Gurpreet Singh vs Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab And Others

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-6768-2021
Gurpreet Singh …..Petitioner
Versus
Registrar, Cooperative Societies and others ....Respondents
1. The date when the judgment is reserved 26.08.2026
2. The date when the judgment is pronounced 09.09.2026
3. The date when the judgment is uploaded on 09.09.2026
4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is Full
pronounced or full judgment is pronounced
5. The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full Not applicable
judgment, and reasons thereof.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Argued by : Mr. Shiv Kumar, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Siddharth Sandhu, A.A.G., Punjab.
Mr. Raghav Vashisht, Advocate for respondents No.3 & 4.

NAMIT KUMAR, J.
1. The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of a writ of
mandamus directing the respondents to allow the petitioner to join the
respondent-Markfed, in compliance of the award dated 11.03.1996
(Annexure P-3), passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala,
and to grant him all consequential benefits, along with interest @ 18%
per annum. Further, seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari for setting
aside the resolution dated 26.10.2020 (Annexure P-11), passed by
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CWP-6768-2021 2
respondent No.3, whereby the claim of the petitioner for allowing him
to join the respondent-department has been rejected.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case, as have been pleaded in
the petition, are that the petitioner had joined the ‘Dhuri Cooperative
Marketing-cum-Processing Societies Limited, Dhuri’ (for short
‘Society’) as Clerk on 28.01.1992 and after a period of 01 year and 03
months, his services were terminated, vide order dated 27.04.1993.
Aggrieved by his termination, the petitioner served a demand notice
dated 07.09.1993 (Annexure P-1) under Section 2-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the 1947 Act’) before the Assistant
Labour Commissioner, Sangrur. The Assistant Labour Commissioner,
Sangrur referred the dispute to the Presiding Officer of Labour Tribunal,
Patiala for adjudication under Section 10(1)C of the 1947 Act. During
pendency of the said dispute, Sh. Gurwinder Singh, President; Sh.
Harvinder Singh, Director; and Sh. K.L. Behal, representative of the
Society made a statement before the Presiding Officer, Industrial
Tribunal, Patiala on 11.03.1996 (Annexure P-2) that the workman shall
be reinstated with continuity of service but without back wages on the
previous terms and conditions and that he shall not be given any
monetary benefits for the intervening period and he shall be treated on
duty on his rejoining on or before 15.04.1996. In terms of the said
statement, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala passed an award
dated 11.03.1996 (Annexure P-3), whereby the petitioner was reinstated
in service without back wages. Pursuant to the said award, the petitioner
stated to have submitted his joining report on 25.03.1996 (Annexure P-
4) to the President of the Society. However, the President neither
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CWP-6768-2021 3
allowed the petitioner to join the service nor rejected his joining report
dated 25.03.1996. Subsequently, vide order dated 24.12.2008 (Annexure
P-5), passed by respondent No.1-Registrar, Cooperative Societies,
Punjab under Section 13(8) of the ‘Punjab Cooperative Societies Act,
1961’, the Society was merged into the Markfed and as per the said
order, all the assets and liabilities of the Society were taken over by the
Markfed. All the employees on the role of the Society were also taken
by the Markfed. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted representations
dated 25.07.2017 (Annexure P-6) to the District Manager, Markfed and
dated 22.07.2017 (Annexure P-7) to respondent No.1, to allow him to
join the service in terms of the award dated 11.03.1996 (Annexure P-3),
passed by the Labour Court, Patiala. Finally, respondent No.1 marked
the matter for enquiry to respondent No.2 and respondent No.2 further
inquired the matter from Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies,
Dhuri, Sangrur, who submitted his report dated 07.06.2018 (Annexure
P-8), stating therein that since the Society has already been merged into
the Markfed, the Markfed may allow the petitioner to join the duty as
per the award dated 11.03.1996 (Annexure P-3), passed by the Labour
Court, Patiala. Thereafter, respondent No.1, vide letter dated
25.02.2019, sent the matter to the Deputy Registrar, Markfed, for taking
necessary action as per rules. Consequently, respondent No.4 placed an
agenda (Annexure P-10) before respondent No.3-Board of Directors,
Markfed for consideration of the report of the Deputy Registrar,
Cooperative Societies, Patiala, received through respondent No.1, and
also to consider the implementation of the award dated 11.03.1996,
passed by the Labour Court, Patiala. However, respondent No.3 rejected
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CWP-6768-2021 4
the said agenda item, vide resolution dated 26.10.2020 (Annexure P-11)
by observing that the matter has become time barred. Hence, the instant
petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that despite the
award dated 11.03.1996 (Annexure P-3), passed by the Labour Court,
Patiala, in favour of the petitioner, the Society did not allow him to join
the service regardless to his joining report dated 25.03.1996 (Annexure
P-4). He further submits that in the year 2008, the Society was merged
into the respondent-Markfed and thereafter, the petitioner submitted a
representation dated 25.07.2017 to the District Manager, Markfed and a
representation dated 22.07.2017 to respondent No.1, seeking joining in
service in terms of award dated 11.03.1996 (Annexure P-3). However,
his claim was rejected by respondent No.3, vide resolution dated
26.10.2020 (Annexure P-11), which is totally illegal, arbitrary and
violative of the principles of natural justice as the same has been passed
without giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner.
4. Per contra, learned State counsel assisted by learned
counsel for respondents No.3 & 4 submits that the Labour Court, Patiala
had passed the award on 11.03.1996 (Annexure P-3), whereas the
petitioner had submitted his representation to the District Manager,
Markfed on 25.07.2017 (Annexure P-6), i.e., after a delay of more than
21 years. Therefore, the claim of the petitioner has rightly been rejected
by respondent No.3 on the ground of delay and laches.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant documents.
6. The facts are not in dispute that the petitioner had joined
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CWP-6768-2021 5
the Society as Clerk on 28.01.1992 and his services were terminated on
27.04.1993. Aggrieved by his termination, the petitioner served a
demand notice under Section 2A of the 1947 Act upon the Society. In
terms of the statement, made by the President, Director and
Representative of the Society, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court,
Patiala had passed an award dated 11.03.1996 (Annexure P-3), which
was a consent order, whereby the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated
in service but without back wages on the same terms and conditions,
however, after passing the said award, the petitioner was not allowed to
join the service by the Society, despite his joining report submitted on
25.03.1996 (Annexure P-4). Subsequently, in the year 2008, the Society
was merged into the Markfed and had taken over the employees who
were on the rolls of the Society. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted
representations dated 25.07.2017 (Annexure P-6) to the District
Manager, Markfed and dated 22.07.2017 (Annexure P-7) to respondent
No.1, to allow him to join the service in terms of the award dated
11.03.1996 (Annexure P-3), passed by the Labour Court, Patiala. After
completing the necessary formalities, the claim of the petitioner was
placed before respondent No.3 and the same was rejected, vide
resolution dated 26.10.2020 (Annexure P-11), by observing that the
matter has become time barred.
7. It is also an admitted position that the Labour Court had
passed the award on 11.03.1996 and the petitioner, after giving his
alleged joining report on 25.03.1996, chose to submit his
representation(s) to assert his claim with the respondent-Markfed only
on 25.07.2017, i.e., after an inordinate and unexplained delay of more
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CWP-6768-2021 6
than two decades. In the absence of any cogent explanation, the delay
cannot be treated as a mere procedural irregularity and a litigant who
has remained indolent and allowed his claim to become stale cannot as a
matter of right, seek interference of this Court. Such an unexplained and
prolonged delay renders the petitioner's claim liable to be rejected on
the ground of delay and latches.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhupal Singh Bhandari
Vs. Union of India and others : 2026 Lawfinder (SC) 456 , while
referring to the issue of delay and laches, had held as follows:-
“5. This Court time and again have reiterated that for
exercise of writ jurisdiction, the issue of limitation would
not be a ground to delay the legitimate benefit that may
flow from the right vested to an individual. However, such
rights if not invoked at appropriate time and at appropriate
stage, the extra-ordinary relief to be granted under Article
226 of the Constitution of India would not be granted. In
the instant case, petitioner having superannuated in the
year 2003 and till 2015, i.e., 05.05.2015, the date on which
the Government of India issued the order, did not raise his
little finger or in other words, he had gone to deep sleep. It
is only when said order came to be passed, he woke up
from his slumber and started submitting memorials and
representations to revive the dead cause of action. This
Court in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. Through Its
Chairman & Managing Director and Another v. K.
Thangappan and Another, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322
has held that mere making of representations to the
authority cannot justify a belated approach. It has been
further held:
“10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a
number of cases that representations would not be
adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was
first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of
Mysore [(1967) 2 SCR 70 : AIR 1967 SC 993] . This
was reiterated in Rabindranath Bose case [(1970) 1
SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] by stating that there is a
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CWP-6768-2021 7
limit to the time which can be considered reasonable
for making representations and if the Government
had turned down one representation the making of
another representation on similar lines will not
explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan
Samantaray [(1977) 3 SCC 396 : 1977 SCC (L&S)
424 : AIR 1976 SC 2617] making of repeated
representations was not regarded as satisfactory
explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had
been dismissed for delay alone. (See State of Orissa
v. Arun Kumar Patnaik [(1976) 3 SCC 579 : 1976
SCC (L&S) 468 : AIR 1976 SC 1639] also.)”
6. In the light of the afore-stated position of law, we are
not inclined to entertain the present petition directed
against the impugned order and same has been rightly
nipped at the bud on the ground of delay and laches.
Hence, Special Leave Petition stands dismissed.”
9. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of
Uttaranchal and another Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and
others, 2013(12) SCC 179 , while considering the issue regarding delay
and laches and referring to earlier judgments on the issue, opined that
repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. A stale or a
dead issue/dispute cannot be revived even if such a representation has
been decided either by the authority or got decided by getting a
direction from the court as the issue regarding delay and laches is to be
decided with reference to original cause of action and not with reference
to any such order passed. Delay and laches on the part of a government
servant may disentitle him from receiving the benefit that had been
granted to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not be
attracted as it is well established principle that the law favours those
who are alert and vigilant. Even equality has to be claimed at the right
juncture and not on expiry of reasonable time. Even if there is no period
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prescribed for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the
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CWP-6768-2021 8
Constitution of India, yet it should be filed within a reasonable time.
Though it is not a strict rule, the courts can always interfere even
subsequent thereto, but relief to a person, who allows things to happen
and then approach the court and puts forward a stale claim and try to
unsettle settled matters, can certainly be refused on account of delay and
laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights is bound to suffer the
consequences. An employee who remains dormant like a ‘Rip Van
Winkle’ and awakens from his slumber at his own convenience,
cannot claim relief, as such conduct justifies denial on the ground of
delay and latches. Relevant paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment are
extracted below:
“13. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could
have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the
junior employee at the relevant time. They chose not to do
so for six years and the junior employee held the
promotional post for six years till regular promotion took
place. The submission of the learned counsel for the
respondents is that they had given representations at the
relevant time but the same fell in deaf ears. It is interesting
to note that when the regular selection took place, they
accepted the position solely because the seniority was
maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of the
tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that the cause
of action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior
employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983. In
C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and another,
2008(4) SCT 604 : (2008) 10 SCC 115 , a two-Judge Bench
was dealing with the concept of representations and the
directions issued by the court or tribunal to consider the
representations and the challenge to the said rejection
thereafter. In that context, the court has expressed thus:-
“Every representation to the Government for relief,
may not be replied on merits. Representations
relating to matters which have become stale or
barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground
alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In
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CWP-6768-2021 9
regard to representations unrelated to the
Department, the reply may be only to inform that the
matter did not concern the Department or to inform
the appropriate Department. Representations with
incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking
relevant particulars. The replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of
action or revive a stale or dead claim.”
14. xx xx xx xx
15. xx xx xx xx
16. xx xx xx xx
17. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Ghanshyam
Dass (2) and others, 2011(2) SCT 712 : (2011) 4 SCC 374 ,
a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated the principle stated in Jagdish Lal Vs. State of
Haryana, 1998(1) SCT 26: (1997) 6 SCC 538 and
proceeded to observe that as the respondents therein
preferred to sleep over their rights and approached the
tribunal in 1997, they would not get the benefit of the order
dated 07.07.1992.
18. In State of T. N. v. Seshachalam, 2007(4) SCT 472 :
(2007) 10 SCC 137 , this Court, testing the equality clause
on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of
service benefit, has ruled thus:-
“... filing of representations alone would not save
the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant
factor for a court of law to determine the question as
to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves
consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a
government servant may deprive him of the benefit
which had been given to others. Article 14 of the
Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that
nature, be attracted as it is well known that law
leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.
19. xx xx xx xx
20 . In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
others, 2007(2) SCT 601 : (2007) 9 SCC 278 , the Court
has opined that though there is no period of limitation
provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a writ petition should
be filed within a reasonable time. In the said case the
respondents had filed the writ petition after seventeen
years and the court, as stated earlier, took note of the delay
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CWP-6768-2021 10
and laches as relevant factors and set aside the order
passed by the High Court which had exercised the
discretionary jurisdiction.”
10. The aforesaid view was followed by Hon'ble the Supreme
Court in Union of India and others Vs. Chaman Rana : 2018(5) SCC
798 and Union of India and others Vs. C. Girija and others : 2019 (3)
SCALE 527 .
11. In a recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in
Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others : 2022 (3) SCT 346 ,
while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for counting of his ad hoc
service, for the purpose of seniority/pension and regularization in
service on completion of 02 years as per policy, held that the petition
filed by him suffered from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in
approaching the High Court. In the said judgment, it has been held as
under:-
“10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that
services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f.
01.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority
position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining
the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to
assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it
rather appears that institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a
stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC
278 , observed:
“15. There is another aspect of the matter which
cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a
Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate
their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed
herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at
the earliest possible opportunity. They did not
implead themselves as parties even in the reference
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CWP-6768-2021 11
not their case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after the cut-
off date have been granted the said scale of pay.
After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions
could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the Court after a long time. Delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K.
Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman,
U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr.
[2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing
Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and
Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322] ”
11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs. State of
Haryana & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538 , it was held by the
Supreme Court:
“That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the
delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. It is not
necessary to reiterate all catena of precedents in this
behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellant kept
sleeping over their rights for long and elected to
wake up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal
Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios……...............
Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to re-
do the seniority had by them in various
cadres/grades though in the same services according
to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable to
judicial review at this belated stage….”
12. In the wake of the position as sketched out above, we
are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and
judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. The appeal
being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”
12. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Prem Nath Vs.
State of Punjab : 2018(2) SCT 687 , while rejecting the claim of
additional increments on acquisition of higher qualifications has held as
under:-
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“3. It is the case set up on behalf of the petitioners that
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CWP-6768-2021 12
they had all been appointed before 19.02.1979 and had
even improved/acquired higher qualifications before
19.02.1979 and as such there would be no difference
between the employees working with the Punjab
Government, holding corresponding post and the
employees like the petitioners who have worked for Punjab
Privately Managed Recognised Aided Schools. It is also
the assertion made by counsel representing the petitioners
that their claim would be covered in terms of decision
dated 02.07.2013 rendered by this Court in a bunch of writ
petitions including CWP No.8083 of 1989 titled as Radha
Krishan Narang and others vs. State of Punjab and
others .
4. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at length,
this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the
petitioners would not require any consideration on merits
and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole
ground of delay and laches.
5. Placed on record and appended at Annexure P-1 are
the particulars of the petitioners. The tabulation at
Annexure P-1 would show that all the petitioners stand
retired on various dates between the years 1995 to 2012.
Out of 32 petitioners in all, 22 petitioners superannuated
more than 10 years back.
6. There is no justification coming forth as regards the
inordinate delay in having approached the Writ Court.
There is also no explanation put forth by the petitioners as
to why the claim raised in the instant petition was not
agitated by the petitioners while they were in service. The
entire thrust of the submissions advanced by counsel is that
similarly situated employees had approached this Court
and have been granted relief.
7. The issue regarding delay in invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was considered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Chairman , U.P. Jal Nigam and another
v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2007(1) SCT 224 :
(2006)11 SCC 464 . In such case, certain employees raised
the issue that they were not liable to be retired at the age of
58 years but should be permitted to continue in service till
they attain the age of 60 years. Such employees were still
in service when the writ petitions were filed. The writ
petitions were ultimately allowed. Placing reliance upon
such judgment, some of the employees, who had already
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CWP-6768-2021 13
superannuated, filed writ petitions seeking the same
benefit. Even such petitions were allowed by the High
Court in terms of following the earlier judgment. The
judgment of the High Court was challenged before the
Apex Court and wherein while referring to earlier
judgments in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989)2
SCC 356; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) S.C.T.
26 : (1997)6 SCC 538 and Government of West Bengal v.
Tarun K. Roy, 2004(1) SCT 78 : (2004)1 SCC 347 , it was
opined that persons who approached the Court at a
belated stage placing reliance upon the order passed in
some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary
relief on the ground of delay and laches. The relevant
observations made by the Supreme Court are contained in
Paras 5, 6 and 16 of the judgment and are extracted here
under:-
“5. So far as the principal issue is concerned, that
has been settled by this court. Therefore, there is no
quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only
question is grant of relief to such other persons who
were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge
their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ
petitions after the judgment of this court in
Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik,
2006(1) SCT 541 : (2005) 13 SCC 300 . Whether
they are entitled to same relief or not? Therefore, a
serious question that arises for consideration is
whether the employees who did not wake up to
challenge their retirement and accepted the same,
collected their post-retirement benefits, can such
persons be given the relief in the light of the
subsequent decision delivered by this court?
6. The question of delay and laches has been
examined by this court in a series of decisions and
laches and delay has been considered to be an
important factor in exercise of the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a
person who is not vigilant of his rights and
acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be
heard after a couple of years on the ground that
same relief should be granted to him as was granted
to person similarly situated who was vigilant about
his rights and challenged his retirement which was
said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A
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CWP-6768-2021 14
chart has been supplied to us in which it has been
pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by
the employees of the Nigam before their retirement
wherein their retirement was somewhere between
30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were
filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed.
They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate
of writ petitions followed in which employees who
retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006
much after their retirement. Whether such persons
should be granted the same relief or not?
xx xx xx
16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if
similar relief is to be given to the persons who have
not approached the court that will unnecessarily
overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will
completely collapse with the liability of payment to
these persons in terms of two years' salary and
increased benefit of pension and other consequential
benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any
relief to the persons who have approached the court
after their retirement. Only those persons who have
filed the writ petitions when they were in service or
who have obtained interim order for their
retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand
to benefit and not others.
(Emphasis Supplied).”
8. The issue of delay was also dealt with by this Court
in Tarsem Pal vs. Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and others, 2013 (3)SLR 314 . In the case of
Tarsem Pal(supra), the petitioner was serving as a Clerk
with the respondent-Corporation and had retired on
31.03.2005. Claim in the writ petition was to grant to him
the benefit of proficiency set up in the pay scale on
completion of 23 years of service from the due date as per
policy of the Corporation. During the service career, he
had not agitated the claim for increments. For the first
time, such claim had been made on 28.02.2005 i.e. just one
month prior to superannuation. While non-suiting the
petitioner on account of delay and laches it was held as
follows:-
“11. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been
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clearly laid down that discretionary relief in a writ
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CWP-6768-2021 15
jurisdiction is available to a party who is alive of
his rights and enforces the same in court within
reasonable time. The judgment in another case does
not give a cause of action to file a writ petition at a
belated stage seeking the same relief. Such petitions
can be dismissed on account of delay and laches.
As has already been noticed above in the present
case as well, the petitioner joined service in the
year 1965 and retired in the year 2005, but raised
the issue regarding benefit of proficiency step up in
the pay scale on completion of 23 years of service
from the due date more than five years after his
retirement referring to a judgment of this court and
filed the petition claiming the same relief.
12. The petitioner retired from service on
31.3.2005 and the claim pertaining to the benefit of
proficiency step up, which may be admissible to the
petitioner during his service career, was sought to be
raised more than five years after his retirement, the
claim made at such a late stage deserves to be
dismissed on account of delay and laches only. The
petitioner could raise a grievance about the pay
scales admissible to him or the last pay drawn by
him within a reasonable time after his retirement. He
cannot be permitted to raise the same at any time on
the plea that the same is recurring cause of action.
13. Considering the enunciation of law, as
referred to above, in my opinion, the petitioner
herein is not entitled to the relief prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed merely on account
of delay and laches.”
9. At this stage, counsel appearing for the petitioners
would make an attempt to overcome the obstacle of delay
by placing reliance upon a Full Bench Judgment of this
Court in Saroj Kumar vs. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT
664 . Counsel would argue that as per dictum laid down in
Saroj Kumar's case(supra), matters of pay fixation involve
a recurring cause of action and as such, writ petitions for
such claim cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches and the Court at the most, may restrict the arrears
upto 38 months from the date of filing of the petition and
disallow the arrears for the period for which even a suit
had become time barred.
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CWP-6768-2021 16
10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in
Saroj Kumar's case, is wholly misplaced. The observations
and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar's case, were in the light
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta vs.
Union of India and others, 1996(1) SCT 8 : 1995(4) RSJ
502 . In M.R. Gupta's case(supra), it had been
categorically held that so long as an employee “is in
service” a fresh cause of action arises every month when
he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong
calculation made contrary to rules. It was further held that
the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a
proper pay fixation “is a right which subsists during the
entire tenure of service”.
11. In the present case, however the petitioners choose
not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much
subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken
up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that
may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated
employees .
12. Considering the dictum of law as laid down in
Chariman, U.P. Jal Nigam's case (supra), the petitioners
herein are not entitled to any relief as prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of
delay and laches .
13. Ordered accordingly.”
.
13 Subsequently, a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the
Supreme Court in Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance
Corporation Vs. Shree Lal Meena : (2019) 4 SCC 479 , considering the
principle of delay and laches, opined as under:-
“36. We may also find that the appellant remained silent
for years together and that this Court, taking a particular
view subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India
Assurance Company Limited, (2011)12 SCC 197 would not
entitle stale claims to be raised on this behalf, like that of
the appellant. In fact the appellant slept over the matter for
almost a little over two years even after the pronouncement
of the judgment.
37. Thus, the endeavour of the appellant, to approach
this Copurt seeking the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a
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CWP-6768-2021 17
misadventure, which is liable to be rejected, and the appeal
is dismissed.”
14. In the present case, the petitioner is claiming reinstatement
in service in terms of award dated 11.03.1996 (Annexure P-3), passed
by the Labour Court, Patiala. However, he has approached the
respondent-Markfed by submitting a representation dated 25.07.2017,
i.e., after an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 21 years.
Even the plea of the petitioner that in the year 2008, the Society was
merged into the Markfed and thereafter, he approached the Markfed for
allowing him to join the service, is not acceptable as no document to
prove the said assertion has been placed on record and even from the
year 2008 also, a period of more than 09 years had elapsed in
approaching the respondent-Markfed.
15. It is an admitted position on record that the Labour Court
passed the award on 11.03.1996, which was a consent order. The
petitioner claims to have submitted his joining report on 25.03.1996;
however, according to his own case, he was not permitted to join duties
pursuant to the said award. In such circumstances, it was incumbent
upon the petitioner to avail of an appropriate legal remedy with due
diligence and within a reasonable period. He, however, chose not to
pursue the matter for more than two decades and remained completely
inactive. It was only on 25.07.2017, i.e. after a lapse of more than
twenty-one years from the date of the award, that the petitioner
submitted a representation before respondent-Markfed asserting his
alleged right on the basis of the said award.
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CWP-6768-2021 18
16. It is further significant that neither the petitioner nor the
respondent-Society is in possession of the original joining report
allegedly submitted by the petitioner on 25.03.1996. Apart from the
representation dated 25.07.2017, the petitioner has also failed to place
on record any cogent or contemporaneous material demonstrating that
he had been diligently pursuing the matter with the respondent-Society
or Markfed for being permitted to join duties. Thus, there is no cogent,
plausible or satisfactory explanation on record for the extraordinary
delay of more than two decades. The mere submission of a
representation after an inordinate lapse of time cannot have the effect of
reviving a claim which had, by reason of the petitioner's own inaction
and indolence, become stale.
17. It is also significant that, if the petitioner had, in fact, been
denied joining pursuant to the award in the year 1996, there was nothing
preventing him from approaching the competent forum or this Court for
enforcement of the rights allegedly flowing from the said award.
Instead, the petitioner adopted a complete "wait and watch" approach
and permitted the matter to remain dormant for several years. Such
conduct cannot be countenanced while exercising the extraordinary and
discretionary writ jurisdiction of this Court. A person who consciously
sleeps over his alleged rights for such a prolonged period cannot seek to
revive a stale claim merely by submitting a representation at a much
belated stage.
18. There is yet another material and undisputed circumstance
which assumes significance. Upon the merger of the respondent-
Cooperative Society with Markfed in the year 2008, the employees of
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CWP-6768-2021 19
the erstwhile respondent-Society submitted their respective joining
reports before Markfed and took effective steps to pursue and assert
their claims in accordance with the procedure prevailing at the relevant
time. The petitioner, however, admittedly did not take any such step. He
remained silent and inactive even at the time of the merger and,
thereafter, did not assert the alleged rights claimed by him before
Markfed for several years.
19. The conduct of the petitioner, therefore, cannot be
attributed merely to inadvertence or bona fide circumstances. His
prolonged silence, coupled with his failure to avail himself of the
remedies available to him at the relevant stages, clearly demonstrates
acquiescence and laches. The petitioner was admittedly aware of the
award as far back as in the year 1996 and, despite his allegation that he
was denied joining pursuant thereto, consciously chose not to pursue the
matter by taking recourse to any appropriate legal remedy. Even when
the respondent-Society was merged with Markfed in the year 2008 and
other employees of the Society took steps to assert their claims, whereas
the petitioner continued to remain dormant.
20. The principle that the remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is discretionary and cannot ordinarily be invoked
for enforcement of stale and belated claims is well settled. Though no
rigid period of limitation is prescribed for exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court is required to examine
whether the petitioner has approached it with reasonable promptitude
and whether the delay has resulted in prejudice, altered circumstances or
other consequences which may render the belated exercise of
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CWP-6768-2021 20
jurisdiction inequitable. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
cannot be permitted to become a mechanism for reviving rights which
the petitioner himself has consciously allowed to remain dormant for an
unreasonably long period.
21. Tested on the aforesaid principles, facts and circumstances
and settled proposition of law, the present case does not disclose any
satisfactory explanation for the delay of more than two decades.
During the intervening period, the Society itself came to be merged with
Markfed in the year 2008, while the claims of the other employees were
dealt with at the relevant time. The petitioner, despite having knowledge
of the award and the alleged denial of joining, neither pursued any
appropriate remedy in the year 1996 nor took any effective steps at the
time of the merger in the year 2008. It is also not without significance
that the petitioner had worked in the Society for a period of only 01 year
and 03 months. In these circumstances, the subsequent representation
dated 25.07.2017, submitted after an unexplained lapse of more than
two decades, cannot have the effect of reviving a claim which had
already become stale by reason of the petitioner's own conduct.
22. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court
is of the considered view that the petitioner, having remained indolent
and having acquiesced in the position for an extraordinarily long period,
cannot be permitted to invoke the extraordinary and discretionary writ
jurisdiction of this Court for revival of a stale and belated claim. The
doctrine of delay and laches squarely applies to the facts of the present
case. The petitioner, having slept over his alleged rights for more than
two decades without furnishing any cogent or satisfactory explanation
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CWP-6768-2021 21
for such delay, is not entitled to seek discretionary relief from this Court
at this belated stage. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone.
23. Dismissed , being devoid of any merit.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
09.09.2026 JUDGE
kothiyal/mkkoundal
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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