KALASAPPA vs GANGUBAI

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RSA.5660 OF 2009




IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

th
DATED THIS THE 9 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE RAJESHWARI N.HEGDE

REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.5660 OF 2009

BETWEEN:

1. SRI. KALASAPPA S/O. NINGAPPA HARAGAPURE
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LR’S

1A. SRI. MALLIKARJUN
S/O. KALASAPPA HARAGAPURE,
AGE: 36 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. SHIRAGAONWADI, TQ: CHIKODI,
DIST: BELAGAVI-591201.

1B. SMT. MAHANANDA W/O. SANJAY PATIL
D/O. KALASAPPA HARAGAPURE,
AGE: 32 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. PATIL GALLI, KAGWAD,
TQ: KAGWAD, DIST: BELAGAVI-591223.

1C. SMT. SUJATA W/O. VINAYAK PATIL
D/O. KALASAPPA HARAGAPURE,
AGE: 29 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. CHANDUR, TQ: HATAKANAGALE,
DIST: KOLHAPUR-416109.
MAHARASHTRA STATE.

…APPELLANTS
(BY SMT. PALLAVI S. PACHHAPURE, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. SMT. GANGUBAI
W/O. KALASAPPA HARAGAPURE
AGE: 54 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. SHIRAGAONWADI, TQ: CHIKODI,
DIST: BELAGAVI-591201.

…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. CHETAN MUNNOLI, ADVOCATE)













Digitally signed
by BHARATHI H
M
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
DHARWAD
BENCH
Date: 2026.10.13
17:00:29 +0530

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RSA.5660 OF 2009




THIS RSA IS FILED U/S. 100 OF CPC., PRAYING TO CALL FOR
RECORDS IN R.A.NO. 57 OF 2007 ON THE FILE OF THE FAST TRACK
COURT-I, CHIKODI, CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE IN
O.S.NO.02/2002 ON THE FILE OF COURT OF THE PRINCIPAL CIVIL
JUDGE (SR.DN.) CHIKODI AND ON PERUSAL OF THE SAME TO BE
PLEASED TO SET ASIDE BOTH THE JUDGMENTS AND DECREES DATED
17.09.2009 AND 31.07.2007, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND
EQUITY.

THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 08.09.2026 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE RAJESHWARI N.HEGDE

CAV JUDGMENT


1. This Regular Second Appeal is filed by the
plaintiff, assailing the judgment and decree dated
17.09.2009 passed in R.A. No.57/2007, whereby the Fast
Track Court-I, Chikkodi, (for short, ‘First Appellate Court’)
confirmed the judgment and decree dated 31.07.2007
passed in O.S. No.2/2002 by the learned Principal Civil
Judge (Senior Division), Chikkodi (for short, ‘the trial
Court’).

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are
referred to as ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’, as they were
arrayed before the Trial Court.

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RSA.5660 OF 2009




3. The plaintiff instituted the suit seeking following
reliefs:

a. Declaration that suit land is the joint family land of the
plaintiff.

b. Consequently, the defendant be restrained by an order of
injunction not to transfer the said land in favour any
body.

c. Any other relief which the Court deems fit to be granted.


4. Description of the Suit Property is as under:
Land bearing RS No.35/3B/2 measuring 3 acres 19
guntas situated at village Nej, Chikkodi taluk.

5. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that the suit
property is land bearing R.S. No.35/3B/2, measuring 3
acres 19 guntas, out of which the plaintiff claims a half
share, situated at Nej Village, Chikkodi Taluk. The
defendant is his wife. Their marriage was solemnized about
60 years prior to the institution of the suit at Shiragaon
Village. After their marriage, they lived together as husband

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



and wife until December 2001. They had no children
through the wedlock.
5.a The plaintiff contended that he did not own any
ancestral property. By his hard work and labour, he
purchased land bearing R.S. No.57/1 in the year 1967.
Thereafter, by his own efforts and earnings, he became
financially sound. He had deposited a sum of ₹7,000/- in a
fixed deposit in the name of his wife and a sum of
₹20,000/- in his own name.
5.b In the year 1993, the plaintiff intended to purchase
the suit property. Accordingly, he entered into an
Agreement of Sale dated 18.01.1993 in respect of the suit
property with its owner, along with one Darigouda Annappa
Muddai.
5.c. it is further contended that, although the
transaction was negotiated and the consideration was
arranged by him, the registered Sale Deed dated
20.10.1993 was executed in the name of the defendant for

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



a consideration of ₹22,000/-. He had provided the entire
sale consideration and that the defendant had not
contributed any amount towards the purchase.
5.d. It was further contended that the property was
purchased in the name of the defendant only for the benefit
and convenience of the family. He was managing the affairs
of the family and was personally cultivating the suit land,
raising sugarcane and other crops thereon. The sugarcane
grown in the suit property was supplied to the sugar factory
in his name.
5.e It is further contended that, he was in actual
possession and enjoyment of the suit property and had
been paying the land revenue payable in respect thereof.
5.f. It is further contended that the defendant
subsequently quarrelled with him and went to reside with
her brothers, who were residing in the same village. Despite
his request, she did not return to reside with him. The
defendant by taking advantage of the fact that the suit

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property stood in her name, attempted to alienate the same
in favour of her brothers.
5.g. It was alleged that the brothers of the defendant
were attempting to interfere and grab the suit property. The
defendant denied the plaintiff's title and asserted that she is
the absolute owner of the suit property. She also allegedly
threatened to transfer the property in favour of third
parties.
5.h. Therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to institute
the suit seeking a declaration that, he was the owner of the
suit property and for a consequential permanent injunction
restraining the defendant from alienating or otherwise
transferring the suit property in favour of any person.

6. Upon service of summons, the defendant entered
appearance through her counsel and filed her written
statement, resisting the suit.

7. The defendant’s contention is that the plaintiff
had never led a happy marital life with her and that he had

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



subjected her to physical and mental cruelty and thereby
she was constrained to reside separately from the plaintiff.
7.a It was further alleged that the plaintiff was
leading an adulterous life and also had children through
such relationship. The plaintiff was addicted to bad habits
and that she had tolerated physical and mental harassment
at his hands.
7.b. It is further contended that she had been
residing separately and maintaining herself from her own
earnings, particularly from a small milk business. She
claimed that she had made savings from her earnings and
had kept some amount in the bank.
7.c. It is further contended that, she belonged to the
same village as the plaintiff and that her brothers had been
helping her in her day-to-day affairs. Her brothers had also
contributed towards the purchase of the suit property and in
any event, the property had been purchased out of her own
earnings.

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



7.d She asserted that, she was in possession and
enjoyment of the suit property and was personally
cultivating the same. The plaintiff insisted that she should
transfer the suit property in his favour. When she refused to
do so, the plaintiff allegedly assaulted her on 22.12.2001
and threw her belongings out of the house.
7.e. It is further contended that she approached the
police, but no effective action was taken. She further
contended that she had been residing separately from the
plaintiff since 1984.
7.f. The defendant also raised an objection regarding
non-joinder of necessary parties. According to her, the suit
was not maintainable in the absence of necessary parties
and was instituted at the instance of the plaintiff's alleged
illegitimate children.
7.g. The defendant specifically denied that the
plaintiff had contributed any amount towards the purchase
of the suit property. She asserted that, she was the

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



absolute owner thereof and that the plaintiff had no right,
title or interest in the property. Accordingly, she sought
dismissal of the suit.

8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the
Trial Court framed the following issues:
Issues

1. Whether the plaintiff prove that the suit
property is the joint family property consisting
of him and defendant?

2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant
is making attempts to transfer or alienate the
suit land?

3. Whether the suit in the present form i.e., the
relief claimed is tenable?

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs
which are claimed?

5. What order/decree?

Addl. Issue

1. Whether the Defendant proves that the suit land
R.S.No.35/3B/2 is the self acquired property
and which is purchased by her independent
income?

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RSA.5660 OF 2009




9. In order to establish his case, the plaintiff
examined himself as PW-1 and examined two other
witnesses as PW-2 and PW-3. He produced and marked
documents at Exs P-1 to P-9.

10. The defendant examined herself as DW-1 and
examined one witness as DW-2. No documentary evidence
was produced on behalf of the defendant.

11. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence on record and after hearing the learned counsel
appearing for the parties, the Trial Court dismissed the suit
by judgment and decree dated 31.07.2007.

12. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the
plaintiff preferred R.A. No.57/2007 before the First
Appellate Court.

13. The First Appellate Court re-appreciated the
evidence on record and, by judgment and decree dated
17.07.2009, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.

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RSA.5660 OF 2009




14. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit by
both the Courts below, the plaintiff has preferred the
present Regular Second Appeal on the following grounds:

a. The impugned judgment and decree passed by both the
Courts below are erroneous, contrary to the facts and
circumstances of the case, the probabilities of the case,
and the weight of evidence available on record.

b. The Trial Court failed to frame proper and necessary
issues for determination. Consequently, the judgment
and decree passed by the Trial Court are erroneous and
liable to be set aside.

c. The Trial Court committed a serious error in failing to
appreciate the fact that the defendant was a housewife
and had no independent source of income sufficient to
purchase the suit property.

d. Both the Courts below committed a serious error in
appreciating the admissions allegedly made by the
defendant with regard to the respective shares of the
plaintiff and the defendant in the suit property.

e. The First Appellate Court ought to have remanded the
matter to the Trial Court, particularly when the Trial
Court had failed to properly adjudicate the question of
title to the suit property. It was contended that the
defendant had no independent title to the suit property.

f. Both the Courts below further erred in applying Section
14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, to the facts of the
present case, particularly when, according to the plaintiff,

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



the suit property was his self-acquired property
purchased out of his own earnings in the year 1993.

g. It was contended that the Agreement of Sale had been
entered into by the plaintiff with the vendor of the suit
property and that the sale consideration had been
arranged and paid by him. However, in order to avail
certain benefits relating to the cultivation and supply of
sugarcane, the registered Sale Deed was executed in the
name of the defendant who is plaintiff's wife. Merely
because the Sale Deed stood in the name of the
defendant, according to the plaintiff, the property did not
become her exclusive property.


15. The aforesaid aspect of the matter was not
properly appreciated by either of the Courts below. The
plaintiff therefore contended that, the concurrent judgments
and decrees dismissing the suit, suffer from errors of law
and appreciation of evidence and are liable to be set aside.

16. In response to the notice issued in the present
appeal, the respondent-defendant appeared through the
counsel and resisted the appeal.

17. The records of the Trial Court were secured.
Heard the Smt.Pallavi Pachhapure, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant-plaintiff and Sri.Chetan Munnoli,

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
defendant.

18. Learned counsel for respondent-defendant has
relied upon the following judgment in support of his case:
Gangamma and Others Vs. G. Nagarathnamma and
Others reported in (2009) 15 SCC 756

19. At the time of admission of the present appeal,
the following substantial questions of law were framed:

a. Whether both the Courts below have committed a
serious error in dismissing the suit more particularly in
view of the negative finding recorded on Additional
Issue No.1?

b. Whether both the Courts below have committed a
serious error in holding that the defendant had become
the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in
the absence of any pleading to that effect, particularly
in view of the negative finding recorded on Additional
Issue No.1?


20. The learned counsel appearing for the
plaintiff/appellant contended that the defendant/respondent

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



had no independent source of income to purchase the suit
property in her own name. It was submitted that the
Agreement of Sale, marked as Ex.P-1, had been executed in
favour of the plaintiff/appellant, who had entered into the
said agreement with the intention of purchasing the
property out of his own earnings.

21. It was further contended that, although the
registered Sale Deed was executed in the name of the
defendant, the plaintiff had provided the entire sale
consideration for the purchase of the suit property.
According to the plaintiff, the Sale Deed was executed in
the name of his wife because he was cultivating sugarcane
and other crops in the suit property and intended to avail
certain facilities from the sugar factory in her name. It was
also contended that the property had been purchased in the
name of the defendant out of love and affection for her.

22. The plaintiff further contended that he was the
absolute owner of the suit property and that the defendant
was merely a nominal owner, as the property had been
purchased in her name. According to him, the defendant

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



had no independent source of income and had not
contributed any amount towards the purchase
consideration. He specifically asserted that he alone had
entered into the Agreement of Sale and had paid the entire
consideration for the purchase of the suit property.

23. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the
defendant/respondent contended that, although the
Agreement of Sale marked as Ex.P-1 stood in the name of
the plaintiff, he was not the sole party to the transaction. It
was submitted that one Darigouda Annappa Muddai was
also a party to the said Agreement of Sale and that he was
the father of Champavva, with whom, according to the
defendant, the plaintiff had been leading an adulterous life.

24. It was further contended that the plaintiff had
entered into the Agreement of Sale in the aforesaid
circumstances with a view to safeguarding the interests of
Champavva and that the transaction relied upon by the
plaintiff was, in substance, a benami transaction. The
defendant specifically denied that the plaintiff had

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



contributed any amount towards the purchase consideration
of the suit property.

25. According to the defendant, she had herself
arranged the requisite funds and purchased the suit
property in her own name. She contended that the plaintiff
had no right, title or interest whatsoever in the suit property
and that she was in actual possession and enjoyment
thereof. On these grounds, she asserted that she was the
absolute owner of the suit property.

26. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions,
PW-1 was subjected to cross-examination. During his cross-
examination, PW-1 admitted that the defendant was his
legally wedded wife and that no children had been born out
of their wedlock. It was suggested to PW-1 that he had
been leading an adulterous life with Champavva; however,
he denied the said suggestion.

27. PW-1 further admitted that, under the
Agreement of Sale marked as Ex.P-1, an extent of 3 acres
and 19 guntas was agreed to be purchased. He also
admitted that Darigouda Annappa Muddai, the father of

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RSA.5660 OF 2009



Champavva, had agreed to purchase a half share in the
same survey number along with the plaintiff under the said
Agreement of Sale.

28. PW-1 further admitted that he had no
documentary evidence to establish that he had possessed
₹20,000 in cash or that he had withdrawn the said amount
from the bank on the relevant date.

29. It was also suggested to PW-1 that Ex.P-1 was a
created document, which suggestion he denied. PW-1
further admitted that he had purchased another extent of 2
acres and 2 guntas of land in the year 1967.

30. Upon perusal of Ex.P-1, it is seen that the
Agreement of Sale is dated 18.01.1993, whereas the Sale
Deed is dated 20.10.1993. The defendant specifically
contended that Ex.P-1 was a created document. PW-1
further admitted that the Sale Deed did not disclose the
reason for purchasing the suit property in the name of his
wife, although he claimed to have paid the entire sale
consideration.

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31. The plaintiff examined PW-2 in support of his
case. PW-2 deposed that he was acquainted with the
plaintiff and that the plaintiff had purchased the land under
Ex.P-2. He further stated that the plaintiff had paid the sale
consideration and had informed him that the suit property
was being purchased in the name of his wife to enable her
to acquire shares in a sugar factory.

32. During his cross-examination by the learned
counsel for the defendant, PW-2 denied the suggestion that
the defendant had paid the sale consideration for the
purchase of the suit property.

33. In order to substantiate her defence, the
defendant examined herself as DW-1. She deposed that, as
the plaintiff was allegedly leading an adulterous life and ill-
treating her, she had started residing separately from him.
She further deposed that she had purchased the suit
property out of her own income, with financial assistance
from her brothers, and that the purchase was evidenced by
Ex.P-2.

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34. DW-1 was cross-examined by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff. During her cross-examination, it
was suggested to her that she had no independent source
of income to purchase the suit property and that the
plaintiff had paid the entire sale consideration. She denied
both suggestions.

35. The learned counsel appearing for the
appellant/plaintiff contended that the evidence on record
established that the plaintiff had paid the entire sale
consideration and had purchased the suit property in the
name of the defendant to enable her to acquire shares in
the sugar factory. It was therefore argued that both the
Courts below had erred in dismissing the suit instituted by
the plaintiff.

36. In the present appeal, the substantial question of
law framed for consideration is whether both the Courts
below erred in dismissing the suit in the light of the finding
recorded on Additional Issue No. 1.

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37. Upon perusal of the records, it is seen that
Additional Issue No. 1 framed by the Trial Court reads as
follows:
Whether the defendant proves that the suit land
bearing R.S. No.35/3B/2 is her self-acquired property
purchased from her independent income?

38. The Trial Court answered the said issue in the
negative. In other words, the Trial Court held that the
defendant had failed to establish that the suit property was
her self-acquired property purchased out of her independent
income.

39. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
contended that, in view of the finding recorded by the Trial
Court that the defendant had failed to establish that the suit
property had been purchased out of her independent
income and that it was her self-acquired property, the
dismissal of the suit by both the Courts below was
erroneous.

40. However, the Trial Court had also framed Issue
No. 1 as to whether the plaintiff proved that the suit

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property was the joint family property of himself and the
defendant. The Trial Court answered the said issue in the
negative.

41. The Trial Court assigned the reason that, even
assuming that the plaintiff had purchased the suit property
in the name of his wife, the defendant had acquired
ownership over the property by virtue of such purchase.
The Trial Court further observed that the plaintiff had not
pleaded that the transaction was a benami transaction.

42. Accordingly, having regard to the nature of the
transaction and the fact that the suit property had been
purchased in the name of the wife, the Trial Court
proceeded to hold that the defendant was the owner of the
suit property, placing reliance on Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.

43. The learned counsel appearing for the
respondent placed reliance on the judgment in Gangamma
and Others v. G. Nagarathnamma and Others (supra),
wherein it was held that the expression “acquired”, as
occurring in Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,

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1956, is required to be construed in its widest possible
sense.

44. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,
reads as follows:
14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute
property.—
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,
whether acquired before or after the commencement of
this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and
not as a limited owner.
Explanation.—In this sub-section, ‘property’
includes both movable and immovable property acquired
by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a
partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of
maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a
relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her
own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription,
or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such
property held by her as stridhana immediately before the
commencement of this Act.”

45. Placing reliance on the aforesaid proposition of
law, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent
contended that, although the defendant-respondent had

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failed to establish that she had paid the sale consideration
for the purchase of the suit property under Ex.P-2, the fact
that the property had been purchased in her name would
constitute acquisition of the property within the meaning of
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Consequently, according to the learned counsel, the
property would constitute her absolute property.

46. The learned counsel for the respondent further
contended that the expression “acquired”, as occurring in
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is required
to be construed in its widest possible sense, as held in the
judgment relied upon by him.

47. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence on record, it is evident that the defendant-
respondent had not produced sufficient evidence to
establish that she had the requisite funds to pay the sale
consideration for the purchase of the suit property.
Accordingly, the Trial Court answered Additional Issue No. 1
in the negative, holding that the defendant had failed to

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establish that the suit property was her self-acquired
property purchased out of her independent income.

48. However, the failure of the defendant-respondent
to establish that she had paid the sale consideration out of
her independent income does not, by itself, determine the
question of title to the suit property. It is an admitted
position that the registered Sale Deed was executed in her
name. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the property was
purchased in the name of a female Hindu does not, by
itself, conclude the question of ownership under Section
14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The applicability
of the said provision must be determined in the light of the
nature and circumstances of the acquisition and the legal
rights, if any, possessed by the female Hindu in respect of
the property. The expression “acquired” occurring in the
said provision must be construed in accordance with the
settled principles of law governing the interpretation of that
provision.

49. In the present case, both the Courts below, upon
consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on

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record, have concurrently held that the defendant-
respondent is the absolute owner of the suit property. The
mere absence of proof that the defendant paid the sale
consideration from her independent income does not, in
itself, render the said findings legally unsustainable. Unless
the findings recorded by the Courts below are demonstrated
to be perverse, contrary to the evidence on record, or
vitiated by an error of law giving rise to a substantial
question of law, interference in the present second appeal
would not be warranted.

50. For the foregoing reasons, the substantial
questions of law are answered against the appellant-plaintiff
and in favour of the respondent-defendant. Consequently,
the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, this Court
proceeds to pass the following:
ORDER
dismissed
The appeal is .
The judgment and decree dated 17.09.2009
passed in R.A. No.57/2007 by the Fast Track Court-I,

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Chikkodi and the judgment and decree dated
31.07.2007 passed in O.S. No.2/2002 by the learned
Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Chikkodi, is
hereby confirmed.

Sd/-
(RAJESHWARI N.HEGDE)
JUDGE
AC
CT:CMU