Ananda Marga School and another vs The State of Tripura and 2 others

Page 1 of 14
TRHC010010192025 2026:THC:622


HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) NO.360 OF 2025

1. Ananda Marga School ,
Bishalgarh, Sipahijala, Tripura-799102,
To be represented by Authorized signatory,
& its Chairman, Sri Nani Gopal Debnath,
S/o- Lt. Sachindra Chandra Debnath,
Resident of Village-Ambagan,
P.O. & P.S.-Bishalgarh,
District- Sepahijala Tripura, Pin-799102.

2. Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha ,
To be represented by its General Secretary,
Acarya Bhaveshananda Avadhutta, S/o-
Shri Shri Anandamurtiji, registered Office at
Ananda Nagar, P.O.- Baglata, District-
Residing at 527, VIP Nagar, Police Station-
Anandapur, District-South 24 Paraganas,
Kolkata-700100
…… Petitioner ( s )
Versus
1. The State of Tripura
(To be represented by the Secretary,
Revenue Department, Government of Tripura)
New Secretariat Building,
New Capital Complex, Kunjaban,
P.S.- New Capital Complex,
Agartala, West Tripura, PIN-799006.

2. The District Magistrate and Collector ,
Bishramganj, District- Sipahijala, Tripura.

3. The Sub-Divisonal Magistrate ,
Bishalgarh, Sepahijala, Tripura.

....... Respondent ( s )

For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate.
Mr. K. Nath, Advocate.

Page 2 of 14
Ms. S. D. Barman, Advocate.
Ms. A. Debbarma, Advocate.
Mr. D. Paul, Advocate.

For the Respondent(s) : Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, Advocate General.
Mr. P. Gautam, Sr. G.A.
Mr. Kohinoor N. Bhattacharyya, G.A.
Mr. K. De, Addl. G.A.

Date of hearing : 11.05.2026.

Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order : 15/05/2026

Whether fit for reporting : YES.

HON’BLE JUSTICE DR. T. AMARNATH GOUD
J U D G M E N T & O R D E R

1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of an
appropriate writ, order and/or direction, particularly in the nature of mandamus,
for quashing the communication dated 22.03.2025 issued by the District
Magistrate & Collector, Sepahijala District, Bishramganj, whereby the prayer of
the petitioners for allotment of Government khas land was not acceded to. The
petitioners have further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to issue
formal allotment order in favour of the petitioner No.1 in respect of land
measuring 0.250 acre appertaining to R.S. Plot Nos. 6186, 6185 and 6183 under
Khatian No.1/220 situated at Mouja Bishalgarh, Teshil Bishalgarh, Revenue
Circle Bishalgarh, Sepahijala District.
2. The fact of the case is brief is that Petitioner No. 2, namely
Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha, is stated to be a society duly registered under
the Societies Registration Act, 1961, and has been running Ananda Marga
School, Bishalgarh, since the year 1984. Petitioner No. 1, namely the school, is
stated to be situated at Bishalgarh in the district of Sepahijala, Tripura.
According to the petitioners, the school is a recognized educational institution

Page 3 of 14
and, over time, has come to be affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary
Education (CBSE). It is further pleaded that the school has a substantial student
strength and has been rendering educational service to the locality for several
decades.
3. It is the pleaded case of the petitioners that the school is
presently established over land measuring about 0.31 acre belonging to it. In
addition thereto, the petitioners claim to have been in permanent possession and
use, since 1984, of adjacent Government khas land measuring 0.250 acres,
comprised in R.S. Plot No. 6186 measuring 0.09 acres, R.S. Plot No. 6185
measuring 0.12 acres, and R.S. Plot No. 6183 measuring 0.04 acres, under
Khatian No. 1/220, Mouja Bishalgarh, Tehsil Bishalgarh, Revenue Circle
Bishalgarh, Sub-Division Bishalgarh, District Sepahijala. According to the
petitioners, the said land has been developed by the school through filling and
leveling and has been used as part of the school campus, particularly for the
benefit of the students.
4. The petitioners assert that the aforesaid adjacent khas land is
urgently required for expansion of the school and for fulfillment of the
infrastructural requirements prescribed by CBSE, particularly for upgradation
to the Senior Secondary stage.
5. With a view to obtaining formal allotment of the said land,
an application dated 18.05.2016 was submitted before the District Magistrate &
Collector, Bishramganj, Sepahijala, seeking allotment of the khas land in favour
of Petitioner No. 1. The said application, as pleaded, was supported by
signatures of guardians, teachers and members connected with the school and
highlighted the necessity of such allotment for the welfare of the institution and
the students.
6. Pursuant thereto, the matter was enquired into by the
revenue authorities. On 28.10.2016 Tehsildar, Bishalgarh T.K., submitted a
report to the Deputy Collector & Magistrate, Bishalgarh Revenue Circle,

Page 4 of 14
wherein, upon physical enquiry, it was reportedly found that the aforesaid plots
measuring in total 0.25 acres were occupied by Ananda Marga School,
Bishalgarh. On the basis of such enquiry, the Tehsildar recommended that the
land may be allotted in favour of the school.
7. The record, as pleaded by the petitioners, further reveals that
the matter was placed before the Sub-Divisional Level Land Allotment Site
Selection Committee, which, in its decision dated 02.12.2016, approved
allotment of the said land measuring 0.250 acres in favour of Ananda Marga
School. Thereafter, by letter dated 08.12.2016, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Bishalgarh, Sepahijala District forwarded the allotment proposal in favour of
the school to the District Magistrate & Collector, Sepahijala District, requesting
necessary action. Along with the said proposal, proceedings under Section
14(1) of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 were also
forwarded, wherein the value of the land was assessed at Rs. 7,50,000/-.
8. According to the petitioners, despite the aforesaid
recommendation and forwarding of the proposal in the year 2016, no final
allotment order was issued by the District Magistrate. The petitioners contend
that the authorities remained inactive and that the school authorities repeatedly
approached the respondents requesting completion of the allotment process. In
that regard, the petition refers to several representations submitted from time to
time by the school management, the society, teachers, guardians and others,
particularly in the years 2023, 2024 and 2025, urging the authorities to accept
the premium and grant allotment of the land.
9. The petitioners have specifically referred to representations
dated 21.07.2023, 03.06.2024, 11.07.2024, 28.08.2024, and 05.11.2024,
addressed to different competent authorities, including the Secretary, Revenue
Department, the Sub-Divisional Officer and the District Magistrate & Collector.
The consistent stand in those representations, as pleaded, was that the
petitioners were ready and willing to pay the premium amount and that

Page 5 of 14
allotment of the land was necessary for upgradation of the school to the Senior
Secondary level under CBSE norms.
10. In the midst of the above, a dispute appears to have
arisen with one Gouri Rani Saha, described in the writ petition as the northern
neighbour of the school. According to the petitioners, she and her men
attempted to disturb the possession of the school over the disputed land,
compelling Petitioner No. 1 to institute Title Suit No. 06 of 2024 before the
Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No. 2, Bishalgarh, seeking
declaration of right, title and interest and permanent injunction. It is pleaded
that, in the said suit, an interim injunction order dated 05.06.2024 was passed
restraining the defendant and her agents from entering into the suit land until
disposal of the suit or until further orders.
11. The petitioners, however, further state that the said suit was
subsequently withdrawn by order dated 23.04.2025 with liberty to file afresh,
and that, as a consequence, at present there is no subsisting dispute pending in
respect of the land in question.
12. It is further pleaded that, due to the indecision of the
respondents, the petitioners were constrained to approach this Court earlier by
filing W.P.(C) No. 827 of 2024, praying for a direction upon the respondents to
issue allotment order in favour of Petitioner No. 1 on the basis of the approval
granted by the Sub-Divisional Level Land Allotment Site Selection Committee
on 02.12.2016. By order dated 06.01.2025, this Court directed the respondents
to consider the case of the petitioners in accordance with law within a period of
two months from the date of receipt of the order. The petitioners state that the
said order was duly forwarded to the respondents by a forwarding letter dated
10.01.2025.
13. The petitioners further refer to a communication dated
07.03.2025 issued by the Sub Divisional Level Land Allotment Committee,
informing the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that suitable Government khas land

Page 6 of 14
had been identified for Ananda Marga School in the aforesaid plots measuring
in total 0.250 acres. The records were thereafter placed before the competent
committees for consideration.
14. It is then pleaded that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Bishalgarh, initiated proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Tripura Land
Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 and, by proceeding dated 07.03.2025,
recommended the proposal for allotment of the said land in favour of Ananda
Marga School with premium as an exceptional case. In the said proceeding,
reference was also made to Rule 11(b) of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land
Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1980, and it was noted that the proposed
land was situated within the municipal area.
15. Thereafter, instead of granting allotment, the District
Magistrate & Collector, Sepahijala District, by letter dated 05.02.2025, returned
the earlier allotment proposal for review. The grounds indicated in the said
communication were, absence of encumbrance-free certificate, the fact that the
committee which had approved the proposal in 2016 no longer existed and a
fresh committee had since been constituted in August 2023, and the need to
recalculate the premium on the basis of the current market value of the land.
16. Following the aforesaid development, the matter was
reconsidered afresh by the authorities at the sub-divisional level. The petitioners
rely upon a Non-Encumbrance Certificate dated 07.03.2025 jointly issued by
the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bishalgarh and the Deputy Collector &
Magistrate, Bishalgarh, certifying that a portion of Ananda Marga School
existed on R.S. Plot Nos. 6186 and 6185, and that Plot No. 6183 was free from
encumbrances.
17. On the same date, i.e. 07.03.2025, the Sub-Divisional Level
Land Allotment Committee is stated to have approved allotment of land
measuring 0.250 acres in favour of Petitioner No. 1 with premium as an
exceptional case. Likewise, the Site Selection Committee, also in its proceeding

Page 7 of 14
dated 07.03.2025, approved the allotment proposal in favour of the school in
respect of the same land. Thus, according to the petitioners, the
recommendation earlier made in 2016 stood reaffirmed by the newly
constituted committees in the year 2025 after fresh scrutiny of the relevant
documents.
18. Notwithstanding the aforesaid recommendations, the District
Magistrate & Collector, Sepahijala District, by the impugned letter dated
22.03.2025, informed Petitioner No. 1 that the application for land allotment
was regretted. The reasons assigned in the impugned communication, as set out
in the writ petition, were that a land dispute had occurred in respect of the plots
in question, that proceedings under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C. had earlier been
initiated. That the subject land was not completely encumbrance-free, and that
under Rule 11(b) of the 1980 Rules no town land can be allotted without prior
sanction of the State Government and except for the purpose of homestead. On
the said reasoning, the District Magistrate concluded that allotment of the
disputed land in favour of one of the contesting parties and allotment for a
school would not be proper.
19. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred this present
writ petition seeking the following reliefs:-
“i. Issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to why
Writ in the nature of mandamus and/or Order ог direction/directions shall not
be issued whereby quashing the letter, dated, 22.03.2025, issued by the District
Magistrate and Collector, Sepahijala District, Bishramganj.
ii. Issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to why
Writ in the nature of mandamus and/or Order or direction/directions shall not
be issued whereby directing the Respondents to issue Allotment Order in favour
of the Petitioner No 1 in consequence of decision taken by Sub-Divisional Level
Land Allotment Site Selection Committee on 02.12.2016, wherein the land
allotment committee has given approval for allotment of land measuring 0.250
acres in favour of the Petitioner No 1.
iii. Issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to why
Writ in the nature of mandamus and/or Order or direction/directions shall not
be issued whereby directing the Respondents to issue Allotment Order in favour
of the Petitioner No 1 in consequence of decision taken by Sub-Divisional Level
Land Allotment Committee on 07.03.2025, wherein the land allotment

Page 8 of 14
committee has given approval for allotment of land measuring 0.250 acres in
favour of the Petitioner No 1.
iv. Issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to why
Writ in the nature of mandamus and/or Order or direction/directions shall not
be issued whereby directing the Respondents to issue Allotment Order in favour
of the Petitioner No 1 in consequence of decision taken by the Site Selection
Committee on 07.03.2025, wherein the Site Selection committee has given
approval for allotment of land measuring 0.250 acres in favour of the Petitioner
No 1.
V. Make the rules absolute,
vi. Call for records
vii. Pass any further order/orders as this Hon'ble High Court
considered fit and proper.”

20. Heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned Sr. counsel assisted by
Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel and Mr. K. Nath, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners as well as Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned
Advocate General and Mr. P. Gautam, learned Sr. G.A., appearing for the
respondents.
21. Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners, contended that the impugned order of rejection dated 22.03.2025 is
a result of gross non-application of mind, as it arbitrarily brushes aside the
consistent recommendations made by the competent statutory committees in
2016 and again on 07.03.2025. He argued that the school, which has been in
peaceful possession of the subject land since 1984, requires this 0.250-acre
parcel not for private gain, but for a clear public utility purpose, namely, the
expansion of its infrastructure to secure Class XI and XII affiliation from the
CBSE. Learned senior counsel further submitted that once the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate and the newly-constituted Land Allotment Committees had formally
approved the proposal as an "exceptional case" and issued a Non-Encumbrance
Certificate, the District Magistrate had no legal justification to block the
allotment by citing a withdrawn civil dispute or local land rules that actually
permit allotment with State sanction. Rather, the authorities were duty-bound
under Section 14 of the TLR & LR Act to facilitate such public-utility

Page 9 of 14
expansion instead of taking a hyper-technical and obstructive stance that
infringes upon the petitioners' legitimate expectation and the educational
interests of the community.
22. On the other hand, Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned Advocate
General appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed the writ petition and
supported the impugned order of rejection dated 22.03.2025, contending that no
legal or fundamental right of the petitioners has been infringed. It is submitted
that the State Government, being the lawful owner of the subject land which is
admittedly Government khas land, exercised due diligence and fairness in
considering the petitioners’ request and, in fact, left no stone unturned in
examining the proposal by constituting and reconstituting the competent
committees at different stages. Thus, there is no question of arbitrariness or
discrimination against the petitioners. Learned Advocate General submits that
the entire foundation of the petitioners’ case, namely, that allotment of land is
necessary for obtaining CBSE affiliation is wholly misconceived and
unsupported by any documentary evidence, inasmuch as CBSE has not even
been impleaded as a party, nor has any communication been placed on record to
show that additional land is a mandatory pre-condition for grant of affiliation. It
is further contended that the subject land is admittedly situated within the
Bishalgarh Municipal area, and therefore the case squarely attracts Rule 11(b)
of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules,
1980, which clearly provides that no town land shall be allotted without prior
sanction of the State Government and except for the purpose of homestead.
Since the petitioners seek allotment for running and expanding a school, which
is not a homestead purpose, the proposal is legally impermissible. Learned
Advocate General submits that although Section 14 of the TLR & LR Act
confers power upon the State to allot land, such power is not absolute and is
subject to the restrictions contained in the Rules, particularly Rule 11, and once
the statutory bar applies, the recommendations of subordinate committees
cannot override the mandate of law. It is further argued that there exists a
serious dispute regarding possession of the land between the petitioner school

Page 10 of 14
and one Gouri Rani Saha, and a civil suit had been instituted in that regard,
thereby rendering the land not free from encumbrance. In such circumstances,
the State was fully justified in declining allotment. Learned Advocate General
emphasizes that the petitioner cannot, as a matter of right, seek a writ of
mandamus to compel the State to part with its land, as no person can compel the
owner of a property, including the Government, to transfer or allot land,
particularly when the request is contrary to statutory provisions. Stating thus
learned Advocate general submitted that the decision of the District Magistrate
is in consonance with law, based on relevant considerations, and does not
warrant interference of this Court.
To support his argument that the writ petitioner herein should
establish legal right and sympathy or sentiment alone cannot form the basis of
issuing writ of or in the nature of mandamus, learned Advocate General relied
upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported at (2009) 15 SCC
436 tiled as Shesh Mani Shukla Vs. District Inspector or Schools, Deoria and
st
ors., bearing No. Civil Appeal No.4966 of 2009 , decided on July 31 , 2009 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that “ the writ petitioner must
estlablsish a legal right in himself and a corresponding legal duty in the state.
Sympathy or sentiments alone, it is well settled, cannot form the basis of
issuing a writ of or in the nature of mandamus .”
23. Heard and perused the evidence on record. Before delving in
the reasoning and conclusion of the case let us quote Section 11 and Section 14
of The Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms(Allotment of Land) Rules
1980 for better appreciation of the matter in hand.
11. Allotment of land within certain distance of roads and
town lands:
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules-
(a) no land lying within fifteen metres of the centre line of any public
road in a town or within twenty meters of centre line of any main road or within
five meters of the centre line of any village road shall be allotted exceptional
measure and without prior sanction of the State Government.

Page 11 of 14
b) no town land shall be allotted without prior sanction of the State
Government and except for the purpose of homestead.
14. Allotment of land for the purpose of industry or for any purpose
of public utility:
The allotment of land under sub-section (2) of section 14, shall
be subject to the following conditions namely-
(i) the allottee shall be liable to pay a premium equal to the market value of the
land:
Provided that the State (Government may, by order, exempt any allottee from the
payment of the whole or any part of the premium or permit any allottee to pay the
premium in such number of annual instalments, not exceeding twenty, as may be
specified therein together with interest at two and half person per annum on the
unpaid amount;
(ii) the allottee shall be liable to pay such land revenue as may be specified in the
allotment order:
provided that the land revenue so specified shall not exceed the
land revenue in accordance with section 19:
(iii) the land shall be liable to be resumed by the Government if used for a
purpose other than that for such which it has been allotted, or if the allottee has
committed breach of any of the conditions of allotment;
(iv) no compensation shall be payable by t by the Governinent on account of
resumption any land under clause (iii)except when a premium has been been
paid by the allottee in respect of the allotment of land; and in a case where such
premium has been paid the compensation payable by the (Government shall be
the amount so paid as premium or the market value of the land at the time of
resumption whichever less;
(v) if the land be resumed by Government it shall have the option of-
(a) taking over any construction built on the land on payment of their cost or
their market value at the time of resumption, whichever be less; or
(b) requiring the allottee to remove the construction and to restore the the land to
its original condition within a reasonable period to he fixed by the State
Government from time to time, should the allottee fail to comply with the order
for removal of construction or to restore the land to its original condition within
the time so fixed or, as the case may be, within the extended period, the
construction shall vest in the Government without payment of any compensation
therefore and the cost incurred in restoring the land to its original condition shall
be recoverable on the allottee as arrear of land revenue; and
(vi) any other condition which the State Government may consider reasonable to
impose, in view of the special circumstances of any individual cases.”
24. The principal grievance of the writ petitioner is that it
is running an educational institution with good academic results and, for the

Page 12 of 14
purpose of expansion and diversification, particularly to extend facilities under
CBSE for higher classes, it requires the subject land, and that due to non-
availability of such additional land, its expansion has been hindered. However,
upon careful consideration, this Court finds that the said contention is not
supported by any cogent or reliable material on record. The petitioner has failed
to place any documentary evidence to substantiate that it had taken concrete
steps for such expansion. No application, representation or communication
addressed to the Central Board of Secondary Education has been produced
before this Court to demonstrate that additional land is a prerequisite for grant
or continuation of affiliation. There is also no material to show that CBSE had
ever indicated that upon allotment of additional land, affiliation would be
granted or extended. In absence of such foundational evidence, the submissions
advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner remain without any
factual basis. Mere reliance upon recommendations of the years 2016 and 2025
without any contemporaneous material showing present necessity, is of no avail
to the petitioner.
25. It is an admitted position that the subject land is Government
khas land. Therefore, any claim for allotment thereof has to be strictly tested on
the touchstone of the statutory scheme governing allotment of Government
land. A plain reading of Rule 11 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land
Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1980 makes it abundantly clear that no
town land shall be allotted without prior sanction of the State Government and
except for the purpose of homestead. In the present case, from the pleadings and
materials on record, it appears that the subject land falls within the Bishalgarh
Municipal area and is thus covered by the expression “town land ” within the
meaning of Rule 11(b). The petitioner is not seeking the land for the purpose of
homestead, but for expansion of a school institution. Therefore, the very nature
of the petitioner’s claim runs contrary to the express restriction contained in
Rule 11(b). Once the Rule itself places a clear embargo upon allotment of town
land except for homestead and that too without prior sanction of the State

Page 13 of 14
Government, this Court cannot issue a direction contrary to the statutory
mandate.
26. This Court is also unable to accept the contention that Rule
14, which deals with allotment of land for the purpose of public utility, creates
any enforceable right in favour of the petitioners. Rule 14 only lays down the
conditions subject to which allotment may be made under sub-section (2) of
Section 14 of the Act, such as payment of premium, payment of land revenue,
liability to resumption, and such other conditions as the State Government may
consider reasonable in the special facts of an individual case. The said Rule is
thus conditional and enabling in nature. It does not mandate that land must
necessarily be allotted whenever a claim of public utility is raised. The power
remains that of the State Government, to be exercised in accordance with law,
subject to the restrictions imposed by the Rules themselves. Hence, Rule 14
cannot be read in isolation so as to override the express bar contained in Rule
11(b).
27. Further, with regard to the issue of possession and claim
over the subject land, it appears from the record that there has been a dispute
involving one Gouri Rani Saha (Paul) and the petitioner-institution, and
proceedings had been initiated in respect thereof. In view of such dispute, this
Court is not inclined to enter into the questions relating to title or possession
over the land. Moreover, considering the prevailing legal position and the
surrounding circumstances, this Court is of the view that the existence of such
dispute also does not justify issuance of any direction for allotment in favour of
the petitioner.
28. No doubt, as a welfare State, the respondents are guided by
the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution
of India. Specifically, Article 41 directs the State to make effective provision
for securing the right to education, while Article 47 mandates the State to
regard the improvement of public health and the provision of adequate nutrition
as among its primary duties. However, in the present case, it is not the

Page 14 of 14
contention of the petitioner that its foundational right to impart education has
been deprived or curtailed by the State. The petitioner institution is admittedly
already operational and functional with several faculties as indicated in the
pleadings. The present dispute does not pertain to the denial of the right to
education, but rather to a request for territorial expansion. While the State has a
duty to provide education to its citizens, an individual institution cannot, under
the garb of a welfare mandate, compel the Government to part with specific
parcels of its own land. Here the petitioner seeks to mandate the respondents to
divest themselves of Government property in its favour for expansion purposes,
such a demand appears to be unreasonable and is not supported by any specific
law.
29. Consequently, since the petitioner has no vested legal right
to claim the allotment of a particular piece of Government khas land as a matter
of right, its legal and constitutional rights cannot be said to have been infringed
by the refusal of the Government to grant such allotment. The Doctrine of
Public Policy and the Constitutional mandates of a welfare State do not create a
legal obligation on the State to distribute its land resources to a private entity
merely upon its demand for institutional growth.
30. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the
submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner are not convincing and do not
warrant interference of this Court.
31. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. As a sequel,
stay if any stands vacated. Pending application(s) if any also stands closed.



DR. T. AMARNATH GOUD, J
Suhanjit
RAJKUMAR SUHANJIT SINGHA
Digitally signed by RAJKUMAR SUHANJIT SINGHA
Date: 2026.05.15 15:05:15 +05'30'