SOHAN LAL vs STATE AND ORS.
- Court
- Rajasthan High Court
[2026:RJ-JP:31319]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2337/1996
CNR: RJHC020046181996 | URN: CW / 3317U / 1996
1. Sohan Lal S/o. Late Sh. Hari Shankar (since deceased)
through legal heirs:-
1/1 Santosh Devi W/o Late Sh. Sohan Lal, aged about 53 years;
1/2 Rambhrosh Sharma S/o Late Sh. Sohan Lal, aged about 21
years;
1/3 Ganesh Sharma S/o Late Sh. Sohan Lal, aged about 19
years;
1/4 Asha Sharma D/o Late Sh. Sohan Lal, W/o. Shailendra
Sharma, aged about 33 years;
1/5 Poonam Sharma D/o Late Sh. Sohan Lal, W/o. Deepak
Sharma, aged about 29 years,
1/6 Krishna Sharma D/o Late Sh. Sohan Lal, aged about 24
years,
All residents of Banasthali Mode, Village Roopwas, Tehsil Niwai,
District Tonk, Rajasthan.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Rajasthan through its Secretary, Urban
Development and Housing Department, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. The Land Acquisition Officer, Sub-Divisional Officer, Tonk.
3. The Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment
Corporation (RIICO), Udyog Bhawan, Jaipur through its
Managing Director.
----Respondents
For Petitioners : Mr. Anil Mehta Senior Advocate
assisted by Mr. Saurav Mehta
Advocate & Mr. Ranvijay Singh
Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. Abhishek Sharma Advocate with
Mr. Vishal Kumar Advocate on behalf
of Mr. Manoj Sharma Additional
Advocate General.
Mr. S.N. Kumawat Advocate with Mr.
Ishan Kumawat Advocate & Mr. Naval
Kishore Saini Advocate.
(D.B. SAW/89/2000 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments :: 03.08.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved :: 03.08.2026
Whether the full judgment or only
the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement :: 12.08.2026
1. By way of filing this writ petition, the petitioner, Sohan
Lal has laid challenge to notification dated 15.09.1994 issued
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter to
be referred as ‘the Act of 1894’), as well as declaration dated
24.08.1995 issued under Section 6 thereof and published in
official Gazette on 31.08.1995.
2. The petitioner has come out with a case that he
purchased one plot measuring 1,000 square yards comprised in
Khasra Number 90 situated at Village Roopwas, Tehsil Niwai,
District Tonk, vide registered sale deed dated 16.02.1993. After
purchasing the aforesaid plot, the petitioner raised construction of
residential house as well as shops over the aforesaid plot, where
he is not only residing with his family, but also carrying out
business over the aforesaid plot. Total construction raised by the
petitioner at the aforesaid plot is measuring around 2,000 square
feet. It is submitted that one notification under Section 4 of the
Act of 1894 was issued by the respondents on 15.09.1994 for the
purpose of expansion of industrial area by Rajasthan State
Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Limited
(hereinafter to be referred as ‘RIICO’), whereby, total 371.05
Bighas land was sought to be acquired. It is stated in the writ
petition that prior to purchase of plot vide registered sale deed
dated 16.02.1993, the subject land was converted by the Tehsildar
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Niwai from agricultural to Abadi land and thereafter, it was sold by
the erstwhile khatedar Mangilal to the petitioner. It is stated that
although the land was purchased by the petitioner vide registered
sale deed and as such, on account of registration of sale deed, the
respondents were having knowledge with regard to said
transaction, yet in notification dated 15.09.1994, the land situated
over Khasra No. 90, measuring 1 Bigha 8 Biswa has been shown
to be Barani land and name of khatedar has been shown as
Mangilal son of Harbaksh. Thus, not only nature of the land has
wrongly been shown, name of the petitioner was also not
mentioned in the notification. Consequently, the petitioner was not
aware of the acquisition proceedings.
3. It is the case of the petitioner that the aforesaid
notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was neither
published in newspapers, nor public notice thereof was affixed at
conspicuous places of the locality. Thus, there was no means
available to the petitioner to have knowledge of issuance of
notification dated 15.09.1994 issued under section 4 of the Act of
1894.
4. It is stated that on the same day, that is, on
15.09.1994, one another notification under Section 17(2) read
with Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 was issued and notice thereof
was sent to erstwhile khatedar Mangilal son of Harbaksh and not
to the petitioner. Aforesaid notification dated 15.09.1994
(Annexure-6) was never published in Official Gazette and although
there is provision for providing 30 days' time from the date of last
publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 to the
persons interested for filing objections against the intended
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acquisition, yet vide notification dated 15.09.1994 issued under
section 17(2) of the Act of 1894, merely 15 days' time was
granted for filing objections, which, as per the petitioner, is
violation of mandatory provisions of the Act of 1894.
5. It is stated that on account of lack of knowledge, no
objection could be filed by the petitioner against notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. Thereafter, declaration
under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued on 24.08.1994 and
the same was published in Official Gazette on 31.08.1995.
However, again the said declaration was neither published in the
locality, nor in the newspapers. It is stated that later on intimation
was given by Mangilal to the petitioner with regard to acquisition
proceedings and the petitioner tried to inspect the record, yet on
the pretext that the record has been sent to the Government, the
Land Acquisition Officer did not provide any information to the
petitioner. The petitioner has also stated that thus the proceedings
have been undertaken without affording any opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner and on account of there being no notice
to the petitioner as well as absence of publication of notification as
per the requirement of Section 4 of the Act of 1894, the petitioner
was deprived of submitting objections against notification which
has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner.
6. It is submitted that the respondents have also
discriminated in carrying out impugned acquisition proceedings, as
one similarly situated person, Jagdish Prasad Sharma, who was
khatedar of land bearing Khasra No. 114/1 and having petrol
pump and houses over the agricultural land, was benefited by
excluding his land from acquisition and similarly, later on, land
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bearing Khasra No. 93 and 95 was also left from acquisition, yet
similar benefit was not extended to the petitioner.
7. During the pendency of the writ petition, award was
passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 19.08.1996. After
enforcement of the Right to Fair Compensation, Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
(hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 2013’), an amendment
was incorporated by the petitioner in memo of writ petition,
whereby it was alleged that as the compensation has not been
given to the petitioner, therefore, in view of the fact that the
award was passed more than five years before the date of
enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 01.01.2014, by virtue of
Section 24 of the Act of 2013, the acquisition proceedings have
lapsed.
8. Reply to the writ petition has been filed by Respondent
No. 1 and 2, wherein it was mentioned that since mutation was
not opened in favour of the petitioner, despite sale of property in
his favour, therefore, the petitioner's name was not reflected in
notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 issued by the
respondents. It was also submitted that individual notice vide
letter dated 08.11.1994 was issued to the erstwhile khatedar
Mangilal, whereby 15 days' time was granted to him to file
objections. It is also stated that information with regard to sale of
1,000 square meter land to the petitioner came into the
knowledge of Respondent No. 2 only on 30.09.1995. It was denied
that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was
not published in newspapers and it was specified that the
notification was published in two daily newspapers, namely, Dainik
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Lahron Ki Barkaha, Ajmer Edition and Dainik Khamos, Tonk
Edition.
9. Respondent No. 3 also filed reply to writ petition
reiterating therein that notification dated 15.09.1994 issued under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was published in Official Gazette on
17.09.1994 as well as in two local newspapers, namely Dainik
Lahron Ki Barkaha, Ajmer Edition and Dainik Khamos, Tonk
Edition. It was submitted that on account of judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, number of industries were asked to shift
out of Delhi. Therefore, looking to the urgency, provisions of
section 17(2) of the Act of 1894 were invoked by the respondents.
Thereafter, declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was
issued on 24.08.1995, which was followed by award which was
sent to the Government on 29.02.1996 for approval and the same
was approved by the Government on 05.08.1996 and declaration
of final award was made by the Land Acquisition Officer on
19.08.1996. It is submitted that the land acquisition proceedings
have been conducted in accordance with law and the writ petition
filed by the petitioner is misconceived.
10. Rejoinder to reply was filed by the petitioner wherein it
was stated that no public notice was ever affixed in the locality
and so far as publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act
of 1894 in daily newspapers, namely Dainik Lahron Ki Barkaha,
Ajmer Edition and Dainik Khamos, Tonk Edition is concerned, it
was submitted that such newspapers are totally unknown, having
no circulation whatsoever in Niwai. In support of such contention,
affidavit of Shri Nand Kishore Jaisawal, newspaper merchant of
the concerned area, was submitted by the petitioner, who deposed
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that he has never heard about such newspapers, namely Dainik
Lahron Ki Barkaha, Ajmer Edition and Dainik Khamos, Tonk Edition
and such newspapers have got no circulation in the locality.
11. In rejoinder, it was also pointed out by the petitioner
that although in reply the respondents have referred two
newspapers, namely Dainik Lahron Ki Barkaha, Ajmer Edition and
Dainik Khamos, Tonk Edition, yet such statement is contradictory
to award dated 19.08.1996, in which it has been mentioned that
notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was published in
newspaper Dainik Taj Bharti and even such newspaper has got no
circulation in the locality. It was also submitted that since writ
petition was filed by the petitioner prior to passing of award and
mandatory provisions of the Act of 1894 have not been complied
with, therefore, the acquisition proceedings have vitiated and
award based thereupon is also a nullity.
12. This is a matter of record that earlier, writ petition filed
by the petitioner was dismissed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court vide order dated 16.08.1999, after taking note of the fact
that award has already been passed in the year 1996. Feeling
aggrieved by order dated 16.08.1999, the petitioner preferred
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 89/2000, which was allowed
by the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated
29.07.2008 and the matter was remitted back to the Single Judge
for hearing afresh. Thereafter, the matter was taken up by the Co-
ordinate Bench and after hearing both the parties on 20.11.2008,
the writ petition was admitted to be finally heard in due course
and interim order with regard to status quo earlier granted on
17.09.1996 was directed to be continued. Thereafter, in the light
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of directions given by Co-ordinate Benches of this Court from time
to time, different additional affidavits were filed from either side.
On 25.09.2009, affidavit was filed by Regional Manager of
Respondent No. 3 mentioning therein that after passing award
dated 19.08.1996, possession of land measuring 348 Bighas 8
Biswas out of total 371 Bighas 5 Biswas was taken by the
respondents on 19.08.1996. It was also submitted that
compensation qua the land in question measuring 8 Biswas and
construction thereon has been assessed to Rs. 3,30,959/-.
However, the same has neither been accepted by the erstwhile
Khatedar Mangilal, nor by the present petitioner. It was also
informed in the affidavit on behalf of respondent-RIICO that on
acquired land, total 281 industrial plots have been chalked out,
out of which 250 plots have already been allotted to various
entrepreneurs. In 81 plots, units have already started production
and 62 units are under construction. Rest 31 plots could not be
allotted due to dispute regarding possession/compensation.
13. One another additional affidavit dated 23.04.2024 was
filed by the Additional Officer-in-Charge of Respondent-RIICO,
mentioning therein that since cheque pursuant to land acquisition
award was prepared and offered to the erstwhile khatedar, who
never accepted the same, therefore, it would be termed as legal
tender of compensation and since there is already interim order
operating in the instant writ petition, therefore, in view of
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development
Authority vs. Manoharlal & Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 , the
provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 shall not be attracted
in the present matter.
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14. Counter to the affidavit was filed by the petitioner
mentioning therein that the petitioner has raised construction over
the land in question and he is having possession thereof. Hence, it
was denied that the possession of the land in question was taken
by the respondents and compensation in lieu of acquisition of land
in question was also never offered to the petitioner by the
respondents.
15. Later on, on 29.11.2024, yet another additional
affidavit was filed by Respondent No. 3, mentioning therein that
information with regard to details of publication of notification
under section 4 of the Act of 1894 was required by the State
Government, vide letter dated 07.08.1995, and thereupon the
Land Acquisition Officer responded vide letter dated 24.08.1995
by informing the State Government that notification under section
4 of the Act of 1894 was published in two daily newspapers,
namely Dainik Taj Bharti dated 15.12.1994 and Dainik Khamos
dated 14.12.1994. It was also mentioned that relevant extract of
the notification was also affixed in the locality on 07.11.1994 and
compliance thereof was made by 22.11.1994.
16. Thereafter, one more additional affidavit was filed on
behalf of Respondent No. 3, in which it was reiterated that the
Land Acquisition Officer had already informed the State
Government with regard to publication of notification under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894 in Dainik Taj Bharti dated 15.12.1994
and Dainik Khamos dated 14.12.1994. It is also submitted that
thereafter one more letter was written on 12.07.1996, wherein it
was submitted that declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894
was published in Dainik Khamos on 03.11.1995 and Dainik Lahron
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Ki Barkaha on 07.11.1995. This Court also finds that one
application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was also
filed by the respondent-RIICO, whereby, the fact was brought on
record that the award was passed on 19.08.1996 and pursuant
thereto, although possession of the land in question was taken by
the Land Acquisition Officer on 11.12.1996, yet on account of
litigation, possession of the land in question bearing Khasra No. 90
could not be taken. It was also informed that so far as
compensation is concerned, cheque of Rs. 3,30,959/- dated
01.07.2021 has been deposited with the District and Sessions
Judge, which is the competent authority.
17. Mr. Anil Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioners, while reiterating the contents of writ
petition, argued that in the present matter, the respondents have
flouted mandatory provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1894. It is
submitted that three modes of publication of notification under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894 have been given, which are, (i)
publication in Official Gazette; (ii) publication in two daily
newspapers having circulation in the locality, out of which at least
one shall be in regional language and (iii) Collector (Land
Acquisition Officer) shall cause public notice of the substance of
such notification at convenient places in the said locality. Learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the respondents have not followed
the above provisions in the manner that no public notice was ever
affixed in the locality and so far as publication of the notification in
newspapers is concerned, such publication cannot be said to be a
publication in true spirit of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of
1894, which makes it quite clear that the publication should be in
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the newspapers having circulation in the locality. Initially, although
in reply, the respondents have submitted that the notification
under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was published in Dainik Lahron
Ki Barkaha, Ajmer Edition and Dainik Khamos, Tonk Edition
respectively. However, in award, the statement is contradictory
where instead of name of newspaper Dainik Lahron Ki Barkaha,
name of another newspaper Dainik Taj Bharti has been given. In
the letters enclosed along with the additional affidavits also,
names of newspapers in which alleged publication has taken place
are different from the contents of reply to the writ petition.
18. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioners further submitted that the respondents have
deliberately withheld production of such newspapers before this
Court and none of the newspapers or copy thereof has been
enclosed either with the reply or additional affidavits. Learned
Senior Counsel also contended that provisions of the Act of 1894
are mandatory in nature and the procedure for publication of
notification as given under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 cannot be
treated as an empty formality. Hence, when Section 4 of the Act of
1894 specifically provides for publication of the notification in
newspapers having circulation in locality, then the respondents are
required to demonstrate that alleged newspapers in which
notification is said to have been published, were having any
circulation whatsoever in the locality. However, the respondents
have utterly failed to place any material in this regard, whereas
the petitioner has filed affidavit of the newspaper merchant of
Niwai so as to prove that even the newspaper merchant had never
heard names of newspaper Dainik Lahron Ki Barkaha and Dainik
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Khamos. Resultantly, there is no question of such newspapers
having any circulation whatsoever in the locality. Thus, in quite
malicious manner, if at all any publication in newspaper has taken
place, (though it is emphatically disputed by learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners), publication in
totally strange and unknown newspapers cannot be said to be
sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of
1894.
19. It is settled proposition of law that non-compliance of
provisions with regard to publication of notification as
contemplated under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 vitiates the
entire acquisition proceedings.
20. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that sole
object of giving a wide publicity of notification under Section 4 of
the Act of 1894 is that all the persons interested should be made
aware of the fact that their land is likely to be acquired for alleged
public purpose by the State Government. Hence, the provisions
have been given under the Act of 1894 for publishing the
notification in three different modes. It is submitted that a layman
cannot be expected to have knowledge of publication of
notification in official Gazette and he/she is supposed to have
knowledge thereof only by way of publication of notification in
newspapers having wide circulation in the locality or by way of
affixation of extract of notification at convenient places in the
locality. In the instant case, the last two modes have not been
complied with by the respondents, which has deprived the
petitioner of knowledge of acquisition proceedings.
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21. Mr. Anil Mehta, learned Senior Counsel submitted that
land in question was purchased by the petitioner vide registered
sale deed dated 16.02.1993 and much earlier thereto, agricultural
land was converted by the competent authority as Abadi land.
Such facts were duly recorded in the official record of respondents
authorities, yet while issuing notification under Section 4 of the
Act of 1894, name of petitioner was not reflected therein and even
the nature of the land was shown as Barani instead of Abadi .
Thus, the petitioner was having no means of knowledge with
regard to proposed acquisition of land.
22. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in the
light of above, the petitioner could not exercise his right to submit
objection against proposed acquisition and under such
circumstances where after purchase of the land, the petitioner had
already raised substantial construction of residential house and
shops over the land, as well as in view of the fact that in similar
circumstances, lands of other khatedars, namely Jagdish Prasad
Sharma and others was left out from acquisition, the petitioner
was deprived of filing any such objections before the Land
Acquisition Officer under Section 5A of the Act of 1894, which is
the minimal right prescribed under the Act of 1894 to the land
owners. Thus, in the instant case, acquisition proceedings have
been carried out by the respondents in flagrant violation of
provisions of the Act of 1894 as well as Article 300A of the
Constitution of India.
23. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner further submitted that the respondents have admitted in
their reply that erstwhile khatedar Mangilal had already informed
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them that he had sold the land in question to the petitioner and as
per the respondents, such information was given to them after
expiry of prescribed period for hearing of objections, yet the same
was given prior to issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the
Act of 1894, even then the respondents did not rectify their
mistake earlier committed by them and in declaration under
Section 6 of the Act of 1894, instead of reflecting name of the
petitioner, name of erstwhile khatedar Mangilal was reflected and
despite there being order of status quo passed by this Court on
17.09.1996, award was passed by the respondents on
19.08.1996, again in the name of erstwhile khatedar Mangilal.
24. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the
respondents have admitted the fact that possession of the land in
question is still with the petitioner and under such circumstances,
where more than 30 years have passed, no fruitful purpose is
likely to be achieved by acquiring the land of the petitioner.
Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that under the
circumstances where the petitioner has already approached this
Court much before passing of the award, merely on account of the
fact that during the pendency of writ petition, award has been
passed, in the circumstances where the initial notification under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894 is a nullity, in view of the grounds
raised hereinabove, the award would not confer any validity upon
such void proceedings. It is submitted that award is nothing but
determination of compensation consequent upon initial
notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894.
Therefore, rights of the petitioner cannot be taken away by the
respondents by making a statement that award has been passed
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by the respondents. In support of his submissions, learned Senior
Counsel relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
in the cases of Khub Chand & Others vs. State of Rajasthan &
Others, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 113; State of Mysore vs. Abdul
Razak Sahib, (1973) 3 SCC 196; Narindrajit Singh & Ranjit
Singh & Others vs. The State of U.P. & Others, (1973) 1 SCC
157; Kulsum R. Nadiadwala vs. State of Maharashtra &
Others, (2012) 6 SCC 348; V.K.M. Kattha Industries Private
Limited vs. State of Haryana & Others, (2013) 9 SCC 338;
Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad & Another vs. Raja
Ram Jaiswal, (1985) 3 SCC 1; J&K Housing Board &
Another vs. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul & Others, (2011)
10 SCC 714; Union of India & Others vs. Gopaldas Bhagwan
Das & Others, (2023) 12 SCC 531; Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Others, (2005) 7
SCC 627; Talson Real Estate (P) Ltd. vs. State of
Maharashtra & Others, (2007) 13 SCC 186; and decision of
Division Bench of Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Mohd.
Abdullah Chowdhary vs. State of J&K & Others 2021, SCC
OnLine J&K 304 .
25. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents
opposed the writ petition and submitted that nothing has been
shown by the petitioner that he ever made any attempt for getting
mutation opened in his name after purchase of the land in
question from erstwhile khatedar Mangilal. It is submitted that the
respondents have complied with all the requirements of
publication of notification under section 4 of the Act of 1894. The
notification has been published in the newspapers and public
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notice thereof was also given in the locality. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the respondents have flouted the provisions of the Act
of 1894.
26. It is also submitted that vide letter dated 08.11.1994,
notice was given to erstwhile khatedar Mangilal with regard to
notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(2) of the Act of
1894 and since there was an urgency on account of there being a
likelihood of shifting of industries from Delhi to Rajasthan, the
recourse provided under Section 17(2) of the Act of 1894 were
undertaken. Thus, information was given well in time by the
respondents to the erstwhile khatedar as per the available record
and it cannot be said that the respondents have withheld
information with regard to the acquisition of the land in question.
27. It has also been submitted that award is culmination of
acquisition proceedings and since in the instant writ petition,
award has not been challenged by the petitioner, therefore, no
relief whatsoever can be granted. It is submitted that so far as
possession is concerned, the respondents could not take
possession of the land in question on account of interim order
passed by this Court, whereas most of the area of land under
acquisition has already been taken in possession by the
respondents whereupon industries have also been set up. Under
these circumstances, leaving a small portion of land held by the
petitioner would create hurdles in smooth functioning of rest
industrial area.
28. It is submitted that so far as compensation is
concerned, since it was not accepted either by the petitioner or
by the erstwhile khatedar, therefore, the respondents have
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deposited the same with the Civil Court in the year 2021, which
can be said to be competent authority. Learned counsel for the
respondents submitted that in view of above, provisions of Section
24 of the Act of 2013 cannot be pressed into service by the
petitioner in the light of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) .
29. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the
rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and
meticulously examined the material available on record.
30. During the course of arguments, on account of the fact
that stay order is operating in the instant writ petition restraining
the respondents from taking possession of land in question,
ground with regard to lapse of proceedings under Section 24 of
the Act of 2013 was not pressed by learned counsel for the
petitioner, hence, the aforesaid ground is not being examined on
merits.
31. The principal ground of challenge to the acquisition
proceedings, as raised by the petitioner, is with regard to non-
compliance with the mandatory procedure contemplated under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894. Therefore, for the sake of
convenience, the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1894 are
reproduced hereunder:
“ 4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers
of officers thereupon.- (1) Whenever it appears to the
1 2
[appropriate Government] that land in any locality [is
3
needed or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose [or
for a company], a notification to that effect shall be
3
published in the Official Gazette [and in two daily
newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one
shall be in the regional language], and the Collector shall
cause public notice of the substance of such notification to
3
be given at convenient places in the said locality [{the last
of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public
notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the
publication of the notification}].
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(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either,
generally or specially authorised by such Government in this
behalf, and for his servants and workmen,
to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in
such locality;
to dig or bore in the sub-soil;
to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the
land is adapted for such purpose;
to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be
taken and the intended line of the work {if any}
proposed to be made thereon;
to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing
marks and cutting trenches; and,
where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and
the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to
cut down and clear away any part of any standing
crops, fence or jungle:
Provided that no person shall enter into any building
or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to a
dwelling-house {unless with the consent of the occupier
thereof} without previously giving such occupier at least
seven days’ notice in writing of his intention to do so.”
32. It is settled proposition of law that the Land Acquisition
Act is an expropriatory legislation and, therefore, the provisions
thereof are required to be construed strictly. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court has reiterated this principle time and again, including in the
case of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur
Chenai & Others (supra) .
33. Bare perusal of provisions of Section 4 of the Act of
1894 would make it clear that the legislature in its wisdom has
prescribed three different modes of publication of notification
under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. The purpose of giving wide
publicity to notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 is
absolutely clear. Notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 is
the initial step whereby the State Government raises its intention
to acquire a land notified in the notification. Therefore, in order to
follow a fair and transparent procedure, the sole object is to
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apprise the public at large with regard to public purpose for which
land is intended to be acquired and the landowners whose lands
are intended to be acquired should be made aware of the
proposed acquisition so that if they have got any objection to
object public purpose or to seek an exemption from acquisition by
showing justified reasons, they may file objections under Section
5A of the Act of 1894. Such purpose is quite akin to well-known
principle of natural justice, namely, audi alteram partem . Thus,
the Government is under an obligation to provide due opportunity
of hearing to the landowners before expropriating their lands
under compulsory acquisition process.
34. In view of above, this Court finds that the procedure
provided under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 cannot be treated as
an empty ritual by the State Government and the same is required
to be followed strictly. The expression used by the Legislature is
not mere ‘publication in newspaper’, but quite consciously Section
4 of the Act of 1894 provides for ‘publication in newspapers having
circulation in the locality’. Thus, the Government cannot be
allowed to carry out an empty formality by publishing the
notification in any of the newspapers of its choice. While making
such publication, it is also bounden duty of the State Government
to satisfy that the newspapers which were chosen for publication
of the notification are having sufficient circulation in the locality.
35. While examining the record of the present case, this
Court finds that the stand taken by the respondents is surprisingly
contradictory. In initial reply to the writ petition, notification under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was stated to be published in daily
newspapers, i.e., Dainik Lahron Ki Barkaha and Dainik Khamos,
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whereas in the award passed under Section 11 of the Act of 1894,
as well as in subsequent additional affidavits filed by the
respondents, names of newspapers were disclosed as Dainik Taj
Bharti and Dainik Khamos. Such variation is quite material and
has not been explained by the respondents either in their reply or
in subsequent additional affidavits.
36. Apart from above, when objection with regard to
statement made by the respondents qua the names of newspapers
was specifically raised, then in order to show their bona fides, the
respondents were required to discharge their onus by placing
newspapers or copies thereof on record. This Court finds that
despite there being objection taken by the petitioner, either
original newspapers or copies thereof were not produced by the
respondents before this Court so as to satisfy that notification
under section 4 of the Act of 1894 was actually published by them
in the newspapers.
37. The respondents have utterly failed to satisfy this Court
with regard to circulation of alleged newspapers, namely, Dainik
Lahron Ki Barkaha, Dainik Khamos and Dainik Taj Bharti in the
locality. In reply to the writ petition, the respondents have stated
that one of the newspapers is circulated in Ajmer, whereas
another is circulated in Tonk. In the instant case, the land, which
is sought to be acquired, is situated in a small town, namely,
Niwai. No iota of evidence whatsoever has been placed on record
by the respondents to show that the alleged newspapers were
having any circulation whatsoever in Niwai. On the contrary, to
refute the contention of the respondents, the petitioner has filed
affidavit of Shri Nand Kishore Jaisawal, newspaper merchant of
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Niwai, who showed his total ignorance with regard to even
existence of above newspapers. Hence, there was no material on
record to assume any circulation of such newspapers in the
locality.
38. In Special Duty Collector, Land Acquisition,
C.M.D.A. vs. J. Sivaprakasam & Others, (2011) 1 SCC 330 ,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the publication of a
notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 serves twofold
purpose. Firstly, it is intended to ensure adequate publicity so that
the landowners and persons interested in the land have an
effective opportunity to file their objections under Section 5A of
the Act of 1894. Secondly, it is intended to put the landowners
and occupants on notice that the Government officers may enter
upon the property for carrying out the activities enumerated under
Section 4(2) of the Act of 1894. Having regard to the aforesaid
object and purpose of the statutory requirement, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that the notification must necessarily be
published in newspapers having reasonably good circulation in the
locality. It has further been held that where there is failure to
publish the notification in two daily newspapers, or where the
publication is made in two newspapers having no circulation at all
in the locality, notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 and
the consequential acquisition proceedings would stand vitiated on
account of non-compliance with an essential statutory
requirement. Following pertinent observations of the aforesaid
judgment are reproduced hereunder:
“ 16. On the contentions raised, two questions arise for our
consideration:
(i) Whether the finding of the High Court that the two
regional language newspapers in which the notification
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under Section 4(1) was published did not have reasonably
wide circulation in the locality and therefore there is non-
compliance with the provisions of Section 4(1), calls for
interference?
(ii) Whether the acquisition is invalid?
17. Section 4(1) of the Act relates to publication of
preliminary notification and relevant portion thereof is
extracted below:
“4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of
officers thereupon.—(1) Whenever it appears to the
appropriate Government that land in any locality is
needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose
or for a company a notification to that effect shall be
published in the Official Gazette and in two daily
newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least
one shall be in the regional language and the Collector
shall cause public notice of the substance of such
notification to be given at convenient places in the said
locality….”
Section 4(1) of the Act requires publication of the
preliminary notification by three modes: (i) publication in
the Official Gazette; (ii) publication in two daily newspapers
circulating in the locality, at least one of which being in the
regional language; and (iii) causing public notice of the
substance of such preliminary notification to be given at
convenient places in the locality.
18. The controversy in this case relates to the second mode,
that is, publication in “two daily newspapers circulating in
that locality”. The provision does not use the words “two
daily newspapers having a wide circulation in the locality”.
In the absence of any definition or explanation in the
statute, the question is as to how should the words
“circulating in that locality” be understood? Do they refer to
newspapers having the widest circulation in the locality? Or
do they refer to newspapers which are regularly sold or
circulated in the locality, irrespective of numbers, even if
their circulation figures are very modest?
19. If there are nine newspapers circulating in the locality,
having a market share of 25%, 20%, 15%, 12%, 10%, 8%,
5%, 3% and 2% of the total daily sales of regional
newspapers in the locality, whether all of them can be
termed as “newspapers circulating in the locality” or whether
only newspapers with a particular minimum percentage can
be described as “newspapers circulating in the locality”. Can
it be said that the newspapers having 5%, 3% and 2% of
total sales of newspapers, are not newspapers circulating in
the locality? Can it be said that only the newspapers having
the maximum market share of 25% or 20% or 15% of the
total sales in the locality, could be described as newspapers
circulating in the locality? Whether the total circulation
figures of the newspaper are relevant or whether the
circulation figures in the locality alone are relevant?
20. From a newspaper's point of view, if its total circulation
is 40,000 and out of it circulation figure for Chennai is
21,000, it can very well say that its major circulation is in
Chennai. But from the reader's point of view, if the total
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number of regional newspapers sold in Chennai is a million,
a newspaper having a circulation of 21,000 (which is around
2%) may not be considered to be a newspaper with a wide
circulation in the locality. Which perspective should be
preferred? If Section 4(1) is to be interpreted as requiring
publication in two newspapers having reasonably wide
circulation, as held by the High Court, what should be the
guidelines to determine “reasonably wide circulation”?
Where should the line be drawn and whether any line should
be drawn are questions that may arise, if we read the words
“newspapers circulating in that locality” as “newspapers
having wide circulation in that locality”.
21. The purpose of publication of the notification is twofold:
First is to ensure that adequate publicity is given so that the
landowners and persons interested will have an opportunity
to file their objections under Section 5-A of the Act. Second
is to put the landowners/occupants on notice that
government officers will be entering upon the property for
carrying on the activities enumerated in Section 4(2) of the
Act. Section 4(1), before its amendment in 1984, required
publication of the preliminary notification only in the Official
Gazette and public notice of the substance of the notification
at convenient places in the locality.
22. This Court, in M.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi
[(1992) 2 SCC 168] explained the object of issuing a
notification under Section 4 of the Act thus: (SCC p. 173,
para 8)
“8. … The object of issuing a notification under Section 4
of the Act is twofold. First, it is a public announcement
by the Government and a public notice by the Collector
to the effect that the land, as specified therein, is needed
or is likely to be needed by the Government for the
‘public purpose’ mentioned therein; and secondly, it
authorises the departmental officers or officers of the
local authority, as the case may be to do all such acts as
are mentioned in Section 4(2) of the Act. The notification
has to be published in the locality and particularly
persons likely to be affected by the proposal have to be
put on notice that such an activity is afoot. The
notification is, thus, required to give with sufficient
clarity not only the ‘public purpose’ for which the
acquisition proceedings are being commenced but also
the ‘locality’ where the land is situate with as full a
description as possible of the land proposed to be
acquired to enable the ‘interested’ persons to know as to
which land is being acquired and for what purpose and to
take further steps under the Act by filing objections, etc.
since it is open to such persons to canvass the non-
suitability of the land for the alleged ‘public purpose’
also. If a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is
defective and does not comply with the requirements of
the Act, it not only vitiates the notification, but also
renders all subsequent proceedings connected with the
acquisition, bad.”
23. By Amendment Act 68 of 1984, Section 4(1) was
amended introducing the additional requirement relating to
publication of the notification in two daily newspapers
circulating in the locality. The purpose of requiring such
newspaper publication is to give as wide a publicity to the
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notification as possible, as the State Gazettes do not have a
wide circulation and causing public notice of the substance
of the notification at convenient places in the locality would
give notice only in specific pockets in the locality. The
legislature therefore provided for publication in two
newspapers (of which at least one being in the regional
language) to have a wider reach. Having regard to the
object and purpose of the provision, it is evident that
publication should be in newspapers which have a
reasonably good circulation in the locality. If the publication
is to be made in obscure newspapers having only token or
insignificant circulation, either to cut the cost of publication
or by way of political or official patronage, that will defeat
the very purpose of providing for publication in newspapers.
24. On the other hand, if the words “newspapers circulating
in that locality” are to be interpreted in a purely literal and
normal sense, they would mean newspapers having a
regular and steady circulation among the general public in
the locality, irrespective of the number. In that sense even a
newspaper having 2% to 3% market share out of the total
circulation figures for regional newspapers sold in the
locality, can be considered as a newspaper “circulating in the
locality”. Therefore, where there is compliance with the
requirement relating to publication in two daily newspapers
circulating in that locality (one of which at least should be in
the regional language) in a technical or literal sense, but it is
found that those newspapers have only a circulation share of
2% to 3% of the total number of newspapers sold in the
locality, it may not be possible to mechanically invalidate the
entire acquisition, on the ground that the two regional
newspapers in which the notification was published were not
“circulating in that locality”.
25. We have held that the object and purpose of the
amended Section 4(1) of the Act is to provide for publication
of the preliminary notification in two daily newspapers
having reasonably wide circulation in the locality so that
people (persons interested) in that locality may become
aware of the proposals for acquisition. We have also held
that publications in two newspapers having regular and
steady circulation, but having a market share of only 2% to
3% of the total newspapers cannot invalidate the acquisition
proceedings automatically, on the ground that such
publication violates the requirement of Section 4(1) relating
to newspaper publication. As the said two findings are
slightly contradictory, it is necessary to harmonise the
consequences.
26. This leads us next to the consequences of publication of
the notification in two newspapers having reasonably wide
circulation and consequences of bona fide publication of the
notification in two newspapers which do not have a wide
circulation in the locality.
27. If there is failure to publish in two daily newspapers or if
the publication is in two newspapers that have no circulation
at all in the locality, without anything more, the notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act and the consequential
acquisition proceedings will be vitiated, on the ground of
non-compliance with an essential condition of Section 4(1)
of the Act.
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28. If the two newspapers carrying the publication of the
notification have reasonably wide circulation in the locality
(apart from the publication of the notification in the gazette
and causing public notice of the substance of the notification
to be given at convenient places in the locality), then the
requirements of Section 4(1) are complied with and all
persons concerned in the locality shall be deemed to have
notice of the notification. (For this purpose, the publication
need not be in newspapers having the widest or largest
circulation, but it is sufficient if the publication is in
newspapers having reasonably wide circulation.) In that
event, neither the notification under Section 4(1), nor the
consequential acquisition proceedings would be open to
challenge, on the ground of violation of Section 4 of the Act.
29. If the newspapers in which the notification is published
were circulating in the locality, but did not have a
reasonably wide circulation in the locality, then neither the
notification under Section 4(1) nor the consequential
acquisition proceedings, will become vitiated automatically.
If the person aggrieved, apart from demonstrating that the
two newspapers did not have reasonably wide circulation in
the locality, also asserts that as a consequence, he did not
have notice of the proposed acquisition that was provided
for in Section 4(1) of the Act, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the acquisition to the extent of the land of
such person will be vitiated. But if such assertion is rebutted
by the acquiring authority by placing evidence to show that
the person concerned had in fact notice (as for example
where he participated in the enquiry under Section 5-A of
the Act), the acquisition will not be vitiated on the ground of
violation of Section 4-A of the Act.
30. If the person challenging the acquisition is able to
establish that the notifications were deliberate and with
mala fides, published in newspapers having negligible
circulation, to avoid notice to the persons concerned, then
Section 4(1) will be violated.
31. The acquiring authority need not prove actual notice of
the proposal to acquire under Section 4(1) of the Act, to the
person challenging the acquisition. As the purpose of
publication of public notice provided in Section 4(1) of the
Act is to give notice of the proposal of acquisition to the
persons concerned, such notice can also be by way of
implied notice or constructive notice. For this purpose, we
may refer to the difference between actual, implied and
constructive notice:
1. When notice is directly served upon a party in a formal
manner or when it is received personally by him, there is
actual notice.
2. If from the facts it can be inferred that a party knew
about the subject-matter of the notice, knowledge is
imputed by implied notice. For example, if the purpose of
the notice is to require a party to appear before an authority
on a particular date, even though such a notice is not
personally served on him, if the person appears before the
authority on that date or participates in the subsequent
proceedings, then the person can be said to have implied
notice.
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3. Notice arising by presumption of law from the existence
of certain specified facts and circumstances is constructive
or deemed notice. For example, any person purchasing or
obtaining a transfer of an immovable property is deemed to
have notice of all transactions relating to such property
effected by registered instruments till the date of his
acquisition. Or, where the statute provides for publication of
the notification relating to a proposed acquisition of lands in
the gazette and newspapers and by causing public notice of
the substance of the notification at convenient places in the
locality, but does not provide for actual direct notice, then
such provision provides for constructive notice; and on
fulfilment of those requirements, all persons interested in
the lands proposed for acquisition are deemed to have
notice of the proposal regarding acquisition.
36. It is significant to note that there is no averment in the
writ petition that the respondents were not aware of the
proposed acquisition. It is evident that they were aware of
the notification. It is also inconceivable that Respondents 5
to 11 who knew about the proposed acquisition would not
have informed Respondents 1 to 4 about the proposed
acquisition. Be that as it may. Therefore, even if the
publication in two regional language newspapers is
considered to be not in compliance with the requirements of
Section 4(1), it cannot affect the validity of the preliminary
notification or the consequential proceedings in regard to
Survey Nos. 186/1 and 186/2.”
39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Urban Improvement
Trust vs. Vidhya Devi & Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725 ,
while relying upon and reiterating the principles laid down in
Special Duty Collector, Land Acquisition, C.M.D.A. vs. J.
Sivaprakasam & Others (supra) , has held as under:
“ 56. The provisions of the Section 52(2) are akin to Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. To initiate the
acquisition proceedings, the State must publish a notice
under Section 52(2) of the RUI Act for the owners or any
other interested parties to show cause as to why their land
should not be acquired.
57. As regards the validity of the notification under Section
52(1) for the acquisition of the Nangli Kota lands and
procedural deviation as alleged by the respondents, we
observe the following:
a) It is an admitted fact by both the parties that there were
no individual notices served upon the owners as required
under Section 52(2) nor was the notice of the proposed
acquisition pasted on some conspicuous space in the locality
where the property was situated. The State Government had
only published the notice under Section 52(2) in the official
gazette.
b) The object of issuing a notice under Section 52(2) prior to
a notification under Section 52(1) is to allow the owners and
interested parties to put forth their case as to why a land
proposed to be acquired should not be acquired or to make
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representations regarding the amount of compensation. A
deviation from the process prescribed runs the risk of
prejudicing the rights of the landowners and should be
discouraged.
c) A plain reading of Section 52(2) shows that the legislature
considered publication of notice in the official gazette and
pasting of the same in conspicuous areas of the locality is
considered to be sufficient notice. These requirements are
akin to the ones under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.
The requirement of individual notices to be served upon the
owners is an additional measure taken by the legislature to
safeguard the rights of the landowners. While the State
Government ought to have complied with this measure, we
cannot say that non-compliance therewith can make the
whole acquisition proceedings infructuous.
d) However, a reading of Section 52(2) shows that the
conditions of publication of notice in the official gazette and
pasting the same at a conspicuous area of the locality are
together considered to be sufficient notice and fulfilment of
just one requirement out of the two risked causing prejudice
to the respondents herein.
e) What remains to be seen is whether the improper service
of notice did in fact deprive the respondents from making
their representations and objections to the acquisition
proceedings. The documents placed on record show that the
seven sons of late Ram Narain participated in the
proceedings before the OSD and were aware that the Nangli
Kota lands were proposed to be acquired.
f) This Court has held in the case of Special Deputy
Collector, Land Acquisition CMDA (supra) that:
“The acquiring authority need not prove actual notice of
the proposal to acquire under section 4(1) of the Act to
the person challenging the acquisition. As the purpose of
publication of public notice provided in section 4(10) of
the Act is to give notice of the proposal of acquisition to
the persons concerned, such notice can also be by way
of implied notice or constructive notice. For this purpose,
we may refer to the difference between actual, implied
and constructive notice:
1. When notice is directly served upon a party in a
formal manner or when it is received personally by him,
there is actual notice.
2. If from the facts it can be inferred that a party
knew about the subject matter of the notice,
knowledge is to be imputed by implied notice. For
example, if the purpose of the notice is to require a
party to appear before an authority on a particular
date, even though such a notice is not personally
served on him, if the person appears before the
authority on that date or participates in the
subsequent proceedings, then the person can be
said to have implied notice.
3. Notice arising by presumption of law from the
existence of certain specified facts and circumstances is
constructive or deemed notice, for example, any person
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purchasing or obtaining a transfer of an immovable
property is deemed to have notice of all transactions
relating to such property affected by registered
instruments till the date of his acquisition. Or where the
statute provides for publication of the notification
relating to a proposed acquisition of lands in the gazette
and newspapers and by causing public notice of the
substance of the notification at convenient places in the
locality, but does not provide for actual direct notice,
then such provision provides for constructive notice and
on fulfillment of those requirements, all persons
interested in the lands proposed for acquisition are
deemed to have notice of the proposal regarding
acquisition.”
[Emphasis supplied]
Therefore, the participation in the proceedings by the
landowners themselves is sufficient evidence that the object
of the publication of the notice under Section 52(2) was met
and we are of the view that the acquiring authority that is,
the State was not required to prove actual notice of the
proposal to acquire in this case and the knowledge of the
appellants about the acquisition proceedings is equivalent to
implied notice to the appellants.
g) Therefore, the non-service of individual notices upon the
owners under Section 52(2) cannot be a ground to invalidate
the acquisition proceedings. We find that the reasoning of
the High Court to this extent is liable to be set aside.
58. As regards the validity of the notification under Section
52(1) for the acquisition of the Moongaska lands and
procedural deviation as alleged by the respondents, we
observe the following:
a) In case of this parcel of land as well, the State did not
serve individual notices upon the owners. The notice under
Section 52(2) was also not pasted at a conspicuous area of
the locality in which the property is situated. The State
Government only published the notice in the official gazette.
b) This Court in the case of Kolkata Municipal Corporation
(supra) has held that the “right to be heard” forms an
integral part of the seven sub-rights that have been
synchronously incorporated in laws concerning compulsory
acquisition. Improper service of notice under Section 52(2)
runs the risk of contravening the “right to be heard”.
Whether the objective of making the respondents aware was
achieved or not has to be tested on the basis of concrete
evidence placed on record by the parties.
c) For the reasons stated hereinabove, we move directly to
ascertain whether the improper service of notice prejudiced
the rights of the landowners. From the documents placed on
record before us, we find that the representations made by
the landowners dated 30.10.1976, 01.11.1976, 30.12.1976,
17.01.1977, 07.02.1977, 24.02.1977 and 10.03.1977 were
only from legal heirs of two of the original landowners, that
is the late Mr. Ram Narain and Mr. Yogesh Chand Goyal. We
find that there is no evidence of the participation by the
other two original landowners that is, Mr. Radhey Shyam
and Mr. Manohar Lal or their legal heirs. The appellant Trust
or the State Government has also not adduced any evidence
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whether written or oral that these two landowners and their
legal heirs actively participated in the acquisition
proceedings and made their objections heard.
d) The appellant's contention that there is a presumption as
per illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872
that the notification under Section 52(1) was in conformity
with the provisions of the RUI Act unless dislodged by the
respondents, is of no avail to them. Such presumption is
available to the State in cases where the owner or interested
party had not gotten their names recorded in the revenue
records thereby disabling the State from identifying who the
interested parties are. This has been the position adopted by
this Court in Ahuja Industries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka,
(2003) 5 SCC 365 and the split verdict by Manoj Misra J. in
the case of Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner v. Gordhan
Dass (D.) through Lrs., (2024) 3 SCC 250 wherein it was
held that “mere non-service of notice, under Section 52(2)
of the 1959 Act, upon non-recorded owner , such as the
plaintiff, would not render the acquisition notification under
Section 52(1) void…”
However, in the present case, there was no question of the
landowners’ names not being present in the revenue
records, therefore, the presumption under Section 114(e) of
the Evidence Act, 1872 is of no help to the appellant's case.
e) We find from the records placed before us that improper
service of notice under Section 52(2) did in fact prejudice
the rights of the two original landowners and their legal
heirs and they were not provided with an opportunity to be
heard. Such factum is sufficient to declare the notification
under Section 52(1) for the Moongaska land, invalid. Thus,
we uphold the findings of the High Court to this extent.
59. This Court in the case of D.B. Basnett (D) through Lrs v.
Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim, (2020) 4 SCC 572
has held that:
“14. … even though rights in land are no more a
fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional
right under Article 300A of the Constitution of
India , and the provisions of any Act seeking to
divest any person from the rights in property have
to be strictly followed.
15. It is also settled law that following the procedure of
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 18942 (akin to
Section 5(1) of the said Act) is mandatory, and unless
that notice is given in accordance with the provisions
contained therein, the entire acquisition proceeding
would be vitiated. An entry into the premises based on
such non-compliance would result in the entry being
unlawfu l3. The law being ex-propriatory in
character, the same is required to be strictly
followed . The purpose of the notice is to intimate the
interested persons about the intent to acquire the land.
These provisions, as they read, of the said Act, thus, are
also required to be so followed.”
[Emphasis supplied]
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Therefore, we are of the view that in cases of compulsory
acquisition by the State, it is all the more important that
proper service of notice be made to the owners.”
40. In the aforesaid case of Urban Improvement Trust
vs. Vidhya Devi & Others (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has clarified that as the object of publication is to apprise the land
owners, therefore, knowledge of the acquisition is an important
factor. Therefore, even if any person, despite there being any
proper publication, or is of personal notice, either participates in
the subsequent proceedings or had acquired knowledge, then it
can be assumed that the person was having ample notice. In the
present case, the petitioner has come out with a specific case that
he had no knowledge with regard to acquisition proceedings and,
therefore, he was deprived of participating in the inquiry under
Section 5A of the Act of 1894.
41. In the case of Khub Chand & Others(supra) , it has
been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that all the modes
prescribed under section 4 of the Act of 1894 for publication of
notification are mandatory, including publication in newspapers.
42. In the case of State of Mysore vs. Abdul Razak
Sahib(supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the
necessity of publication of notice strictly in accordance with the
provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1894 and it has been held
that in absence of such publication, the interested person is likely
to be deprived of his right to object against the acquisition
proceedings. Similar principles have been laid down in the cases of
Narindrajit Singh & Ranjit Singh & Others (supra); Kulsum
R. Nadiadwala (supra); V.K.M. Kattha Industries Private
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Limited (supra) and Collector (District Magistrate)
Allahabad & Another vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal (supra) .
43. In J&K Housing Board & Another vs. Kunwar
Sanjay Krishan Kaul & Others (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has gone to the extent of holding that irrespective of the
fact that the affected parties may have had knowledge of the
acquisition proceedings, failure to follow the procedure prescribed
under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 would vitiate the acquisition
proceedings. Paragraph 32 of the aforesaid judgment, being
relevant, is reproduced hereunder:
“ 32. It is settled law that when any statutory provision
provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, the
said thing or act must be done in accordance with the
manner prescribed therefor in the Act. Merely because the
parties concerned were aware of the acquisition proceedings
or served with individual notices does not make the position
alter when the statute makes it very clear that all the
procedures/modes have to be strictly complied with in the
manner provided therein. Merely because the landowners
failed to submit their objections within 15 days after the
publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the State
Act, the authorities cannot be permitted to claim that it need
not be strictly resorted to.”
44. Likewise, in Union of India & Others vs. Gopaldas
Bhagwan Das & Others, (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has reiterated that acquisition proceedings undertaken without
publication of the notification at convenient places in the locality,
notwithstanding the fact that personal notices may have been
served upon the claimants, constitute a serious infringement of
the mandatory requirements prescribed under Section 4 of the Act
of 1894. On this ground, the acquisition proceedings were held to
be vitiated and were consequently nullified. The following
observations of the aforesaid judgment being relevant are
reproduced hereunder:
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“ 3. The Court then held : (Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case
[Kulsum R. Nadiadwala v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 6
SCC 348] , SCC p. 352, paras 13-15)
“13. In the instant case, the respondents before the
High Court had filed their reply-affidavit. They did not
dispute the contentions of the appellants that they had
not issued any public notices as required under Section
4 of the Act. They only reiterated that such notification
was published in the Official Gazette. Since the
mandatory requirement as required under Section 4(1)
of the Act is not complied with by the respondents,
while acquiring the lands in question, in our opinion, the
entire acquisition proceedings requires to be declared as
null and void.
14. This Court in J&K Housing Board v. Sanjay Krishan
Kaul [(2011) 10 SCC 714] has observed that all the
formalities of serving notice to the interested person,
stipulated under Section 4 of the Act, has to be
mandatorily complied with in the manner provided
therein, even though the interested persons have
knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. This Court
further observed thus : (SCC p. 725, para 32)
‘32. It is settled law that when any statutory
provision provides a particular manner for doing a
particular act, the said thing or act must be done in
accordance with the manner prescribed therefor in
the Act. Merely because the parties concerned were
aware of the acquisition proceedings or served with
individual notices does not make the position alter
when the statute makes it very clear that all the
procedures/modes have to be strictly complied with
in the manner provided therein. Merely because the
landowners failed to submit their objections within
15 days after the publication of notification under
Section 4(1) of the State Act, the authorities
cannot be permitted to claim that it need not be
strictly resorted to.’
15. In view of the conclusion that we have reached on
the first issue canvassed by the learned counsel for the
appellants, we do not think that other issues that the
learned counsel for the appellants has raised and
canvassed before us need to be answered.”
5. Ms Rekha Pandey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant, has raised several points in support of this
appeal. First and foremost, she adverted to an order of this
Court dated 27-3-2018 [Union of India v. Gopaldas Bhagwan
Das, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3621] by which a Division Bench
of this Court has referred this matter to a larger Bench of
three Judges. This order reads as follows : [Union of India v.
Gopaldas Bhagwan Das, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3621], SCC
OnLine SC paras 1-7)
“1. The land of the respondents was acquired vide
Notification dated 24-10-1975 under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“the Act”). The said land
was earlier requisitioned in the years 1942 to 1945 for
defence purpose. Award was made in the year 1986
and symbolic possession of the land was taken on 6-1-
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1987. Objections of the award were filed by the
respondents against the award. A reference under
Section 18 of the Act was made which was disposed of.
Thereafter, the writ petition was filed by the
respondents mainly on the ground that there was no
due publication of the notification under Section 4 of the
Act which was a mandatory requirement.
2. The High Court upheld the plea of the respondents
relying upon judgment of this Court in Kulsum R.
Nadiadwala v. State of Maharashtra [(2012) 6 SCC
348].
3. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that
having regard to the fact that the land was already
being used for defence purpose since the year 1942 to
1945 and the notification under Section 4 issued on 24-
10-1975 was challenged for the first time by the writ
petition filed on 24-6-2002, the High Court should have
dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and
laches as entertaining such petition will seriously affect
public interest. It was submitted that view taken in the
relied upon judgment ignores the concept of laches.
4. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that
in spite of delay and laches, this Court in the aforesaid
judgment quashed the acquisition.
5. We are of the view that delay and laches may be a
bar to challenge to the acquisition after 27 years. In
T.N. Housing Board v. M. Meiyappan [(2010) 14 SCC
309] this Court held that in land acquisition proceedings
the Court should not encourage stale litigation as it may
hinder projects of public importance. The contra view in
three-Judge Bench decision in Dayal Singh v. Union of
India [(2003) 2 SCC 593] was held to be in conflict with
the Constitution Bench judgment in Rabindranath Bose
v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] and three-Judge
Bench judgment in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A.
Rasheed [ (2004) 4 SCC 460]. The said judgment was
cited with approval in recent judgment of three-Judge
Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra
[(2018) 3 SCC 412].
6. In view of the above, the view taken by the two-
Judge Bench in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala v. State of
Maharashtra to the effect that delay and laches have to
be ignored is not free from doubt.
7. Thus, we are of the view that the matter needs to be
placed before a Bench of three Judges. Accordingly, let
the papers be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief
Justice of India for appropriate directions.”
8. Though this Court has, by its order dated 27-3-2018
[Union of India v. Gopaldas Bhagwan Das], referred this
case to a larger Bench in view of the decision in Kulsum R.
Nadiadwala case that delay and laches have to be ignored,
we are of the view that on the facts of this case, we need
not answer this question. This is for the reason that Section
4 notification that was struck down in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala
case is the very notification in the facts of this case. We
may also note that in para 13 of Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case
set out hereinabove, this Court quashed the entire
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[2026:RJ-JP:31319] [CW-2337/1996]
acquisition proceedings stating that they be declared as null
and void. We are unable to agree with Ms Pandey's
contention that Section 4 notification not only deals with
various other lands in Village Malad but also deals with a
land in a different village altogether viz. Village Wadhawan,
and that this Court's judgment did not go to the extent of
declaring the acquisition bad so far as Village Wadhawan is
concerned. So far as Village Malad is concerned, where the
land in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case was land that was
adjacent to the present land, the very Section 4 notification
has been struck down and declared null and void, and this
being the case, it would not be in the interest of justice to
allow the present appeal in favour of the Union of India, as
this would amount to a discrimination between two persons
who are otherwise similarly placed.
10. Insofar as the “per incuriam” point is concerned, this
can be disposed of by stating that even though newspaper
publication of Section 4 notification came in by amendment
for the first time in 1984, the requirement of public notice
where the land is situate in addition to publication in the
Official Gazette, was always there from the inception.
Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case [Kulsum R. Nadiadwala v. State
of Maharashtra, (2012) 6 SCC 348] did not deal with
newspaper publication at all. It only dealt with the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and public
notices of the substance of the notification being given in
the locality in which the lands are acquired, both of which
were held to be cumulative and mandatory requirements of
Section 4.
11. So far as Indore Development Authority case [Indore
Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412] is
concerned, the Constitution Bench is seized of several
questions, all of which pertain to the construction of Section
24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
12. This being the case, and regard being had to what we
have stated hereinabove, it is wholly unnecessary for us to
adjourn this case in order to await the judgment of the
Constitution Bench in this case. Given the fact that this is a
defence project in which possession has been with the Union
since 1942, the same facts would obtain as in Kulsum R.
Nadiadwala case [Kulsum R. Nadiadwala v. State of
Maharashtra, (2012) 6 SCC 348] in which relief has been
granted to Kulsum R. Nadiadwala. This case, therefore,
cannot lead to a different conclusion on similar facts.”
45. It is also settled preposition that opportunity of hearing
under section 5A of the Act of 1894 is not an empty formality and
rather the only right given to the land owner to object to the
acquisition proceedings. In the instant case, this Court finds that
on account of not following the proper procedure for publication of
notification in the newspapers and rather by allegedly publishing
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[2026:RJ-JP:31319] [CW-2337/1996]
the same in unknown newspapers, even copies thereof was not
placed on record by the respondent, this Court finds that the
conduct of the respondents shows sheer defiance of mandatory
statutory procedure. On account of such conduct of the
respondents, the petitioner has been deprived of his right to
participate in the inquiry proceedings under section 5A of the Act
of 1894.
46. In the case of Union of India & Others vs. Mukesh
Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under:
“ 35. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that the limited
right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A
of the Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an
empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be
taken away for good and valid reason and within the
limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. The
object and importance of Section 5-A inquiry was noticed by
this Court in the case of Munshi Singh v. Union of India
[(1973) 2 SCC 337] wherein this Court held thus: (SCC p.
342, para 7)
“7. Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome
principle that a person whose property is being or is
intended to be acquired should have a proper and
reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities
concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that
person should not be made. … The legislature has,
therefore, made complete provisions for the persons
interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition
and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of
urgency that special powers have been conferred on the
appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of
Section 5-A:”
47. In the light of above, this Court is of the opinion that
the respondents have utterly failed to follow the mandatory
procedure of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act
of 1894, which has ultimately deprived the petitioner of the right
of being heard under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894. Hence, on
account of violation of mandatory provisions, the entire acquisition
proceedings stand vitiated.
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48. Merely the fact that award has been passed in respect
of impugned notification, this Court finds that under the
circumstances where the initial notifications have suffered serious
lapses and infirmities on account of not following mandatory
procedure as contemplated under the provisions of the Act of
1894 and where the foundation of the acquisition proceedings has
been held to be illegal by this Court, superstructure of award
erected upon such illegal notifications has got no independent
existence and the same would automatically stand vitiated.
49. Admittedly, till date, possession of the land and
property belonging to the petitioner has not been taken by the
respondents. Consequently, it cannot be said that the land in
question has vested in the State Government. In these
circumstances, the contention of the respondents that a
substantial part of the acquired land has already been utilised for
industrial purposes and that retention of the petitioner’s land
would cause an impediment in the functioning of the industrial
area, does not advance the case of the respondents.
50. The question of legality of acquisition has to be
examined with reference to the individual rights of the person
whose property is sought to be acquired. The mere fact that other
landowners have accepted the acquisition or that a substantial
portion of the acquired land has been utilised pursuant thereto
cannot, by itself, defeat the lawful challenge raised by an
individual landowner whose property has not been taken into
possession.
51. In Radhy Shyam(Dead) through LRs & Others vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2011) 5 SCC 553 , the
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Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with a similar situation where a
substantial portion of the acquired land had vested in the
Government and only some of the landowners had challenged the
acquisition proceedings. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the
right to property is an individual right and that a person cannot be
deprived of his property merely because other landowners have
accepted the acquisition proceedings. The following observations
of the judgment being relevant are reproduced hereunder:
“ 87. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents that the Court may not annul the impugned
acquisition because land of other villages had already been
acquired and other landowners of Village Makaura have not
come forward to challenge the acquisition of their land
cannot be entertained and the Court cannot refuse to
protect the legal and constitutional rights of the appellants
merely because the others have not come forward to
challenge the illegitimate exercise of power by the State
Government. It is quite possible that others may have, due
to sheer poverty, ignorance and similar handicaps not been
able to avail legal remedies for protection of their rights, but
that cannot be made the basis to deny what is due to the
appellants.”
52. Equally untenable is the contention of the respondents
that in view of the fact that industries were likely to be shifted
from Delhi to Rajasthan, the respondents had invoked powers
under Section 17(2) of the Act of 1894, as nothing has been
placed on record that notification dated 15.09.1994 (Annexure-6)
allegedly issued Section 17(2) read with Section 4 of the Act of
1894 was ever published in the Official Gazette, nor is there any
whisper in the notification or otherwise on record to reflect any
element of urgency or emergency. By bare reading from the
contents thereof, the said notification cannot be said to be
notification under Section 17(2) of the Act of 1894, either in form
or in substance. Even otherwise, careful reading of Section 17(2)
of the Act of 1894 makes it evident that the provision is an
exception to the ordinary procedure prescribed under the Act and,
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therefore, its application has to be confined strictly to the
circumstances expressly contemplated therein. The provision does
not confer an unfettered or general power upon the acquiring
authority to dispense with the statutory procedure merely on the
ground of urgency. The authority must first satisfy the conditions
stipulated in Section 17(2) of the Act of 1894 and must
demonstrate the existence of circumstances which bring the
acquisition within the specific contingencies enumerated therein.
The extraordinary power under Section 17(2) of the Act of 1894,
being capable of depriving the landowner of the normal statutory
protection available under the acquisition proceedings, cannot be
invoked mechanically or as a matter of routine. More particularly,
the mere assertion that the land is urgently required for a public
purpose, without establishing the factual foundation necessary for
invoking the particular clause of Section 17(2) of the Act of 1894,
would not validate exercise of such power. Thus, where the
statutory conditions precedent are not shown to have existed, the
special power under Section 17(2) of the Act of 1894 cannot be
sustained merely by describing the acquisition as one involving
urgency.
53. For the reasons recorded hereinabove and upon a
comprehensive consideration of the entire material available on
record, this Court finds that the respondents have utterly failed to
discharge the statutory obligations cast upon them under the
mandatory provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1894. The non-
compliance with the said mandatory requirements goes to the root
of the acquisition proceedings and consequently, the entire
acquisition proceedings are held to be vitiated.
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54. Accordingly, notification dated 15.09.1994 issued under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894 and declaration dated 24.08.1995
issued under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 and published in Official
Gazette on 31.08.1995 along with all consequential and
subsequent proceedings qua the petitioners, are hereby quashed
and set aside. The respondents are restrained from interfering
with the ownership and possession of the petitioners over the land
in question pursuant to the aforesaid acquisition proceedings.
55. Writ petition is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid
terms.
56. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI
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