Munna Moyuddin Shaikh vs State Of Gujarat

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 558

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2686 OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 35717 of 2025)


Munna Moyuddin Shaikh … Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Gujarat … Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T
K. V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. Heard Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, learned counsel for the
appellant and Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, learned counsel for the
respondent-State.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2026.05.26
17:58:13 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 9

4. The present appeal calls in question the correctness of
the judgment and order dated 18.03.2002 in Criminal Appeal
No. 459/2001 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad. By the said judgment and order, the High Court
confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara, Camp at
Chhotaudepur, Gujarat (for short, ‘Trial Court) in Sessions
Case No.33/1998. The Trial Court had convicted the
appellant for the offences punishable under Section 302 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) as well as
under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act (for short, ‘BP
Act’) and after sentencing him to imprisonment for life also
imposed a fine of Rs.25,000/-. Appropriate default sentences
were also imposed.

5. Originally, four accused were set up for trial, and the
appellant herein was A-2. While the appellant was convicted,
the other three accused were acquitted.
Page 2 of 9

6. The case of the prosecution is amply supported by three
eye witnesses - PW-1 Arifhusain Inarbhai Mirza, PW-2
Ahmed Ali Mohmmed Ali Shaikh, and PW-5 Rashid Ali Kadar
Ali Makrani. Relying on the evidence of PWs 1,2 and 5, the
Trial Court found that the appellant dealt knife blows on the
Torso and abdomen of the deceased and caused him injuries
resulting in his death. The Trial Court found that the
contradictions in the statement of witnesses were only with
regard to the other accused (A-1, A-3 and A-4) and there was
no contradiction with regard to the case against the
appellant. The Court also found corroboration in the medical
evidence and on the aspect of discovery of the knife at the
behest of the appellant.
7. The High Court confirmed the findings of the Trial
Court. The High Court held that all the eyewitnesses were
reliable and were corroborated by the discovery of knife as
well as by the medical evidence.
8. We have not been persuaded to disturb the concurrent
findings on the aspect of conviction. Hence, we are not
Page 3 of 9

disturbing the conviction imposed on the appellant for the
offences for which he has been convicted.
9. However, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the appellant as on today has already undergone without
remission, a period of about 23 years, 6 months and 3 days
imprisonment. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that it is eminently a fit case where the sentence of life
imprisonment ought to be converted to that of the period
already undergone, i.e. about 23 years, 6 months and 3 days.
10. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v.
1
V. Sriharan , held as under: -
“Questions (i) and (ii)
(i) As to whether the imprisonment for life means till
the end of convict's life with or without any scope
for remission?
(ii) xxx xxx
xxx xxx
61. Having noted the abovereferred to two Constitution
Bench decisions in Godse [ Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of
Maharashtra , AIR 1961 SC 600 and Maru Ram [ Maru
Ram v. Union of India , (1981) 1 SCC 107 which were
consistently followed in the subsequent decisions
in Sambha Ji Krishan Ji [ Sambha Ji Krishan Ji v. State of
Maharashtra , (1974) 1 SCC 196, Ratan Singh [ State of

1
(2016) 7 SCC 1
Page 4 of 9

M.P. v. Ratan Singh , (1976) 3 SCC 470, Ranjit Singh [ Ranjit
Singh v. UT of Chandigarh , (1984) 1 SCC 31, Ashok
Kumar [ Ashok Kumar v. Union of India , (1991) 3 SCC 498
and Subash Chander [ Subash Chander v. Krishan Lal , (2001)
4 SCC 458. The first part of the first question can be
conveniently answered to the effect that imprisonment
for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the
Penal Code only means imprisonment for rest of the
life of the prisoner subject, however, to the right to
claim remission, etc. as provided under Articles 72 and
161 of the Constitution to be exercisable by the
President and the Governor of the State and also as
provided under Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure
Code.”
[Emphasis supplied]
11. Further, this Court in Para 105 held as under:-
105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from
the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the
punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such
specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court
and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme
Court and not by any other court in this country. To put it
differently, the power to impose a modified punishment
providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the
end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can
be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme
Court and not by any other inferior court.

12. Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, learned counsel for the appellant
relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Shiva
Kumar alias Shiva alias Shivamurthy vs. State of
Page 5 of 9

2
Karnataka , wherein in paragraphs 11 & 14, it was held as
under:-
“11. What is held by the Constitution Bench in V. Sriharan,
cannot be construed in a narrow perspective. The
Constitution Bench has held that there is a power which can
be derived from IPC to impose a fixed-term sentence or
modified punishment which can only be exercised by the
High Court or in the event of any further appeal, by the
Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country.
In addition, the Constitution Bench held that power to
impose a modified punishment of providing any specific
term of incarceration or till the end of convict's life as an
alternative to death penalty, can be exercised only by the
High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other
inferior court.
xxx xxx
14. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that even in a
case where capital punishment is not imposed or is not
proposed, the constitutional courts can always exercise
the power of imposing a modified or fixed-term
sentence by directing that a life sentence, as
contemplated by "secondly" in Section 53 IPC, shall be
of a fixed period of more than fourteen years, for
example, of twenty years, thirty years and so on. The
fixed punishment cannot be for a period less than 14
years in view of the mandate of Section 433-A CrPC.”
[Emphasis supplied]
13. We heard learned counsel for the respondent-State on
the issue whether a sentence of life imprisonment could be
modified to that of a fixed term and also as to whether such a
modification would amount to enhancement of sentence.

2
(2023) 9 SCC 817
Page 6 of 9

14. Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, learned Counsel for the
respondent-State with her usual fairness brought to the
notice of the Court a judgment of this Court in the case of
3
Birbal Choudhary alias Mukhiya Jee vs. State of Bihar ,
wherein at paragraph 42, it was held as under:-
“42. Even the last argument of Mr Basant lacks merit. It is to
be kept in mind that the Sessions Court had sentenced the
appellant for life for conviction under Sections 364-A/34
IPC. It has been held by this Court in Swamy Shraddananda
(2) v. State of Karnataka that imprisonment for life would
mean full life and not sentence of 14 years which may be
grossly disproportionate or inadequate and cannot be
called as sentence of life. After specifically taking note of
this judgment, the High Court felt it appropriate to award
the punishment of imprisonment for 20 years. It was done
not only in the case of the appellant or others who were
awarded life imprisonment by the trial court but even
two other convicts who were given death sentence,
their sentence is also reduced to 20 years' RI. It is,
therefore, clear that the High Court while modifying the
sentence qua the appellant Birbal, in fact, reduced the
same from life imprisonment to 20 years' RI.
Therefore, the question of giving any notice under
Section 401 CrPC did not arise. The judgment of this
Court in Vikas Yadav case is of no help to the appellant.
In that case, the main issue was of remission of life
sentence and observation in para 39 were made in that
context. Otherwise, facts of that case would reveal that
life imprisonment by the trial court converted to
minimum non-remittable fixed term of 25 years by the
High Court was held to be appropriate in the facts of
that case. We may mention that the Constitution Bench
judgment of this Court in Muthuramalingam v. State
has approved the view taken in Swami Shraddananda

3
(2018) 12 SCC 440
Page 7 of 9

case that life imprisonment would be treated as
imprisonment for full life. The issue which fell for
consideration was altogether different.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

15. It will be noticed that in the said case, the High Court
had modified the imprisonment for life imposed with regard
to few of the convicts to that of 20 years. It was further held
that since such modification is not enhancement, the question
of giving notice under Section 386 read with Section 401 of
the Criminal Procedure Code also did not arise.
16. The underlying ratio of the above quoted judgments is
that when a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed,
Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC would convey the
meaning that it is till the natural life subject to the right of
claiming remission. Hence, modifying a sentence of life
imprisonment and imposing a fixed sentence is permissible
under the interpretation placed in Sriharan ( supra ) and
followed in Shiva Kumar ( supra ), as long as the period
imposed is more than fourteen years of imprisonment.
Page 8 of 9

17. There is one more reason which has compelled us to
adopt this course of action. The incident is of 1998 and the
appellant was then about 21 years of age.
18. For the reasons stated above, while maintaining the
conviction under Section 302 of the IPC and under Section
135 of the BP Act, we modify the sentence of the appellant to
the period already undergone i.e. 23 years, 6 months and 3
days.
19. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. We direct
that in view of the order made by this Court today, the
appellant be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any
other case. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.

……….........................J.
[ K. V. VISWANATHAN ]


……….........................J.
[ VIJAY BISHNOI ]

New Delhi;
th
26 May, 2026
Page 9 of 9