M/S Belgravia Projects Pvt. Ltd. vs The Registrar Drat And Ors
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Date of decision: 18 NOVEMBER, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
# CNR No. DLHC010794932016
+ W.P.(C) 2163/2016
M/S BELGRAVIA PROJECTS PVT. LTD. .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Niraj Kumar Singh along
with Ms. Bhavya Singh, Adv.
versus
THE REGISTRAR DRAT AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr.Tanmaya Mehta, Mr. R P
Agarwal, Mr.Reema Mishra,
Mr.Johnson Negi, (Advocates).
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated
27.08.2015 (“Impugned Order”) passed by the learned Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal (“DRAT”), whereby S.A. No. 524/2011 filed by
the petitioner herein was dismissed.
2. By the Impugned Order, the learned DRAT upheld the order
dated 26.06.2015 passed by the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal-III
(“DRT-III”), whereby the securitisation application filed by the
petitioner herein was dismissed.
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3. The present petition arises out of a challenge to the auction
notice issued by respondent No. 1 herein, for the sale of the property
in question, being “land measuring 1,250 square yards or 1,045.125
square metres, falling under Khasra No. 660/851, situated at Village
Ghukana, Tehsil Loni, District Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh” .
4. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had entered into
an agreement to sell dated 01.01.2009. The said agreement to sell in
respect of the suit property was entered into between the petitioner
company and Mr. Alok Aggarwal, Director of M/s Daksh Scooter
Private Limited. The sale consideration was fixed at Rs. 2,61,28,125/-.
It is the case of the petitioner that an amount of Rs. 2.35 crores had
already been paid as advance payment and that the remaining amount
was payable at the time of execution of the sale deed.
5. The petitioner claims that they were shocked to see a public
Auction notice dated 02.09.2011 putting the said property up for sale.
It is the case of the petitioner that they were unaware that the property
had been mortgaged by M/s Daksh, of which Mr. Alok Aggarwal was
a director, in favour of Lord Krishna Bank & State Bank of India
6. The debt had been assigned to M/s ACRE Reconstruction
Company by the bank, which had further assigned it to M/s ACE Ltd.
7. M/s ACE had issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the
SARFAESI Act on 12.11.2010, stating that a sum of Rs. 18.18 crores
was due and calling upon M/s Daksh Scooter Private Limited, the
petitioner herein and others to pay the amount due and payable to M/s
ACE.
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8. The petitioner, therefore, filed an application under Section 17
of the SARFAESI Act, challenging the auction notice dated
02.09.2011 issued by the respondent on the ground that the petitioner
had entered into an agreement to sell in respect of the suit property
and that their rights could not be taken away by the proposed sale. It is
also the case of the petitioner that the notice issued under Section
13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was not in accordance with law. Other
objections were also raised regarding the area of the property.
9. The DRT vide order dated 26.06.2015 dismissed the petition.
The DRT held that the petitioner had entered into an agreement to sell
and that the sale deed was scheduled to be executed on 31.01.2012.
However, no sale deed had actually been executed, and the mortgage
created in favour of the respondent-bank pre-dated the said agreement
to sell. It was also observed that no right or interest had passed on to
the petitioner on the basis of the said agreement to sell unless a sale
deed was executed. Hence, the application was held to be not
maintainable.
10. The Tribunal further held that the petitioner was taking
contradictory stands. On the one hand, the petitioner had stated that
money had been paid towards re-payment of the debts, whereas, in the
same breath, the petitioner claimed to be unaware that the property in
question had been mortgaged.
11. The petitioner herein contended that ACE was merely an
assignee of the loan accounts and that, since the assignment took place
subsequent to the mortgage, the assignee could not have put the
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property up for sale. Reliance was placed on Section 14 of the
Transfer of Property Act.
12. The said argument was rejected by the learned DRT, which held
that there was no impediment to the creation of the mortgage and that
the assignment in favour of ACE could not be faulted, as the banks
being the mortgagees, had every right to assign their interests without
the said assignment being challenged or questioned.
13. The said order was the subject matter of a challenge before the
DRAT. The learned DRAT was also of the opinion that the petitioner
herein had claimed rights solely on the basis of the agreement to sell
dated 01.01.2009. Even possession of the property had not been
handed over to the petitioner. The entire payment had not been made,
and no sale deed had been executed. Therefore, no right had accrued
in favour of the petitioner.
14. The DRAT was of the opinion that the appellant had no locus
standi to file a securitisation application before the DRT on the basis
of the said agreement to sell. The DRAT also held that unless and
until the petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of the contract
and obtained a decree directing the vendor to execute a sale deed in
favour of the petitioner, the sale could not be said to have been
completed and the challenge to the sale notice in the proceedings
before the DRAT could not, therefore, be sustained.
15. It is this order that is under challenge in the present petition.
16. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner drew the attention
of this Court to the notice issued by the bank under Section 13(2) of
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the SARFAESI Act. It is contended that the notice does not specify
the amount due and payable.
17. It is also contended that the account of Mr. Alok Aggarwal
could not have been declared a non-performing asset without
following the prescribed procedure.
18. It is further contended that the assignment to the financial
institution, which initiated proceedings under Section 13 of the
SARFAESI Act, took place subsequent to the mortgage. Since the
mortgage pre-dated the assignment, the financial institution acquired
its interest in the suit property after the agreement to sell.
19. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Vannarakkal Kallalathil Shreedharan v. Chandra
Math Balakrishnan & Anr., (1990) 3 SCC 291 , wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, more particularly in paragraphs 5 and 7 of the said
judgment, observed as follows:
“5.We may first draw attention to some of the
relevant statutory provisions bearing on the
question. Order 38 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that attachment before
judgment shall not affect the rights existing prior
to the attachment of persons not parties to the
suit. Under Section 40 of the Transfer of Property
Act, a purchaser under a contract of sale of land
is entitled to the benefit of an obligation arising
out of that contract and it pro- vides that that
obligation may be enforced inter alia against a
transferee with notice. Section 91 of the Trusts Act
also recognises this principle that the transferee
with notice of an existing contract of which
specific performance can be enforced must hold
the property for the benefit of the party to the
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contract. These are equitable rights though not
amounting to interest in immovable property
within the meaning of Section 54 of the Transfer
of Property Act which declares that a contract of
sale does not create an interest in the property.
On this line of reasoning it has been held by the
Madras High Court that the purchaser of an
antecedent agreement gets good title despite
attachment. See Paparaju Veeraraghavayya v.
Killaru Kamala Devi & Ors., AIR 1935 Mad. 193,
Veerappa Thevar & Ors. v.C.S. Venkataramma
Aiyar & Ors., AIR 1935 Mad. 872 and Angu Pillai
v.M.S.M. Kasiviswa- nathan Chettiar, AIR 1974
Mad. 16.
7. Hence, if under a contract of sale entered into
before attachment, the conveyance after
attachment in pursuance of the contract passes on
good title inspite of the attachment. To the same
effect are the decisions of the Bombay High Court
in Rango Ramachandra v. Gurlingappa
Chinnappa, AIR 1941 Bom. 198 and Yashvant
Shankar Dunakhe v. Prayarji Nurji Tamboli, AIR
1943 Bom. 145. The High Court of Travancore-
Cochin in Kochuponchi Varughese v. Quseph
Lonan, AIR 1952 Travancore-Cochin 467 has
also adopted the same reasoning.”
20. Learned counsel submits that, while dealing with the question
of Order 38 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”),
which provides that an attachment vide judgment shall not affect the
rights of persons existing prior to the attachment who are not parties to
the suit and protects the pre-existing rights. It is, therefore, contended
that, since the mortgage is stated to have been created after the
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agreement to sell, the property could not be sold in a manner affecting
the rights of the petitioner herein.
21. On the same principle, reliance has been placed on the
judgment of the Bombay High Court in Rango Ramchandra Kulkarni
v. Gurulingappa Chinnappa Muthal, AIR 1941 Bom 198 .
22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also vehemently
challenged the validity of the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the
SARFAESI Act.
23. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
contends that the auction had already taken place on 13.10.2011. A
sale certificate was issued on 30.03.2012, and the right to redeem the
mortgage came to an end on the date the auction notice was published.
24. Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act is sought to be pressed into
service by the respondent. The relevant provision is reproduced as
under:
“ [ 13. Enforcement of security interest.-
XXXX
(8) [(8) Where the amount of dues of the secured
creditor together with all costs, charges and
expenses incurred by him is tendered to the
secured creditor at any time before the date of
publication of notice for public auction or inviting
quotations or tender from public or private treaty
for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of
the secured assets,—
(i) the secured assets shall not be transferred by
way of lease assignment or sale by the secured
creditor; and
(ii) in case, any step has been taken by the
secured creditor for transfer by way of lease or
assignment or sale of the assets before tendering
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of such amount under this sub-section, no further
step shall be taken by such secured creditor for
transfer by way of lease or assignment or sale of
such secured assets.]”.
25. Learned counsel further draws the attention of this Court to the
notice dated 12.11.2010 issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI
Act. It is submitted that Schedule A to the said notice clearly shows
that a sum of Rs. 320.91 lakhs, together with interest at the rate of
24% was due from 31.03.2009 until payment. This according to the
respondent indicates that the mortgage of the property pre-dated the
agreement to sell dated 01.01.2009.
26. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the facts of the case do
not establish that the agreement to sell was entered into prior to the
mortgage.
27. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioner
has placed reliance only on the deed of assignment, which does not
constitute the creation of a mortgage. The property had already been
mortgaged by Mr. Alok Aggarwal, director of M/s Daksh, in favour of
Lord Krishna Bank and State Bank of India. Therefore, the deed of
assignment executed between the parties does not amount to the
creation of a fresh mortgage.
28. Learned counsel further submits that, in any event, the
agreement to sell does not create any right, title or interest in the
property in favour of the petitioner.
29. As pointed out by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, a
reading of Schedule A to the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the
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SARFAESI Act indicates that the property was mortgaged around
September 2009, i.e., on the date of taking the loan. This date,
according to the respondent, predates the agreement to sell, and
therefore, any agreement to sell would remain subject to the said
mortgage.
30. In any event, it is now well settled that an agreement to sell
does not, by itself, create any right, title or interest in the property.
31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2009) 7 SCC 363 , observed as follows:
“We therefore reiterate that immovable
property can be legally and lawfully
transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of
conveyance.
Transactions of the nature of `GPA sales' or
`SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and
do not amount to transfer, nor can they be
recognized or valid mode of transfer of
immoveable property. The courts will not treat
such transactions as completed or concluded
transfers or as conveyances as they neither
convey title nor create any interest in an
immovable property.
They cannot be recognized as deeds of title,
except to the limited extent of section 53A of the
TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon
or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or
Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply
not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to
freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold
property. A lease can be validly transferred only
under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time
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that an end is put to the pernicious practice of
SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.
17. It has been submitted that making declaration
that GPA sales and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are
not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to
create hardship to a large number of persons who
have entered into such transactions and they
should be given sufficient time to regularize the
transactions by obtaining deeds of conveyance. It
is also submitted that this decision should be
made applicable prospectively to avoid
hardship.”
32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shakeel Ahmed v. Syed Akhlaq
Hussain, (2023) 20 SCC 655, has held that the Judgment of the Apex
Court in Suraj Lamps (supra) applies retrospectively. Relevant
portion of the said Judgment reads as under:
“ 15 . The argument advanced on behalf of the
respondent that the judgment in Suraj Lamp &
Industries [Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2)
v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656 : (2012) 1
SCC (Civ) 351 : (2011) 183 DLT 1 (SC)] would
be prospective is also misplaced. The requirement
of compulsory registration and effect on non-
registration emanates from the statutes, in
particular the Registration Act and the Transfer of
Property Act. The ratio in Suraj Lamp &
Industries [Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2)
v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656 : (2012) 1
SCC (Civ) 351 : (2011) 183 DLT 1 (SC)] only
approves the provisions in the two enactments.
Earlier judgments of this Court have taken the
same view.”
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33. The principle laid down in the said judgment has since been
followed in a number of cases. The petitioner has not filed a suit for
specific performance and has not obtained any decree directing Mr.
Alok Aggarwal to execute a sale deed in the petitioner's favour. No
right, title or interest in the suit property can be said to have accrued to
the petitioner on the basis of the agreement to sell alone.
34. In any event, the agreement to sell was entered into after the
mortgage. The interest of the bank being prior to the interest claimed
by the petitioner, would prevail over the latter.
35. There is merit in the contention advanced by learned counsel for
the respondent that Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act provides for the
consequences of the sale of a secured asset and that the petitioner's
right to redeem the mortgage stood extinguished upon completion of
the sale, subject to the applicable statutory provisions.
36. In M. Rajendran v. KPK Oils & Protiens India (P) Ltd., (2026)
3 SCC 505 , the Apex Court has held as under:
“ 43 . A plain reading of Section 13 sub-section (8)
of the Sarfaesi Act reveals that the said provision
is in two parts, being as under:
43.1. Firstly, it enables the borrower to exercise
his right of redemption up to a particular point of
time by stipulating the time-limit during which the
borrower can tender all the dues with interest,
costs and charges to the secured creditor.
43.2 .Secondly, it enables the secured creditor to
exercise its power to deal or dispose of the
secured asset, by providing as to when the
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secured creditor can proceed to sell, auction,
assign or lease the secured asset.
179 . As already afore-stated, the term “notice of
sale” is an umbrella term, which refers to and
includes the giving of notice for sale by the
secured creditor in all the forms and manner that
he is obliged in law to do, under the relevant
Sarfaesi Rules, depending upon the mode of sale
elected by the secured creditor.
180 . Similarly, despite the different mode or
manner in which the notice of sale is to be given
by the secured creditor in terms of Rule 8(6), the
proviso thereto read with Rule 9(1), and for that
matter even Rule 8(7), are to be construed to refer
and mean parts of a single composite notice of
sale, then irrespective of the variation in the
manner in which each rule contemplates the
giving of such notice of sale, the discord in the
language of Section 13(8) of the Sarfaesi Act,
more particularly, the expression “before the date
of publication” may be resolved, notwithstanding
the absence of any actual publication of notice of
sale in some modes of sale.
181 . Thus, for the purpose of the amended Section
13(8) of the Sarfaesi Act, the expression “before
the date of publication” used therein, has to be
construed to refer and mean the publication of a
valid “notice of sale” for the secured asset,
although such publication may vary depending
upon the mode of sale chosen by the secured
creditor.
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182 . The word “publication” used in Section
13(8) of the Sarfaesi Act, has to be understood to
mean and include the service, publication in
newspaper, and the affixation and uploading of
the “notice of sale”, as may be required under the
Sarfaesi Rules. Wherever, the chosen mode of sale
requires the secured creditor to effectuate the
“notice of sale” in any or all of the aforesaid
manner, as the case may be, the expiry of thirty
days as required under Rule 9(1) from the day
when the secured creditor complies with the
requirement of giving the notice of sale, as per the
applicable rules, would be the date on which the
secured creditor is said to have validly published
the “notice of sale” and it would be this date on
which the right of redemption of the borrower
would stand extinguished.”
37. It is trite law that, even under the CPC, the right to redeem a
mortgaged property cannot be exercised after the sale has been
completed in accordance with law and the sale certificate has been
issued.
38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Allokam Peddabbayya & Ors. v.
Allahabad Bank & Ors., (2017) 2 SCC 272 , observed as follows:
“16. The extinguishment of the right to redeem by
virtue of the proviso to Section 60 of the Act fell
for consideration in L.K. Trust vs. EDC Ltd.,
(2011) 6 SCC 780, observing as follows :-
"55. Rejecting the appeal, this Court in
Narandas Karsondas case has held that the
right of redemption which is embodied in
Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act is
available to the mortgagor unless it has been
extinguished by the act of the parties or by
the decree of a court. What is held by this
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Court is that, in India it is only on execution
of the conveyance and registration of
transfer of the mortgagor’s interest by
registered instrument that the mortgagor’s
right of redemption will be extinguished but
the conferment of power to sell the
mortgaged property without intervention of
the court, in a mortgage deed, in itself, will
not deprive the mortgagor of his right of
redemption…..”
17. The effect of the proviso to Section 60 again
fell for consideration in Rukmini Amma & Ors. vs.
Rajeswary [dead] through LRs., (2013) 9 SCC
121, wherein it was held:-
"29. In the above said background the
factum of the filing of the suit nearly after 30
years of the mortgage was very relevant. If
really the respondents were serious about the
consequences which flowed from the public
auction-sale or were really aggrieved of the
sale effected under Ext. B-5, the respondents
should have been prompt in taking any steps
for redressal of their grievance in order to
save the property mortgaged. Having failed
to evince any such keen interest in protecting
their property, it is too late in the day for the
respondents to have approached the Court at
their own sweet will i.e. after nearly 30 long
years of the mortgage and file a simple suit
for redemption without taking any steps to
question a sale which was effected by way of
public auction….”
18. The extinguishment of the right to redeem
under the proviso to Section 60 of the Act was
again considered in Embassy Hotels Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Gajaraj & Co. & ors., (2015) 14 SCC 316
observing as follows:
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"15.... In such circumstances, in our
considered view, the only option was to
directly challenge the court auction of the
suit property and the issuance of sale
certificate. The learned counsel for the
appellant has correctly submitted that as a
result of judgment of this Court dated 20-2-
1990 (P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries, 1990
(2) SCC 378) the order of the executing court
dated 7-5-1983 got confirmed and the sale
certificate obtained finality. As a sequel, the
ownership of the suit property or at least a
major part of it got transferred from the first
defendant to the auction-purchaser the
appellant. In such a situation, it is not
possible to accept the contention on behalf of
the plaintiff that the first defendant being a
mortgagor will continue to have a right of
redemption although the sale of mortgaged
property to a third party through a court
auction became final."
19. In Mrutunjay Pani (supra), it was observed as
follows :-
"(1) The governing principle is "once a
mortgage always a mortgage" till the
mortgage is terminated by the act of the
parties themselves, by merger or by order of
the court. (2) Where a mortgagee purchases
the equity of redemption in execution his
mortgage decree with the leave of court or in
execution of a mortgage or money decree
contained by a third party, the equity of
redemption may be extinguished;
and, in that event, the mortgagor cannot sue
for redemption without getting the sale set
aside..."
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20. In B. Arvind Kumar (supra), the proviso to
Section 60 of the Act fell for consideration and it
was observed:
"...The proviso specifically says that the right
of redemption conferred on the mortgagor
under Section 60 could be extinguished by
the act of parties or by decree of the court.
The sale deed was executed in
favour of the
auction-purchaser on 10-11-1981 and
the appellants in
their suit for redemption had not obtained any
interim order staying the operation of the auction-
sale or the execution of any sale deed and in the
absence of (Sic thereof) such right of redemption
would be extinguished."
21. In Nagubai (supra), the proviso to Section 60
of the Act did not fall for consideration. Likewise,
Mangru Mahto (supra) dealt with Order XXXIV,
CPC and Section 52A of the Act with regard to a
purchase pendente lite which is again
distinguishable.
22. In Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil (supra), it
was observed that the mortgagor has a right of
redemption even after sale has taken place
pursuant to the final decree, but before the
confirmation of sale.
23. The aforesaid discussion leads to the
conclusion that the Plaintiffs lost the right to sue
for redemption of the mortgaged property by
virtue of the proviso to Section 60 of the Act, no
sooner that the mortgaged property was put to
auction sale in a suit for foreclosure and sale
certificate was issued in favour of Defendant
No.2. There remained no property mortgaged to
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be redeemed. The right to redemption could not
be claimed in the abstract.”
39. The SARFAESI Act provides that its provisions shall prevail
over inconsistent provisions of other laws. Therefore, the petitioner's
right to redeem the mortgage stood extinguished upon the sale subject
to the applicable statutory provisions, particularly since the sale notice
had been issued before the petitioner filed the application under
Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Aforesaid paragragh of the
Allokam (supra) is relevant in this regard.
40. In any event, there is nothing in the application to indicate that
the petitioner expressed a willingness to redeem the mortgage.
41. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the petition. The sale
took place in 2012, and the sale certificate was issued thereafter. The
successful auction purchaser has been dragged into frivolous litigation
for the last 14 years.
42. In the opinion of this Court, the present proceedings constitute
an abuse of the process of law. The proceedings have been initiated by
a person who has not even a semblance of a right in the suit property
and who is agitating a claim solely on the basis of an agreement to
sell, which, as held hereinabove, does not confer any right, title or
interest in the suit property.
43. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.
1,00,000/-, to be paid in the following manner: Rs. 50,000/- to the
Army Welfare War Widows Fund and Rs. 50,000/- to the Delhi High
Court Bar Association. This Court is not examining the question of
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whether the petitioner was entitled to file the present petition merely
on the basis of the agreement to sell, but whether the petitioner had
any right at all to initiate these proceedings on the basis of such an
agreement.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
RENU BHATNAGAR, J
NOVEMBER 18, 2026
bs/kz
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