Som Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Decided on
23-03-2026
<div> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 1 WP-4915-2026<br /> IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH<br /> AT JABALPUR<br /> <br /> BEFORE<br /> HON&#x27;BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL<br /> rd<br /> ON THE 23 OF MARCH, 2026<br /> WRIT PETITION No. 4915 of 2026<br /> SOM DISTILLERIES PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS<br /> Versus<br /> THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS<br /> Appearance:<br /> Shri Naman Nagrath - Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Rahul Diwakar - Advocate<br /> for the petitioners. <br /> Shri Harpreet Singh Ruprah - Additional Advocate General assisted by Shri Manas<br /> Mani Verma - Government Advocate for the respondents-State. <br /> Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal - Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Nitesh Kumar Barman<br /> - Advocate for the intervener. <br /> ORDER<br /> Shri Harpreet Singh Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate General,<br /> submits that there is an alternative remedy of revision provided under<br /> Section 62 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915, and the Rules made<br /> thereunder specifically in this regard against the impugned action of<br /> suspension, but instead of relegating the petitioners to avail the said statutory<br /> remedy of revision, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties,<br /> the matter is heard finally. <br /> 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed<br /> by the petitioners challenging the order dated 04.02.2026 (Annexure P-8),<br /> whereby the licences of the petitioners were suspended. <br /> 3. On 20.03.2026, arguments were heard in part, as due to paucity of time,<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 2 WP-4915-2026<br /> arguments could not be completed by all the concerned parties. To<br /> <br /> recapitulate what transpire on 20.03.2026, it will be appropriate to reproduce<br /> the submissions made by Shri Naman Nagrath, learned Senior counsel for<br /> the petitioners and Shri Harpreet Singh Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate<br /> General. <br /> 4. Shri Naman Nagrath, learned Senior counsel submits that the petitioners<br /> are calling in question the order dated 04.02.2026 (Annexure P-8) passed by<br /> the Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior, whereby 8 licences<br /> held by two distinct entities, namely, petitioner No.1 Som Distilleries Pvt.<br /> Ltd. and petitioner No.2 Som Distilleries and Breweries Pvt. Ltd. have been<br /> placed under suspension on the strength of show notice notice dated<br /> 26.02.2024, contained in Annexure P-3. It is submitted that in fact when<br /> show cause notice Annexure P-3 was issued, at that time the licences which<br /> were valid had their validity upto 31.03.2024. Therefore, it is submitted that<br /> since the period of licence came to an end on 31.03.2024, therefore, show<br /> cause notice should have come to an end automatically. <br /> 3. It is submitted that in criminal appeals suspension of sentence was<br /> granted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore and since the<br /> suspension was granted, therefore, show cause notice lost its efficacy. <br /> 4. It is submitted that vide Annexure P-6, all the licences were granted<br /> afresh for the year 2024-25 and 2025-26, but since show cause notice relates<br /> to the period 2023-24, it could not have been extended for the licences which<br /> were granted for the year 2024-25 and thereafter, for the year 2025-26. Thus,<br /> it is submitted that the action taken vide Annexure P-8 placing these licences<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 3 WP-4915-2026<br /> under suspension for the year 2025-26 being not relatable to the show cause<br /> <br /> notice dated 26.02.2024 (Annexure P-3), which was for the year 2023-24, no<br /> action could have been taken.<br /> 5. It is further submitted that the first reply to the show cause notice was<br /> furnished on 04.03.2024 and in continuation to the same, second reply was<br /> furnished on 18.07.2024 as is contained in Annexure P-5. It is also submitted<br /> that since these 8 licences deal with distilling, brewing, filtration of distilled<br /> and brewed material, so also distilling of country liquor and their respective<br /> bottling, cancellation of all these 8 licences at one go, is contrary to the<br /> principles of natural justice and the law. <br /> 6. It is further submitted that combined show cause notice to different<br /> entities without referring to which of the entities were guilty of violation, is<br /> unheard of. <br /> 7. It is also submitted that show cause notices, with the efflux of time and<br /> with grant of fresh licences, resulted in the SCN coming to an end. <br /> 8. It is further submitted that show cause notice is based on conviction of<br /> certain employees. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon&#x27;ble<br /> Supreme Court in N.S. Shethna and others Vs. Vinubhai Harilal<br /> Panchal, reference to which is uploaded from 1966 SCC OnLine SC 239.<br /> Reading from paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said judgment, it is submitted that<br /> with the issuance of fresh licences, the matter had come to an end. Paragraph<br /> 2 and 3 of the said judgment reads as under:-<br /> &quot;2. At all material times the respondent was carrying on and<br /> still carries on the business of exhibiting cinematographic pictures<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 4 WP-4915-2026<br /> at Lakshmi Talkies in Ahmedabad and had obtained for that<br /> <br /> purpose a licence for sale of tickets which was valid upto<br /> December 31, 1960. On an allegation that through his manager<br /> and other employees he was indulging in sale of tickets contrary to<br /> the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954, framed under the Bombay<br /> Cinema (Regulation) Act, 11 of 1953 a notice dated June 14, 1960<br /> was served upon him to show cause why the said licence should<br /> not be suspended. On an inquiry having been held by the first<br /> appellant, that officer passed the impeached order suspending the<br /> said licence for a period of two months from the date of service of<br /> the order. But before the inquiry was completed and the said order<br /> passed, the period for which the licence was issued expired and an<br /> order renewing it for the next year, that is 1961, was passed on<br /> December 31, 1960. The impugned order was served on the<br /> respondent on March 5, 1961.<br /> 3. Aggrieved by the said order the licensee took out a writ<br /> petition in the High Court for setting aside the said order. The plea<br /> urged in the petition was that the show cause notice related to the<br /> licence for the year 1960 which expired on December 31, 1960<br /> and therefore did not affect the renewed licence for 1961 sought to<br /> be suspended by the impugned order. The High Court took the<br /> view that the renewed licence was a separate licence and not in<br /> continuation of the licence for the year 1960 and a fresh show<br /> cause notice ought to have been served for suspending the<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 5 WP-4915-2026<br /> renewed licence and that not having been done the inquiry was not<br /> <br /> in consonance with the rules and quashed the order.&quot;<br /> 9. It is submitted that in paragraph 9 of the said judgment of N.S. Shethna<br /> (supra), it is held that current licences could not have been suspended as new<br /> licences cannot be suspended in the light of old show cause notice. <br /> 10. It is also submitted that in terms of the Section 28 of the Excise Act,<br /> since licence during currency of which SCN was issued, was only upto<br /> 31.03.2024, therefore, there was no justification in continuing the show<br /> cause notice, which ultimately culminated in the order of suspension<br /> contained in Annexure P-8. <br /> 11. Reading from the provisions contained in Section 31(1-A) of the<br /> Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915, it is submitted that &quot;Before making an<br /> order cancelling or suspending a licence permit or pass under sub-section (1),<br /> the authority aforesaid shall record in writing the reasons for the proposed<br /> action, furnish to the holder thereof a brief statement of the same and afford<br /> him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.&quot; Thus, it is submitted that in<br /> fact the requirements which are ingrained in sub-section (1-A) of Section 31<br /> of the Excise Act are that the authorities should record in writing the reasons<br /> for the proposed action. <br /> 12. Reading the second clause of this sub-section, it is submitted that in<br /> fact a draft order should have been provided by the Commissioner to the<br /> licencee. Thirdly, that reasonable opportunity of being heard should have<br /> been provided. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 6 WP-4915-2026<br /> 13. It is submitted that common show cause notice for two different legal<br /> <br /> entities, will give rise to a question as to which of the entities convicted<br /> persons belong to i.e. whether they belong to one entity or both. Though it is<br /> submitted that there is no mention of this fact in the SCN, however, at this<br /> stage, Shri Harpreet Singh Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate General,<br /> interrupts and submits that even in the reply to the show cause notice, the<br /> petitioners have not come clean as to which of the entities i.e. the petitioners,<br /> the convicted employees belong to. <br /> 14. It is also submitted that judgment of conviction was passed by the<br /> concerned Additional Sessions Judge, vide judgment dated 23.12.2023 in<br /> S.T. No.21/2021. Reading from paragraph 111, it is submitted that persons<br /> mentioned therein at S.No.1, 2 and 3, namely, Umashankar, Dinkar and<br /> Mohansingh, were convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of of<br /> the Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with persons mentioned at S.No.8, 9, 10<br /> and 11, namely, Deenanath Singh, Shailendra Singh, Gurudarshan and<br /> Surjeet Lal. <br /> 15. It is admitted that persons namely, Umashankar, Dinkar and<br /> Mohansingh were working as Supervisors in the petitioners company,<br /> whereas Deenanath Singh, Shailendra Singh, Gurudarshan and Surjeet Lal<br /> were working as Directors. It is submitted that the show cause notice makes a<br /> mention of only names of the aforesaid persons and admitted they were not<br /> convicted under any of the provisions contained in the Excise Act.<br /> 16. It is submitted that those who are convicted under the provisions of the<br /> Section 34(2) of the Excise Act are Santosh and Omprakash, whose names<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 7 WP-4915-2026<br /> are not mentioned in the show cause notice. Thus, it is submitted that since<br /> <br /> they have been convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of of the<br /> Indian Penal Code, 1860, therefore, they will be outside the purview of the<br /> provisions contained in Sections 31(1)(b) and 31(1)(c) of he Excise Act<br /> because none of the persons mentioned in the show cause notice, namely,<br /> Umashankar, Dinkar, Mohansingh, Deenanath Singh, Shailendra Singh,<br /> Gurudarshan and Surjeet Lal, have been convicted either under the<br /> provisions of the Excise Act or under the provisions of the Dangerous Drugs<br /> Act, 1930 or under the provisions of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act,<br /> 1889, or under any Section which have been introduced into the Indian Penal<br /> Code (XLV of 1860) in Section 3 of that Act; and, therefore, it is submitted<br /> that since names of Santosh and Omprakash, who were convicted under<br /> Section 34(2) of the Excise Act, do not find mention in the show cause<br /> notice and even their identification with the two entities is not shown,<br /> therefore, action under Sections 44 / 31(1)(b)(c), is wholly vitiated.<br /> Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside or<br /> at least stayed in terms of the directions of the Hon&#x27;ble Supreme Court.<br /> 17. It is also submitted that Section 3 of the Indian Merchandise Marks<br /> Act, 1889, has introduced/incorporated by way of amendment in the IPC<br /> Sections 478 to 489 and since conviction is not under any of these Sections,<br /> starting from Section 478 to Section 489 of the IPC, which have been<br /> introduced in the IPC through the Act of 1889, the act of the respondents<br /> cannot be justified. Therefore, a prayer is made that order dated 04.02.2026<br /> (Annexure P-8) be set aside. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 8 WP-4915-2026<br /> 18. Shri Harpreet Singh Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate General, in<br /> <br /> his turn, submits that Annexure P-3 is the show cause notice. It is submitted<br /> that names of Santosh and Omprakash, who have been convicted by the<br /> learned Additional Sessions Judge, finds mention in the second paragraph of<br /> this show cause notice, wherein it is mentioned that Santosh and Omprakash<br /> have been convicted under Section 34(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act,<br /> whereas others have been convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-<br /> B of of the Indian Penal Code. It is also submitted that allegation on Santosh<br /> and Omprakash is that they as an agent of a carrier, which was hired by the<br /> licencee or his agents were involved in using forged permit books for<br /> transportation of liquor from Raisen to Diu. Thus, it is submitted that<br /> submissions made by Shri Naman Nagrath, learned Senior counsel, that their<br /> names have not been mentioned in the show cause notice, is factually<br /> incorrect. <br /> 19. Shri Harpreet Singh Ruprah, reading from his reply, submits that three<br /> appeals have been filed, namely, Criminal Appeal No.1246/2024 (Annexure<br /> R-1), Criminal Appeal No.1146/2024 (Annexure R-2) and Criminal Appeal<br /> No.1249/2024 (Annexure R-3) by three different sets of persons, namely,<br /> Supervisors, Directors or former Directors and the driver and cleaner of the<br /> truck. It is submitted that the fact in regard to their status is an admitted fact,<br /> which can be read into paragraph 5.2 of their respective appeals.<br /> 20. Reading from paragraph 5.2 of Annexure R-3, it is pointed out that<br /> both Santosh and Omprakash admitted that they have been engaged by<br /> Chanchal Goods Carrier, an independent contractor dealing in the business<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 9 WP-4915-2026<br /> of transportation. Similarly, in Annexures R-1 and R-2, convicted accused<br /> <br /> have admitted their status as Supervisors and Directors of the petitioners&#x27;<br /> company. Som Distilleries Breweries Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated<br /> under the Companies Act, has taken the transport services of Chanchal<br /> Goods Carrier for transport of liquor from Madhya Pradesh to Diu and the<br /> appellants being the driver and helper were given the responsibility of the<br /> same along with the necessary documents/licences/permits required for the<br /> transportation of liquor. Thereafter, in paragraph 5.3, a vivid description is<br /> given as to how their truck was intercepted by the SHO of the Police Station<br /> Betma and then what followed.<br /> 21. Today, Shri Harpreet Singh Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate<br /> General, submits that in the first reply to the show cause notice dated<br /> 26.02.2024, as was filed on 04.03.2024, it is mentioned that despite there<br /> being stay on the judgment of the Sessions Court, issuance of show cause<br /> notice falls in the category of contempt of the Court. It is submitted that<br /> there was no stay on the judgment of the trial Court, but it was only the<br /> suspension application, which was entertained by the High Court.<br /> 22. It is also submitted that the petitioners had filed two replies, one on<br /> 04.03.2024 and another on 18.07.2024 and in none of these replies, they<br /> have raised any issue in regard to the propriety of the show cause notice. It<br /> is submitted that in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this High<br /> Court in case of Rathore and Mehta Associated, Bhopal Vs. State of Madhya<br /> Pradesh and others, 2023 SCC OnLine MP 1482 : 2023 (3) MPLJ 409, in<br /> paragraphs 10, 11 &amp; 28, the position in regard to non-grant of opportunity of<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 10 WP-4915-2026<br /> hearing has been dealt with. <br /> <br /> 23. It is also submitted that though the provisions as contained in Section<br /> 31(1)(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, have not been mentioned, but in<br /> view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Mani Vs.<br /> Sangeetha Theatre and others, (2004) 12 SCC 278, wherein in paragraph 9, it<br /> is held that “It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law<br /> merely because while exercising that power the source of power is not<br /> specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law,<br /> that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does<br /> exist and can be traced to a source available in law.”<br /> 24. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Division Bench of this<br /> High Court in Smt. Sandhya Sharma Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and<br /> others, in W.A.No.316/2023, wherein reference is made to paragraph 10,<br /> where the Hon’ble Division Bench of this High Court apart from referring to<br /> N. Mani (supra) also made a reference to paragraph 19 of the judgment of<br /> the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramsunder Ram Vs. Union of India, (2007)<br /> 13 SCC 255, so also another judgment of the Supreme Court in P.K.<br /> Palanisamy v. N. Arumugham, (2009) 9 SCC 173.<br /> 25. Shri Harpreet Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate General, submits<br /> that both the entities are manned by the same Director namely Surjeet Lal,<br /> who according to him was Managing Director in both the petitioner<br /> companies. It is, thus, submitted that the distinction sought to be made<br /> between the two identities i.e. the two petitioners is insignificant because<br /> both the companies are manned by the same Managing Director, namely,<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 11 WP-4915-2026<br /> Surjeet Lal. <br /> <br /> 26. At this stage, Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate, on my<br /> query to the learned Additional Advocate General that as to why name of<br /> Shri Surjeet Lal is not mentioned in the show cause notice, submits that this<br /> is precisely the allegation of the intervener that the Excise Commissioner<br /> was not acting bonafidely and had not mentioned name of Shri Surjeet Lal,<br /> though he was the Managing Director of the petitioner companies. It is<br /> submitted that undue advantage is sought to be given to the petitioner<br /> companies. It is submitted that Shri Surjeet Lal was one of the accused<br /> before the trial Court, judgment of which has generated the present litigation<br /> and he was not only arrayed as accused No.6, but was also convicted.<br /> 27. To this Shri Harpreet Singh Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate<br /> General, replies that in the show cause notice, after mentioning five names,<br /> “and others” is mentioned.<br /> 28. Shri Harpreet Singh Ruprah, learned Additional Advocate General, has<br /> drawn the attention of this Court to the provisions of Rule 3(11) of the<br /> Madhya Pradesh Distillery Rules, 1995, to point out that it is not a fresh<br /> grant as far as distillery license is concerned, but it is annual renewal, subject<br /> to due observance of the provisions of the Act and the Rules made<br /> thereunder and the conditions of the license.<br /> 29. It is beyond comprehension that when the Managing Director of a<br /> limited and private limited company was convicted, then the Excise<br /> Commissioner not mentioning his name in the show cause notice reflects<br /> upon the intentions of the Excise Commissioner Shri Abhijit Agrawal. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 12 WP-4915-2026<br /> Prima facie it appears that he was not acting bonafidely, otherwise he would<br /> <br /> not have left the Managing Director of the company.<br /> 30. To give an analogy which is cross-checked from the learned Additional<br /> Advocate General, that the office of Advocate General is always referred to<br /> as Advocate General and others and not as Panel Lawyer and others of the<br /> Advocate General Office, to which Shri Ruprah, conceded that Advocate<br /> General’s Office will always be known in the name of Advocate General and<br /> others and not Panel Lawyer and others. When same analogy is extended,<br /> then it is evident that the conduct of the Excise Commissioner was not up to<br /> the mark in not mentioning the name of the convicted Managing Director<br /> Surjeet Lal. <br /> 31. Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri<br /> Nitesh Kumar Burman, Advocate, submits that petitioner No.1 was granted<br /> primary licence D-1 i.e. Distillery License and then followed by licences CS-<br /> 1, CS-1B which are supply licences. Similarly, petitioner No.2 was given FL-<br /> 9 licence to manufacture foreign liquor and B-3 licence to manufacture beer<br /> and, thereafter, other licenses were given for the purpose of warehousing and<br /> bottling.<br /> 32. Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned Senior counsel, submits that B-1,<br /> FL-9 and B-3 are perpetual licences. He refers to Sub-rule (11) of Rule 3 of<br /> the Madhya Pradesh Distillery Rules, 1995, to point out that Sub- rule (11) in<br /> itself provides for renewal of the licence every year, subject to due<br /> observance of the provisions of the Act, the Rules made thereunder and the<br /> conditions of the licence.<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 13 WP-4915-2026<br /> 33. It is submitted that similar provisions are contained in Rule 3(12) of<br /> <br /> Madhya Pradesh Foreign Liquor Rules and similar provisions are also<br /> contained in the Madhya Pradesh Brewery and Wine Rules, 2000. Thus, it is<br /> submitted that as far as manufacturing licences are concerned, they are<br /> perpetual in nature. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the<br /> petitioner that his licences were not renewed, but were fresh grants for the<br /> year 2024-25 and 2025-26, is incorrect.<br /> 34. At this stage, Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned Senior counsel, also<br /> submits that the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.S. Sethna and<br /> others (supra), is distinguishable on the ground that the licence which was<br /> granted to the Laxmi Talkies in Ahmedabad was not a perpetual licence, but<br /> was restricted to a period, validity of which was December 31, 1960. Thus,<br /> it is submitted that a distinction is to be drawn between the perpetual licences<br /> and grant of fresh licences and thus, in the present case, the licence being<br /> perpetual, it will be a case of renewal only and not that of grant of fresh<br /> licence.<br /> 35. It is also submitted that in terms of the provisions contained in Section<br /> 31(1)(d), if the holder thereof is convicted of any cognizable and non-<br /> bailable offence, then also the power to cancel or suspend the licence can be<br /> used, and the same will be applicable, inasmuch as, Surjeet Lal, Managing<br /> Director of the petitioner companies from 21.03.2009 to 10.08.2016, was<br /> also convicted. It is pointed out that date of the incident was 14.12.2011,<br /> when Surjeet Lal was the Managing Director. Thus, it is submitted that, the<br /> then Excise Commissioner, who issued the show cause notice, was extra<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 14 WP-4915-2026<br /> lenient towards Surjeet Lal and the company.<br /> <br /> 36. It is also submitted that the doctrine of “alter ego” will be applicable<br /> and in support of this contention places reliance on the judgment of the<br /> Supreme Court in case of Iridium India Telecom Limited Vs. Motorola<br /> Incorporated and others, (2011) 1 SCC 74. Referring to paragraph 63, it is<br /> pointed out that the doctrine of “alter ego” will be applicable as mens rea is<br /> attributed to corporations on this very principle.<br /> 37. It is further submitted that Section 31(1)(c) of the Excise Act will also<br /> be applicable, inasmuch as, loss of revenue was caused by the petitioner<br /> companies, on account of charges of transferring finished excisable products<br /> from Raisen to Diu on the strength of forged and fictitious transport permits.<br /> 38. It is also submitted that Gurudarshan Arora, one of the convicted<br /> accused and whose name finds mention in the show cause notice, unlike that<br /> of Surjeet Lal, who too was convicted, was a Director in petitioner<br /> companies, the provisions of not only Sections 31(1)(b) and 31(1)(c) of the<br /> Madhya Pradesh Excise Act will be applicable, but even Section 31(1)(d) of<br /> the Excise Act will also be applicable.<br /> 39. It is also pointed out that in fact after issuing show cause notice in the<br /> year 2024, the Excise Commissioner was sleeping over the matter for about<br /> two years. When the intervener made a complaint to the Chief Secretary of<br /> Madhya Pradesh as contained in Annexure I-3 on 03.07.2024, with copies to<br /> other functionaries including the Chief Minister, etc., then only on his<br /> persistence, the Excise Commissioner woke up from his slumber and passed<br /> the impugned order (Annexure P-5). Thus, it is submitted that the Excise<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 15 WP-4915-2026<br /> Commissioner was not acting bonafidely, inasmuch as, in the first place, he<br /> <br /> failed to make a mention of name of Surjeet Lal, Managing Director of the<br /> petitioner companies in his show cause notice and also in the final order.<br /> Secondly, he slept over the matter for about two years, which shows his other<br /> intentions rather than acting bonafidely.<br /> 40. Shri Naman Nagrath, learned Senior counsel in his rejoinder takes the<br /> first objection to the locus of the intervener. He also raises an eyebrow about<br /> the motives of the intervener. Thereafter, reading Section 28 of the Madhya<br /> Pradesh Excise Act, it is pointed out that licences are not in perpetuity, but<br /> for a fixed duration. It is submitted that when Section 28 is read with Rule<br /> 3(11) of the Madhya Pradesh Distillery Rules, 1995, then it will be clear that<br /> licence was not in perpetuity. Therefore, the judgment of the Hon’ble<br /> Supreme Court in case of N.S. Sethna (supra) in paragraphs 4 and 9 is<br /> relevant. It is submitted that opportunity of hearing, though sought not once<br /> but twice while giving reply to the show cause notice, was not afforded.<br /> Thirdly, it is submitted that since the show cause notice confines only to five<br /> persons, therefore, it cannot be extended beyond those five persons.<br /> 41. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in<br /> case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs. Chief Election Commissioner,<br /> New Delhi and others, (1978) 1 SCC 405. Reading paragraphs 8 and 9 of the<br /> said judgment, it is submitted that the things which are not mentioned in the<br /> show cause notice, cannot be incorporated by reference.<br /> 42. It is also submitted that the requirements to fulfill parameters of<br /> Section 31(1)(c) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act are different from those<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 16 WP-4915-2026<br /> which are required to be fulfilled to bring a case within the ambit of Section<br /> <br /> 31(1)(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act.<br /> 43. It is submitted that since the company is not an accused, though the<br /> judgment of Iridium India Telecom Ltd (supra), in paragraphs 63 and 64 has<br /> categorically held that a company can be arrayed as an accused and its<br /> culpability can be examined and on being held guilty, persons who were at<br /> the helm of the affairs can be sentenced, but in the present case, since the<br /> company is not an accused, show cause notice cannot be extended to include<br /> Section 31(1)(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act. Thus, it is submitted<br /> that the principle of “alter ego” will not arise in the absence of conviction of<br /> the company. Thus, it is prayed that it is a fit case to grant injunction when<br /> petitioner companies are giving revenue of about Rs.700 to Rs.800 crores to<br /> the State and the livelihood of about 3,000 persons is at stake.<br /> 44. It is also submitted that Section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act<br /> cannot be read beyond the judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court.<br /> It is submitted that the appeal memo or the evidence or the statements of the<br /> accused under Section 313, Cr.P.C., cannot be read and the Court has to<br /> confine itself to the finding of conviction and the substantive Sections under<br /> which an accused has been convicted.<br /> 45. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the issue which emerges<br /> herein is whether the issuance of show cause notice, as contained in<br /> Annexure P-3, on the strength of conviction passed by the learned Additional<br /> Sessions Judge, Depalpur, District Indore, is within the four corners of<br /> requirements of Section 31(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915, or<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 17 WP-4915-2026<br /> whether the Excise Commissioner exceeded his authority while issuing the<br /> <br /> show cause notice, as submitted by Shri Naman Nagrath, learned Senior<br /> counsel. <br /> 46. Another aspect which is required to be examined is whether the<br /> principles of natural justice were violated before taking the final decision, as<br /> contained in Annexure P-8, whereby various licences held by the petitioners<br /> have been suspended alleging violation of the provisions as contained in<br /> Section 31(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act. <br /> 47. The third issue which emerges herein is to determine as to whether the<br /> alleged acts of violation are covered under Clauses (b) and (c) of Section<br /> 31(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, or there is inherent implication of<br /> Section 31(1)(d) to which there is a reference in paragraph 6 of the impugned<br /> order dated 04.02.2026 (Annexure P-8). <br /> 48. An ancillary issue which arises herein is whether the conviction of the<br /> driver and cleaner of the truck in which confiscated material was being<br /> transported, namely, Santosh and Omprakash under Section 34(2) of the<br /> Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, will be covered in terms of the provisions<br /> contained in Section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act or it only relates<br /> to the holders of the licence, as has been submitted by Shri Naman Nagrath. <br /> 49. Yet another issue which emerges is whether the licences are in<br /> perpetuity, subject to renewal at prescribed periodic intervals or every time it<br /> is a fresh grant. <br /> 50. Section 31 deals with &quot;Power to cancel or suspend licence, etc.&quot; and<br /> Sub-section (l) of Section 31 provides that &quot;Subject to such restrictions as<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 18 WP-4915-2026<br /> the State Government may prescribe, the authority granting any licence,<br /> <br /> permit or pass under this Act may cancel or suspend it - (a) if any duty or fee<br /> payable by the holder thereof be not duly paid; or, (b) in the event of any<br /> breach by the holder thereof or by any of his servants, or by any one acting<br /> on his behalf with his express or implied permission, of any of the terms or<br /> conditions thereof; or, (c) if the holder thereof, or any of his servants, or any<br /> one acting on his behalf with his express or implied permission, is convicted<br /> of any offence under this Act or any other law for the time being in force<br /> relating to revenue, or of any offence (under the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930<br /> (11 of 1930), or under the Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 (IV of<br /> 1889), or under any section which has been introduced into the Indian Penal<br /> Code (XLV of 1860), Section 3 of that Act; or, (d) if the holder thereof is<br /> convicted of any cognizable and non -bailable offence; ....&quot;<br /> 51. Section (1-A) of Section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act<br /> provides that &quot;Before making an order cancelling or suspending a licence<br /> permit or pass under sub -section (1), the authority aforesaid shall record in<br /> writing the reasons for the proposed action, furnish to the holder thereof a<br /> brief statement of the same and afford him a reasonable opportunity of being<br /> heard.&quot;<br /> 52. When show cause notice (Annexure P-3) and the impugned order dated<br /> 04.02.2026 (Annexure P-8) are tested on the touchstone of the provisions<br /> contained in Sub-section (1-A) of Section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise<br /> Act, 1915, then it is evident that show cause notice (Annexure P-3) prima<br /> facie fulfills all the three requirements, namely, it makes a mention of<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 19 WP-4915-2026<br /> conviction of two of the accused Santosh and Omprakash under Section<br /> <br /> 34(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act and conviction of other accused<br /> persons under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal<br /> Code, 1860. It also gives details of the incident which took place on<br /> 14.12.2011 at 20:15 hours on Mhow-Neemuch road, Ghatabillod, where<br /> truck bearing registration No.MP09-HF-5185, containing 1200 boxes of<br /> foreign liquor Bluechip whiskey, was found to be transported without valid<br /> licence. It also makes a mention of the fact that permit books were forged and<br /> there was a conspiracy. Different accused persons had prepared number of<br /> forged permits as are mentioned in the show cause notice and, thereafter, it<br /> made reference to Section 44 and Section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise<br /> Act and categorically stated that five of the persons employed with the<br /> company were convicted. It also granted opportunity of hearing asking the<br /> addressees to submit reply within 7 days of receipt of the notice.<br /> 53. It is evident from the record and not disputed by the parties that first<br /> reply to the show cause notice was furnished on 04.03.2024, cumulatively<br /> filed along with Annexure P-5. Interestingly, this reply only makes a<br /> mention of the fact that criminal appeals were filed at the Indore Bench of<br /> the High Court and interim application has been disposed of by the Indore<br /> Bench of the High Court. In this regard, three criminal appeals, namely,<br /> Criminal Appeal No.1146/2024 filed in relation to Surjeet Lal, Dina Nath<br /> Singh, Shailendra Singh and Gurudarshan Arora; Criminal Appeal<br /> No.1246/2024 was filed qua Dinkar Singh, Uma Shankar and Mohan Singh<br /> Tomar; and Criminal Appeal No.1249/2024 is filed qua Santosh Gadariya<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 20 WP-4915-2026<br /> and Omprakash Singh. Thus, the petitioners took cognizance of this fact as<br /> <br /> mentioned in the show cause notice that even the driver, cleaner of the truck<br /> were convicted and appeals have been filed on their behalf too.<br /> 54. A perusal of the memo of appeals, as have been filed on behalf of three<br /> different sets of appellants will reveal that counsel for all the three sets of<br /> appellants is common, namely Ms. Gunjan Chowkey. <br /> 55. Another interesting facet of the first reply to the show cause notice is<br /> audacity of the petitioners in threatening the Excise Commissioner, as can be<br /> seen from paragraph 4 that since judgment of the trial Court has been stayed,<br /> therefore, issuance of show cause notice falls under the purview of contempt<br /> of the High Court. <br /> 56. Second reply was filed on 18.07.2024 in which it is mentioned that on<br /> six of the persons, namely, Uma Shankar Sharma, Dinkar Singh, Mohan<br /> Singh Tomar, Dina Nath Singh, Shailendra Singh and Gurudarsh Arora, the<br /> provisions of Section 44 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act will not be<br /> applicable. <br /> 57. It is also mentioned in paragraph 2 that the accused, who have been<br /> convicted under Section 34(2) of the Excise Act, namely, Santosh Gadariya<br /> and Omprakash Lodhi, were not employees of the company and, therefore,<br /> there is no justification to make mention of their conviction in the show<br /> cause notice. <br /> 58. Interestingly, neither first reply dated 04.03.2024 nor the second reply<br /> dated 18.07.2024, makes a mention of the fact that how petitioners are<br /> innocent or are not guilty of using forged transit permits to transport liquor<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 21 WP-4915-2026<br /> from Raisen to Diu. There is no explanation to the said allegation. Thus, by<br /> <br /> implication, there is an admission of guilt that the company and its agents<br /> were involved in transportation of foreign liquor on the strength of forged<br /> permits. <br /> 59. Another interesting aspect is that in the first reply, a threat which has<br /> been handed down in paragraph 4, prima facie reflects guilty mind of the<br /> petitioners. <br /> 60. Though Shri Naman Nagrath, learned Senior counsel submits that they<br /> are company having turnover of Rs.700 to Rs.800 crores, but it is necessary<br /> to note that an authorized signatory of the company, who furnished the reply<br /> did not even understood the meaning of suspension of sentence granted<br /> under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. vis-a-vis stay on the judgment of<br /> conviction. No document has been produced before this Court at any stage to<br /> point out that High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore Bench ever stayed the<br /> operation of the judgment of the trial Court. <br /> 61. Thus, reliance on the judgment of the Hon&#x27;ble Supreme Court in case<br /> of Gwalior Distilleries Private Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others,<br /> (2020) 12 SCC 690, to suggest that there is a violation of Article 14 of the<br /> Constitution besides that of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 31 of the Madhya<br /> Pradesh Excise Act, is not made out. The petitioners have not brought any<br /> case where any other licencee has been dealt with in any different manner on<br /> proved allegation of transportation of foreign liquor on the basis of forged<br /> permits, resulting in conviction of the Managing Director, Director,<br /> agents/servants of the licencee by the competent Court. No case of hostile<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 22 WP-4915-2026<br /> discrimination is also made out as put forth before this Court. <br /> <br /> 62. Thus, when three aspects of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 31 are taken<br /> into consideration, namely, recording of reasons in writing for the proposed<br /> action, furnishing a brief statement to the licencee and that afford him a<br /> reasonable opportunity of being heard, then all three requirements having<br /> been fulfilled, it cannot be said that there is any violation of Article 14 of the<br /> Constitution or Sub-section (1-A) of Section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh<br /> Excise Act, 1915. <br /> 63. Second submission put forth by the learned Senior counsel for the<br /> petitioners that Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Excise Act<br /> applies only to the licencee and not to the servants, is not correct in my<br /> opinion. The opening words of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of<br /> the Excise Act are that &quot;if the holder thereof, or any of his servants, or any<br /> one acting on his behalf with his express or implied permission, is convicted<br /> of any offence under this Act ...&quot;<br /> 64. Thus, the expression &#x27;anyone acting on his behalf with his express or<br /> implied permission&#x27;, will include the driver and cleaner of the truck in which<br /> material was transported. Therefore, their conviction under Section 34(2) of<br /> the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, will bind the licencee in terms of the<br /> language of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Excise Act. <br /> 65. Transporting liquor without permit means to cause loss of revenue and,<br /> therefore, even the second part of Clause (c), namely &quot;is convicted of any<br /> offence under this Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to<br /> revenue&quot;, shall also be attracted. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 23 WP-4915-2026<br /> 66. It is true that the provisions of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act,<br /> <br /> 1889, incorporates certain offences in the Indian Penal Code from Section<br /> 478 to Section 489 by way of amendment in the Indian Penal Code, but the<br /> Indian Merchandise Marks Act deals with &quot;trade mark&quot; and &quot;trade<br /> description&quot;. It also deals with &quot;false trade description&quot;. By means of<br /> amendment in the Indian Penal Code, Section 3 substituted Chapter XVIII of<br /> the Indian Penal Code on the subject of &quot;Trade, Property and Other marks.&quot;<br /> 67. Trade is different from trade mark. Meaning of trade is to be<br /> understood in terms of the provisions contained in the Excise Act and also in<br /> terms of the terms and conditions incorporated in the licence besides the<br /> relevant Rules framed under the Excise Act. <br /> 68. Sub-section (8) of Section 2 of the Excise Act deals with excise<br /> revenue and provides that &quot;excise revenue&quot; means revenue derived or<br /> derivable from any duty, fee, tax, penalty, payment (other than a fine<br /> imposed by a Court of Law) or confiscation imposed or ordered or agreed to<br /> under the provisions of this Act, or of any law for the time being in force<br /> relating to liquor or intoxicating drugs. <br /> 69. Sub-section (16) of Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915,<br /> defines &quot;sale&quot; to mean any transfer otherwise than by way of gift. <br /> 70. The Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 was enacted for the purpose of<br /> control and to regulate import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and<br /> possession of intoxicating liquor and of intoxicating drugs and various<br /> provisions are made for the said purpose in the Act. <br /> 71. Section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915, deals<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 24 WP-4915-2026<br /> with &#x27;Restriction on import, export or transport&#x27; and provides that without the<br /> <br /> sanction of the State Government no intoxicant shall be imported, exported<br /> or transported, except - (a) after payment of any duty to which it may be<br /> liable under this Act, or execution of a bond for such payment; and (b) on<br /> compliance with such conditions as the State Government may impose.<br /> 72. Section 10 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915, provides for<br /> &#x27;Requirement of pass for import, export or transport. This pass is to be issued<br /> under the provisions of the Act and allegation is that liquor was being<br /> transported without the authorized pass that means to cause loss of revenue,<br /> which will be clearly covered under second part of Clause (c) of Sub-section<br /> (1) of Section 31 of the Excise Act. It is true that the provisions of the Indian<br /> Merchandise Marks Act, 1889, will not be applicable to the present case, but<br /> at the same time, the provisions of the Excise Act are applicable. <br /> 73. It is interesting to note, as has been submitted by Shri Sanjay K.<br /> Agrawal, learned Senior counsel, that the Excise Commissioner while giving<br /> the show cause notice omitted name of Surjeet Lal, who was admittedly<br /> Managing Director of the petitioner companies from 2009 to 2016 i.e. he<br /> was at the helm of affairs in 2011 when the incident took place, but this<br /> omission will not come in the way of the State, inasmuch as, it is admitted by<br /> the parties and not disputed before this Court that Surjeet Lal was also<br /> convicted vide Annexure P-4, judgment of conviction passed by the trial<br /> Court. <br /> 74. As far as use of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 is<br /> concerned, it is an admitted fact that the conviction of other persons under<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 25 WP-4915-2026<br /> Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, will be<br /> <br /> covered by this clause as they are cognizable and non-bailable offence.<br /> Therefore, on this touchstone also, the impugned order cannot be<br /> questioned. <br /> 75. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Excise Act provides that &quot;Where a<br /> licence, permit or pass held by any person is cancelled under clause (a),<br /> clause (b), clause (c) or clause (e) of sub -section (1), the authority aforesaid<br /> may cancel any other licence, permit or pass granted to such person under<br /> this Act or under any other law for the time being in force relating to excise<br /> revenue, or under the Opium Act, 1878 (1 of 1878).<br /> 76. Law in regard to requirements to be fulfilled before cancellation or<br /> suspension of licence is summarized in case of Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag<br /> Saikia, AIR 1984 SC 989: (1984) 2 SCC 488, and, therefore, I am satisfied<br /> that the requirements of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Excise Act are<br /> fulfilled, therefore, impugned order (Annexure P-8) cannot be faulted with. It<br /> can also be not faulted with for an additional reason that no where in the<br /> reply to the show cause notice, transportation of liquor on the basis of forged<br /> permit has been disputed. <br /> 77. Section 44 of the Excise Act categorically provides for Criminal<br /> liability of licensee for acts of servants. This is in addition to the provisions<br /> contained in Clause (c) of Section 31(1) of the Excise Act. Section 44<br /> provides that &quot;Where any offence under Section 34, Section 35, Section 36,<br /> Section 36-A, Section 38, Section 38-A or Section 39 is committed by any<br /> person in the employ and acting on behalf of the holder of a licence, permit<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 26 WP-4915-2026<br /> or pass granted under this Act such holder shall also be punishable as if he<br /> <br /> had himself committed the same, unless he establishes that al l due and<br /> reasonable precaution were exercised by him to prevent the commission of<br /> such offence&quot;. Therefore, when Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 is<br /> read with Section 44, then it is not open to the petitioners to say that they had<br /> not committed any offence under Section 34(2) of the Excise Act, and,<br /> therefore, their acts will not be covered. <br /> 78. Thus, the judgment of the Hon&#x27;ble Supreme Court in case of Iridium<br /> India Telecom Limited (supra), though it is submitted by Shri Naman<br /> Nagrath that since petitioner companies have not been prosecuted and<br /> punished for criminal offence, therefore, doctrine of &quot;alter ego&quot; will not be<br /> effective, in my opinion, has no application, inasmuch as, what Supreme<br /> Court has held is that a corporation is virtually in the same position as any<br /> individual and may be convicted of common law as well as statutory offence<br /> including those requiring mens rea. The criminal lability of corporation<br /> arises when an offence is committed in relation to the business of the<br /> corporation by a person or the body of persons in control of its affairs. In<br /> such circumstances, it would be necessary to ascertain that the degree and<br /> control of the person or body of persons is so intense that a corporation may<br /> be said to think and act through the person or the body of persons. Mens rea<br /> is attributed to corporations on the principle of &quot;alter ego&quot; of the company.<br /> While ascertaining the applicability of the judgment of Hon&#x27;ble Supreme<br /> Court in Iridium India Telecom Limited (supra), it is submitted that<br /> principles of proportionately is required to be applied by the Court. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 27 WP-4915-2026<br /> 79. It is observed in case of Belfast City Council v. Miss Behavin&#x27; Ltd,<br /> <br /> (2007) 3 All ER 1007, para 24 HL, wherein it is held that proportionately<br /> must be objective. The court must make a value judgment or evaluation by<br /> reference to the circumstances prevaling at the relevant time. The principles<br /> of proportionately require the Court to apply a three stage test, (1) Whether<br /> the objective sought to be achieved is relevant and sufficiently important to<br /> justify limiting the fundamental rights; (2) Whether the means chosen to<br /> limit that right are rational, fair and not arbitrary; and, (3) Whether the means<br /> used impaired the right as minimally as reasonably possible.<br /> 80. In case of Huang Vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department,<br /> (2007) 4 ALL ER 15, HL, in paragraph 19 has held that the judgment on<br /> proportionately must always involve the striking of a fair balance between<br /> the rights of the individual and the interests of the community.<br /> 81. Similarly, it is well settled principle of law that when the question is of<br /> pressing social needs and it is to be decided as to whether measures adopted<br /> by the legislature is proportionate to the legitimate aim persued, the Court<br /> may have also to show due respect to the judgment of democratically elected<br /> representatives. In Tweed Vs. Parades Commission for Norther Ireland,<br /> (2007) 2 ALL ER 273, (H.L.), it is held that properitory principles is a<br /> concept of &#x27;latitude&#x27;, which recognizes that the Court does not become the<br /> primary decision maker on matters of policy, judgment and discretion, so<br /> that public authorities are left with room to make legitimate choices.<br /> &#x27;Latitute&#x27; denotes a particular degree of deference by the Court to public<br /> body. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 28 WP-4915-2026<br /> In case of Ajay Hasia Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC<br /> <br /> 722, it is held that the fundamental right of equality in Article 14 has also<br /> been so construed as to make the concept of reasonableness and non-<br /> arbitrariness pervade the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread<br /> which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Constitution.<br /> In case of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Maddula Ratnavalli, (2007)<br /> 6 SCC 81, it is held that the “State” acting whether as a “landlord” or a<br /> “tenant” is required to act bona fide and not arbitrarily and every executive<br /> action must be informed by reason. <br /> 82. Firstly, liquor business is not a fundamental right and secondly, when<br /> the test of proportionately is applied, then on that touchstone also, decision of<br /> the authority being within the framework of the Excise Act and the Rules<br /> framed thereunder, cannot be faulted with. <br /> 83. In fact, Sub-section (2) of Section 31 clearly authorises the authority to<br /> cancel any other licence, therefore, the submission made by Shri Naman<br /> Nagrath that the show cause notice will relate only to the period when it was<br /> issued and not further, is not at all justified because even if that yardstick is<br /> applied, then cause of action for the show cause notice is for the year 2011,<br /> that being so, in the light of the judgment of Hon&#x27;ble Supreme Court in case<br /> of N.S. Sethna (supra), even show cause notice could not have been issued in<br /> the year 2023, but that is not the position, inasmuch as, to fulfill the<br /> requirements of Section 31(1), authorizes the State to take action when<br /> judgment of conviction was passed by the competent Court.<br /> 84. Therefore, when these facts are taken into consideration, then Section<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 29 WP-4915-2026<br /> 31(2) read with Section 44, so also read with Rule 3(11) of the M.P.<br /> <br /> Distillery Rules and analogous provisions in other rules, leaves no iota of<br /> doubt that the words used in Rule 3(11) of the M.P. Distillery Rules, 1995,<br /> which deals with licence D-1 for manufacturing of spirit is to be renewed<br /> every year, subject to observance of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder<br /> and the condition of the licence. Even Clause V of the Licence provides for<br /> cancellation of licence for violation of the terms, therefore, on this<br /> touchstone also, act of the Excise Commissioner, cannot be faulted with. In<br /> fact in N.S. Sethna (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly noted that there is<br /> no separate rule or provision conferring power of renewal. There is also no<br /> provision in these rules laying down procedure for renewal or fee for such<br /> renewal or the condition on which it may be granted, except the insertion in<br /> Clause 4 of the word &quot;renewal which only suggests that the renewal is<br /> competent.&quot; <br /> 85. However, in the present case, Rule 3(11) of the M.P. Distillary Rules,<br /> 1995, so also Rule 3(12) of the M.P. Foreign liquor Rules, 1996, clearly uses<br /> an expression &quot;the licence shall be renewed every year subject to due<br /> observance of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and<br /> the conditions of the licence&quot; and the Foreign liquor Rules uses the<br /> expression that the licence may be renewed on payment of the prescribed<br /> fees as aforesaid, subject to the due observance of the provisions of the Act<br /> and the Rules made thereunder and the conditions of the licence. <br /> 86. Thus, the judgment of N.S. Sethna (supra) is distinguishable, inasmuch<br /> as, relevant Rules incorporate in specific terms the provisions of renewal,<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 30 WP-4915-2026<br /> unlike the Bombay Cinema Rules, which were the subject matter in N.S.<br /> <br /> Sethna (supra). Thus, the judgment of N.S. Sethna (supra) is distinguishable<br /> on its own facts. <br /> 87. As far as reference to the judgment in case of N. Mani (supra) is<br /> concerned, though it is submitted that if a wrong provision is mentioned, it<br /> will not vitiate the exercise of power, but in my opinion, there is no mention<br /> of wrong provision in the impugned order of suspension or in the show cause<br /> notice, which preceded it. The show cause notice clearly make a mention of<br /> conviction of two of the accused persons, namely, Santosh and Omprakash,<br /> under Section 34(2) of the Excise Act and also of others under the provisions<br /> of the Indian Penal Code for cognizable and non-bailable offences. The<br /> impugned order also clearly makes a mention of violation of the provisions<br /> contained in Section 31(1)(d), so also that of Section 44 of the Excise Act.<br /> Thus, when explicitly the show cause notice dealt with the ambit of Sections<br /> 31(1)(c) and (d) of the Excise Act, pointing out the acts of various persons<br /> being convicted under Section 34(2) of the Excise Act or under various<br /> Sections of the Indian Penal Code and then gave vivid description of some of<br /> the acts, leaves no iota of doubt that there are no grey areas of mentioning<br /> the incorrect provisions, requiring to filling of gaps in the light of judgment<br /> of the Hon&#x27;ble Supreme Court in case of N. Mani (supra).<br /> 88. As far as law laid down in case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another<br /> (supra) is concerned, it is held that statutory functionaries makes an order<br /> passed on certain grounds. Its validity must he judged by the reason so<br /> mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of<br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 31 WP-4915-2026<br /> affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning, by the time<br /> <br /> it comes to the Court on account of challenge, gets validated by additional<br /> grounds later brought on. <br /> 89. In my opinion, the facts in the present case are different. The decision<br /> of the statutory authority is neither supplemented by fresh reasons in the<br /> shape of an affidavit or otherwise, nor is there any intention apparent from<br /> the record to cure an order bad in the beginning, inasmuch as the show cause<br /> notice and the order of suspension are clear in themselves and contain<br /> reasons in the fullest breadth. Therefore, the ratio of law laid down in the<br /> case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another (supra) too is not applicable to the<br /> facts and circumstances of the present case.<br /> 90. The Division Bench of this High Court in case of Rathore and Mehta<br /> Associated, Bhopal (supra) held that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Fraud<br /> means an intention to deceive, whether it is from any expectation of<br /> advantage to party himself or from ill-will towards other is immaterial, as<br /> held by Hon&#x27;ble Supreme Court in case of Commissioner of<br /> Customs(Preventive) Vs. M/S. Aafloat Textiles (I) P.Ltd.&amp; Others, 2009<br /> (11) SCC 18. Therefore, in terms of the fraud perpetuated in using forged<br /> permits to transport foreign liquor, the impugned acts of the respondents,<br /> when tested on the touchstone of doctrine of proportionality, cannot be<br /> faulted with. <br /> 91. In view of above, writ petition fails and is dismissed. Pending<br /> application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42<br /><br /> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:24006<br /> 32 WP-4915-2026<br /> (VIVEK AGARWAL)<br /> JUDGE<br /> pp<br /> <br /> <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed by: PUSHPENDRA<br /> PATEL<br /> Signing time: 24-03-2026<br /> 10:18:42</div>