Kamlaben B Solanki vs M/o Railways

Court
Central Administrative Tribunal

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CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
AHMEDABAD BENCH
Original Application No. 471/2018

th
Dated this the 30 day of October, 2026.


Reserved On: 29.09.2026
Pronounced On: 30.10.2026



CORAM:
Hon’ble Shri Jayesh V Bhairavia, Member (J)
Hon’ble Shri Sanjiv Kumar, Member (A)

1. Kamlaben B. Solanki
W/o. Bhaiju U. Solanki
Aged 57 years,
R/o. Delhi Chakla, Vill, Kathana,
Taluka: Borsad. Dist – Anand.
… Applicant

(By Advocate Ms. S S Chaturvedi)

V/s.

1. Union of India,
Notice to be served through,
General Manager,
Western Railway,
Churchgate, Mumbai – 400 020.

2. Assistant Operating Manager (E)
Western Railway,
Pratapnagar,
Baroda – 390 04.

3. Divisional Operating Manager,
Western Railway,
Pratapnagar, Vadodara – 390 004.
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4. Sr. Divisional Operating Manager,
Western Railway,
Pratapnagar,
Vadodara – 390 004.
… Respondents

(By Advocate Ms. A B Makwana)



ORDER

Per: Hon’ble Shri Sanjiv Kumar, Member (A)
1. The applicant has filed this OA under Section 19 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following
reliefs:
“8.1 Lord Ships be pleased to admit this petition. And be
pleased to issue order quash and setting aside Order no.
E/308/10.3/71 (06) Dated 13.03.2015 Passed by RA & Sr.
DOM/BRC (Annex. A/1), Order no. E/308/10/3/71 (06) Dated
05.01/2.2014 passed by AA & DOM/BRC (Annex. A/2) and
Order no. E/308/10.3.71 (06), Dated 17.11.2008 passed by
AOM/BRC (Annex. A/3).
8.2 Be pleased to direct the respondent to release the all the
retirement/death benefit to the applicant.
8.3 The Order to call for the record.
8.4 Any other relief which the Hon’ble Tribunal deems fit.
8.5 Cost of suit be awarded.”
2. The facts, as stated by the applicant, are briefly as follows: -
2. 1 2.1 The applicant is the widow of late Shri Bhaiji U. Solanki,
who joined Western Railway on 26.11.1982 and was working as
Gangman at Kanjari-Boriyavi Railway Station.
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2.2 A charge-sheet dated 27.02.2006 (Annexure A/4) was issued to
him under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1968, for unauthorised absence from duty from 23.04.2003 to
31.12.2005. The Inquiry Officer, by report dated 17.07.2008
(Annexure A/5), held the charge proved. The disciplinary
authority, by order dated 17.11.2008, imposed the penalty of
removal from service.
2.3 The employee filed an appeal on 04.06.2013, which was rejected
on 05.02.2014. His revision petition dated 11.03.2014 was
rejected on 13.03.2015. He died on 23.02.2016. The applicant
filed this OA on 21.08.2018, along with M.A. No. 392/2018
seeking condonation of delay.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the inquiry was
held, in substance, ex parte, and the employee did not get a fair
chance to defend himself. Relevant documents were not supplied.
He was not allowed a defence assistant or a chance to cross-
examine witnesses. The original attendance records were not
examined. His absence was due to illness, which the authorities
ignored. His request for voluntary retirement dated 15.02.2008
was not considered. Removal after more than twenty years of
service is too harsh and has left the family without support.
3.1 In the written notes of arguments, it was further submitted that,
as held by the Supreme Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar v.
Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178, unauthorised absence is not
misconduct unless it is proved to be wilful, and no authority
recorded such a finding. It was also submitted that no Presenting
Officer was appointed, so the Inquiry Officer acted as both
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prosecutor and judge. Reliance was placed on Union of India v.
Ram Lakhan Sharma, Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 2012 , decided
by the Supreme Court on 02.07.2018, and on the judgment of the
Gujarat High Court in Satish S/o Ramprasad Agnihotri v. Union
of India, R/Special Civil Application No. 7466 of 2019 . The
delay in filing the OA was attributed to the illness and death of
the employee.
4. The respondents have filed a reply opposing the OA. Learned
counsel for the respondents submitted that the inquiry was held
as per the rules. The employee was informed of the dates of
inquiry and given the chance to take a defence assistant, but he
did not attend. He cannot now blame the department for his own
non-participation. The charge was proved on the basis of the
record, and the appellate and revisional authorities examined the
matter and upheld the penalty. It was also pointed out that the
appeal itself was filed about four and a half years after the
penalty order.
5. The applicant has filed a rejoinder reiterating the averments
made in the OA.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record, including the written notes of arguments filed on behalf
of the applicant.
7. The following points arise for determination:
(i) Whether the delay in filing the OA deserves to be
condoned?
(ii) Whether, even otherwise, the penalty of removal and
the appellate and revisional orders call for interference?
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8. We first take up the question of delay. Under Section 21 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, an OA must be filed within
one year from the date of the final order. The final order in this
case is the revisional order dated 13.03.2015. The OA should,
therefore, have been filed in March, 2016. It was filed on
21.08.2018, that is, about two years and five months late.
8.1 The applicant attributes the delay to the illness and death of her
husband. We are unable to accept this explanation. Her husband
was alive for almost the whole of the one-year period available to
him; he died only on 23.02.2016. During that period he did not
approach this Tribunal. Even the plea of illness is not supported
by any medical record. After his death on 23.02.2016, the
applicant took a further two and a half years to file the OA. No
reason at all is given for this period. The delay is not explained at
all, much less shown to be due to sufficient cause. The M.A. for
condonation of delay is, therefore, liable to be rejected, and the
OA is barred by limitation.
9. Even otherwise, we have examined the matter on merits. Before
doing so, we note the settled law on the limited role of courts and
tribunals in disciplinary matters.
9.1 As regards the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters,
we refer to the judgment of the three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it was
held as under:
“13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has
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coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the
nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict
proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are
not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the
court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of
India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364]
this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if
the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers
from patent error on the face of the record or based on no
evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
9.2 In another judgment rendered by the Three Judge Bench in the
case of SBI vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2
SCC 612: (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457, by referring the law laid
down in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and catena of other judgments,
the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-
“23. The power of judicial review in the matters of
disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the
departmental/appellate authorities discharged by
constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or
Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by
limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors
leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of
natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case
on merits as an appellate authority………………
24. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of
this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P.
SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC
(L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin
Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1
SCC (L&S) 103].
25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the
constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-
making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It
is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure
fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in
the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any
manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
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disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the
face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial
review cannot be extended to the examination of
correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as
a matter of fact.
26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the
alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is
to examine and determine:
(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent
authority;
(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;
(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some
evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach
finding of fact or conclusion.
27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the
disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry,
the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the
findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement,
the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for
disagreement and after affording an opportunity of
hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if
the evidence available on record be sufficient for such
exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for
further enquiry.
28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable
to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only
requirement of law is that the allegation against the
delinquent must be established by such evidence acting
upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and
with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the
gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is
true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the
finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry
proceedings.
29. The constitutional court while exercising its
jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article
136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry
proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e.
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where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a
finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with
objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long
as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived
at by the departmental authority, the same has to be
sustained.”
9.3 Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Karnataka &
Anr. vs. Umesh, (2022) 6 SCC 563: (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 321 ,
emphasized about the scope of judicial review by the
Courts/Tribunal in the matter of disciplinary/departmental
inquiry and held that:-
"17. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not
act as an appellate forum over the findings of the
disciplinary authority. The court does not re-appreciate the
evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct
has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry.
The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its
review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice
have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is
based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing
the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been
observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary
authority suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is
disproportionate to the proven misconduct."
9.4 We have also gone through the verdict of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court delivered in the matter of Union of India & Ors. v.
Subrata Nath, Civil Appeal Nos. 7939–7940 of 2022 @ SLP (C)
rd
Nos. 3524–25 of 2022 dated 23 November, 2022 [2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1617 : 2022 INSC 1221], wherein the Hon’ble Apex
Court has observed and held as follows:
“15. It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from
interfering with findings of facts recorded in a
departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such
findings are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with
the evidence on record, based on no evidence. However, if
principles of natural justice have been violated or the
statutory regulations have not been adhered to or there are
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malafides attributable to the Disciplinary Authority, then
the courts can certainly interfere.
16. In the above context, following are the observations
made by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C.
Chaturvedi (supra):
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which
the decision is made. Power of judicial review is
meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion
which the authority reaches is necessarily
correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry
is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned
to determine whether the inquiry was held by a
competent officer or whether rules of natural
justice are complied with. Whether the findings
or conclusions are based on some evidence, the
authority entrusted with the power to hold
inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to
reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that
finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor
of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein,
apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the
authority accepts that evidence and conclusion
receives support therefrom, the disciplinary
authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge. The
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review
does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its
own independent findings on the evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the
delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry
or where the conclusion or finding reached by
the disciplinary authority is based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as
no reasonable person would have ever reached,
the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the
conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief
so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each
case.
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13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge
of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
authority has coextensive power to reappreciate
the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not
relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed
before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v.
H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the
conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse
or suffers from patent error on the face of the
record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
18. A review of the above legal position would establish
that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate
authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive
power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain
discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose
appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or
gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while
exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally
substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some
other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the
conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in
exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”
[Emphasis laid]
17. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya, a two Judge Bench of this Court held as below :
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry
has been fairly and properly held and the findings are
based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the
evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be
grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings
of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where
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such findings are based on no evidence or where they are
clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at
such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The
courts will however interfere with the findings in
disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or
statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is
found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on
extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union
of India, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Bank of India
v. Degala Suryanarayana and High Court of Judicature at
Bombay -vs- Shashikant S. Patil). [Emphasis laid]
18. In Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and Others
v. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, a two Judge
Bench of this Court referred to several precedents on the
Doctrine of Proportionality of the order of punishment
passed by the Disciplinary Authority and held that :
“21. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements
have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily
interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a
delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some
cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the
decision of an employer is found to be within the legal
parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be
invoked when the misconduct stands proved.”
19. Laying down the broad parameters within which the
High Court ought to exercise its powers under Article
226/227 of the Constitution of India and matters relating to
disciplinary proceedings, a two Judge Bench of this Court
in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran reported
in (2015) 2 SCC 610 held thus :
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry
officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of
its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
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(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to
be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.”
XXXXXXXXXXX
22. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding
authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the
Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to
examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report.
On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during
the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has
the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the
delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the
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misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial
review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal
cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its
own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless
and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to
the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons,
as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the
punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such
that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the
Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be
called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in
exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned,
should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose
appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent
reasons therefore.”
9.5 We now examine the applicant’s pleas in the light of these
principles.
9.6 The main grievance is that the inquiry was held ex-parte. The
Inquiry Officer’s report dated 17.07.2008 records that the
procedure to inform the employee of the charges was followed
and five dates of hearing were fixed. Notices were sent to him by
registered post and to his permanent address, and were also
pasted at various places. He was given enough time to present his
case, but he did not attend or cooperate. An employee who does
not join the inquiry despite repeated notices cannot later
complain that it was held in his absence. Nor can he complain
that he was denied documents, a defence assistant, or the chance
to cross-examine witnesses, when he never appeared to ask for
them.
9.7 The next plea rests on Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra). There,
the Supreme Court held that the department must prove that the
absence was wilful, and that absence caused by compelling
circumstances is not misconduct. The present case stands on
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different facts. Here, the employee remained absent for about
two years and eight months, from 23.04.2003 to 31.12.2005. He
did not join the inquiry, despite five dates and notices sent by
several modes, and gave no explanation of his absence at any
stage before the Inquiry Officer. No medical record showing
illness during the period of absence has been placed before the
authorities or before us. Nothing was placed before the
disciplinary authority, appellate or revisional authority to show
that the absence was the result of compelling circumstance which
prevented him from reporting for duty, which was the situation in
Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra). In these circumstances, the
finding that the charge of unauthorized absence is proved cannot
be faulted.
9.8 The present case stands on different facts. We have gone through
the inquiry report dated 17.07.2008 (Annexure A/7), which is on
record. It records that the Station Superintendent concerned was
examined and the records were taken into account and that on
this basis the charge was found proved. The report does not show
that the Inquiry Officer led the evidence by putting questions,
cross-examined the witness, or otherwise took the side of the
department. More importantly, the fact of absence is not in
dispute. The applicant only explains it as being due to illness, for
which there is no medical record. The evidence of the Station
Superintendent and the records only proved a fact that is
admitted. The employee chose not to appear despite repeated
notices, and did not question that evidence. Further, unlike in
Satish Agnihotri (supra), the appellate and revisional authorities
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here considered the matter and gave reasons, referring to the
procedure followed and the repeated opportunities given to the
employee. The decisions relied upon by the applicant, therefore,
do not help her.
9.9 The applicant has also referred to a request for voluntary
retirement dated 15.02.2008. No copy of the request, or of any
order on it, has been placed on record. The request was in any
case made when the disciplinary proceedings were pending. The
plea is not substantiated and cannot be examined further.
9.10 As to the penalty, the employee remained absent without leave
for about two years and eight months and did not take part in the
inquiry. The penalty imposed is removal, not dismissal. We do
not find it so disproportionate as to call for interference. The
appellate and revisional authorities considered the matter and
gave reasons for upholding the penalty.
10. In the result, M.A. No. 392/2018 for condonation of delay is
rejected. Even on merits, the penalty order dated 17.11.2008, the
appellate order dated 05.02.2014 and the revisional order dated
13.03.2015 are in line with the settled law as noted above.
Accordingly, the OA is dismissed.
11. There shall be no order as to costs.
12. Pending MA(s), if any, also stand disposed of.


(Sanjiv Kumar) (Jayesh V Bhairavia)
Member (A) Member (J)

//Anu//
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