SUGANA FOODS PRIVATE LIMITED vs STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

Court
Uttarakhand High Court

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Reserved Judgment

Approved For Reporting

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL




THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHASH UPADHYAY


Reserved on : 16.09.2026
Delivered on : 30.09.2026


WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 244 OF 2025


Ashirwad Agro Industries & another …… Petitioners

Versus

State of Uttarakhand & others …… Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 245 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 246 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 247 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 248 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 250 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 251 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 263 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 264 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 266 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 267 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 268 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 269 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 318 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 319 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 320 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 322 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 323 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 326 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 327 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 328 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 329 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 332 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 333 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 334 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 335 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 336 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 420 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 439 OF 2025
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WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 515 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 516 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 517 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 518 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 519 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 520 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 521 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 522 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 523 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 524 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 525 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 526 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 135 OF 2026



Counsel for the petitioners : Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh (through
VC) and Mr. Prem Prakash Singh
Phartiyal, learned counsel for
petitioners in WPMB Nos. 244, 245,
246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 263, 264,
266, 267, 268, 269, 332, 333, 334,
335, 336, 439, 516, 517, 518, 519,
520, 521, 522, 523, 524 & 525 of
2025

: Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel for
petitioners in WPMB Nos. 318, 319,
320, 322, 326 & 526 of 2025

: Mr. Nikhil Singhal, learned counsel
for petitioners in WPMB Nos. 323,
327, 328 & 329 of 2025

: Mr. Jitendra Chaudhary, Mr.
Rajyavardhan Chaudhary, Mr. Anuj
Sharma and Mr. Hardik Sah, learned
counsel for petitioner in WPMB No.
420 of 2025

: Mr. Rajyavardhan Chaudhary, Mr.
Anuj Sharma and Mr. Hardik Sah,
learned counsel for petitioner in
WPMB No. 515 of 2025

: Mr. Rajeev Bhatt, learned counsel for
petitioner in WPMB No. 135 of 2026


Counsel for the respondents : Mr. Ganesh Dutt Kandpal, learned
Additional Advocate General with Mr.
B.P.S. Mer, learned Standing
Counsel and Mr. M.S. Bisht, learned
Brief Holder for the State

: Mr. A.S. Rawat, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Mr. Vipul
Sharma & Mr. Kartikeya Naithani,
learned counsel for respondent Nos.
2 & 3 in WPMB Nos. 244, 245, 246,
247, 248, 250, 251, 263, 264, 266,
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267, 268, 269, 332, 333, 334, 335,
336, 439, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520,
521, 522, 523, 524, 525 of 2025 &
WPMB No. 135 of 2026

: Mr. A.S. Rawat, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Mr. N.S. Pundir,
learned counsel for respondent Nos.
2 & 3 in WPMB Nos. 318, 319, 320,
322, 323, 326, 327, 328, 329 & 526
of 2025

: Ms. Monika Pant, learned counsel for
private respondents in WPMB Nos.
420 and 515 of 2025



The Court made the following:
JUDGMENT: ( per Hon’ble Chief Justice Sri Manoj Kumar Gupta )


1) The petitioners have challenged the
constitutional validity of the first proviso to Section
27(c)(v) of the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce
Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act 2011 (for
short ‘the Act’), as well as the consequential notices
demanding development cess.
2) The petitioners have manufacturing units in
Uttarakhand. They bring notified agricultural produce
such as paddy, wheat, maize, legumes, wood etc. from
outside the State for use in manufacturing or processing
different products, such as atta, suji, maida, rice, corn
starch liquor, gluten, paper, boards, laminates, plywood
etc. Their case is that the agricultural produce is brought
into Uttarakhand for processing / manufacturing and not
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for sale or any commercial transaction within the market
area.
3) The impugned notices, however, proceed on the
basis that when specified agricultural produce is brought
into the market area from outside Uttarakhand, for
processing or manufacturing, even after payment of
market fee and/or development cess into the State, such
arrival constitutes ‘Other Secondary Arrival’ within the
meaning of the first proviso to Section 27(c)(v), and is
therefore subject to development cess.
4) According to the petitioners, the impugned
notices thus fasten liability to development cess solely on
the event of bringing the agricultural produce from outside
the State into the market area for processing or
manufacturing, without there being any sale or purchase
within the market area.
5) The principal submission of the petitioners is
that the first proviso to Section 27(c)(v) is substantially
similar, in its effect, to Section 27(c)(iii), which was struck
down by the Supreme Court in M/s Gujarat Ambuja
Exports Ltd. Vs State of Uttarakhand, (2016) 3 SCC 601 .
It is contended that both provisions impose levy on
agricultural produce brought from outside Uttarakhand for
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processing or manufacturing and, therefore, the ratio in
Gujarat Ambuja applies to the impugned proviso as well.
M/s ITC Vs State of
Reliance is also placed upon
Karnataka, AIR 2005 Karnataka 330 APMC
and
Yashwantpura Vs Selva Foods, (2022) 3 SCC 313
to
contend that mere import or bringing of agricultural
produce into a market area for processing or
manufacturing does not attract market fee in absence of
the taxable event namely, sale or purchase taking place
within the limits of the market area of the State.
6) The petitioners also invoke the settled principles
applicable to fiscal statutes that the charging provision
must be clear and unambiguous and that a fiscal liability
must be determined according to the language employed
by the legislature and cannot be created merely on the
basis of the perceived object or spirit of the enactment.
For these propositions, reliance is placed, inter alia , upon
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs Pilibhit Pantnagar beej
Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 391; Orient Paper & Industries Ltd.
Vs State of M.P. & others, (2006) 12 SCC 468; A.V.
Fernadez Vs The State of Kerala, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 23
and State of Rajasthan & others Vs Basant Agrotech
(India) Ltd ., (2013) 15 SCC 1 .
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7) The respondents defend the validity of the
impugned provision and the consequential demand of
development cess. Their submission, in substance, are as
follows :
7(i) The Act was enacted for regulation and
development of agricultural produce markets,
establishment of a modern marketing system, promotion
of agricultural processing and export, and supervision and
control of markets. According to the respondents, the
State legislature possesses legislative competence under,
inter alia , Entries 28 and 66 of List II and under Entry 24
subject to Entries 7 and 52 of List I and also Entries 26
and 27 of List I subject to Entry 33 of List III. It is
submitted that various clauses of Section 27(c) constitute
separate and independent charging provisions operating in
different contingencies. Section 27(c)(ii) provides for
market fee and development cess on transactions of sale,
whereas clauses (iii), (iv) and (v) deal with different
situations concerning agricultural produce brought into or
moved within a market area. Thus, according to the
respondents, clause (v) and its proviso have to be
considered independently of clause (iii).
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7(ii) It is pointed out that initially, Section 27(iii) did
not contain the word ‘manufacture’. Certain demands
against manufacturing units were consequently set aside.
Thereafter, by amendment, the word ‘manufacture’ was
incorporated in Section 27(c)(iii) and Section 27(c)(v) was
also introduced as a separate charging provision. The
respondents rely upon this legislative history to contend
that the amended provisions were intended to cover
distinct situations.
7(iii) The amended provisions were challenged before
this Court. The Division Bench judgment in Maa Uma Agri
Food (P) Ltd. Vs State of Uttarakhand, 2014 SCC OnLine
Utt 2423 upheld their validity.
7(iv) The principal defence of the respondents is that
Gujarat Ambuja
the decision of the Supreme Court in
does not invalidate the first proviso to Section 27(c)(v).
According to them, the Supreme Court struck down
Section 27(c)(iii) on the ground of legislative competence
but did not interfere with Section 27(c)(v) or its first
proviso. Consequently, it is contended that the earlier
Division Bench judgment upholding clause (v) subject to
its clarification regarding market fee continues to operate.
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7(v) On the above basis, it is further contended that
since the first proviso to Section 27(c)(v) had formed part
of the earlier challenge and was not struck down by the
Supreme Court its validity cannot now be reopened by
another Division Bench.
7(vi) The respondents seek to distinguish the
Gujarat
impugned levy from the levy invalidated in
Ambuja
. Their case is that under the first proviso to
Section 27(c)(v) only development cess and not market
fee is leviable. The development cess is stated to be
connected with the maintenance and development of
facilities within the market area.
7(vii) According to the respondents, agricultural
produce brought into the market area uses infrastructure
and facilities developed and maintained by the market
committee including roads, bridges and other market
facilities. Manufacturing units as well as producers
bringing agricultural produce into the market area derive
the benefit of such facilities. Development cess is
therefore sought to be justified as a charge towards their
maintenance and development rather than merely as a
tax upon import or manufacture.
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8) Before examining the rival submissions, it would
be apposite to notice the litigation and legislative history
of the provisions in question, particularly since the
controversy has travelled through more than one round of
litigation culminating in the judgment of the Supreme
Gujarat Ambuja
Court in .
9) When the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce
Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011 came
into force, Section 27(c)(iii), as it then stood, provided for
levy of market fee and development cess upon agricultural
produce reaching any market area of the State from
another State or from outside the country for sale,
storage, processing or transaction. The provision,
however, did not expressly include agricultural produce
brought into market for manufacturing . The relevant part
of Section 27(c)(iii) was as follows :
“27. A Committee shall, for the purposes of this
Act, have the following power; namely –
…
(c)(i) to levy such fees, as may be prescribed for the
issue or renewal of licenses; and
…
(iii) any such agricultural produce which reaches any
Market Area of the State for sale, storage, processing or
transaction from any other State or out of Country for the
first time it shall be registered as “First Arrival” and on
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such produce, Market fee and Development cess shall be
payable…”

10) Demands raised against manufacturing units in
respect of agricultural produce brought from outside the
State were challenged by the manufacturers by filing
various writ petitions before this Court on the ground that
no market fee and/or development cess was leviable on
their agricultural produce since there was no sale or
purchase of such produce in the designated market area.
In M/s BST Textile Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vs State of
Uttarakhand and another, Writ Petition No. 375 of 2012 ,
decided on 11.01.2013, this Court held that market
fee/development cess could not be levied on agricultural
produce brought into the market area for the purpose of
manufacturing, since the provision, as it then stood,
contemplated sale, storage, processing and transaction
but not manufacture.
11) The Legislature thereafter amended Section
27(c)(iii) by expressly incorporating ‘manufacturing’ and
simultaneously introduced Section 27(c)(v), with
retrospective effect. The first proviso to Section 27(c)(v),
with which we are presently concerned, provided, in
substance, that where agricultural produce was brought
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into a market area from outside Uttarakhand for
processing or manufacturing, after payment of market fee
and/or development cess in the originating State, such
arrival would be treated as ‘Other Secondary Arrival’ on
which, though no market fee would be leviable,
development cess would, nevertheless, be payable. The
amended provision is as follows :
“27. A Committee shall, for the purposes of this
Act, have the following power; namely –
…
(c) (i) to levy such fees, as may be prescribed for the
issue or renewal of licenses; and
…
(iii) any such agricultural produce which arrives in any
Market Area of the State for sale, storage, processing,
manufacturing, transaction or other commercial purposes
from any other State or out of Country for the first time it
shall be registered as “Primary Arrival” and on such
produce, Market fee and Development cess shall be
payable.”
(v) any agricultural produce, which is brought to any
Market area from out side Uttarakhand State for sale,
storage, transaction or commercial purpose after paying
Market fee and/or Development cess than Market fees
and Development cess shall be leviable on such produce :
Provided that brought to Market area from outside
Uttarakhand State for processing or manufacturing
purpose after paying Market fee and/or Development
cess from concerning State than it shall be called as
“Other Secondary Arrival” and no Market fee shall be
leviable however due Development cess shall be leviable.
Provided further that the market fee and
development cess shall not be payable on the sale of
flowers in bulk.”

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12) Relying on the amended provision, once again
demands were raised for payment of market fee and/or
development cess under Section 27(c)(iii) and Section
27(c)(v) of the Act from various manufacturers. It was
M/s Century Pulp
challenged before this Court in case of
and Paper Vs State of Uttarakhand and another, with
other connected cases, Writ Petition No. 847 of 2013 . A
learned Single Judge by judgment dated 18.04.2013
upheld the demand on the ground that the lacuna which
existed earlier in the relevant provision of the Act was
cured by enactment of the Uttarakhand Agricultural
Produce Marketing (Development & Regulation)
(Amendment) Act, 2012 and therefore the reasoning on
which the demand earlier made was quashed in M/s BST
Textile Mills Pvt. Ltd.
no longer existed. The judgment of
learned Single Judge was challenged before Division
Maa Uma Agri Food Pvt. Ltd. Vs State of
Bench in
Uttarakhand, 2014 SCC OnLine Utt 2423
. The Division
Bench upheld the amended provisions. Its reasoning,
material for the present controversy was that agricultural
produce brought into the market area for manufacturing
separable transaction
constituted a , capable of being
independently regulated and subjected to market fee/
cess in exercise of the legislative power under Entry 28
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Maa Uma
read with Entry 66 of List II. The judgment in
was carried to the Supreme Court and the controversy
Gujarat Ambuja Exports Ltd. and
came to be decided in
another Vs State of Uttarakhand and others, (2016) 3
SCC 601 . Significantly, the Supreme Court noticed and
extracted the aforesaid reasoning of the Division Bench
and specifically examined the legislative competence of
the State of impose the levy.
13) Upon examining the scheme, object and
constitutional setting of the enactment, the Supreme
Court did not accept the conclusion reached by the
Division Bench in so far as Section 27(c)(iii) was
concerned. It held that the primary object of market
legislation is regulation of transactions in agricultural
produce and protection of the producer in the buyer-seller
relationship. Section 27(c)(iii), in so far as it sought to
impose market fee and development cess upon
agricultural produce merely brought from outside the
State into the market area for manufacturing without any
sale or purchase within the market area, travelled beyond
the permissive field of legislation. Section 27(c)(iii) was
accordingly struck down for want of legislative
competence.
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14) It is equally important to note that while the
Supreme Court struck down 27(c)(iii) and dealt separately
with Section 27(c)(iv), it did not expressly pronounce
upon or strike down Section 27(c)(v) or its proviso. It is
principally on this circumstance that the respondents base
their demand to the development cess.
15) Here it is also relevant to note that the State
also filed a review application before the Supreme Court
Gujarat Ambuja
for review of its judgment in but it was
rejected by the Supreme Court by order dated
29.03.2016.
Gujarat Ambuja
16) The aftermath of also
generated litigation concerning refund of the market fee
and development cess already collected. In Shyam Oil
and Rice mills Vs State of Uttarakhand & another, along
with connected matters, Writ Petition (M/S) No. 3252 of
2016 , this Court permitted the manufacturers to make
representations for refund. The Director, Mandi Parishad
vide its order dated 10.02.2017 dismissed the
representation for refund. This once again led to filing of
various writ petitions before this Court challenging the
order of the Director, Mandi Parishad, rejecting the
representations. Ultimately, this Court by judgment dated
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Sheel Chand Flour Mills
16.05.2017, passed in case of
Pvt. Ltd. and another Vs State of Uttarakhand and
others, along with connected matters, Writ Petition
(M/S) No. 2440 of 2016 , held that once the mandi fee
was held to be unconstitutional and not validly imposed,
the amount in the normal course was liable to be
refunded. The relevant observation made by this Court is
extracted below :
“14. Article 265 of the Constitution of India
stipulates that no tax shall be levied or collected except
by the authority of law. Since the Supreme Court, in
“ M/s Ambuja Exports Ltd. & another vs. State of
Uttarakhand & others ”, 2016 (3) SCC 601, had held
that Section 27(3), whereby mandi fees and
development cess were levied, was unconstitutional,
levy of the said amount by the Mandi Samitis is not
authorized by law and is illegal. Once the levy is
declared illegal by the Supreme Court, collection of fees
and cess, under the said illegal levy, would also be
illegal; and, consequently, all those, from whom mandi
fees and development cess was illegally collected,
would be entitled to claim refund of the said amount;
and such a benefit of refund cannot be confined only to
those who were parties before the Supreme Court in
“ M/s Ambuja Exports Ltd. & another vs. State of
Uttarakhand & others ”. The mere fact that the
Supreme Court has not, specifically, directed refund of
the amount would not disable the respondent-writ
petitioner from claiming refund, for the State cannot be
permitted to retain the amount, collected by them
under an unauthorized and illegal levy; and the said
amount would be required to be refunded to those from
whom such amounts were levied and collected.”
(emphasis supplied)
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
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17) The principal question which arises for
consideration is whether the first proviso to Section
27(c)(v) of the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce
Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011, in so
far as it provides for levy of development cess on
agricultural produce brought from outside the State for
manufacturing or processing is within the legislative

competence of the State Legislature.
18) As already noticed, the Division Bench of this
Maa Uma Agro Foods Private Limited Vs State of
Court in
Uttarakhand, 2014 SCC OnLine Utt 2423 , while
considering the validity of the amended provisions, had
upheld the competence of the State Legislature to levy
market fee and development cess on agricultural produce
brought into the market area for manufacture. The
reasoning proceeded on the basis that the act of bringing
agricultural produce into the market area, even when it
was brought for manufacture, constituted a separable
transaction which could independently be regulated and
subjected to levy under Entry 28 read with Entry 66 of List
II of the Seventh Schedule. The Division Bench observed:
“…The transaction of bringing the agricultural
produce, be it for the purpose of manufacture inter alia ,
is what attracts the levy of market fee/cess. We would
think that this is a separable transaction, which is well
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within the province of the State Legislature and the
powers available to it in Entry 28, read with Entry 66, of
List II. Entry 28 of List II provides for “markets”. The
Entries are fields of legislation. It is elementary that
widest and most liberal interpretation must be placed on
the Entries. An interpretation may not be placed, which
will deprive the competent Legislature of the full
legislative powers it enjoys.”

19) The Supreme Court in Gajarat Ambuja , in
paragraph 10, had extracted the aforesaid observations
from the Division Bench judgment and thereafter
proceeded to frame a specific issue as to whether the
State Government had the legislative competence to enact
the impugned provisions.
20) The Supreme Court, however, did not accept
the findings of the Division Bench in Maa Uma . The
Supreme Court examined the scheme and object of the
2011 Act and observed that the primary object of market
legislation is to ensure a fair return to the producer and
that such legislation is essentially intended to govern the
buyer-seller relationship. It then found that Section
27(c)(iii) travelled beyond that scheme in so far as it
sought to levy market fee and development cess upon
units which merely brought agricultural produce from
outside the State into the market area for carrying out
manufacturing without there being any sale or purchase of
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the produce within the market area. In this regard it has
been observed as follows :
“33. The primary object, thus, of any market
legislation is to ensure that the producer of the
agricultural produce gets a fair return. It is also
essentially meant to govern the “buyer-seller”
relationship. In this context, an examination of Section
27(c)(iii) would show that it is against the scheme of the
Act, as it seeks to levy market fee and development cess
even on those units which merely bring agricultural
produce from outside the State into the market area for
carrying out manufacturing, in that there is no sale or
purchase of the product within the market area per se.”


21) The Supreme Court thereafter specifically
examined the question of legislative competence with
reference to Entry 52 of List I and Entry 28 of List II. In
doing so, the Supreme Court referred to Belsund Sugar
Co. Ltd. Vs State of Bihar, (1999) 9 SCC 620 , and the
Constitution Bench decision in ITC Ltd. Vs Agricultural
Produce Market Committee, (2002) 9 SCC 232 , including
the scope of Entry 28. While recognizing that Entry 28
constitutes an independent field of State Legislation
relating to “markets and fairs”, the Court nevertheless
concluded that the State Legislature lacked competence to
levy market fee upon agricultural produce brought into the
market area not for sale, but for manufacturing or further
processing. The relevant discussion is as follows :
“34. Further, it is important to examine the legislative
competence of the State Legislature to enact the
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particular provision. The two relevant entries in play
here are Entry 52 of List I and Entry 28 of List II.
Entry 28 of List II pertains to Markets and Fairs, while
Entry 52 of List I pertains to Industry. In Belsund
Sugar Co. Ltd v. State of Bihar, (1999) 9 SCC 620 , it
was held, inter alia , as under:

“16. It becomes at once clear that if
location of markets and fairs simpliciter and the
management and maintenance thereof are only
contemplated by the Market Act, then they would
fall squarely within the topic of legislative power
envisaged by List II Entry 28. However, the
Market Act, as we will presently show, deals with
supply and distribution of goods as well as trade
and commerce therein as it seeks to regulate the
sale and purchase of agricultural produce to be
carried on in the specified markets under the
Act. To that extent the provisions of List III Entry
33 override the legislative powers of the State
Legislature in connection with legislations dealing
with trade and commerce in, and the production,
supply and distribution of goods. Once we turn to
Entry 33 of the Concurrent List, we find that on
the topic of trade and commerce in, and the
production, supply and distribution of, goods
enumerated therein at Sub- clause (b), we find
listed items of foodstuffs, including edible
oilseeds and oils.”

35. The scope of the term ‘Industry’ for the
purpose of List I Entry 52 was examined at length by
Ruma Pal, J. in her concurring opinion in the
constitution bench decision of ITC Ltd. vs. Agricultural
Produce Market Committee, (2002) 9 SCC 232 ,
wherein it was held as under:
“126. To sum up: the word 'Industry' for
the purposes of List I Entry 52 has been firmly
confined by Tika Ramji vs. State of U.P., AIR
1956 SC 676 to the process of manufacture or
production only. Subsequent decisions including
those of other Constitution Benches have re-
affirmed that Tika Ramji's case authoritatively
defined the word 'industry'- to mean the process
of manufacture or production and that it does
not include the raw materials used in the
industry or the distribution of the products of the
industry. Given the constitutional framework,
and the weight of judicial authority it is not
possible to accept an argument canvassing a
wider meaning of the word 'industry'. Whatever
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the word may mean in any other context, it must
be understood in the Constitutional context as
meaning 'manufacture or production'.
127. Applying the negative test as evolved
in Tika Ramji in this case it would follow that the
word 'industry' in List II Entry 24 and
consequently List I Entry 52 does not and cannot
be read to include List II Entries 28 and 66 which
have been expressly marked out as fields within
the State's exclusive legislative powers. As noted
earlier Entry 28 deals with markets and fairs and
Entry 66 with the right to levy fees in respect of,
in the present context, markets and fairs. List I
Entry 52 does not override Entry 28 in List II nor
has Entry 28 in List II been made subject to
Entry 52 unlike List II Entry 24. This Court in
Belsund Sugar (supra) has also accepted the
argument that List II Entry 28 operated on its
own and cannot be affected by any legislation
pertaining to industry as found in List I Entry 52.
128. If 'industry' does not include 'markets
and fairs' it is important to define what markets
and fairs connote. 'Market' may strictly be
defined as ‘the meeting or congregating together
of people for the purchase and sale of provisions
or livestock, publicly exposed, at a fixed time
and place’.
……At common law, fairs and markets were
also franchises or rights to hold a concourse of
buyers and sellers to dispose of the commodities
in respect of which the franchise is given. This
included the right to levy a toll or sum payable
by the buyer upon sales of articles in a market.
The sense in which the words has been used in
Entry 28 appears to cover not only such right but
the market place itself including the ‘concourse
of buyers and sellers' and the regulation of all
these.” (emphasis laid by this Court)
36. A perusal of the abovementioned judgments
makes it clear that List I Entry 52 governs the process
of manufacture and production. Therefore, in the
instant case, the State Legislature did not have the
competence to enact the impugned provisions which
sought to levy market fee and development cess even
on those agricultural produce which were not being
brought into the market for the purpose of sale, but
for the purpose of manufacture or further processing.
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Since the State Legislature was not competent to
enact the impugned provision of Section 27(c)(iii) of
the Act, the same is liable to be struck down as the
same was enacted by the State Legislature without
having the legislative competence to do so.”
(emphasis supplied)

22) The Supreme Court ultimately set aside the
judgment of this Court in Maa Uma and struck down
clause (iii) of Section 27(c). Section 27(c)(iv), however,
was specifically upheld.
23) The effect of the decision on the reasoning of
the Division Bench in Maa Uma is significant. The
proposition that bringing agricultural produce into a
market area for manufacture constitutes, by itself, a
separable transaction capable of sustaining a levy under
Entry 28 read with Entry 66 of List II cannot survive in so
far as Section 27(c)(iii) is concerned. It was on that very
basis that the levy under the said provision has been
sustained by the Division Bench in Maa Uma , whereas the
Supreme Court held that the State Legislature lacked
competence to impose market fee and development cess
upon agricultural produce brought into the market area
not for sale but merely for manufacturing or further
processing.
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24) It is true, as urged by the respondents, that the
Supreme Court expressly struck down Section 27(c)(iii)
and did not strike down Section 27(c)(v) or its first
proviso. This circumstance, however, has to be
appreciated in its proper perspective. The appeals before
the Supreme Court arises from the challenge to Section
27(c)(iii) and Section 27(c)(iv) and, the Supreme Court
adjudicated upon those provisions. The absence of an
express declaration regarding Section 27(c)(v), therefore,
cannot be treated as an affirmative pronouncement
upholding its validity.
25) The principle declared by the Supreme Court
while examining the legislative competence of the State
Legislature cannot be ignored while testing the validity of
another provision which is alleged to impose a levy upon
substantially the same event. The question, therefore, is
whether the event upon which it imposes development
cess can constitutionally be distinguished from the event
which the Supreme Court held incapable of sustaining the
levy under Section 27(c)(iii).
26) This brings us to the constitutional entries relied
upon by the respondents. Entry 24 of List II deals with
industries, subject to Entries 7 and 52 of List I. Entries 26
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and 27 of List II deal respectively with trade and
commerce within the State and production, supply and
distribution of goods, both being subject to Entry 33 of
List III. Entry 28 of List II deals with markets and fairs,
while Entry 66 of List II enables the State Legislature to
levy fees in respect of matters contained in List II.
27) Entry 66 of List II does not constitute an
independent substantive field of legislation. A fee levied
there under must have a nexus with a matter which
otherwise falls within the legislative competence of the
State under List II. Likewise, Entries 24, 26 and 27 of List
II cannot, merely because the agricultural produce is
ultimately utilised in manufacture or thereafter enters
trade or commerce, confer competence to levy
development cess upon the anterior event of its being
brought from outside the State into a market area. The
legislative competence has to be tested with reference to
its true nature and incidence of the levy and not merely
by reference to the ultimate use to which the goods may
substantially be put.
28) Entry 28 of List II undoubtedly constitutes an
independent legislative field relating to ‘markets and fairs’.
The issue, however, is whether the particular event
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subjected to levy by the proviso falls within the field. That
question stands substantially answered in Gujarat
Ambuja
. Notwithstanding the availability of Entry 28 read
with Entry 66 of List II, the Supreme Court held that the
State Legislature lacked competence to impose market fee
and development cess upon agricultural produce brought
into the market area not for sale, but merely for
manufacture or further processing. The mere physical
entry of agricultural produce into an area notified as
market area, therefore, does not, by itself, render such
movement an activity relating to a “market” so as to
sustain the levy under Entry 28 read with Entry 66 of List
II. Consequently, we find no force in the contention that
Entry 28 of List II would confer power in the State
Legislature to impose development cess on agricultural
produce brought into a market area not for sale but only
for manufacture or further processing.
29) We are also unable to accept the contention that
the impugned proviso can be distinguished merely
because it provides for development cess alone and not
market fee. Section 27(c)(iii), which was struck down in
Gujarat Ambuja , itself contemplate both the market fee
and development cess. The infirmity identified by the
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Supreme Court was not dependent merely upon the
nomenclature of the impost. The Court was concerned
with the event upon which the liability was sought to be
fastened namely, agricultural produce being brought from
outside the State into the market area for manufacture or
further processing despite absence of any sale or
purchase therein.
30) Consequently, if the first proviso to Section
27(c)(v) makes development cess payable merely
because agricultural produce is brought from outside
Uttarakhand for manufacture or processing retaining
development cess while excluding market fee, it does not
remove the constitutional infirmity. What is relevant is
the true nature and incidence of the levy and not the
name by which the levy is described.
31) For the same reason, the statutory description
of movement of agricultural produce as “primary arrival”
or “other secondary arrival” cannot determine legislative
competence. These are classifications created by the
State enactment and cannot enlarge the legislative field
available to the State Legislature. While examining the
constitutional validity the substance of the transaction has
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to be seen and thereafter it has to be ascertained that
what event actually attracts the levy.
32) The respondents’ submission that development
cess is justified because manufacturing units utilizes
roads, bridges and other infrastructure developed and
maintained by the market committees also does not
answer the question of legislative competence. The
purpose for which the proceeds of a levy are utilized is
distinct from the source of legislative power to impose the
levy. The utilization of the amount collected for
development of market infrastructure cannot by itself
confer legislative competence if the event upon which the
levy is imposed does not otherwise fall within the
legislative field of the State.
33) Equally, the levy cannot be sustained by
treating it as one arising out of a sale or other commercial
transaction if that is not event upon which the impugned
demands proceeds. If there is a sale or purchase of
notified agricultural produce within the market area the
liability would have to be determined under the charging
provision applicable to such transaction. That would
constitute a different statutory and factual foundation. In
the case before us, however, the demand is founded upon
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agricultural produce having been brought from outside
Uttarakhand for manufacture or processing.
34) The matter, therefore, has to be decided on the
basis of the event which actually attracts the levy under
the impugned proviso. If the liability of development cess
arises merely upon agricultural produce being brought
from outside the State into the market area for
manufacture or further processing notwithstanding the
absence of any sale or purchase of such produce within
the market area the distinction sought to be drawn by the
respondents between Section 27(c)(iii) and the first
proviso to Section 27(c)(v) is merely of form rather than
substance. The ratio of Gujarat Ambuja cannot be
circumvented by shifting substantially the same levy from
one sub-clause to another, by describing the movement of
goods as ‘Primary Arrival’ or ‘Additional Secondary
Arrival’, or by retaining development cess while excluding
market fee. The legislative competence of the State has
to be tested by reference to the substance and incidence
of the levy.
35) We, accordingly, hold that the reasoning in Maa
Uma , in so far as it treated the mere bringing of the
agriculture produce into a market area for manufacture as
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independent or separable sufficient to sustain the levy
under Entries 28 and 66 of List II, does not survive the
Gujarat Ambuja
judgment of the Supreme Court in .
Consequently, in so far as the proviso to Section 27(c)(v)
authorizes levy of development cess merely upon
agricultural produce brought from outside the State into a
market area for manufacture or further processing without
any sale or purchase of such agricultural produce within
the market area, it suffers from the same lack of
legislative competence which led the Supreme Court to
strike down Section 27(c)(iii).
36) We, therefore, hold that the first proviso to
Section 27(c)(v) to the aforesaid extent to be beyond the
legislative competence of the State Legislature. The
impugned notices and the consequential demands, in so
far as they require petitioners to pay development cess
solely on agricultural produce brought from outside the
State for manufacture or processing, cannot be sustained
and are accordingly quashed.
37) It is, however, clarified that nothing stated
herein shall preclude the levy of market fee or
development cess where on the facts of a particular case
the ingredients of any other valid charging provision of the
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Act are independently satisfied including where the levy is
founded upon a taxable transaction of sale or purchase
within a market area.
38) The writ petitions accordingly stand disposed of.
39) No order as to costs.

_______________________
MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, C.J.




_________________
SUBHASH UPADHYAY, J.



TH
Dt: 30 SEPTEMBER, 2026
Negi


HIMANS
HU NEGI
Digitally signed by HIMANSHU NEGI
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=bb3b60774012c1ef1dae20d13aaf11
6e73351fdaf6878326386908a7f90d5757,
postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=75BD9D0FB7F4A80990FC51A
722A6BC552D470EB4FD2F88DDF7C18DB2A
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Date: 2026.09.30 11:20:33 +05'30'






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