RANA SIL vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE

PRESENT:
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR

CRR 2253 OF 2022

RANA SIL
-VS-
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Arindam Jana,
Mr. Rahul Surtani,
Ms. Sonali Ghosh

For the Opposite Party No. 2 : Mr. Sumanta Ganguly

Reserved on : 27.08.2026
Pronounced on : 07.09.2026

UDAY KUMAR, J.: –
1. This criminal revision petition calls into question the legality, propriety,
and correctness of the judgment and order dated 01.06.2022 passed by
the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Krishnanagar,
Nadia, in Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 2019. By the said impugned
judgment, the Learned Appellate Court affirmed the earlier judgment
and order of conviction and sentence dated 16.08.2019 passed by the
Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnanagar, Nadia, in
C.R. Case No. 15C of 2016. Under those concurrent findings, the

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petitioner, Rana Sil, was found guilty under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, initially being sentenced to suffer
simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a compensation of Rs.
2,00,000/-, with a default term of six months' further imprisonment.
Although the Learned Appellate Court was graciously pleased to set
aside the substantive sentence of imprisonment, it unfortunately
upheld the conviction and the heavy compensatory fine of Rs.
2,00,000/-. Being aggrieved by this mechanical and superficial
appreciation of statutory law and evidence, the petitioner has knocked
on the doors of this Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, urging that penal sanctions have
been wrongfully weaponized to validate a fabricated financial claim
where no genuine underlying debt ever existed.
2. The foundational genesis of this litigation traces back to a private
complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act by the opposite party
no. 1, Kallol Biswas, against the petitioner, which came to be registered
as C.R. Case No. 15C of 2016 before the court of the Learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate at Krishnagar. The complainant’s case, set
forth in his petition of complaint, was that he had advanced a friendly
cash accommodation loan of Rs. 1,20,000/- to the petitioner, and that
towards the discharge of this purported liability, the petitioner issued a
cheque drawn on the State Bank of India, Krishnagar Branch. When
the complainant presented this instrument for encashment, it bounced
and was returned unpaid on 01.12.2015 with the bank endorsement
"insufficiency of funds." This prompted the complainant to issue a

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statutory demand notice on 09.12.2015, and upon the petitioner's
failure to meet the demand within the statutory window, the formal
criminal complaint was instituted.
3. During the trial before the Learned Magistrate, the complainant rested
his case primarily on the original cheque, the bank return memo, the
demand notice, and postal receipts, while the trial court heavily leaned
on the automated statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139
of the NI Act, concluding that the mere admission of a signature on the
cheque automatically proved a legally enforceable debt, and finding that
the accused failed to discharge his reverse onus, ultimately leading to
the judgment of conviction on 16.08.2019. When the matter traveled in
appeal as Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 2019, the Learned Additional
Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal and sustained the conviction and
fine, prompting the present challenge before this Bench.
4. Assailing these concurrent findings, Mr. Arindam Jana, the learned
counsel for the petitioner submitted that both the trial and appellate
courts committed grave, patent errors of law and misdirected
themselves in appreciating the evidence on record, thereby rendering
the concurrent findings of guilt legally unsustainable, as the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, was never established by the
complainant. He merely relied on a bald assertion of advancing an
accommodation loan without producing a shred of documentary
evidence, bank account statements, or proof of financial capacity to
lend Rs. 1,20,000/-.

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5. Furthermore, learned counsel submitted that the fact that the
complainant took advantage of frequent familial visits to misappropriate
a blank signed cheque was clearly established on a preponderance of
probabilities through the consistent and unshaken testimonies of
defence witnesses DW-1 and DW-2, including the petitioner's mother.
6. Crucially, the prosecution's case suffered from a fatal infirmity because
the complainant deliberately withheld Witness No. 4, an individual
whom he had specifically cited in his original complaint as an
eyewitness to the alleged loan transaction and the handing over of the
cheque, thereby attracting a severe adverse inference under Section
114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act that the witness would have exposed
the falsehood of the claim.
7. Additionally, Mr. Jana submitted that the petitioner successfully
discharged his reverse onus by rebutting the statutory presumption
through consistent testimonies of DW-1 and DW-2 (including the
petitioner's mother, a pensioner), establishing on a preponderance of
probabilities that no such transaction transpired, and that the appellate
court erred in drawing adverse conclusions from the petitioner's
summary answers during his examination under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, losing sight of the settled legal position
that an accused's summary examination cannot cure foundational
lacunae or lack of independent proof in the prosecution's case, which
must stand entirely on its own legs. Therefore, he prayed for setting
aside of the impugned judgment and orders.

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8. Per contra, Mr. Sumanta Ganguly, the Ld. Advocate for the Opposite
Party (Complainant) supports the concurrent findings, submitting that
the instant criminal revision petition is devoid of legal merit, lacks
substance, and is a clear abuse of the process of law designed solely to
delay the execution of a just and lawful conviction. He urged that both
the Ld. Trial Court and the Ld. Appellate Court meticulously examined
the oral and documentary evidence on record, arriving at well-reasoned,
legally sound concurrent findings of fact regarding the issuance of the
cheque, the signature of the petitioner, the presentation within validity,
subsequent dishonour due to insufficient funds, prompt issuance of the
statutory demand notice, and filing within limitation which were all
proved beyond doubt through the original instrument, bank return
memo, and postal receipts thus satisfying the foundational ingredients
of an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, as such do not warrant
interference under the limited and circumscribed scope of revisional
jurisdiction.
9. He further submitted that once the petitioner admitted his signature
and the issuance of the cheque, the mandatory statutory presumptions
under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act immediately and firmly
kicked in, shifting the burden entirely onto the accused.
10. Relying upon the settled landmark ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197 , he contended that even
if the blanks of a signed cheque are filled up by someone other than the
drawer, it does not invalidate the instrument once the signature is
acknowledged.

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11. Mr. Ganguly further urged that the petitioner though alleged unlawful
acquisition of a blank signed cheque by the complainant, but he failed
to discharge his reverse onus because he never lodged a police
complaint, general diary, or bank stop-payment instruction upon
receiving the statutory demand notice, rendering his defence of a stolen
or misused blank cheque a mere afterthought that was rightly rejected
by the both courts. Furthermore, regarding the non-examination of
Witness No. 4, it is submitted that the complainant is the master of his
case and is not bound to examine all cited witnesses if primary evidence
is self-sufficient, while the testimony of defence witnesses DW-1 and
DW-2 was rightly rejected as interested and self-serving.
12. Finally, Mr. Ganguly submitted that a Revisional Court under Sections
397 and 401 of the CrPC does not sit as a second Court of Appeal to re-
appreciate evidence unless there is gross perversity, illegality, or
misreading of evidence, none of which exist here, especially since the
appellate court took a lenient view by modifying substantive
imprisonment into a compensatory fine. Therefore, he prayed for the
dismissal of this revision.

13. Having heard the learned counsel for the competing parties and
perused the lower court records, the primary question for determination
is whether the concurrent findings of conviction suffer from patent
perversity, illegality, or a gross misreading of evidence, particularly
concerning the rebuttal of statutory presumptions, the proof of a legally
enforceable debt, and the withholding of a material witness?

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14. The resolution of this criminal revision hinges upon a careful
harmonization of statutory presumptions, the standard of rebuttal in
criminal jurisprudence, and the foundational requirement of a legally
enforceable debt under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The legal
architecture governing cheque dishonour cases is anchored primarily in
Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act, which mandate that every
negotiable instrument is presumed to have been drawn for
consideration, and that the holder received it in discharge of a legally
enforceable debt or liability. However, these provisions do not operate
as an irrebuttable command; they must be interpreted alongside
Section 20 of the NI Act concerning inchoate instruments, Section
114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the withholding of vital
evidence, and the restricted parameters of revisional review under
Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
15. The foundational scope of these statutory presumptions was
authoritatively settled by a three-judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [(2010) 11 SCC 441]. The Apex Court
clarified that while Section 139 includes the presumption regarding the
existence of a legally enforceable debt, this presumption is rebuttable in
nature. The standard of proof required of an accused to remove this
statutory presumption does not scale the heavy criminal threshold of
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Instead, the accused is required to
establish a probable defence on the civil standard of a "preponderance
of probabilities," which can be successfully achieved by highlighting
inherent improbabilities, structural gaps, or contradictions in the

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complainant’s version during cross-examination or by adducing positive
defence evidence. As the Supreme Court observed:
"Once the cheque relates to the account of the accused and he
accepts and admits the signatures on the said cheque, then initial
presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act has to be raised by the Court in favour of the
complainant. The presumption referred to in Section 139 of the N.I.
Act is a mandatory presumption... but the accused is entitled to
rebut the said presumption."
16. Building upon these principles, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [(2019) 5 SCC 418] enunciated a vital
corollary: once the accused raises a probable defence specifically by
calling into question the financial capacity of the complainant to
advance a substantial cash loan without any supporting
documentation, accounting trail, or formal banking transaction, the
evidentiary onus shifts. The complainant can no longer rest idly on the
initial statutory presumption; rather, the burden shifts squarely onto
the complainant to affirmatively prove his financial capability and the
authenticity of the transaction. In the factual matrix of the present
case, both lower courts committed a patent illegality by entirely
overlooking this shifted burden. The complainant asserted the
advancement of a cash loan of Rs. 1,20,000/- yet failed to produce a
single bank statement, receipt, or shred of documentary proof
demonstrating his financial capacity to lend such an amount.
17. Furthermore, the legal implications surrounding signatures on blank or
inchoate cheque leaves must be evaluated through the lens of Bir Singh
(supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while filling in the

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particulars of a signed blank cheque is permissible under Section 20 of
the NI Act, the foundational premise of Section 139 still presumes that
the instrument originated from a legitimate transaction and a genuine
underlying debt, holding as follows:
"If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee,
towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and
other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque.
The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque
was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence...
Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by
the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract
presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act..."
18. In the present case, the petitioner's defence was not a mere technical
denial of the handwriting, but a substantive assertion that the blank
signed cheque was secretly misappropriated during the complainant's
frequent familial visits. While the prosecution relied heavily on the
admitted signature, the total absence of a proved financial trail
rendered the mechanical application of Section 139 legally flawed.
19. A glaring dimension of perversity in the impugned judgments, is the
complete judicial silence and oversight regarding the non-examination
of Witness No. 4. In the original petition of complaint, the complainant
explicitly cited Witness No. 4 as a direct eyewitness to both the alleged
loan transaction and the physical handing over of the cheque. Under
Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the law empowers the
Court to draw a strong adverse inference that if a material witness cited
by a party is deliberately withheld from the witness box, their testimony

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would have been unfavourable to that party. The complainant’s failure
to examine this key witness, combined with the lower courts' failure to
draw an adverse inference, constitutes a grave misreading of evidence.
The prosecution cannot selectively withhold primary eyewitnesses while
seeking the blanket protection of strict statutory presumptions.
20. The petitioner successfully discharged his burden of proof on a
preponderance of probabilities through the consistent and unshaken
testimonies of defence witnesses DW-1 and DW-2 (including the
petitioner's mother, a pensioner). Their evidence established the high
probability that no loan transaction ever transpired and that the
instrument was acquired without any underlying debt. Moreover, the
appellate court's adverse reliance on the petitioner's summary answers
during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure violated settled legal principles, which dictate that an
accused’s summary statement cannot cure the foundational lacunae or
lack of independent proof in the complainant's case, as the complaint
must stand entirely on its own legs.
21. Upon a rigorous analysis of the facts, statutory provisions, and binding
precedents, the conclusion becomes inescapable. While the petitioner's
admitted signature triggered the initial statutory presumption under
Section 139, the petitioner successfully rebutted it by exposing the
complainant's lack of financial capacity, the absence of any financial
trail, and the deliberate suppression of the primary eyewitness. The
lower courts committed a grave miscarriage of justice by mechanically
ignoring these vital structural defects.

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22. Accordingly, the question formulated for determination is answered in
the affirmative. The concurrent findings of the courts below therefore
suffer from a fundamental perversity and a misapplication of the legal
burden of proof, resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice.
23. In the result, the criminal revision petition, C.R.R. No. 2253 of 2026, is
hereby allowed.

24. The impugned judgment and order of conviction dated 01.06.2022
passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court,
Krishnanagar, Nadia, in Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 2019, affirming the
judgment and order dated 16.08.2019 passed by the Learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnanagar, Nadia, in C.R. Case No. 15C of
2016, are hereby set aside.
25. The petitioner, Rana Sil, is hereby acquitted of the charge under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
26. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the petitioner stand discharged, and
any fine or compensation amount deposited pursuant to the orders of
the courts below shall be refunded to the petitioner in accordance with
law.

27. Any interim orders passed earlier stand vacated.
28. There shall be no order as to costs.
29. Let a copy of this judgment along with the lower court records be
transmitted down immediately to the courts below for information and
necessary compliance.
30. Case diary, be returned to the Learned Counsel for the State.

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31. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.

(Uday Kumar, J.)