MAHANTESH S/O BASAYYA KALLIMATH vs STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18594-DB
WA No. 101079 of 2026
CNR: KAHC020201012026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
TH
DATED THIS THE 13 DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
WRIT APPEAL NO.101079 OF 2026 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
MAHANTESH S/O. BASAYYA KALLIMATH
AGE: 42 YEARS, OCC: NIL,
R/O. BANDIHALARA ONI,
GAJENDRAGADA-582114,
DISTRICT: GADAG.
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI.M.M.PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS,
VIDHANASOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001.
2. STATE OF KARNATAKA
RPTD. BY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION
AND LITERACY, M.S. BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560001.
3. THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC EDUCATION,
IVAN-E SHAHI BADAVAN, KALABURGI-585101.
Digitally signed
by PRATIBHA M
PATIL
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
DHARWAD
BENCH
Date:
2026.11.17
10:45:09 +0530
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4. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
KOPPAL DISTRICT, KOPPAL-583231.
5. THE BLOCK EDUCATION OFFICER
KUSTAGI BLOCK, DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS, KUSTAGI-583277,
DISTRICT KOPPAL.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.RAKESH M.BILKI, GOVT. ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THE WRIT
APPEAL FILED BY THE APPELLANT AND CONSEQUENTLY SET ASIDE
THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 05.10.2026 MADE IN W.P.NO.
109531/2025 (S-RES) PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE,
AND QUASH THE ENDORSEMENT DATED 06-01-2025 BEARING ITS
NO.C1(3)/ADALITA/AAAANE/PRADASA/152/2019-20/1514 ISSUED
RD
BY THE 3 RESPONDENT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND
EQUITY; DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS TO APPOINT THE PETITIONER
ON COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT
WITHOUT ANY FURTHER DELAY IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE CASE; AND ETC.
THIS WRIT APPEAL COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
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ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )
The appellant, who is said to be the husband of a primary
school teacher and the teacher, wife, dying in harness, leads
the appellant to fight for an appointment on compassionate
grounds for himself as a widower.
2. The appellant is said to have approached the
1
Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal not once, but twice,
and both occasions, the Tribunal has allowed the application
with certain directions, and the directions are twice over met
with endorsements rejecting his claim.
3. Therefore, the learned counsel submits that they are
before this Court and before the learned Single Judge
challenging the validity of the rule, which does not provide
employment to the widower and seeking relaxation of age.
4. The learned Single Judge by the order dated
05.10.2026 has rejected the petition reserving liberty to the
1
Hereinafter referred to as
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petitioner to knock at the doors of the Tribunal as was done
earlier.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that
validity of the rule can be challenged here and there is no
impediment for this Court to consider the issue and not
relegate the matter to the Tribunal. The said submission is
noted only to be rejected.
6. The Seven Bench of the Apex Court in L. CHANDRA
2
KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS , clearly holds that
the Tribunal is the Court of First Instance for all issues
concerning the government servants. It reads as under:
“90. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the
power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have
already held that in respect of the power of judicial
review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles
226/227 cannot be excluded. It has been contended
before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to
adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is
questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to
handling matters where constitutional issues are not
raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to this
proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings
and may cause avoidable delay. If such a view were to
be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise
constitutional issues, many of which may be quite
frivolous, to directly approach the High Courts and thus
subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even
2
AIR 1997 SC 1125
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in these special branches of law, some areas do involve
the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular
basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large
majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14,
15 and 16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals
have no power to handle matters involving constitutional
issues would not serve the purpose for which they were
constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such
decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before
a Division Bench of the High Court within whose
territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will
serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial
review of legislative action vested in the High Courts
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure
that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process
of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also
have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which
will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter.
91. It has also been contended before us that even
in dealing with cases which are properly before the
Tribunals, the manner in which justice is dispensed by
them leaves much to be desired. Moreover, the remedy
provided in the parent statutes, by way of an appeal by
special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, is too
costly and inaccessible for it to be real and effective.
Furthermore, the result of providing such a remedy is
that the docket of the Supreme Court is crowded with
decisions of Tribunals that are challenged on relatively
trivial grounds and it is forced to perform the role of a
First Appellate Court. We have already emphasised the
necessity for ensuring that the High Courts are able to
exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of
the Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In
R.K. Jain case
(1993 AIR SCW 1899), after taking note
of these facts, it was suggested that the possibility of an
appeal from the Tribunal on questions of law to a
Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial
jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be pursued. It appears that
no follow-up action has been taken pursuant to the
suggestion. Such a measure would have improved
matters considerably. Having regard to both the afore-
stated contentions, we hold that all decisions of
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Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323A or
Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the
High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High
Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular
Tribunal falls.
92. We may add here that under the existing system,
direct appeals have been provided from the decisions of
all Tribunals to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of
the Constitution. In view of our above-mentioned
observations, this situation will also stand modified. In
the view that we have taken, no appeal from the
decision of a Tribunal will directly lie before the Supreme
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead,
the aggrieved party will be entitled to move the High
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and
from the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court
the aggrieved party could move this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution.
93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may
summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers
of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear
matters where the vires of statutory provisions are
questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they
cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the
Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional
setup, been specifically entrusted with such an
obligation. Their function in this respect is only
supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals
will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the
respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently
also have the power to test the vires of subordinate
legislations and rules. However, this power of the
Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The
Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the
vires of their parent statutes following the settled
principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act
cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In
such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be
approached directly. All other decisions of these
Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically
empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent
statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division
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Bench of their respective High Court. We may add that
the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only
Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for
which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that
it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the
High Courts even in cases where they question the vires
of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where
the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is
challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal concerned.
94. The directions issued by us in respect of making
the decisions of Tribunals amenable to scrutiny before a
Division Bench of the respective High Courts will,
however, come into effect prospectively i.e. will apply to
decisions rendered hereafter. To maintain the sanctity of
judicial proceedings, we have invoked the doctrine of
prospective over-ruling so as not to disturb the
procedure in relation to decisions already rendered.”
7. The said Judgment is again followed by the Apex
Court in RAJEEV KUMAR AND ANOTHER v. HEMRAJ SINGH
3
CHAUHAN AND OTHERS , where the Apex Court reiterates that
the Court of First Instance is the Tribunal. A relevant portion of
the said order reads as under:
“ 9. The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar
(supra) held that the power of the High Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of
the basic structure of our Constitution (See
paragraphs 78 & 79, pages 301 and 302 of the
report). The Constitution Bench also held that various
Tribunals created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of
the Constitution, will function as Court of first instance
3
(2010) 4 SCC 554
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and are subject to the power of judicial review of the
High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution. The Constitution Bench also held that
these tribunals are empowered even to deal with
constitutional questions and can also examine the
vires of statutory legislation, except the vires of the
legislation which creates the particular Tribunal.
10. In paragraph 93, at page 309 of the Report, the
Constitution Bench specifically held: (L. Chandra
Kumar case)
"93. .....We may add that the Tribunals will,
however, continue to act as the only courts of
first instance in respect of the areas of law for
which they have been constituted.”
(Emphasis added)
The Constitution Bench explained the said statement
of law by reiterating in the next sentence: (L. Chandra
Kumar case, SCC p. 309, para 93)
"93. …...By this, we mean that it will not be
open for litigants to directly approach the High
Courts even in cases where they question the
vires of statutory legislations (except, as
mentioned, where the legislation which creates
the particular Tribunal is challenged) by
overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
concerned.
11. On a proper reading of the abovequoted two
sentences, it is clear:
(a) The tribunals will function as the only Court of
first instance in respect of the areas of law for which
they have been constituted.
(b) Even where any challenge is made to the vires
of legislation, excepting the legislation under which
Tribunal has been set up, in such cases also, litigants
will not be able to directly approach the High Court
`overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal'.
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12. The aforesaid propositions have been repeated
again by the Constitution Bench (in L. Chandra Kumar
case) in the penultimate paragraph 99 at page 311 of
the report in the following words:
"99. …... The Tribunals will, nevertheless,
continue to act like courts of first instance in
respect of the areas of law for which they have
been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open
for litigants to directly approach the High Courts
even in cases where they question the vires of
statutory legislations (except where the
legislation which creates the particular Tribunal
is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal concerned.”
8. It is not that the appellant is unaware of the said
provision, as he has twice over approached the Tribunal.
Therefore, the fact that the appellant is met with endorsements
despite the orders of the Tribunal would not clothe this Court
with jurisdiction, the Tribunal being the Court of First Instance,
particularly in the teeth of the judgments of the Apex court in
L. CHANDRA KUMAR (supra) and in RAMESH KUMAR (supra).
9. In that light, we do not find any error in the order of
the learned Single Judge. The order of the Learned Single
Judge stands affirmed.
10. Accordingly, writ appeal stands rejected .
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11. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand
disposed as not calling for adjudication.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
PMP
CT:VH
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 13