STATE BANK OF INDIA vs THE COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL GOODS AND SERVICE TAX AND CENTRAL EXCISE, SLG COMMISSIONERSTE AND ORS.
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
1
Form J(2)
JPD Sl.No. 01
In the High Court at Calcutta
In the Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Aniruddha Roy
WPA 433 OF 2026
State Bank of India
Vs.
The Commercial Central Goods and
Service Tax and Central Excise, SLG
Commissionerate, Central Revenue
Building and Ors.
For the Petitioner/State Bank of India : Mr. Sakya Sen, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Dey, Adv.
Ms. Trisha Mukerjee, Adv.
Mr. Siddhartha Datta, Adv.
Ms. Payel Chanda, Adv.
For the Respondents / Union of India : Mr. Dilip Kumar Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Bishwa Raj Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Satyajit Paul, Adv.
Reserved on : May 21, 2026
Judgment on : June 30, 2026
Aniruddha Roy, J. :
Facts:
1. The writ petitioner/State Bank of India through its regional manager has
filed the instant writ petition principally challenging a composite show-
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
2
cause notice dated June 25, 2025 part of Annexure P-8 at page 94 to
the writ petition. The said show-cause notice (hereinafter, the said show-
cause notice ) has been issued by the Additional Commissioner under
Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017
(hereinafter the said 2017 Act ).
2. By a letter dated July 21, 2025 , Annexure P-9 at page 425 (Volume-III)
to the writ petition, the writ petitioner replied to the said show-cause
notice. In the said reply for clarity and verification supporting documents
were enclosed which, inter alia, include as follows :-
(a) Calculation worksheets demonstrating the methodology adopted
for computing the taxable value, as submitted to the audit
team. Annexure-4;
(b) Invoices-level details of the disputed transactions. Annexure-5;
and
(c) A copy of every invoice. Annexure-6.
3. In the said reply, the writ petitioner had taken a specific point that single
show-cause notice cannot be issued for multiple tax periods ( at page
439 to the writ petition).
4. By an email dated June 12, 2025 , Annexure P-6 at page 84 to the writ
petition, the writ petitioner submitted inter-branch invoices for the
period upto March 2024, which were 56 in numbers.
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
3
5. Under the impugned order-in-original dated December 12, 2025
Annexure P-12 at Page 454 to the writ petition, the GST authorities
have rejected the objection of the petitioner, inter alia, holding that the
content of the reply was unjustified in lack of invoices, relevant details
supporting the claim and passed its order, which is quoted below :
“I also find that the other contents of the reply are
unjustified in lack of the invoices/relevant details supporting
the claim.
ORDER
In view of the above discussion and findings, I pass the
following order in terms of Section 74(9) of the CGST Act
2017 read with identical provisions of the State GST Act
2017: -
(i) I confirm the demand of GST amounting to
Rs.5,48,56,775/- (IGST Rs.5,48,56,775/-) tabulated as above
(para 9.2), and order for recovery of the same under the
provisions of Section 74(1) of CGST Act, 2017 and read with
Section 20 of IGST Act 2017.
(ii) I order to charge and recover Interest in terms of Section
50 of CGST Act, 2017 read with Sections 5 and 20 of the
IGST Act, 2017 on the (ii) amount as confirmed in para (i)
above.
(iii) I impose Penalty to tune of Rs.5,48,56,775/- (IGST
Rs.5,48,56,775/-) and order to recover the same in terms of
Section 74(i) of the CGST Act, 2017 read with Sections 5 and
20 of the IGST Act, 2017 on the amount as confirmed in para
(i) above.
(iv) The noticee can avail the benefit of reduced penalty to
fifty percent of GST if the GST and interest under Section
50(1) of CGST Act, 2017 & IGST Act, 2017 along with such
reduced penalty is paid within a period of thirty days of the
communication of this order as per the provision of Section
74(11) of the CGST/IGST Act 2017.
(v) I order for entering the above liability in Part-II of
Electronic Liability Register in Form PMT-01.”
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
4
6. Assailing the said impugned show-cause notice and the said impugned
order, the writ petitioner has filed the instant writ petition.
7. The writ petition has been taken up for consideration for final disposal at
its motion stage.
Submissions:
8. Mr. Sakya Sen, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner,
at the threshold, submits that the impugned order has confirmed a
demand of GST authorities amounting to Rs.5,48,56,775/- under
Section 74(1) of 2017 Act with penalty under Section 17 of the Act and
applicable interest under Section 50 of 2017 Act, aggregating a total
liability for about a sum of Rs.10,97,13,550/- having been imposed on
the petitioner. The disproportionate imposition of penalty is without
jurisdiction and perverse, on the face of the impugned order.
9. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Sakya Sen, has primarily challenged the
action of the GST authorities, inter alia, on the following grounds :-
(a) The impugned show-cause notice culminating in the
impugned order was without jurisdiction;
(b) The impugned single show-cause notice clubbing multiple
financial years is not only illegal and de hors the statute
but also without jurisdiction;
(c) The impugned order was passed ignoring vital
documentary evidence resulting in violation of principle of
natural justice; and
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
5
(d) The invocation of power under Section 74 of 2017 Act is
motivated, illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.
10. On facts, learned Senior Advocate submits that the GST authorities
through its letter dated June 04, 2025 Annexure P-2 at page 38 to the
writ petition requested for certain documents. This correspondence was
followed by an email dated June 10, 2025 attaching the said
communication dated June 04, 2025 requesting the petitioner to submit
documents for the financial years 2018-19 to 2023-24 , Annexure P-4
at page 87 to the writ petition.
11. By an email dated June 12, 2025 all the documents were duly provided
by the petitioner for the periods 2018-19 to 2023-24 along with 56 inter-
branch invoices, Annexure P-6 at page 84 to the writ petition. On June
11, 2025 the GST authorities, without waiting for the response to the
said email dated June 10, 2025 issued an audit observation for the
period during April 2018 to March 2019 without considering the
documents and invoices already provided by the petitioner to the GST
authorities, Annexure P-4 at pages 45 to 46 to the writ petition.
12. On June 19, 2025 an audit report for the period of April 2018 to March
2024 was issued by the GST authorities, Annexure P-7 at Pages 88 to 91
to the writ petition, without considering the documents supplied.
13. While issuing the said impugned show-cause notice, the same did not
refer to the documents already provided by the petitioner to the GST
authorities at the pre-show-cause stage. However, the petitioner
submitted a detailed reply to the said impugned show-cause notice dated
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
6
July 21, 2025 where all the invoices and every explanations and
calculation were provided for consideration by the GST authorities but
without considering of the same and without applying its mind, the GST
authorities passed its impugned order dated December 12, 2025. The
impugned order illegally records that the petitioner did not respond to
the queries raised by the GST authorities at the pre-show-cause stage or
even at the post show-cause stage.
14. Mr. Sakya Sen, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner then
refers to Section 73 of 2017 Act and submits that a period of limitation
prescribed therein is three years . He further submits that as per CBIC
notification dated March 31, 2023 and December 28, 2023 for the
three financial years, namely, 2018-19, 2019-20, 2020-21 , the last date
for issuance of show-cause notice were January 30, 204, May 31, 2024
and November 28, 2024 and for the order itself were April 30, 2024 ,
August 31, 2024 and February 28, 2025 . The impugned show-cause
notice was issued on June 25, 2025, accordingly, the demand for the
three financial years for a total sum of Rs.2,76,84,879/- was barred by
limitation.
15. He refers to Section 74 of 2017 Act and submits that the relevant
show-cause notice is permitted to be issued within five years from the
last date of filing of annual return of the relevant financial year. Each
financial year is separate because the period of limitation as provided
under the statute is separate. He then refers to sub-Section (106) to
Section 2 of 2017 Act , where the period for which a return is to be
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
7
furnished is defined. He submits that, reading the said provision with
Section 74, it would appear that clubbing of financial years for issuing a
single show-cause notice is in contravention to Section 74, as no show-
cause notice could be issued beyond five years thereunder.
16. Mr. Sakya Sen, learned Senior Advocate then submits that the limitation
for each year could run separately for issuance of show-cause notice and
thus, a consolidated show-cause notice could not be issued for multiple
financial years. In support, he has relied the following decisions :
(i) In the matter of : Titan Company Limited Vs. Joint
Commissioner of GST and Central Excise, Salem
reported at 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 8082 .
(ii) In the matter of : State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs.
Caltex (India) Ltd. reported at AIR 1966 SC 1350 .
(iii) A decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court In the
matter of : Milrue Good Earth Developers Vs. Union of
India rendered in WP No.2203 of 2025
17. Opposing the impugned action of the GST authorities in violation of
Section 74 and thereby awarding a disproportionate penalty, Mr. Sakya
Sen submits that even if the power of the authority is discretionary for
awarding penalty but the same has to be exercised in a reasonable and
bona fide manner based on established para meters of due process of law
and it is the legitimate expectation of the assessee that the discretion
should be used by the GST authorities not in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner. In support, reliance has been placed in a
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
8
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of : Securities
and Exchange Board of India Vs. Sunil Krishna Khaitan reported
at (2023) 2 SCC 643 .
18. Mr. Sen, learned Senior Advocate submits that there is no finding in the
impugned order about any of the inter-branch invoices and on the other
relevant materials furnished by the petitioner both at pre and post show-
cause, stages save and except a bald observation that details of the
invoices are lacking. This clearly shows a gross non-application of mind
on the part of the authority while passing the impugned order and the
finding does not amount to a reasoned finding, which rendered the
impugned order to nullity. In support, reliance has been placed on an
order passed In the matter of : Maxxcab Wires & Cables Pvt. Ltd. &
th
Anr. Vs. State Tax Officer (order dated 24 November, 2022).
19. Inasmuch as, learned Senior Advocate further submits that there has
been no clear finding with supporting materials against the petitioner.
Therefore, the question of extending the period of limitation under
Section 74 of the 2017 Act does not and cannot arise.
20. In the light of the above submissions, learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Sen,
appearing for the petitioner prays for setting aside and quashing of the
said impugned show-cause notice and the impugned order passed in
pursuance thereof.
21. Mr. Dilip Kumar Agarwal, learned Advocate with Mr. Bishwa Raj Agarwal,
learned Advocate appearing for the revenue authorities, at the threshold,
has taken the point of maintainability of the writ petition in view of the
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
9
existences of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of
2017 Act.
22. He submits that to adjudicate upon the point of limitation, if any, in
respect of any financial year and to assess the impugned order, it
requires a fact-finding enquiry to be conducted to a great extent.
Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Whether all the materials
placed before the authority by the petitioner had been considered or not
while issuing the show-cause notice or passing the impugned order in
pursuance thereof are also required to be gone into by examining the
facts. Writ court is not the forum to conduct a detail fact-finding enquiry.
The statutory appellate remedy is vested with the power to go into the
facts. Hence, appellate remedy is the appropriate remedy for the writ
petitioner.
23. Mr. Dilip Kumar Agarwal, learned Advocate appearing for the revenue
then submits that while issuing the show-cause notice or passing the
impugned order thereunder, the authority has not acted without
jurisdiction. There is no inherent lack of jurisdiction. Thus, appellate
remedy under Section 107 of the statute is the appropriate remedy and
not the writ petition.
24. Mr. Agarwal, further submits that in the event of fraudulent availment of
benefit under the said 2017 Act, where transactions are spread across
several years, a consolidated show-cause notice is permitted in law. In
support, learned Advocate for the revenue has relied upon following
decisions :
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
10
(a) A judgment of the Delhi High Court In the matter of : M/s
Mathur Polymers Vs. Union of India & Ors. rendered in
WP (c) 2394/2025 ;
(b) A decision of the Coordinate Bench of this High Court In
the matter of : Sampa Das Vs. Union of India & Ors.
rendered in WPA 4367 of 2023.
25. In the light of the above submissions, learned Advocate appearing for
the revenue prays for dismissal of the writ petition.
26. In reply , Mr. Sen, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner
submits that clubbing of multiple financial years in one consolidated
show-cause notice itself is not permitted in law, as decided in various
judicial pronouncements referred to above and hence, it is without
jurisdiction and the writ petition is maintainable. If on a prima facie look
on the impugned show-cause notice, since it appears that the revenue
authority while issuing the said impugned show-cause notice by
clubbing the financial years had acted without jurisdiction and illegally,
then the writ petition is maintainable instead of filing the statutory
appeal. Existence of statutory appellate remedy is not an absolute bar in
entertaining a writ petition. In support, Mr. Sen has relied upon a
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of : Godrej Sara
Lee Ltd. Vs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority
and Others reported at 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95 .
27. Mr. Sen further submits that since a consolidated show-cause notice
clubbing multiple financial years is impermissible under the scheme of
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
11
2017 Act, hence, the action of the respondent authorities is without and
in excess of jurisdiction warranting exercise of writ powers. He further
submits that invocation of Section 74 of 2017 Act without establishing
the fundamental ingredience of fraud, willful misstatement or
suppression of facts had rendered the said impugned show-cause notice
and the impugned order passed in pursuance thereto without
jurisdiction and challenging such jurisdictional error, the challenge is
maintainable in the writ jurisdiction.
Decision:
28. After considering the rival contentions of the parties and on perusal of
the materials on record, according to this Court, the foremost and
principal issue require to be adjudicated, at the threshold, is that
whether for multiple financial years a single show-cause notice is
permitted to be issued .
29. Since the impugned show-cause notice had been issued under Section
74 of the 2017 Act , the provision is quoted below :-
“ Section 74: Determination of tax , pertaining to the
period up to Financial Year 2023-24,] not paid or short
paid or erroneously refunded or input tax credit
wrongly availed or utilised by reason of fraud or any
willful- misstatement or suppression of facts.-
(1) Where it appears to the proper officer that any
tax has not been paid or short paid or erroneously
refunded or where input tax credit has been
wrongly availed or utilised by reason of fraud, or
any wilful-misstatement or suppression of facts to
evade tax, he shall serve notice on the person
chargeable with tax which has not been so paid or
which has been so short paid or to whom the
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
12
refund has erroneously been made, or who has
wrongly availed or utilised input tax credit,
requiring him to show cause as to why he should
not pay the amount specified in the notice along
with interest payable thereon under section
50 and a penalty equivalent to the tax specified in
the notice.
(2) The proper officer shall issue the notice under
sub-section (1) at least six months prior to the
time limit specified in sub-section (10) for issuance
of order.
(3) Where a notice has been issued for any period
under sub-section (1), the proper officer may serve
a statement, containing the details of tax not paid
or short paid or erroneously refunded or input tax
credit wrongly availed or utilised for such periods
other than those covered under sub-section (1), on
the person chargeable with tax.
(4) The service of statement under sub-section (3)
shall be deemed to be service of notice under sub-
section (1) of section 73, subject to the condition
that the grounds relied upon in the said
statement, except the ground of fraud, or any
wilful-misstatement or suppression of facts to
evade tax, for periods other than those covered
under subsection (1) are the same as are
mentioned in the earlier notice.
(5) The person chargeable with tax may, before
service of notice under sub-section (1), pay the
amount of tax along with interest payable
under section 50 and a penalty equivalent to
fifteen per cent. of such tax on the basis of his
own ascertainment of such tax or the tax as
ascertained by the proper officer and inform the
proper officer in writing of such payment.
(6) The proper officer, on receipt of such
information, shall not serve any notice under sub-
section (1), in respect of the tax so paid or any
penalty payable under the provisions of this Act
or the rules made thereunder.
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
13
(7) Where the proper officer is of the opinion that
the amount paid under sub-section (5) falls short
of the amount actually payable, he shall proceed
to issue the notice as provided for in sub-section
(1) in respect of such amount which falls short of
the amount actually payable.
(8) Where any person chargeable with tax under
sub-section (1) pays the said tax along with
interest payable under section 50 and a penalty
equivalent to twenty-five per cent. of such tax
within thirty days of issue of the notice, all
proceedings in respect of the said notice shall be
deemed to be concluded.
(9) The proper officer shall, after considering the
representation, if any, made by the person
chargeable with tax, determine the amount of tax,
interest and penalty due from such person and
issue an order.
(10) The proper officer shall issue the order under
sub-section (9) within a period of five years from
the due date for furnishing of annual return for
the financial year to which the tax not paid or
short paid or input tax credit wrongly availed or
utilised relates to or within five years from the
date of erroneous refund.
(11) Where any person served with an order issued
under sub-section (9) pays the tax along with
interest payable thereon under section 50 and a
penalty equivalent to fifty per cent. of such tax
within thirty days of communication of the order,
all proceedings in respect of the said notice shall
be deemed to be concluded.
2
[(12) The provisions of this section shall be
applicable for determination of tax pertaining to
the period up to Financial Year 2023-24.]
Explanation 1 .- For the purposes of section 73 and
this section,-
(i) the expression "all proceedings in respect of the
said notice" shall not include proceedings
under section 132;
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
14
(ii) where the notice under the same proceedings is
issued to the main person liable to pay tax and
some other persons, and such proceedings against
the main person have been concluded
under section 73 or section 74, the proceedings
against all the persons liable to pay penalty
1
under sections 122 and 125 are deemed to be
[ ]
concluded.
xxx”
30. Section 74 of 2017 Act provides for determination of tax pertaining to
the period upto financial year 2023-24. The section provides that where
it appears to the proper officer that any tax has not been paid or short
paid or erroneously refunded or where input tax credit has been wrongly
availed or utilized by reasons of fraud, or any willful misstatement or
suppression of facts to evade tax, such proper officer shall serve notice
on the person chargeable with tax which has been so paid or which has
been so short paid or to whom the refund has erroneously made, or who
has wrongly availed or utilized input tax credit, requiring him to show-
cause as to why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice
along with interest thereupon payable under Section 50 and a penalty
equivalent to tax specified in the notice. Sub-Section (2) specifically
provides that proper officer shall issue the notice at least six months
prior to the time limit specified under sub-Section (10) to Section 74
for issuance of order. Sub-Section (9) provides that the proper officer
shall, after considering the representation, if any, made by the person
chargeable with tax, determine the amount of tax, interest and penalty
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
15
due from such person and issue an order. Sub-Section (10) provides
that the proper officer shall issue the order under sub-Section (9) to
Section 74 of 2017 Act within a period of five years from the due date
for furnishing of annual return for the financial year to which the tax
not paid or short paid or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilized
relates to or within five years from the date of erroneous refund. Sub-
Section (12) further specifically provides that the provision of Section 74
of 2017 Act shall be applicable for determination of tax pertaining to the
period upto Financial Year 2023-24.
31. On a plain reading of the provisions laid down under both Section 73
and 74 of 2017 Act, this Court finds that period of limitation are imposed
under sub-Section (10) to both Sections 73 and 74 of 2017 Act
respectively. Under Section 73 of 2017 Act it is three years from the due
date for furnishing of annual return for the relevant financial year and
under Section 74 it is five years from the due date for furnishing of
annual return for the relevant financial year.
32. Sub-Section (10) to Section 74 of 2017 Act specifically provides the
time limit of five years from the last date for filing the annual return for
the relevant financial year to such the taxes due. The expression and
language used under sub-Section (10) to the effect “… from the due
date for furnishing of annual return for the financial year … or
within five years from the date of issuance of refund …” is of most
important significance. While including the said language under sub-
Section (10) to Section 74 of the 2017 Act, the legislature specifically
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
16
noted a particular financial year and as such used the expression ” .. f or
the financial year. Thus, 2017 Act considers each and every financial
year as a separate unit, due to which the legislation has specified every
financial year separately and independently.
33. It is trite that taxing statute should be interpreted and construed strictly.
Sub-Section (1) to Section 74 empowers the proper officer for issuance of
show-cause notice subject to the time limit provided under sub-Section
(10), as enumerated under sub-Section (2) to Section 74. Sub-Section
(10) imposses a restriction and bar by framing a specified time limit
within which the show-cause notice has to be issued. On a harmonious
and meaningful construction of the sub-Sections under Section 74, it is
clear that clubbing of multiple financial years for the purpose of issuance
of show-cause notice is not permitted under Section 74 of 2017 Act.
Therefore, the limitation period of five years would be separately
applicable for each and every financial year and thus, the limitation
period would be different for every financial year.
34. When a limitation period is specifically provided under a statute any
action taken or any act or deed done in contravention and violation of
such limitation period and beyond that, would not only render the said
act or action illegal and void but also without jurisdiction. Limitation
cannot be carried forward or cannot be enlarged beyond the statutory
prescription, unless specifically provided under the statute. Thus, the
financial years which are beyond the period of limitation, in the light of
conjoint reading of sub-Sections (1), (2) and (10) of Section 74 of 2017
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
17
Act, the provision for issuance of show-cause notice under Section 74 of
the Act cannot and should not be invoked.
35. Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of :
State of Jammu and Kashmir (supra) had observed as under :-
“where an assessment encompasses different
assessment years, each assessment year could be easily
split up and dissected and the items can be separated
and taxed for different periods.”
36. Under sub-Section (4) to Section 74 of 2017 Act, the expression used is
for periods . Under sub-Section (1) and (3) to Section 74 of 2017 Act
notice can be issued for any period . Hence, the conjoint and
harmonious reading of sub-Sections (1), (3) and (4) to Section 74 makes
it clear that the expression any period should be accepted and read as
tax period . Thus, based on the relevant tax period show-cause notice
has to be issued under Section 74 of 2017 Act by the revenue.
37. Sub-Section (106) to Section 2 of 2017 Act defines the expression tax
period , which means the period for which the return is required to
be furnished . A meaningful reading of the said provision shows that the
expression period means the period for which, the return is required to
be furnished. Thus, on the basis of returns tax period would be
determined. Under 2017 Act, an assessee is required to file monthly
return and also annual return. Therefore, on the basis of both monthly
as well as annual return notices can be issued under Section 74 and
when notice is issued based upon the annual return, the same has to be
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
18
for the entire relevant financial year only and not for any further
financial year.
38. The expression return is defined under sub-Section (97) to Section 2 of
2017 Act, which means any return prescribed or otherwise required to
be furnished by or under this Act or the Rules made thereunder. An
assessee is required to file monthly return as well as annual return and
issuance of show-cause notice should be strictly on the basis of the
relevant tax period, which is determined based on filing of return. Thus,
it is clear that the show-cause notice can be issued either based on
monthly return or annual return for the entire year or part thereof as
decided by the department. If any return is filed for more than one
financial year, then, based on the said returns, one single show-cause
notice can be issued. Since under the provisions of the 2017 Act there is
no provision for filing of return other than the monthly and yearly for a
particular financial year, single show-cause notice cannot be issued for
multiple financial years.
39. As discussed above, on a meaningful and conjoint reading of the
provisions under sub-Section (106) to Section 2 read with sub-
Sections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (10) to Section 74 of the 2017 Act , this
Court finds and holds that there is a specific bar under Section 74 of the
Act to issue a single show-cause notice in connection with multiple
financial years.
40. By issuing single show-cause notice for multiple financial years under
Section 74 of the 2017 Act, the revenue authority seeks to invoke its
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
19
power not only for the relevant financial year but also for the previous
financial years, for which no show-cause notice can be issued, having
been barred by the period of limitation mentioned under sub-Section (10)
to Section 74 of 2017 Act. In effect, the revenue seeks to achieve to lay
their hands on the previous assessment years having been barred by
limitation, which it could not and cannot do directly but seeks to do
indirectly, is not permissible in law.
41. The golden rule is that if the law states that a particular action has to be
taken or step to be done in a particular manner and within a particular
period of time fixed under the statute, such an act has to be carried out
in that manner and within the fixed time only or not at all. All other
modes are expressly forbidden in law. Limitation period for five years as
provided under sub-Section (10) to Section 74 of 2017 Act cannot be
carried over or cannot or should not continue perpetually by clubbing
the previous financial years with the current relevant financial year.
42. The provision laid down by the legislature under sub-Section (10) to
Section 74 of 2017 Act keeping in view that each and every assessment
year would have a specific period of limitation and such period of
limitation shall commence independently and would vary from year to
year, as such, the Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of : State of
Jammu and Kashmir (supra) had held that each assessment year
would easily be split up and dissected and the items can be separated
and taxed for different periods. The same view had also been taken by a
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
20
Coordinate Bench of the Hon’ble Madras High Court In the matter of :
Titan Company Limited (supra) and it had been observed as under :-
“16. For all these reasons, I do not find force in the
submission made by the learned Senior Standing
Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
Therefore, I find fault in the process of issuing of
bunching of show cause notices and the same is liable
to be quashed.”
43. A Division Bench of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court had also upheld the
view In the matter of : Milrue Good Earth Developers (supra) and
had observed as under :-
“25. In our view, the aforesaid observations merely
being of primary nature without appreciating the
provisions in the Act of 2017 and Rules made therein,
and recording a finding that there is no prohibition in
issuance of notice calling upon payment of tax for
different financial years, in our considered opinion,
since the Petition before the Division Bench called for
quashing of the demand notice referring to different
financial years, but in any case the Court expressed the
prima facie opinion and recorded that there is no issue
of limitation as contemplated under Section 74(10).
In any case the Court refused to show indulgence and
directed the Petitioner to face the show cause notice
and therefore the Division Bench did not express it final
opinion.
26. For the reasons recorded above, by overruling the
objections raised by Ms Desai for entertaining the
Petition is merely based on the show cause notice as we
find that there is no provision to club various tax
periods and apart from the fact that it is also beyond
the period of limitation, we find that the action of
Respondent No.2 in issuing consolidated show cause
notices for multiple assessment years is without
jurisdiction and since it is a judicial overreach, we
quash and set aside the same.
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
21
The Writ Petition is made absolute in the aforesaid
terms.”
44. In the matter of : M/s Mathur Polymers (supra) the Hon’ble Delhi High
Court though had taken note of all the decisions referred to above under
which it was held that single show-cause notice was not permitted for
multiple financial years but had not dealt with those.
45. In the matter of : Sampa Das (supra) a Coordinate Bench of this Court
had found that there were disputed questions on facts and requirements
of re-appreciating evidence, which is not permissible in a writ petition. It
was also observed on the question of authorities including multiple
periods in one particular show-cause, that the revenue had proceeded
with the failure on the part of the petitioner to make proper disclosure
which was not a case where the limitation would have intervened if
separate notices were issued for different periods. Such is not the case in
the instant writ petition. Hence, the ratio decided in the judgment would
not apply in the facts and circumstances of this case.
46. In the conspectus of the above, this Court holds that the impugned
show-cause notice dated June 25, 2025 at page 94 to the writ
petition being part of Annexure-P8 is de hors and in violation of the
provision laid down under Section 74 of 2017 Act and thus, the same is
illegal, without jurisdiction and not tenable in law. Consequently the
impugned order-in-original dated December 12, 2025 is also held to
be illegal, without jurisdiction and not tenable in law.
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
22
Alternative remedy and writ petition :
47. The law is trite that it is the self-imposed restriction of the Constitutional
Court in exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India when an alternative and efficacious remedy exists under the
statute. However, if the Constitutional Court finds on the face of record
that an act committed by an Article 12 authority on the face of it is de
hors and in violation of the statutory provisions and is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, such self-imposed restriction is
not an absolute bar before a writ Court.
48. If on a close scrutiny of an act of an authority, on record, it appears that
the jurisdictional error is so apparent and ex facie for which no further
fact or evidence is required to be enquired or looked into, existence of an
alternative remedy is not a bar. The plenary power of the Constitutional
Court in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India has the authority and jurisdiction to correct such a
jurisdictional error. If a Constitutional Court finds that without going
into any factual dispute or any triable issue, the jurisdictional error can
be corrected or is required to quashed, it would always be open for
judicial scrutiny.
49. The Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of : Godrej Sara Lee Ltd.
(supra) had observed as under :-
5. A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a Constitution
Bench of this Court in its decision reported in [1958] SCR 595
(State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to
observe as follows:
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
23
“10. In the next place it must be borne in mind that
there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with
mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other
equally effective remedy. It is well established that,
provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie
although a right of appeal has been conferred by
rd
statute, (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3 Edn., Vol. 11,
p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the
aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may
be taken into consideration by the superior court in
arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in
exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to
quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts
subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will
decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has
exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this
rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies
before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy,
convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law
and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari
has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved
party had other adequate legal remedies.. . .”
6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of
the its decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool
Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai) carved out
the exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be
justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party
approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy
provided by the statute. The same read as under:
(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of
the fundamental rights;
(ii) where there is violation of principles of natural
justice;
where the order or the proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction; or
(iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.
7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision reported in [2021]
SCC OnLine SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State
Tax v. Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same
principles in paragraph 11.
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
24
8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of
this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC
482 (Union of India v. State of Haryana). What appears on a
plain reading of the former decision is that whether a certain
item falls within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises a pure
question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary,
the high court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion
even though the alternative remedy was not availed of; and,
unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or
perverse, this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision,
this Court found the issue raised by the appellant to be
pristinely legal requiring determination by the high court
without putting the appellant through the mill of statutory
appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from the said decisions
is that where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does
not
(2021) 93 GST 1 (SC). *
(1977) 39 STC 355 (SC).
involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law,
then it should be decided by the high court instead of
dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative
remedy being available.”
50. It is true that statutory appellate remedy exists where the said impugned
notice dated June 25, 2025 and the impugned order-in-original dated
December 12, 2025 Annexure P-12 at page 454 to the writ petition could
be challenged but since this Court has already held hereinabove that the
said impugned show-cause notice is in violation of the statutory
provision and has been issued without jurisdiction and/or in excess of
jurisdiction of the revenue authority, the consequential impugned order
dated December 12, 2025 is also without jurisdiction and the
jurisdictional error is so apparent on the face of it, no further fact finding
enquiry is required to be gone into. Hence, this Court is of the firm and
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.
25
considered view and holds that the instant writ petition is
maintainable .
51. In view of the forgoing reasons and discussions, the impugned show-
cause notice dated June 25, 2025 part of Annexure-P8 at page 94 to
the writ petition and the consequential impugned order-in-original
dated December 12, 2025 Annexure-P12 at page 454 to the writ
petition stand set aside and quashed .
52. However, it is made clear that this Court has not gone into the rival
contentions of the parties on merits. Since the impugned show-cause
notice and the consequential order-in-original suffer from jurisdictional
error on the face of it, this Court has proceeded on such jurisdictional
issues, as narrated above and not beyond that. This Court has not
expressed any opinion on the other points raised by the petitioner.
53. It is further made clear that the respondent revenue authorities shall be
at liberty to proceed afresh but strictly in accordance with law.
54. The interim order stands vacated .
55. Resultantly, with the above observations the instant writ petition being
WPA 433 of 2026 stands allowed , without any order as to costs.
(Aniruddha Roy, J.)
WPA 433 of 2026
A.Roy, J.