Sanket Mishra vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
nd
ON THE 2 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 107 of 2016
CNR No.: MPHC030325152016
SANKET MISHRA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THR AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Dharmendra Singh Raghuwanshi - learned counsel for petitioner.
Shri G.K. Agarwal - learned Government Advocate for
respondent/State.
Shri Praveen Kumar Newaskar - learned Additional Solicitor General
for respondent No.6.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been
preferred by the petitioner seeking the following reliefs:-
"1) That, specific directions may kindly be given to
respondents to give compassionate appointment to the
petitioner, and;
2) at the same time, the enquiry may kindly initiated in the
matter as to how and why, the respondent No.6 was
appointed in place of the petitioner; and
3) Any other relief that this Hon'ble High Court may deem fit
in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be
granted; and
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 11/3/2026
3:04:07 PM

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4)Costs of this petition may also be awarded to the
petitioner."

2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that one Shri Harisharan
Mishra was working under respondent No.4 as a Clerk and died on
11.04.1993 due to illness. It is further submitted that respondent No.6 applied
for compassionate appointment and without disclosing that the petitioner was
the successor of the deceased, respondent No.6 was appointed on
compassionate ground vide order dated 09.06.1997. It is further submitted
that the petitioner had already obtained a succession certificate in his favour
on 04.04.1994. It is submitted that without considering the aforesaid aspects,
respondent No.5 appointed the respondent No.6 on compassionate grounds.
Thereafter, the petitioner submitted various representations but they were not
considered by the respondents. Irked, the petitioner filed the present petition
on 04.01.2016. It is further submitted that respondent No.6 had already
attained the age of 18 years and therefore, could not have been adopted by
the deceased under Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,
1956.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submit that
respondent No.6 was appointed on compassionate ground vide order dated
09.06.1997, whereas the present petition was filed by the petitioner on
04.01.2016 i.e after an inordinate delay, which has not been explained. It is
further submitted that the petitioner submitted his first representation on
24.10.2015 and had not submitted any representation before the official
respondents prior to that date. It is further submitted that respondent No.6
was appointed on 09.06.1997 and has now completed 29 years of service.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 11/3/2026
3:04:07 PM

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Even at the time of filing of the present petition, respondent No.6 had already

completed 19 years of service on compassionate ground. It is further
submitted that the petitioner has failed to explain the inordinate delay in
filing the present petition. It is a settled position of law that merely filing a
representation does not extend or condone the delay.
4. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the record.
5. Perusal of the record reveals that respondent No.6 was appointed on
compassionate ground vide order dated 09.06.1997, whereas the present
petition was filed by the petitioner on 04.01.2016 i.e after an inordinate
delay, which has not been explained. Petitioner submitted his first
representation on 24.10.2015 and had not submitted any representation
before the official respondents prior to that date. Respondent No.6 was
appointed on 09.06.1997 and has now completed 29 years of service. Even at
the time of filing of the present petition, respondent No.6 had already
completed 19 years of service on compassionate ground. Petitioner has failed
to explain the inordinate delay in filing the present petition. It is a settled
position of law that merely filing a representation does not extend or condone
the delay.
6. The law with respect to delay and laches is settled by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in large number of cases. No benefit can be extended to the
sleeping litigant.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr. vs.
Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:-
“54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a
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Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 11/3/2026
3:04:07 PM

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petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches
in case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to
know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as
the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and
laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and
claim impetus from the judgment in cases where some
diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable
time.”

8. A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53 relying upon
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
“10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible conclusion
that appellant is guilty of delay and laches. Its conduct
disentitles it to any relief. In New Delhi Municipal Council
v. Pan Singh and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1365 the Supreme
Court has held that delay and laches are relevant factors for
exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 the
Supreme Court has observed that discretionary relief can be
provided to one who has not by his act or conduct given a
go-bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an
indolent litigant. In the State of Haryana v. Aravali Khanij
Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been held that where third
party rights are created, the High Court should not interfere.
Similarly, in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra (supra) it has been
held that the Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not
encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third
parties crystallizes in the interregnum.”
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn.
Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows:
6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne
in mind by the High Court when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke
its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or
omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
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Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 11/3/2026
3:04:07 PM

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circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even
where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v.
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 :
AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.

7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5
PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this
Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC
1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor
Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes
had stated:


“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust
to give a remedy either because the party has,
by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay
are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of
that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances
always important in such cases are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as it relates to the remedy.”
10. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
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Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 11/3/2026
3:04:07 PM

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Ashok Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311

that :-
“10. … It is time and again, stated that a party who has slept
over his right since is not entitled to the discretionary relief
of the High Court."
11. Considering the aforesaid, as the present petition has been filed
after an inordinate delay of approximately nineteen years and the delay has
not been satisfactorily explained, no case for interference is made out.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
Ahmad

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 11/3/2026
3:04:07 PM