V Srinivas vs Manoj Kumar
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA:
HYDERABAD
*
CONTEMPT CASE No.856 of 2025
Between:
V. Srinivas, S/o. V.Narsaiah.
Petitioner
VERSUS
Manoj Kumar, S/o. Not known,
Aged : Major, Occ: Registrar,
National Institute of Rural Development,
Rajendra Nagar, Hyderabad and another.
Respondents
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 22.04.2026
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU
RAJESHWAR RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
_______________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
Page 2 of 18
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU
RAJESHWAR RAO
+ CONTEMPT CASE No.856 of 2025
% 22.04.2026
# Between:
V. Srinivas, S/o. V.Narsaiah.
Petitioner
VERSUS
Manoj Kumar, S/o. Not known,
Aged : Major, Occ: Registrar,
National Institute of Rural Development,
Rajendra Nagar, Hyderabad and another.
Respondents
! Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Mr. Avadesh Narayan Sanghi,
learned Senior Counsel.
^Counsel for the respondent(s) : Mr. Sai Eshwar, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of
Mr. N.B.Sudarshan.
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1) AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1465
Page 3 of 18
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU
RAJESHWAR RAO
CONTEMPT CASE No.856 of 2025
DATE: 22.04.2026
Between:
V. Srinivas, S/o. V.Narsaiah.
…Petitioner
AND
Manoj Kumar, S/o. Not known,
Aged : Major, Occ: Registrar,
National Institute of Rural Development,
Rajendra Nagar, Hyderabad and another.
…Respondents
(per the Hon’ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy)
ORDER:
Heard Mr. Avadesh Narayan Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioner; and Mr. Sai Eshwar, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of Mr. N.B.Sudarshan, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. The instant is a Contempt Case filed by the petitioner under
Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 alleging willful non-
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compliance of the order and direction given by the Division Bench of
this High Court in Writ Petition No.5292 of 2020, decided on
03.05.2024.
3. It would be relevant at this juncture to take note of the operative
part of the order passed by the Division Bench of this High Court in Writ
Petition No.5292 of 2020. For ready reference, the operative part is
reproduced hereunder:
“5. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel
nd
appearing for the petitioners, this Court is of the view that the 2
respondent was initially appointed as contract employee on
nd
04.07.1997. Though the 2 respondent was appointed after
undergoing regular selection process, right to be considered is a
fundamental right. The Tribunal has rightly directed the petitioners
nd
to regularize the service of the 2 respondent, “if he is otherwise”
eligible. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the
order passed by the Tribunal.
7. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is disposed of. However, the
nd
petitioners are “ directed to consider” the case of the 2 respondent
for regularization of his services, “if he is otherwise eligible” and
“pass appropriate orders” in accordance with law. No costs.”
4. To understand the facts more clearly, it would also be relevant at
this juncture to take note of the order passed by the Central
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Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench (for short the ‘Tribunal’) in
TA.No.21/1/2015 (W.P.No.397/2003), decided on 24.12.2019, whereby
the Tribunal in its operative part has held as under:
“11. The T.A. is accordingly allowed. The respondents shall
consider the case of the applicant for regularization of his
contractual services, within a period of two months from the date of
receipt of this order. We also direct that on such regularization, the
applicant shall be extended the same benefits as was done in the
case of other contractual employees, who were regularized.”
It was this direction which was subjected to challenge before the
High Court in a writ petition filed by the National Institute of Rural
Development, which stood disposed of in the manner reflected in
paragraph No.3.
5. The National Institute of Rural Development subsequent to the
disposal of the Writ Petition No.5292 of 2020 on 03.05.2024, vide its
order dated 19.03.2025 considered the case of the petitioner and has held
as under:
“12. In view of the above facts, the case of Shri V. Srinivas is not fit
to be considered for regularisation. However, taking into account his
contractual length of service, though due to lispendens, and also as
he would be attaining the age of 60 years by 31.12.2025, the
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undersigned takes a lenient view and comes to the conclusion to
allow Shri V. Srinivas, Junior Engineer (Electrical) to continue on
contractual basis up to his attaining the age of 60 years of service.
On attaining the age of 60 years, all the terminal benefits that were
extended in the similar case of Shri Ch. Prabhakar Rao, Junior
Engineer (Civil) retired on contract basis would be allowed, subject
to his work performance and future good conduct.
13. NOW, THEREFORE, the Director General, NIRD&PR being
the Appointing Authority decided that Shri V.Srinivas, Junior
Engineer (Electrical) will be allowed to continue his services on
contract basis as Junior Engineer (Electrical) in the Institute till the
date of his attaining 60 years of age i.e., up to 31.12.2025.
Accordingly, the order dated 24.12.2019 of the Hon’ble CAT
and order dated 03.05.2024 of the Hon’ble High Court are complied
with.”
6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended
that the subsequent order dated 19.03.2025 is nothing but a reiteration of
the earlier order whereby the petitioner’s claim for regularization was
rejected by the National Institute of Rural Development, which already
was held to be bad by the Tribunal and further there was a specific
mandamus given by the Tribunal for regularizing the services of the
petitioner. Having failed to do so, the action on the part of the National
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Institute of Rural Development amounts to contempt, entailing
punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act.
7. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner further
contended that a plain reading of the order dated 19.03.2025 also goes to
establish that in spite of there being a specific mandamus issued by the
Tribunal while disposing of TA.No.21/1/2015 and passing the very same
order amounts to nothing less than a contempt as it all the more reflects
the conduct of the officers of the National Institute of Rural
Development whereby it has literally sat over the order of the Tribunal
and which was also confirmed by the Division Bench of this High Court,
in the course of passing the order rejecting the petitioner’s claim for
regularization, thereby paying no heed to the order / command /
mandamus issued by the Tribunal as also by the High Court and also
amounts to a blatant disrespect and dishonouring of the orders of the
Tribunal and the High Court.
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Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner heavily relied
8.
upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A. P. S.
1
R. T. C. and Ors. vs. V. G. Srinivas Reddy and Ors. .
9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents /
National Institute of Rural Development contended that the institute
places the orders of the High Court also that of the Tribunal at a very
high esteem and has in its letter and spirit considered the directions
issued and have strictly scrutinized the claim of the petitioner for
regularization. It is only thereafter they have reached to a conclusion that
the relief sought for by the petitioner for the reasons reflected in the
order dated 19.03.2025 could not be granted and the claim for
regularization thus got rejected. Therefore, the action on the part of the
National Institute of Rural Development does not amount to contempt,
moreover the order dated 19.03.2025 shows due compliance of the order
passed by the Tribunal as also by the High Court.
10. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on
perusal of records, what is culled out is fact that the original petition
1
AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1465
Page 9 of 18
filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal stood allowed order dated
vide
24.12.2019. While allowing the T.A., the direction for the National
Institute of Rural Development was to “consider” the claim of the
petitioner for regularization. The order of the Tribunal was subjected to
challenge by the Institute before the High Court and the High Court vide
its order dated 03.05.2024 had disposed of the Writ Petition with the
observations as reflected in paragraph No.3 of this order.
11. A plain reading of the operative part of the judgment passed by the
Division Bench of this High Court which has been reproduced in the
preceding paragraphs would lead us to consider the three phases which
are emphatically laid down by the Division Bench while disposing of the
writ petition. The three phrases are:-
1) If he is otherwise eligible
2) Directed to consider
3) Pass appropriate orders
12. At this juncture we need to consider the strict meaning that can be
given to these phrases one by one.
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means that a person must satisfy all
12.1. “If he is otherwise eligible”
the other applicable legal requirements and parameters apart from the
specific condition being discussed. It is used to indicate that the benefit,
right, or decision mentioned will apply only if the individual already
meets the general eligibility criteria laid down by law, such as age,
qualifications, conduct, or other statutory conditions. The phrase acts as
a safeguard, ensuring that even if one particular issue is addressed or
relaxed, the person is not automatically entitled unless they fulfill all
remaining requirements. In essence, it means ‘provided that he meets all
other necessary conditions’.
12.2 “Directed to consider” means that a Court orders a person or
body (such as a government official or administrative agency) to
examine and evaluate a matter carefully and make a decision according
to law. It does not mean that a specific outcome must be granted; rather,
it requires the authority to apply its mind, review the relevant facts,
follow proper procedure, and then arrive at an independent decision. This
phrase is often used when a Court does not want to substitute its own
judgment for that of the competent authority but still ensures that the
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issue is properly addressed. In essence, it imposes a duty to fairly assess
the matter without guaranteeing any particular result.
12.3 “Pass appropriate orders” means that a Court is required to
make a decision or issue directions that are suitable, lawful, and justified
based on the facts and circumstances of the case. It gives the authority a
degree and element of discretion, allowing it to determine what action is
proper after considering the relevant laws, evidence, and principles of
fairness. The phrase does not prescribe a specific outcome but expects
that the decision taken will be reasonable, legally sound, and in
accordance with established procedures. In essence, it directs the
authority to arrive at a proper and justified decision within the
framework of the law.
13. As regards the reliance on V. G. Srinivas Reddy and Ors. (supra)
by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the said case has dealt with the phrase ‘consider’ extensively.
For ready reference, paragraph Nos.13, 13.1 to 13.5 and 14 of the said
judgment are reproduced hereunder:
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“ 13. We may, in this context, examine the significance and meaning of a
direction given by the court to “consider” a case. When a court directs
an authority to “consider”, it requires the authority to apply its mind to
the facts and circumstances of the case and then take a decision thereon
in accordance with law. There is a reason for a large number of writ
petitions filed in the High Courts being disposed of with a direction to
“consider” the claim/case/representation of the petitioner(s) in the writ
petitions.
13.1. Where an order or action of the State or an authority is found to
be illegal, or in contravention of the prescribed procedure, or in breach
of the rules of natural justice, or arbitrary/unreasonable/irrational, or
prompted by mala fides or extraneous consideration, or the result of
abuse of power, such action is open to judicial review. When the High
Court finds that the order or action requires interference and exercises
the power of judicial review, thereby resulting in the action/order of the
State or authority being quashed, the High Court will not proceed to
substitute its own decision in the matter, as that will amount to
exercising appellate power, but require the authority to “consider” and
decide the matter again. The power of judicial review under Article 226
concentrates and lays emphasis on the decision-making process, rather
than the decision itself.
13.2.
The High Courts also direct the authorities to “consider”, in a
different category of cases. Where an authority vested with the power to
decide a matter, fails to do so in spite of a request, the person aggrieved
approaches the High Court, which in exercise of the power of judicial
review, directs the authority to “consider” and decide the matter. In
such cases, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High
Court directs “consideration” without examining the facts or the legal
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question(s) involved and without recording any findings on the issues.
The High Court may also direct the authority to “consider” afresh,
where the authority had decided a matter without considering the
relevant facts and circumstances, or by taking extraneous or irrelevant
matters into consideration. In such cases also, the High Court may not
examine the validity or tenability of the claim on merits, but require the
authority to do so.
13.3. Where the High Court finds the decision-making process
erroneous and records its findings as to the manner in which the
decision should be made, and then directs the authority to “consider”
the matter, the authority will have to consider and decide the matter in
the light of its findings or observations of the court. But where the High
Court without recording any findings, or without expressing any view,
merely directs the authority to “consider” the matter, the authority will
have to consider the matter in accordance with law, with reference to
the facts and circumstances of the case, its power not being
circumscribed by any observations or findings of the court.
13.4. We may also note that sometimes the High Courts dispose of the
matter merely with a direction to the authority to “consider” the matter
without examining the issue raised even though the facts necessary to
decide the correctness of the order are available. Neither pressure of
work nor the complexity of the issue can be a reason for the court to
avoid deciding the issue which requires to be decided, and disposing of
the matter with a direction to “consider” the matter afresh. Be that as it
may.
13.5. There are also several instances where unscrupulous petitioners
with the connivance of “pliable” authorities have misused the direction
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“to consider” issued by court. We may illustrate by an example. A
claim, which is stale, time-barred or untenable, is put forth in the form
of a representation. On the ground that the authority has not disposed
of the representation within a reasonable time, the person making the
representation approaches the High Court with an innocuous prayer to
direct the authority to “consider” and dispose of the representation.
When the court disposes of the petition with a direction to “consider”,
the authority grants the relief, taking shelter under the order of the
court directing him to “consider” the grant of relief. Instances are also
not wanting where authorities, unfamiliar with the process and practice
relating to writ proceedings and the nuances of judicial review, have
interpreted or understood the order “to consider” as directing grant of
relief sought in the representation and consequently granting reliefs
which otherwise could not have been granted. Thus, action of the
authorities granting undeserving relief, in pursuance of orders to
“consider”, may be on account of ignorance, or on account of bona
fide belief that they should grant relief in view of the court's direction to
“consider” the claim, or on account of collusion/connivance between
the person making the representation and the authority deciding it.
Representations of daily-wagers seeking regularisation/absorption into
regular service is a species of cases, where there has been a large-scale
misuse of the orders “to consider”.
14. Therefore, while disposing of the writ petitions with a direction to
“consider”, there is a need for the High Court to make the direction
clear and specific. The order should clearly indicate whether the High
Court is recording any finding about the entitlement of the petitioner to
the relief or whether the petition is being disposed of without examining
the claim on merits. The court should also normally fix a time-frame for
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consideration and decision. If no time-frame is fixed and if the authority
does not decide the matter, the direction of the court becomes virtually
infructuous as the aggrieved petitioner will have to come again to court
with a fresh writ petition or file an application for fixing time for
deciding the matter.”
14. After going through the judgment relied upon by the learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner, we need to now look into the order
passed by the Division Bench of this High Court. The Division Bench
seems to have interpreted the order of the Tribunal and though has
declined to interfere with the order of the Tribunal, but in very emphatic
terms held that the National Institute of Rural Development “should
consider” the case of the petitioner for regularization “if he is otherwise
eligible” . Likewise, there was also a specific direction given by the
Division Bench to the National Institute of Rural Development in the
course of complying the order of the Tribunal to consider the case of the
petitioner for regularization and subject to his suitability and eligibility
the authorities required to “pass appropriate orders” .
15. A plain reading of these phrases when read with the meaning
which is otherwise given to these phrases as is reflected in the preceding
paragraph would leave no doubt in the mind of this Bench that in the
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course of disposal of the Writ Petition, an element of discretion was left
with the National Institute of Rural Development to scrutinize the claim
of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders.
16. Since the contempt petition has been filed for non-compliance of
the order passed by the Division Bench of this High Court, this Bench
would be constrained to rely only upon the order passed in the Writ
Petition by the Division Bench and cannot and should not initiate a
contempt based upon the directions given by the Tribunal while
disposing of TA.No.21/1/2015 as the petitioner had an option of filing a
contempt petition before the Tribunal as well, for the non-compliance of
the directions given by the Tribunal. Having not availed the same and
having knocked the doors of the High Court alleging non-compliance of
the order of the High Court, this Bench would have to strictly look into
the order of the High Court alone to consider whether a contempt has
been made out or not.
17. The National Institute of Rural Development after carefully
scrutinizing the case of the petitioner has held that the petitioner is not
entitled for regularization of his services, however it held that all the
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terminal benefits that were extended in the case of Shri Ch. Prabhakar
Rao, Junior Engineer (Civil) retired on contract basis would be allowed,
subject to the petitioner’s work performance and future good conduct.
Further, after the petitioner’s retirement, the National Institute of Rural
Development had paid the CPF part, gratuity and EL benefits to the
petitioner, which again shows due compliance of the order passed by the
Division Bench of this High Court.
18. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has
not made out a case for initiating contempt against the respondents.
Rather the order dated 19.03.2025 is one which would meet the
requirements of due compliance of the order of the High Court.
However, we make it clear that this Bench has not ventured into testing
the veracity of the order dated 19.03.2025 since this Bench was
exercising contempt jurisdiction. The veracity of the order dated
19.03.2025 could not be tested while exercising contempt jurisdiction. If
at all if the petitioner is still not satisfied with the findings given by the
respondents while passing the order dated 19.03.2025, the petitioner
would be at liberty to avail appropriate legal recourse available
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challenging the order dated 19.03.2025 passed by the respondents /
National Institute of Rural Development.
19. Accordingly, the instant Contempt Case stands closed and the
respondents are discharged from the contempt proceedings.
20. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand
closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
________________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
__________________________________
NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, J
Date: 22.04.2026
Note: L.R. copy to be marked
GSD
(B/o)