Ashwani Kumar Awasthi And 3 Others vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others

AFR
Reserved
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - A No. - 29926 of 2016
Ashwani Kumar Awasthi and 3 others
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and 3 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Abhishek Mishra, Gopal Verma,
H.A.B. Sinha, Hari Manish Bahadur
Sinha, Rahul Mishra, Sharad Kumar
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C.
Alongwith:
1. WRIA/4362/2020 Smt. Nisha Mishra and 6 others Vs. State of U.P. and 4 others
2. WRIA/4416/2020 Sabina Begum and 14 others Vs. State of U.P. and 5 others
Court No. - 52
HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI CHAUHAN, J.
1. The petitioners in the present batch of petitions were selected for the
Special BTC Training Course, 2004. The controversy involved in these
writ petitions are similar in nature that under the Government Order
dated 14.01.2004, it was specifically provided that the candidates
selected for the said training course would be paid a stipend of Rs.
2,500/- per month from the commencement of their training until the
date of their appointment, however, the respondent authorities have
denied to pay the stipend on the ground that, by means of a corrigendum
letter dated 14.05.2015, the condition contained in the earlier
Government order had been modified, providing that the stipend would
be payable only for the duration of the training period and not till the
date of appointment, as was originally stipulated.

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
2. When the petitioners leading writ petition being Writ-A No. 29926 of 2016
along with some other persons, were not paid the aforesaid stipend, they
1
preferred Writ–A No. 64689 of 2015 , in which this Court directed the
concerned authority to consider the grievance of the petitioners therein and
pass appropriate orders. Pursuant thereto, the claim of the petitioners was
rejected vide order dated 18.05.2016 on the ground that, by means of a
corrigendum letter dated 14.05.2015, the condition contained in the earlier
Government order had been modified, providing that the stipend would be
payable only for the duration of the training period and not till the date of
appointment, as was originally stipulated. Similarly, the claim of other
petitioners in connected two other writ petitions has been rejected by orders
dated 09.06.2015 and 30.07.2015, thus, the petitioners herein have challenged
the claim rejection orders along with the corrigendum letter dated
14.05.2015.
3. Earlier, Writ–A No. 29926 of 2016 was decided on 03.02.2020 by passing
the following order:
“ Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for
respondents.
By means of the present writ petition, the petitioners have sought for issuance of
writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 18.5.2016 passed by the respondent No.1
and corrigendum dated 14.5.2015 with the further prayer to issue a writ of
mandamus to command the respondent No.2 to make immediate payment of
remaining stipend as per Clause-3(12) contained under Government Order dated
14.1.2004.
Brief fact of the case is that the petitioners appeared in Special B.T.C. Training
Course, 2004, wherein they were selected. Under the Government Order dated
14.1.2004, it was provided that the candidates, who have been selected for Special
B.T.C. Training Course shall be given stipend of Rs.2,500/- per month from the
start of training till the date of appointment.
In regard to the controversy that whether the training through correspondence
course is valid or not for consideration of claim for the selection for Special B.T.C.
Training Course was subject matter of challenge before this Court in bunch of writ
petition. The petitions were decided and ultimately, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
vide judgment and order dated 26.4.2013 held that B.Ed. course through
correspondence is valid. After the selection, the petitioners claimed stipend as per
the Government Order issued on 14.1.2004. The respondents paid stipend for 6
months only and not till the date of appointment to the petitioners. Although, till
date, no appointment letter has been issued to the petitioners.
1 Apra Goel & 7 Others v. State of U.P. & 3 Others

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
The controversy in regard to the payment of stipend came before this Court in
Writ-A No.49574 of 2010, which was decided vide judgment and order dated
8.12.2014 and following direction was issued :-
"On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners again
relies upon paragraph 3(12) of the Government Order dated 14.1.2004,
which clearly stipulates that from the date of selection for Special BTC
Course till the appointment the candidate would be entitled for stipend of
Rs.2,500/-.
Paragraph 3(12) of the Government order dated 14.1.2004 is unambiguous
and nothing to the contrary has been presented to the Court. In my view, the
petitioners are entitled for stipend till they are appointed as Assistant
Teachers in the Primary School, therefore, from May 2005 till December
2005 the petitioners are entitled for stipend of Rs.2,500/- per month in case
there is nothing contrary in law against such entitlement.
Subject to the aforesaid, writ petition is allowed."
The order passed by the learned Single Judge was subject matter of challenge in
Special Appeal (Defective) No.321 of 2015 which was decided vide order dated
27.4.2015, by holding the following observation :-
"The aforesaid provision makes it clear that the stipend was liable to be
paid during the period of training and until the order of appointment was
issued. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge is hence consistent
with the clear mandate of paragraph 3(12) of the Government Order. The
reliance which has been placed by the learned Standing Counsel on a
subsequent Government Order dated 9 July 2007, which is placed on the
record, is misconceived. That Government Order merely states that the
recruitment process had been concluded. It has no bearing on the liability to
pay stipend, which is governed by paragraph 3(12) of the earlier
Government Order extracted above. For these reasons, we find no merit in
the special appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order
as to costs."
Thereafter, the matter went up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the S.L.P. filed
by the State Government was dismissed vide judgment and order dated
12.10.2015. A review was also sought, which has also been dismissed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 10.11.2016.
In view of the above, the matter is set at rest. The petitioners are also entitled for
the benefit claimed in the present writ petition.
Accordingly, the writ petition is finally disposed of with the direction to the
respondents to ensure payment of stipend to the petitioners with effect from the
date of training till the date of appointment in view of Clause-3(12) contained
under Government Order dated 14.1.2004 and as per the judgment passed in Writ-
A No.49574 of 2010, Special Appeal (Defective) No.321 of 2015 as well as
affirmed in the S.L.P. by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide judgment and order
dated 12.10.2015, within a period of 3 months from the date of production of
certified copy of this order .”
4. The aforesaid judgment and order dated 03.02.2020 was challenged by the
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State by filing Special Appeal No. 11 of 2021 , wherein the following order
was passed on 27.01.2021:
2 State Of U.P. Through Secretary,Basic Education And 3 Others Vs. Ashwani Kumar Awasthi And 3 Others

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
“By this appeal a challenge is made to the impugned order dated 03.02.2020
passed by the learned Single Judge on a writ petition preferred by the non-
appellant with the following prayers;
"(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the
impugned order dated 18.05.2016 passed by respondent no. 1 and office
order/corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 also be quashed.
(b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding
the respondent no. 2 make immediate payment of remaining stipend
amount as mentioned in the Government Order dated 14.01.2004 in Para 3
(12) till his appointment as Assistant Teacher with interest 18%.
(c) Issue any other writ, order or direction in the nature of which this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
(d) Award the cost of the petition to the petitioners."
The writ petition has been decided in reference to the earlier litigation and the
Government Order dated 14.01.2004, without addressing the issue raised in
reference to the subsequent government order/corrigendum dated 14.05.2015. By
the aforesaid order, a modification was made in regard to the benefit of stipend. It
was made limited to the period of training after entering into Special B.T.C. course.
The issue in reference to the government order/corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 has
not been addressed effectively by any of the Court, though, a review petition
preferred by the State Government before the Apex Court has been dismissed but
the judgment aforesaid does not propound a ratio.
Taking into consideration aforesaid and as prayed by learned counsel for the
parties, the impugned order dated 03.02.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge is
set-aside with remand of the case to the learned Single Judge to be decided afresh
in reference to all the prayers made by the petitioners in writ petition.
Appeal is allowed with the direction given above.”
5. The present petitions are being heard afresh in terms of the directions issued
by the Division Bench of this Court while deciding the aforesaid Special
Appeal, particularly with regard to the issue arising out of the subsequent
Government Order/corrigendum dated 14.05.2015.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Government order dated
14.01.2004 was issued with the due approval and sanction of the State
Government and specifically provided that the candidates selected for the
Special BTC Training Course, 2004 would be entitled to payment of a
stipend at the rate of Rs. 2,500/- per month from the commencement of their
training till the date of their appointment. It is contended that the said
Government order created a substantive and enforceable right in favour of the

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
selected candidates, and the authorities were bound to act in accordance with
the terms and conditions contained therein.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that benefit of payment of stipend
from commencement of training till their appointment having been granted
by a duly sanctioned Government order, could not subsequently be curtailed
or withdrawn retrospectively by means of a mere corrigendum dated
14.05.2015, particularly after the petitioners had already completed the
training and acquired a vested right to receive the stipend in terms of the
original Government order. According to the petitioners, the corrigendum
seeks to alter the very substance of the policy decision contained in the
Government order dated 14.01.2004 by restricting payment of stipend only
up to the training period instead of till the date of appointment, which
amounts to a substantive amendment and not a mere correction or
clarification.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the corrigendum dated
14.05.2015 travels beyond the scope of a mere corrigendum or clarification,
inasmuch as it substantially alters the policy decision embodied in the
original Government order dated 14.01.2004. It is argued that a corrigendum
can ordinarily be issued only to correct clerical, typographical, or inadvertent
errors and cannot be used as an instrument to amend, modify, or take away
substantive benefits already granted under a duly sanctioned Government
order.
9. It is further submitted that the petitioners had already acquired a vested and
accrued right to receive stipend till the date of appointment in terms of the
original Government order, and such right could not have been
retrospectively taken away after lapse of several years by issuing the
impugned corrigendum. The corrigendum, therefore, according to the
petitioners, is arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution of India, apart from being contrary to the doctrine of
legitimate expectation.

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
10. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the original Government
order dated 14.01.2004, having been issued with the sanction of the
Governor, was subsequently amended by another Government order dated
20.02.2004, which was also issued with the sanction and approval of the
Governor. It is contended that the amendment introduced by the Government
order dated 20.02.2004 specifically modified certain conditions relating to the
Special BTC Training Course, while maintaining the stipulation regarding
payment of stipend to the selected candidates .
11. It is further submitted that the very fact that the earlier Government order
dated 14.01.2004 was amended by issuance of a fresh Government order
dated 20.02.2004, duly sanctioned by the Governor, clearly demonstrates that
any substantive alteration in the conditions of the original policy could only
have been made through another properly sanctioned Government order.
According to the petitioners, the subsequent corrigendum dated 14.05.2015,
not being in the nature of a duly sanctioned amendment but merely styled as
a corrigendum, could not legally curtail or withdraw the substantive benefit
of stipend payable till the date of appointment, which had been granted under
the original Government order.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that, with respect to the dispute
relating to payment of stipend, several writ petitions came to be filed before
this Court. One such writ petition, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
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49574 of 2010 , was allowed by judgment and order dated 08.12.2014.
Against the aforesaid judgment, the State preferred Special Appeal Defective
4
No. 246 of 2015 , which too was dismissed by order dated 01.05.2015.
13. It is further submitted that, against the aforesaid orders, the State respondents
approached the Apex Court by filing SLP (Civil) No. 29614 of 2015 , which
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also came to be dismissed. Similarly, Special Appeal No. 321 of 2015 , was
also dismissed. Accordingly, paragraph 3.12 of the Government order dated
3 Vishishtha BTC Shikshak Welfare Association and others Vs. State of U.P. & Others
4 State of U.P. through Secretary Basic Education & 3 Others v. Vishishtha BTC Shikshak Welfare Asso. & 2
Others
5 State of U.P. & 2 Ors. Vs. Dhirendra Pratap Singh

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
14.01.2004 stood affirmed and the controversy relating to payment of stipend
attained finality up to the Supreme Court.
14. It is further submitted that, thereafter, the State filed Review Application No.
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3450 of 2016 in SLP (Civil) No. 29614 of 2015 , raising the plea that the
issue pertained to Vishisht/Special BTC Training, 2004, the selection process
whereof had been conducted pursuant to Government order dated 14.01.2004
as amended by Government order dated 20.02.2004. Reliance was placed
upon paragraph 3.12 of the Government order, which provided that stipend at
the rate of Rs. 2,500/- per month would be payable to the selected candidates
till they completed the requisite training, passed the examinations conducted
under the control of the State Council of Educational Research and Training,
and secured regular appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher in Primary
Schools of the Board. The State, in the review application, further contended
that the Government order dated 14.01.2004 had subsequently been amended
by corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 and, therefore, the judgment dated
12.10.2015 required reconsideration in light of the amended Government
order. However, the aforesaid review application also came to be dismissed.
15. In view of the aforesaid facts, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that
the controversy regarding payment of stipend already stands settled by the
Apex Court, and the petitioners, being similarly situated, are entitled to
payment of stipend from the commencement of their training till the date of
their appointment in terms of the Government order dated 14.01.2004.
16. During the pendency of the present writ petitions, the other petitions were
earlier allowed by judgment and order dated 03.02.2020. Against the
aforesaid judgment, a Special Appeal was preferred, which came to be
decided by order dated 27.01.2021, whereby the matter was remanded to the
learned Single Judge for fresh consideration, particularly with regard to the
issue arising from the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015.
6 State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Vishishtha BTC Shikshak Welfare Association and Others

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
17. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that, in another set of
similarly situated matters, the State had filed Special Appeal No. 532 of
2018 before this Court, which was decided by judgment and order dated
18.02.2020. The said appeal was allowed in favour of the claimants holding
them entitled to the benefit of stipend in terms of the Government order dated
14.01.2004.
18. It is further submitted that the aforesaid judgment was challenged by the
7
State before the Apex Court by filing SLP (C) No. 137 of 2021 , wherein
once again the State raised the issue relating to the amended corrigendum
dated 14.05.2015. However, despite the aforesaid contention having been
specifically raised, the Special Leave Petition also came to be dismissed by
order dated 11.07.2022.
19. Accordingly, learned counsel submits that the issue with regard to entitlement
of stipend under the Government order dated 14.01.2004, notwithstanding the
subsequent corrigendum dated 14.05.2015, already stands concluded against
the State by successive judicial pronouncements extending up to the Supreme
Court, and therefore the petitioners are entitled to the same relief.
20. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is contended that the impugned orders
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, inasmuch as the same are arbitrary,
illegal, unreasonable and contrary to the Government orders dated
14.01.2004 and 20.02.2004, as well as the law laid down by this Court and
affirmed up to the Apex Court. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned
orders may be quashed and set aside, and the petitioners may be granted all
consequential benefits, including payment of stipend from the
commencement of their training till the date of their appointment, in
accordance with the original Government order dated 14.01.2004.
21. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents,
however, submits that the case of the petitioners is founded upon the
Government order dated 14.01.2004, under which the petitioners claim
7 State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Vandana Singh and others

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
entitlement to payment of stipend at the rate of Rs. 2,500/- per month not
only during the training period but also till the date of their appointment.
Since the said amount was not paid, the petitioners, along with other similarly
situated persons, filed Writ-A No. 64689 of 2015, wherein a direction was
issued to the competent authority to consider the grievance of the petitioners
and pass appropriate orders.
22. It is submitted that, pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the claim of the
petitioners was duly considered and rejected by the Joint Secretary by order
dated 18.05.2016 on the ground that, by means of corrigendum letter dated
14.05.2015, the conditions contained in the earlier Government order had
been modified so as to make the stipend payable only up to the period of
training and not till the date of appointment as originally provided.
23. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioners have
challenged the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 mainly on the ground that the
same was not issued under the authority or sanction of the Governor and,
therefore, could not validly amend the earlier Government order dated
14.01.2004, which had been issued with the approval of the Governor.
According to the petitioners, the corrigendum is consequently inoperative in
law and, therefore, the order dated 18.05.2016 rejecting their claim for
stipend is liable to be set aside.
24. It is further submitted that the challenge to the Government
order/corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 is essentially based on the plea that the
original policy decision contained in the Government order dated 14.01.2004
had been issued after obtaining specific approval of the Governor, whereas
the subsequent modification curtailing the period of stipend was effected only
at the level of the Secretary and not through a fresh Government order duly
sanctioned by the Governor.
25. Accordingly, the principal legal issue which arises for consideration in the
present case is as to whether, by means of a corrigendum issued by the
Government, the substantive stipulation relating to payment of stipend till the

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
date of appointment could legally be altered by restricting the period of such
payment only up to completion of the training course.
26. The core legal issue, as raised by learned counsel for the respondents, is
whether a corrigendum issued for clarifying that stipend to Special BTC
trainees would be payable only during the training period, and not till the date
of appointment, required fresh approval or sanction of the Hon’ble Governor,
particularly when the original Government order dated 14.01.2004,
containing the earlier stipulation, had itself been issued with the approval of
the Governor.
27. In other words, the question which falls for consideration is whether the
corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 merely clarifies the original policy and
corrects an inadvertent error, or whether it substantially alters the conditions
of the original Government order so as to necessitate issuance of a fresh
Government order with the sanction of the Hon’ble Governor.
28. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that, so far as the constitutional
scheme governing the conduct of executive business of the State is
concerned, it would be apposite to refer to Article 166 of the Constitution of
India, which regulates the manner in which the business of the Government
of a State is to be transacted.
29. It is submitted that Article 166(1) provides that all executive actions of the
Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the
Governor. Article 166(2) further provides that orders and instruments made
and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such
manner as may be specified in rules framed by the Governor, and once so
authenticated, the validity thereof cannot be questioned on the ground that the
same was not duly made or executed. Article 166(3) empowers the Governor
to frame rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the
Government and for allocation of such business amongst the Ministers,
except in matters where the Governor is required to act in his discretion.

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
30. Learned counsel submits that the significance of Article 166 lies in ensuring
legal accountability and administrative efficiency by prescribing a formal
procedure for executive actions and by enabling systematic delegation of
authority within the governmental framework. According to the respondents,
under the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3), only specified
categories of matters involving important policy decisions, constitutional or
statutory mandates, or issues of substantial significance are required to be
placed before the Hon’ble Governor for approval. Routine, clerical,
administrative, or clarificatory matters are ordinarily dealt with at the
departmental level by the Minister-in-charge or competent departmental
authorities and do not require fresh approval of the Governor.
31. It is thus contended that a corrigendum issued merely for correcting or
clarifying an earlier Government order does not fall within the category of
matters mandatorily requiring approval of the Governor and can validly be
issued at the departmental level.
32. Learned counsel for the respondents has further placed reliance upon the
8
judgment of B.K. Srinivasan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. to
contend that the validity of an executive decision primarily depends upon its
proper authentication in accordance with Article 166 of the Constitution,
whereas the internal process by which such decision is arrived at is regulated
by the Rules of Business framed by the State Government. According to the
respondents, once an order is duly authenticated in the manner prescribed, its
validity cannot ordinarily be questioned on the basis of alleged irregularities
in the internal governmental procedure.
33. It is submitted that the aforesaid judgment recognizes the distinction between
the formal validity of an executive order and the internal decision-making
mechanism within the Government. Learned counsel submits that the Rules
of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India permit
delegation of governmental functions and allocation of business amongst
Ministers and departmental authorities, thereby enabling routine
8 (1987) 1 SCC 658 : AIR 1987 SC 1059

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
administrative and ministerial functions to be discharged without requiring
the Governor’s personal approval in every matter.
34. The respondents further submit that the distinction between ministerial acts
and substantive policy decisions is well recognized in constitutional and
administrative law. Ministerial or administrative acts include routine, clerical,
explanatory, or clarificatory actions taken for proper implementation of
governmental decisions, whereas substantive acts involve creation of new
rights, withdrawal of vested rights, or formulation of fresh policy decisions.
According to the respondents, only matters involving important policy
decisions, constitutional obligations, or statutory mandates are required to be
submitted for approval of the Governor under the applicable Rules of
Business.
35. In this regard, reliance has also been placed upon the Uttar Pradesh
Secretariat Instructions and the Uttar Pradesh Authentication (Orders
9
and Other Instruments) Rules, 1975 framed under Article 166 of the
Constitution of India, which regulate the manner in which Government
business is transacted and executive orders are authenticated within the State
of Uttar Pradesh. Learned counsel submits that the said Rules, 1975
contemplate that ordinary governmental business is to be disposed of by the
Minister-in-charge of the concerned department, and only specified
categories of matters of exceptional importance are required to be placed
before the Governor.
36. It is thus contended that routine clerical, explanatory, or clarificatory matters
do not require fresh approval of the Governor, and therefore a corrigendum
clarifying the scope of payment of stipend under the earlier Government
order could validly be issued at the department level. According to the
respondents, the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 did not constitute a fresh
policy decision but merely clarified the original intent of the Government
order dated 14.01.2004, and hence no separate approval of the Governor was
legally required.
9 The Rules, 1975

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
37. Upon analysis of the constitutional scheme and the Rules of Business framed
under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the critical position which
emerges is that only such matters which involve important policy decisions,
constitutional obligations, statutory mandates, or issues specifically required
under the Constitution or any statute be placed before the Governor for
necessary approval or sanction.
38. On the other hand, routine administrative matters, ministerial acts, clerical
corrections, explanatory communications, or clarificatory corrigenda are
ordinarily excluded from the category of matters requiring the Governor’s
approval and may validly be dealt with at the departmental level in
accordance with the Rules of Business.
39. Thus, the distinction essentially lies between a substantive decision involving
formulation or alteration of governmental policy, creation or extinguishment
of rights, or exercise of constitutional/statutory power on the one hand, and
routine or clarificatory administrative actions intended merely to explain,
correct, or implement an existing decision on the other. While the former
category ordinarily requires approval of the Governor in terms of Article 166
and the applicable Rules of Business, the latter category does not.
40. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that a corrigendum issued for
the purpose of correcting, explaining, or clarifying an earlier Government
order does not fall within the category of matters mandatorily requiring
approval of the Governor and, therefore, such corrigendum can validly be
issued at the departmental level in accordance with the Rules of Business
framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India.
41. It is further submitted that there exists a well settled distinction between a
clerical or clarificatory act, the legal effect whereof is merely ministerial in
nature, and a substantive modification amounting to a fresh governmental
decision. According to the respondents, a ministerial or clarificatory act
intended to remove ambiguity, correct an inadvertent error, or explain the true
purport of an earlier order does not require fresh approval of the Governor,

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
since such action does not result in formulation of a new policy or creation of
new rights and liabilities. However, where the alteration is substantive in
character and its legal effect amounts to taking a fresh policy decision,
modifying vested rights, or introducing a material change in the earlier
governmental policy, such action would require approval of the Governor in
terms of Article 166 of the Constitution and the applicable Rules of Business.
42. On the strength of the aforesaid distinction, learned counsel for the
respondents submits that the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 was merely
clarificatory in nature and intended to rectify the scope of the original
Government order dated 14.01.2004 regarding payment of stipend, and
therefore the same did not require fresh approval or sanction of the Governor.
43. Learned counsel for the respondents, placing reliance upon the judgment of
10
State of Bihar v. D. N. Ganguly & Ors. , submits that ministerial or clerical
acts do not amount to a fresh exercise of statutory or executive power. It is
contended that where an authority merely corrects an apparent error, clarifies
an ambiguity, or rectifies an inadvertent omission in an earlier order, such
action retains the character of a ministerial act and does not constitute taking
of a fresh policy decision.
44. According to the respondents, the principle laid down in the aforesaid
judgment recognizes that correction of apparent errors or issuance of
clarificatory directions does not amount to review or reconsideration of the
original decision, provided the substance of the original policy remains
unchanged. It is thus argued that a corrigendum issued for correcting or
clarifying the true intent of an earlier Government order can validly be issued
at the departmental level without requiring fresh approval of the Governor,
since such action is merely ancillary to the implementation of the original
decision and not an independent exercise of executive power.
45. Learned counsel for the respondents has further placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Master Construction Co. (P)
10 AIR 1958 SC 1018 : 1959 SCR 1191

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
11
Ltd. v. State of Orissa & Another to contend that errors apparent on the
face of the record may be corrected by the competent authority, provided
such correction does not alter the substance of the original decision.
46. It is submitted that, in the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court has
recognized the distinction between correction of an accidental or clerical
mistake and alteration of a substantive determination. The Court observed
that where the correction merely removes an obvious error, omission, or
ambiguity so as to give effect to the true intention underlying the original
order, such correction would not amount to review or reconsideration of the
matter. However, if the purported correction changes the essential nature or
substance of the original decision, the same would travel beyond the scope of
a mere correction.
47. On the strength of the aforesaid principle, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that executive authorities possess inherent ministerial powers to
rectify mistakes, remove ambiguities, and issue clarificatory corrigenda for
proper implementation of governmental decisions. According to the
respondents, the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 merely clarified the actual
scope of the stipend payable under the Government order dated 14.01.2004
and did not introduce any fresh policy decision or substantive alteration
requiring approval of the Governor.
48. In the case of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action & Ors. v. Union of
12
India , the Supreme Court has observed that every Court or authority
possesses inherent power to correct errors in order to ensure that justice is
done and to prevent abuse of the process. The Court recognized that
procedural or accidental mistakes, clerical omissions, or errors arising from
inadvertence can always be corrected so that the record reflects the true
intention of the authority passing the order. The Supreme Court has further
observed that the power to rectify accidental slips or omissions is ancillary to
the exercise of judicial or executive power and that correction of such
11 AIR 1966 SC 1047 : (1966) 3 SCR 99
12 (1966) 3 SCC 212

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mistakes does not amount to review of the original decision, provided the
substantive rights determined by the original order are not altered.
49. Relying upon the aforesaid principle, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that the executive authorities are competent to issue clarificatory or
corrective corrigenda in order to remove inconsistencies or rectify inadvertent
errors in earlier Government orders, and such exercise would fall within the
scope of ministerial or administrative powers rather than constituting a fresh
policy decision requiring approval of the Governor.
50. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the
judgment of Apex Court in the case of S. Nagaraj & Ors. v. State of
13
Karnataka & another to contend that every authority possesses inherent
power to correct accidental mistakes, slips, or omissions in order to ensure
that the record reflects the true intent of the decision originally taken.
51. It is submitted that, in the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court observed
that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and that the purpose of the
Court or authority is to render substantial justice. The Court further held that
where an error is attributable to accidental slip, omission, or inadvertence, the
same may always be corrected, and such correction does not amount to
review of the original decision on merits. The Supreme Court emphasized
that the power to correct mistakes is inherent in every authority so as to avoid
perpetuation of an obvious error and to prevent miscarriage of justice.
52. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the principle laid down in
the aforesaid judgment clearly recognizes the distinction between correction
of an accidental or clerical error and reconsideration of the merits of the
original decision. While review involves re-examination of the substantive
decision itself, correction of an accidental slip merely brings the order in
conformity with the true intention underlying the original decision. On the
basis of the said principle, learned counsel submits that the corrigendum
dated 14.05.2015 was merely corrective and clarificatory in nature, issued to
13 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595 : (1993) Supp 2 SCR 1

17
WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
rectify an inadvertent inconsistency in the earlier Government order dated
14.01.2004, and therefore the same cannot be treated as a fresh policy
decision requiring approval of the Governor or as an impermissible review of
the original Government order.
53. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, learned
counsel for the respondents submits that the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015,
whereby payment of stipend was confined only to the training period, merely
operates as a clarification of the original Government order dated 14.01.2004
and does not amount to formulation of a new policy or withdrawal of any
vested right. According to the respondents, the corrigendum only clarifies the
actual period for which stipend was intended to be paid and, therefore, falls
within the realm of a ministerial or clarificatory act. Consequently, no
separate approval or sanction of the Governor was required for issuance of
the said corrigendum.
54. It is further submitted that if approval of the Governor were to be insisted
upon for every corrigendum, clarification, or clerical correction issued by the
Government, the entire administrative machinery would be rendered
unworkable and the very purpose underlying the Rules of Business framed
under Article 166 of the Constitution would stand defeated. According to the
respondents, settled constitutional practice and administrative law recognize
that routine explanatory or corrective actions can validly be undertaken at the
departmental level without necessitating approval at the highest executive
level.
55. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that, in the instant case,
the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 does not alter the substance of the policy
regarding payment of stipend, but merely clarifies the duration for which
such stipend was payable. Since no substantive change in policy was
introduced, the corrigendum cannot be treated as a fresh executive decision
requiring sanction of the Governor.

18
WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
56. In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the respondents
contends that the impugned order rejecting the claim of the petitioners suffers
from no illegality warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, and consequently the writ petitions are liable to be
dismissed.
57. Heard Mr. H.M.B. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Rishi
Kumar, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State and perused
the record.
58. The controversy which falls for determination before this Court lies in a
narrow compass. The principal issue is whether the corrigendum dated
14.05.2015, whereby the payment of stipend to Special BTC Trainees was
confined only to the period of training instead of extending till the date of
appointment, constitutes a mere clarificatory or ministerial act, or whether it
effects a substantive alteration in the policy embodied in the Government
Order dated 14.01.2004, thereby necessitating approval of the Hon’ble
Governor in terms of Article 166 of the Constitution of India and the Rules of
Business framed thereunder.
59. The distinction between a Government order embodying a policy decision
and a corrigendum intended merely to correct or clarify an earlier order is no
longer res integra. A Government order, particularly issued with the approval
of the Governor, represents an exercise of executive policy making power
and is capable of creating enforceable rights and obligations. A corrigendum,
on the other hand, is ordinarily intended to rectify clerical, typographical,
accidental, or explanatory errors so as to give effect to the true intent of the
original order. The legal permissibility of a corrigendum is thus confined to
correction without alteration of substance. Once a purported corrigendum
travels beyond the realm of clarification and seeks to curtail, modify, or
extinguish rights flowing from the original policy decision, it ceases to
remain ministerial in character and assumes the colour of a substantive
executive determination.

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WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
60. The constitutional framework under Article 166 undoubtedly permits
allocation and transaction of governmental business at departmental levels,
and every routine administrative or clerical action does not require the
personal approval of the Governor. Equally well settled is the principle that
ministerial or clarificatory acts may validly be undertaken by competent
departmental authorities without recourse to the Governor. However, the
crucial test is whether the subsequent action merely clarifies the original
intent or whether it materially alters the rights and liabilities flowing from the
original Government order.
14
61. In the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kripalu Shankar & Ors. , the Apex
Court referring the observations made in the case of Bachhittar Singh v.
15
State of Punjab , has expounded the constitutional sanctity attached to
executive action under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. The Court
lucidly held that mere departmental notings or internal expressions of opinion
do not attain the character of enforceable executive action unless the same are
formally expressed in the name of the Governor and duly authenticated in the
manner prescribed by the Rules of Business. The Supreme Court emphasized
that executive action acquires legal efficacy only upon constitutional
authentication and communication. The ratio of the aforesaid judgment
unmistakably reinforces the principle that a substantive governmental
determination issued with the sanction of the Governor cannot subsequently
be diluted or modified through an informal departmental exercise lacking
corresponding constitutional imprimatur.
62. The Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay v.
16
Gordhandas Bhanji , has held that public orders are to be construed
objectively with reference to the language employed therein and cannot
subsequently be supplemented, varied, or explained away by affidavits or
administrative explanations. The Court authoritatively observed that public
authorities are bound by the tenor of the order actually issued and not by
14 (1987) 3 SCC 34
15 AIR 1963 SC 395
16 AIR 1952 SC 16 : 1952 SCR 135

20
WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
subsequent attempts to reinterpret its content. Applying the aforesaid
principle, once the Government order dated 14.01.2004 expressly
contemplated payment of stipend till the date of appointment, the executive
could not subsequently curtail the extent of such entitlement under the
nomenclature of a “corrigendum” while retaining the façade of a mere
clarification.
17
63. In the case of Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. , the
Supreme Court recognized the binding force of executive instructions and
administrative policy decisions issued in exercise of executive power. The
Court observed that executive instructions, so long as they do not contravene
statutory provisions, govern the field of administration and create enforceable
norms regulating governmental action. The Government order dated
14.01.2004, therefore, cannot be trivialized as a mere administrative
communication devoid of legal consequences, rather, it constituted a
substantive executive policy regulating financial entitlement of Special BTC
trainees.
64. The doctrine of legitimate expectation and accrued rights flowing from
governmental representation has elaborately been considered by the Apex
18
Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. & Another ,
wherein it has been held that governmental representations and policy
assurances, once acted upon by affected parties, create enforceable
expectations which cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn to the detriment of
beneficiaries. The Court underscored that fairness in State action is an
indispensable component of Article 14 of the Constitution and that executive
authorities are not permitted to resile capriciously from representations which
have induced legitimate reliance. In the present case, the trainees entered and
completed the Special BTC Training on the assurance contained in paragraph
3.12 of the Government order dated 14.01.2004, and consequently the stipend
entitlement acquired an enforceable and accrued character incapable of being
extinguished through a unilateral departmental clarification. Equally
17 AIR 1967 SC 1910 : (1968) 1 SCR 111
18 (2004) 6 SCC 465

21
WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
instructive is the decision in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill & Another v.
19
Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Others , wherein the Supreme
Court propounded the celebrated principle that an order must stand or fall
upon the reasons contained therein and cannot subsequently be supplemented
by fresh explanations. The Court cautioned against validating executive
action on the basis of post facto rationalizations. The attempt of the
respondents to characterize the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 as merely
explanatory, despite its palpable effect of curtailing the duration of stipend,
therefore cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.
65. The scope of correction of clerical or accidental errors has been examined by
the Supreme Court in the case of Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State
20
of Orissa & Another , wherein it is observed that accidental slips,
typographical mistakes, or apparent omissions may undoubtedly be corrected
so long as such correction does not alter the substance of the original
determination. The Court drew a clear distinction between rectification of an
obvious mistake and modification of the substantive content of an order. A
correction which transforms the extent of rights originally conferred
necessarily transcends the permissible boundaries of a ministerial correction.
66. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid authorities leaves no room for
ambiguity that while executive authorities possess incidental power to issue
clerical corrections, explanatory notes, or ministerial clarifications, such
authority terminates at the point where the proposed correction materially
alters substantive rights, financial entitlements, or policy conditions
embodied in the original Government Order. Once the alteration ceases to be
explanatory and assumes the character of a substantive modification, the
constitutional discipline contemplated under Article 166 becomes
indispensable.
67. In the considered opinion of this Court, the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015
cannot be construed as a mere clerical or explanatory exercise. The original
Government order dated 14.01.2004, as amended on 20.02.2004,
19 (1978) 1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 851
20 AIR 1966 SC 1047 : (1966) 3 SCR 99

22
WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
unequivocally contemplated payment of stipend to the selected trainees till
the date of their appointment. The subsequent corrigendum, by restricting
such payment only to the duration of training, effectively truncates the period
of entitlement and thereby deprives the beneficiaries of a substantive
financial benefit which had accrued under the original policy. Such
curtailment cannot be characterized as correction of an accidental slip or
removal of ambiguity. It amounts, in substance and effect, to modification of
the original policy decision itself.
68. The submission advanced on behalf of the respondents that the corrigendum
merely clarifies the duration of stipend does not commend acceptance. A
clarification explains, it does not diminish policy. A corrigendum corrects an
error and it does not rewrite the policy. The impugned corrigendum, by
materially altering the extent of monetary entitlement granted under the
original Government order, travels far beyond the permissible limits of a
ministerial correction.
69. This Court is also unable to lose sight of the fact that the original
Government order was issued with the sanction and approval of the Governor
and constituted the foundational policy governing the Special BTC Training
Scheme. Any action having the effect of substantially modifying the
conditions of such policy, particularly one affecting vested or accrued
benefits, could only have been undertaken through issuance of a fresh
Government order in accordance with the constitutional procedure
contemplated under Article 166 and the applicable Rules of Business. Such a
substantive alteration could not legally have been introduced through a
departmental corrigendum lacking corresponding approval.
70. The judgments relied upon by the respondents, including D. N. Ganguly
(supra), Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (supra), Indian Council for
Enviro-Legal Action (supra) and S. Nagaraj (supra) , do not support the
case of the respondents inasmuch as the principles laid down therein pertain
to correction of accidental, clerical, or inadvertent errors without affecting the
substantive nature of the original decision. The said judgments cannot be read

23
WRIA No. - 29926 of 2016
to confer authority upon the executive to alter substantive policy conditions
or extinguish accrued rights under the guise of issuing a corrigendum.
71. Moreover, the issue relating to entitlement of stipend under the Government
order dated 14.01.2004 already stands settled in the earlier rounds of
litigation extending up to the Hon’ble Apex Court, wherein the entitlement of
similarly situated trainees to stipend till the date of appointment stood
affirmed. The attempt made through the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 to
dilute the effect of the original policy and the judicial pronouncements
rendered thereupon cannot be sustained in law.
72. Accordingly, this Court holds that the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015, insofar
as it seeks to restrict payment of stipend only up to the training period, is not
a mere clarificatory or ministerial act but constitutes a substantive
modification of the original Government order dated 14.01.2004. In absence
of issuance of a valid Government order with due approval in accordance
with Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the said corrigendum cannot be
given legal effect. Consequently, the order dated 18.05.2016 rejecting the
claim of the petitioners on the basis of the aforesaid corrigendum is
unsustainable and liable to be quashed.
73. The writ petitions accordingly succeed and are allowed. The corrigendum
dated 14.05.2015, to the extent indicated above, and the consequential orders
under challenge in respective writ petitions, dated 18.05.2016, 09.06.2015
and 30.07.2015 are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to extend to
the petitioners the benefit of stipend in terms of the Government order dated
14.01.2004 read with the Government Order dated 20.02.2004, and to ensure
payment of the admissible amount expeditiously, preferably within a period
of four months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order
before the competent authority.
74. No order as to costs.
(Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.)
May 15, 2026
DS
Digitally signed by :-
DIGAMBER SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad