996] 5 SCC 353. In the
case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the
tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it
was suitable and it cannot be faulted.”
74. Further, in the eviction petition, the landlord need not disclose
the alternate properties available to him if he is of the view that the
alternate properties are unsuitable for him. The eviction petition is
not a declaration or disclosure of all the immovable assets of the
landlord and then and the exercise of sifting through the ones’
which are or could be deemed to be suitable as alternate
accommodation. For any property to be considered alternately
available, it has first to be available, i.e. in possession of the
landlord and capable of being put to immediate use; thereafter only
the issue of its suitability for the bona fide need arises. The
landlord’s discretion and prerogative in this regard cannot be
questioned, except insofar as it is not whimsical, ex facie or
shockingly unreasonable. Reliance is placed upon Babu Lal vs
Atul Kumar & Anr. CRP No. 147 of 2012 passed by the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi.
75. In Praveen and Another vs Mulak Raj and Others (2023)
SCC OnLine Del 7721 , it has been held by the Hon’ble High
Court that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of the landlord
and dictate as to how the available property of the landlord is to be
best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute owner of his
property and is the best person to decide which property is to be
utilized in what way.
76. In view of the settled legal position, it is not for the respondent
to dictate to the petitioner that he should use some other
accommodation for their business, even if it is indeed available
with the petitioner. The tenanted premises belong to the petitioner
and it is for the petitioner to see whether it is suitable for his
requirement or not. It is the right of the petitioner to choose a
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RC.REV. 383/2026 Page 7 of 11

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

property which is going to be more profitable and convenient for
bonafide need. If the tenanted premises is suitable as per his needs,
the petitioner has every right to possess the said premises and the
respondent cannot contend that the petitioner should manage their
affairs otherwise. While deciding the question of bonafide
requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an
endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted. Thus,
the petitioner has successfully established alleged bonafide need
and paucity of accommodation.”

16. A perusal of the aforesaid findings of the learned ARC reveals
that the contention regarding the availability of alternative
accommodation at Property No. 1588, Dariba Kalan, was duly
considered. The learned ARC has taken note of the Respondent’s
explanation that the commercial premises forming part of the said
property comprise a shop owned by Sh. Ram Singh and occupied by a
tenant, which assertion finds support in the documentary material
placed on record, including the property tax documents and the
counterfoil of the rent receipt exhibited during evidence.
17. The learned ARC has further recorded that the Petitioners failed
to adduce any oral or documentary evidence substantiating their
assertion regarding the availability of the alleged alternative
accommodation. In the absence of material establishing that the
accommodation relied upon is available to the Respondent for
immediate use and is reasonably suitable to meet the requirement in
question, the mere assertion of its existence cannot, by itself, displace
the finding of bona fide requirement returned by the learned ARC.
18. It is trite law that the availability of alternative accommodation
cannot be assessed in the abstract, divorced from its actual availability
and suitability in the facts and circumstances of the case. The
determination of such suitability must necessarily be undertaken from
the standpoint of the landlord’s requirement, and the tenant cannot
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

dictate the manner in which the landlord ought to arrange or satisfy
such requirement.
19. The aforesaid view finds support in the decision of the Hon’ble
6
Supreme Court in Anil Bajaj & Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja , wherein it was
reiterated that the existence of other properties with the landlord does
not, by itself, defeat a claim for eviction on the ground of bona fide
requirement, nor can the tenant dictate the manner in which the
landlord ought to utilise his property. The relevant consideration is
whether the alternative accommodation relied upon is, in fact,
available and reasonably suitable to meet the requirement in question.
The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“ 6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant
1) is carrying on his business from a shop premise located in a
narrow lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises located on
the main road which the landlord considers to be more suitable for
his own business. The materials on record, in fact, disclose that the
landlord had offered to the tenant the premises located in the
narrow lane in exchange for the tenanted premises which offer was
declined by the tenant. It is not the tenant's case that the landlord,
Appellant 1, does not propose to utilise the tenanted premises from
which eviction is sought for the purposes of his business. It is also
not the tenant's case that the landlord proposes to rent out/keep
vacant the tenanted premises after obtaining possession thereof or
to use the same is any way inconsistent with the need of the
landlord. What the tenant contends is that the landlord has several
other shop houses from which he is carrying on different
businesses and further that the landlord has other premises from
where the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be
effectively carried out. It would hardly require any reiteration of
the settled principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to
the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord
should be utilised by him for the purpose of his business. Also, the
fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises
cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted
premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for
his own business.”

6
(2014) 15 SCC 610
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RC.REV. 383/2026 Page 9 of 11

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

7
20. Further, in Charanjeet Singh v. Vivek Jain , the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi emphasised that an unsubstantiated assertion regarding
the availability of alternative accommodation, unsupported by
material particulars or documentary evidence, would not suffice to
displace the landlord’s claim. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 16. Then comes the last leg of challenge to the impugned order
qua availability of the reasonably suitable alternate
accommodation. The petitioner tenant in his application for leave
to contest alleged that one room on ground floor of the larger
premises is lying vacant and the same can be used by the
respondent landlord for the purposes of storage of stock. In reply,
the respondent landlord categorically denied availability of any
such vacant room. Despite that, the petitioner tenant did not bring
on record even a shred of reliable documentary material in support
of this averment. Merely on the basis of such bald averment if the
parties are pushed into the churning and rigmaroles of full dress
trial, it would completely negate the principle underlying Section
14(1)( e ) of the Act, which provides speedy remedy to a landlord
for his bona fide need of the tenanted premises as he has no
reasonably suitable alternate accommodation.”

21. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, the learned counsel for the Petitioners have not demonstrated any
perversity in the appreciation of the material on record, any material
evidence having been ignored, or any error apparent on the face of the
Impugned Order warranting interference by this Court in the exercise
of its limited revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act.
22. In view of the foregoing discussion, the challenge raised by the
learned counsel for the Petitioners to the Impugned Order is devoid of
merit. The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

7
2024 SCC OnLine Del 613
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RC.REV. 383/2026 Page 10 of 11

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16

23. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
24. The next date stands cancelled, i.e., 08.12.2026.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/pt/ma
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 383/2026 Page 11 of 11

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:12:16