Shabaz Singh vs Director, Department Of Local Government, Punjab, Punjab Municipal Bhawan, Plot No.3, Room No.1, Ground Floor, Sector-35A, Chandigarh

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
112
CWP-35053-2026
Date of Decision : 27.10.2026
Shabaz Singh …..Petitioner
Versus
Director, Department of Local Government, Punjab
and others ....Respondents
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present : Mr. Vishal Sharma (Vasudeva), Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Rohit Ahuja, D.A.G., Punjab.
Mr. Parambir Singh, Advocate for respondent No.2.

NAMIT KUMAR, J.
1. The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari
for quashing the impugned order dated 02.06.2026 (Annexure P-13),
passed by respondent No.1, whereby the claim of the petitioner for
fixation of his seniority above respondent No.3 has been rejected, and
for setting aside/rectification of the promotion order dated 20.02.2014,
whereby respondent No.3, who is junior to the petitioner, was promoted
to the post of Leading Fireman as well as the subsequent seniority lists
placing respondent No.3 above the petitioner. Further, seeking issuance
of a writ of mandamus directing the official respondents to re-fix the
seniority of the petitioner above respondent No.3 in all cadres (Leading
Fireman, Sub Fire Officer, Fire Station Officer and Assistant Divisional
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CWP-35053-2026 2
Fire Officer) with all consequential benefits, i.e., deemed date of
promotion, seniority and pay fixation.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
petitioner joined the respondent-Department as Fireman on 11.03.1996
in Nagar Nigam, Amritsar, whereas respondent No.3 joined the
respondent-Department as a Fireman on 27.11.1997 in Nagar Council,
Kotkapura. The service particulars of the petitioner and respondent No.3
are as under :-
Particulars Petitioner
Respondent No.3
(Shabaz Singh)
(Jaswinder Singh)
Initial appointment as Fireman 11.03.1996 27.11.1997
Promotion as Leading Fireman 11.02.2016 20.02.2014
Sub Fire Officer (Ad-hoc) 03.01.2017 -
Sub Fire Officer (Regular) 03.12.2018 06.11.2018
Fire Station Officer 06.04.2021 05.01.2021
Assistant Divisional Fire Officer 15.01.2025 13.03.2023
3. He further submits that at his own request, respondent No.3
was transferred from Nagar Council, Kotkapura to Nagar Nigam, Moga
on 19.09.2008 as Fireman and in his transfer order, it was specifically
mentioned that he would not be entitled to the benefit of seniority as a
Fireman, as rendered in Nagar Council, Kotkapura and will join at the
tail end of the seniority list of Fireman maintained by Nagar Nigam,
Moga. However, the respondent-Department wrongly considered the
date of his initial appointment at Nagar Nigam, Kotkapura, i.e.,
27.11.1997, for determining his seniority and promoted him to the post
of Leading Fireman on 20.02.2014 at Municipal Council, Moga, prior to
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CWP-35053-2026 3
the petitioner. He further submits that as per provisional common
seniority list of Fireman/Leading Fireman dated 04.04.2013 (Annexure
P-3), the name of respondent No.3 was placed at Sr. No.169, whereas,
the petitioner was placed at Sr. No.103. However, vide letter dated
21.08.2018 (Annexure P-4), a separate seniority list of ‘Leading
Fireman’ was issued by the respondent-Department, wherein the
petitioner was placed at Sr. No.26, whereas respondent No.3 was placed
at Sr. No.11. The petitioner brought the aforesaid anomaly to the notice
of the respondent-Department from time to time, however, no action has
been taken in the matter till date. The petitioner also served a legal
notice dated 15.07.2023 upon the respondents, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 08.12.2025
(Annexure P-10) by annexing the legal notice dated 15.07.2023, but he
did not receive any response from the respondent-Department.
Consequently, the petitioner approached this Court by filing CWP
No.12168 of 2026 titled as ‘Shabaz Singh Vs. State of Punjab and
others’, which was disposed of by this Court, vide order dated
22.04.2026 (Annexure P-11), with a direction to the respondent-
department to treat the said writ petition as representation and consider
the claim of the petitioner and pass a speaking order, after affording him
an opportunity to be heard, within a period of 03 months from the date
of receipt of certified copy of the order. When the respondent-
Department failed to comply with the order dated 22.04.2026, passed by
this Court, the petitioner filed a contempt petition bearing COCP
No.4745 of 2026. However, before the said contempt petition could be
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CWP-35053-2026 4
listed, the respondent-Department passed the impugned speaking order
dated 02.06.2026 (Annexure P-13), wrongly rejecting the claim of the
petitioner. Consequently, the contempt petition was withdrawn by the
petitioner, vide order dated 30.09.2026. He further submits that in view
of the petitioner’s initial appointment as a Fireman, appropriate
directions be issued to the respondents to re-fix the petitioner’s seniority
above respondent No.3 in all subsequent cadres, namely, Leading
Fireman, Sub Fire Officer, Fire Station Officer and Assistant Divisional
Fire Officer, along with all consequential benefits.
4. On receipt of advance copy of the petition, learned State
counsel and learned counsel for respondent No.2 have put in appearance
and raised an objection with regard to delay and laches and stated that the
cause of action, if any, in favour of the petitioner arose in the year 2014,
when respondent No.3 was promoted to the post of Leading Fireman prior
to him, whereas the petitioner has approached this Court first time only in
the year 2026, i.e., after a period of 12 years which is highly belated and
no explanation has been given in the writ petition for such delay.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant documents.
6. The grievance of the petitioner is that on the basis of his
initial appointment as a Fireman, he is senior to respondent No.3.
However, the respondent-Department erroneously promoted respondent
No.3 to the post of Leading Fireman prior to the petitioner and,
thereafter, placed respondent No.3 above the petitioner in the seniority
list. Undoubtedly, the cause of action, if any, arose in favour of the
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CWP-35053-2026 5
petitioner on 20.02.2014, when respondent No.3 was promoted to the
post of Leading Fireman prior to the petitioner. However, the petitioner
approached this Court for the first time by filing CWP No.12168 of
2026 only in the year 2026, after an inordinate delay of 12 years. No
explanation whatsoever has been furnished in the petition to justify such
a huge delay. In the absence of any cogent explanation, the delay cannot
be treated as a mere procedural irregularity and a litigant who has
remained indolent and allowed his claim to become stale cannot as a
matter of right, seek interference of this Court. Such an unexplained and
prolonged delay renders the petitioner's claim liable to be rejected on
the ground of delay and latches.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhupal Singh Bhandari
Vs. Union of India and others : 2026 Lawfinder (SC) 456 , while
referring to the issue of delay and laches, had held as follows:-
“5. This Court time and again have reiterated that for
exercise of writ jurisdiction, the issue of limitation would
not be a ground to deny the legitimate benefit that may flow
from the right vested to an individual. However, such rights
if not invoked at appropriate time and at appropriate stage,
the extra-ordinary relief to be granted under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India would not be granted. In the
instant case, petitioner having superannuated in the year
2003 and till 2015, i.e., 05.05.2015, the date on which the
Government of India issued the order, did not raise his
little finger or in other words, he had gone to deep sleep. It
is only when said order came to be passed, he woke up
from his slumber and started submitting memorials and
representations to revive the dead cause of action. This
Court in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. Through Its
Chairman & Managing Director and Another v. K.
Thangappan and Another, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322
has held that mere making of representations to the
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CWP-35053-2026 6
authority cannot justify a belated approach. It has been
further held:
“10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a
number of cases that representations would not be
adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was
first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of
Mysore [(1967) 2 SCR 70 : AIR 1967 SC 993] . This
was reiterated in Rabindranath Bose case [(1970) 1
SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] by stating that there is a
limit to the time which can be considered reasonable
for making representations and if the Government
had turned down one representation the making of
another representation on similar lines will not
explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan
Samantaray [(1977) 3 SCC 396 : 1977 SCC (L&S)
424 : AIR 1976 SC 2617] making of repeated
representations was not regarded as satisfactory
explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had
been dismissed for delay alone. (See State of Orissa
v. Arun Kumar Patnaik [(1976) 3 SCC 579 : 1976
SCC (L&S) 468 : AIR 1976 SC 1639] also.)”
6. In the light of the afore-stated position of law, we are
not inclined to entertain the present petition directed
against the impugned order and same has been rightly
nipped at the bud on the ground of delay and laches.
Hence, Special Leave Petition stands dismissed.”
8. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of
Uttaranchal and another Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and
others, 2013(12) SCC 179 , while considering the issue regarding delay
and laches and referring to earlier judgments on the issue, opined that
repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. A stale or a
dead issue/dispute cannot be revived even if such a representation has
been decided either by the authority or got decided by getting a
direction from the court, as the issue regarding delay and laches is to be
decided with reference to original cause of action and not with reference
to any such order passed. Delay and laches on the part of a government
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CWP-35053-2026 7
servant may disentitle him from receiving the benefit that had been
granted to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not be
attracted as it is well established principle that the law favours those
who are alert and vigilant. Even equality has to be claimed at the right
juncture and not on expiry of reasonable time. Even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet it should be filed within a reasonable time.
Though it is not a strict rule, the courts can always interfere even
subsequent thereto, but relief to a person, who allows things to happen
and then approach the court and puts forward a stale claim and try to
unsettle settled matters, can certainly be refused on account of delay and
laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights is bound to suffer the
consequences. An employee who remains dormant like a ‘Rip Van
Winkle’ and awakens from his slumber at his own convenience,
cannot claim relief, as such conduct justifies denial on the ground of
delay and latches. Relevant paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment are
extracted below:
“13. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could
have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the
junior employee at the relevant time. They chose not to do
so for six years and the junior employee held the
promotional post for six years till regular promotion took
place. The submission of the learned counsel for the
respondents is that they had given representations at the
relevant time but the same fell in deaf ears. It is interesting
to note that when the regular selection took place, they
accepted the position solely because the seniority was
maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of the
tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that the cause
of action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior
employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983. In
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CWP-35053-2026 8
C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and another,
2008(4) SCT 604 : (2008) 10 SCC 115 , a two-Judge Bench
was dealing with the concept of representations and the
directions issued by the court or tribunal to consider the
representations and the challenge to the said rejection
thereafter. In that context, the court has expressed thus:-
“Every representation to the Government for relief,
may not be replied on merits. Representations
relating to matters which have become stale or
barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground
alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In
regard to representations unrelated to the
Department, the reply may be only to inform that the
matter did not concern the Department or to inform
the appropriate Department. Representations with
incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking
relevant particulars. The replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of
action or revive a stale or dead claim.”
14. xx xx xx xx
15. xx xx xx xx
16. xx xx xx xx
17. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Ghanshyam
Dass (2) and others, 2011(2) SCT 712 : (2011) 4 SCC 374 ,
a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated the principle stated in Jagdish Lal Vs. State of
Haryana, 1998(1) SCT 26: (1997) 6 SCC 538 and
proceeded to observe that as the respondents therein
preferred to sleep over their rights and approached the
tribunal in 1997, they would not get the benefit of the order
dated 07.07.1992.
18. In State of T. N. v. Seshachalam, 2007(4) SCT 472 :
(2007) 10 SCC 137 , this Court, testing the equality clause
on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of
service benefit, has ruled thus:-
“... filing of representations alone would not save
the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant
factor for a court of law to determine the question as
to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves
consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a
government servant may deprive him of the benefit
which had been given to others. Article 14 of the
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CWP-35053-2026 9
Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that
nature, be attracted as it is well known that law
leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.
19. xx xx xx xx
20 . In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
others, 2007(2) SCT 601 : (2007) 9 SCC 278 , the Court
has opined that though there is no period of limitation
provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a writ petition should
be filed within a reasonable time. In the said case the
respondents had filed the writ petition after seventeen
years and the court, as stated earlier, took note of the delay
and laches as relevant factors and set aside the order
passed by the High Court which had exercised the
discretionary jurisdiction.”
9. The aforesaid view was followed by Hon'ble the Supreme
Court in Union of India and others Vs. Chaman Rana : 2018(5) SCC
798 and Union of India and others Vs. C. Girija and others : 2019 (3)
SCALE 527 .
10. In a recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in
Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others : 2022 (3) SCT 346 ,
while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for counting of his ad hoc
service, for the purpose of seniority/pension and regularization in
service on completion of 02 years as per policy, held that the petition
filed by him suffered from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in
approaching the High Court. In the said judgment, it has been held as
under:-
“10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that
services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f.
01.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority
position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining
the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to
assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it
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CWP-35053-2026 10
rather appears that institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a
stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC
278 , observed:
“15. There is another aspect of the matter which
cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a
Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate
their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed
herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at
the earliest possible opportunity. They did not
implead themselves as parties even in the reference
made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is
not their case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after the cut-
off date have been granted the said scale of pay.
After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions
could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the Court after a long time. Delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K.
Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman,
U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr.
[2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing
Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and
Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322] ”
11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs. State of
Haryana & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538 , it was held by the
Supreme Court:
“That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the
delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. It is not
necessary to reiterate all catena of precedents in this
behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellant kept
sleeping over their rights for long and elected to
wake up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal
Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios……...............
Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to re-
do the seniority had by them in various
cadres/grades though in the same services according
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CWP-35053-2026 11
to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable to
judicial review at this belated stage….”
12. In the wake of the position as sketched out above, we
are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and
judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. The appeal
being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”
11. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Prem Nath Vs.
State of Punjab : 2018(2) SCT 687 , while rejecting the claim of
additional increments on acquisition of higher qualifications has held as
under:-
“3. It is the case set up on behalf of the petitioners that
they had all been appointed before 19.02.1979 and had
even improved/acquired higher qualifications before
19.02.1979 and as such there would be no difference
between the employees working with the Punjab
Government, holding corresponding post and the
employees like the petitioners who have worked for Punjab
Privately Managed Recognised Aided Schools. It is also
the assertion made by counsel representing the petitioners
that their claim would be covered in terms of decision
dated 02.07.2013 rendered by this Court in a bunch of writ
petitions including CWP No.8083 of 1989 titled as Radha
Krishan Narang and others vs. State of Punjab and
others .
4. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at length,
this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the
petitioners would not require any consideration on merits
and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole
ground of delay and laches.
5. Placed on record and appended at Annexure P-1 are
the particulars of the petitioners. The tabulation at
Annexure P-1 would show that all the petitioners stand
retired on various dates between the years 1995 to 2012.
Out of 32 petitioners in all, 22 petitioners superannuated
more than 10 years back.
6. There is no justification coming forth as regards the
inordinate delay in having approached the Writ Court.
There is also no explanation put forth by the petitioners as
to why the claim raised in the instant petition was not
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CWP-35053-2026 12
agitated by the petitioners while they were in service. The
entire thrust of the submissions advanced by counsel is that
similarly situated employees had approached this Court
and have been granted relief.
7. The issue regarding delay in invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was considered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Chairman , U.P. Jal Nigam and another
v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2007(1) SCT 224 :
(2006)11 SCC 464 . In such case, certain employees raised
the issue that they were not liable to be retired at the age of
58 years but should be permitted to continue in service till
they attain the age of 60 years. Such employees were still
in service when the writ petitions were filed. The writ
petitions were ultimately allowed. Placing reliance upon
such judgment, some of the employees, who had already
superannuated, filed writ petitions seeking the same
benefit. Even such petitions were allowed by the High
Court in terms of following the earlier judgment. The
judgment of the High Court was challenged before the
Apex Court and wherein while referring to earlier
judgments in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989)2
SCC 356; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) S.C.T.
26 : (1997)6 SCC 538 and Government of West Bengal v.
Tarun K. Roy, 2004(1) SCT 78 : (2004)1 SCC 347 , it was
opined that persons who approached the Court at a
belated stage placing reliance upon the order passed in
some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary
relief on the ground of delay and laches. The relevant
observations made by the Supreme Court are contained in
Paras 5, 6 and 16 of the judgment and are extracted here
under:-
“5. So far as the principal issue is concerned, that
has been settled by this court. Therefore, there is no
quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only
question is grant of relief to such other persons who
were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge
their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ
petitions after the judgment of this court in
Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik,
2006(1) SCT 541 : (2005) 13 SCC 300 . Whether
they are entitled to same relief or not? Therefore, a
serious question that arises for consideration is
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CWP-35053-2026 13
whether the employees who did not wake up to
challenge their retirement and accepted the same,
collected their post-retirement benefits, can such
persons be given the relief in the light of the
subsequent decision delivered by this court?
6. The question of delay and laches has been
examined by this court in a series of decisions and
laches and delay has been considered to be an
important factor in exercise of the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a
person who is not vigilant of his rights and
acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be
heard after a couple of years on the ground that
same relief should be granted to him as was granted
to person similarly situated who was vigilant about
his rights and challenged his retirement which was
said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A
chart has been supplied to us in which it has been
pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by
the employees of the Nigam before their retirement
wherein their retirement was somewhere between
30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were
filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed.
They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate
of writ petitions followed in which employees who
retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006
much after their retirement. Whether such persons
should be granted the same relief or not?
xx xx xx
16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if
similar relief is to be given to the persons who have
not approached the court that will unnecessarily
overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will
completely collapse with the liability of payment to
these persons in terms of two years' salary and
increased benefit of pension and other consequential
benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any
relief to the persons who have approached the court
after their retirement. Only those persons who have
filed the writ petitions when they were in service or
who have obtained interim order for their
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CWP-35053-2026 14
retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand
to benefit and not others.
(Emphasis Supplied).”
8. The issue of delay was also dealt with by this Court
in Tarsem Pal vs. Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and others, 2013 (3)SLR 314 . In the case of
Tarsem Pal(supra), the petitioner was serving as a Clerk
with the respondent-Corporation and had retired on
31.03.2005. Claim in the writ petition was to grant to him
the benefit of proficiency set up in the pay scale on
completion of 23 years of service from the due date as per
policy of the Corporation. During the service career, he
had not agitated the claim for increments. For the first
time, such claim had been made on 28.02.2005 i.e. just one
month prior to superannuation. While non-suiting the
petitioner on account of delay and laches it was held as
follows:-
“11. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been
clearly laid down that discretionary relief in a writ
jurisdiction is available to a party who is alive of
his rights and enforces the same in court within
reasonable time. The judgment in another case does
not give a cause of action to file a writ petition at a
belated stage seeking the same relief. Such petitions
can be dismissed on account of delay and laches.
As has already been noticed above in the present
case as well, the petitioner joined service in the
year 1965 and retired in the year 2005, but raised
the issue regarding benefit of proficiency step up in
the pay scale on completion of 23 years of service
from the due date more than five years after his
retirement referring to a judgment of this court and
filed the petition claiming the same relief.
12. The petitioner retired from service on
31.3.2005 and the claim pertaining to the benefit of
proficiency step up, which may be admissible to the
petitioner during his service career, was sought to be
raised more than five years after his retirement, the
claim made at such a late stage deserves to be
dismissed on account of delay and laches only. The
petitioner could raise a grievance about the pay
scales admissible to him or the last pay drawn by
him within a reasonable time after his retirement. He
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CWP-35053-2026 15
cannot be permitted to raise the same at any time on
the plea that the same is recurring cause of action.
13. Considering the enunciation of law, as
referred to above, in my opinion, the petitioner
herein is not entitled to the relief prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed merely on account
of delay and laches.”
9. At this stage, counsel appearing for the petitioners
would make an attempt to overcome the obstacle of delay
by placing reliance upon a Full Bench Judgment of this
Court in Saroj Kumar vs. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT
664 . Counsel would argue that as per dictum laid down in
Saroj Kumar's case(supra), matters of pay fixation involve
a recurring cause of action and as such, writ petitions for
such claim cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches and the Court at the most, may restrict the arrears
upto 38 months from the date of filing of the petition and
disallow the arrears for the period for which even a suit
had become time barred.
10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in
Saroj Kumar's case, is wholly misplaced. The observations
and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar's case, were in the light
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta vs.
Union of India and others, 1996(1) SCT 8 : 1995(4) RSJ
502 . In M.R. Gupta's case(supra), it had been
categorically held that so long as an employee “is in
service” a fresh cause of action arises every month when
he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong
calculation made contrary to rules. It was further held that
the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a
proper pay fixation “is a right which subsists during the
entire tenure of service”.
11. In the present case, however the petitioners choose
not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much
subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken
up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that
may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated
employees .
12. Considering the dictum of law as laid down in
Chariman, U.P. Jal Nigam's case (supra), the petitioners
herein are not entitled to any relief as prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of
delay and laches .
VINOD KOTHIYAL
2026.11.03 16:56
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CWP-35053-2026 16
13. Ordered accordingly.”
12. Subsequently, a Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble the
Supreme Court in Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance
Corporation of India and others Vs. Shree Lal Meena : (2019) 4 SCC
479 , considering the principle of delay and laches, opined as under:-
“36. We may also find that the appellant remained silent
for years together and that this Court, taking a particular
view subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India
Assurance Company Limited, (2011)12 SCC 197 would not
entitle stale claims to be raised on this behalf, like that of
the appellant. In fact the appellant slept over the matter for
almost a little over two years even after the pronouncement
of the judgment.
37. Thus, the endeavour of the appellant, to approach
this Copurt seeking the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a
misadventure, which is liable to be rejected, and the appeal
is dismissed.”
13. In the present case, the petitioner’s grievance relates to the
promotion of respondent No.3 to the post of Leading Fireman on
20.02.2014 and the subsequent placement of respondent No.3 above the
petitioner in the seniority list. Therefore, the petitioner was aware of the
alleged infringement of his rights at the relevant time. However, he has
approached this Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay of 12
years from the date on which respondent No. 3 was promoted to the post
of Leading Fireman, i.e., on 20.02.2014. Although, learned counsel for
the petitioner has contended that the petitioner had been continuously
raising the issue of seniority with the respondent-Department since 2014
by submitting representations, however, no such document has been
annexed to the instant petition to substantiate this assertion and mere
submission of representations also does not, by itself, revive a stale
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CWP-35053-2026 17
claim or extend the period of limitation, particularly when the original
cause of action had arisen in 2014. Further, the legal notice was served
by the petitioner upon the respondents only on 15.07.2023, i.e., after a
lapse of more than 09 years after the cause of action first arose in favour
of the petitioner and no plausible explanation has been furnished by the
petitioner for not raising his grievance before the competent authority or
seeking appropriate legal remedy within a reasonable time.
14. Furthermore, after being promoted to the post of Leading
Fireman in 2016, the petitioner received three further promotions to the
posts of Sub Fire Officer, Fire Station Officer and Assistant Divisional
Fire Officer, without raising any objection regarding his seniority.
Accordingly, the petitioner did not challenge the promotion of
respondent No.3 when it was granted in 2014, nor did he approach the
Court immediately upon the issuance of seniority list of Leading
Fireman, vide letter dated 21.08.2018. The petitioner, therefore, allowed
the promotional and seniority arrangements to continue for several
years, without challenge and without seeking judicial intervention. It
was only in 2026, when the petitioner for the first time approached this
Court by filing CWP-12168-2026. But, the order of Court, would not, in
itself, confer a fresh cause of action to the petitioner to reopen the
original dispute relating to year 2014 and the further order dated
02.06.2026, rejecting the petitioner's claim, would not efface the delay
in challenging the seniority of respondent No.3. Therefore, granting of
such relief at this belated stage would have the potential to disturb the
settled seniority and promotional positions of affected employees and
VINOD KOTHIYAL
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CWP-35053-2026 18
the rights that have accrued over the years. Such belated invocation of
the writ jurisdiction, without furnishing any satisfactory explanation for
the prolonged silence, defeats the very object of equitable relief and
disentitles the petitioner from any discretionary relief under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
15. In view of the abovesaid discussion and the settled legal
position, the instant petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed
with costs of Rs.10,000/- to be deposited with High Court Lawyers
Welfare Fund within a period of two months from today, failing which,
the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, is directed to recover the same as
arrears of land revenue.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
27.10.2026 JUDGE
kothiyal
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
VINOD KOTHIYAL
2026.11.03 16:56
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authenticity of this document