Jamnabai vs Vasudev
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 900
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.39 OF 2026)
JAMNABAI AND OTHERS … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
VASUDEV AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal impugns the judgment and order
dated 09.05.2025 passed by the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh at Indore (hereinafter referred
as the “High Court") in Second Appeal No. 1394
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2026.08.20
18:13:04 IST
Reason:
of 2019, whereby the High Court, in exercise of
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 1 of 29
its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred
as the "Code"), reversed the concurrent
judgment and decree dated 04.05.2016 passed
by the Civil Judge, Class-2, Indore in Civil Suit
No. 126-A/2015 (hereinafter referred as the
"trial court"), and the judgment and decree
dated 02.05.2019 passed by the Additional
District Judge, Indore in Regular Civil Appeal
No. 18/2016 (hereinafter referred as the "first
appellate court"), and dismissed the suit
instituted by the appellants.
3. At the outset, we may notice that during the
pendency of the present proceedings, vide
order dated 15.12.2025, parties were directed
to maintain status quo regarding the nature,
possession and title of the suit property as it
existed at that time. Further, this Court also
made an endeavour to facilitate an amicable
resolution of the dispute. The parties were
encouraged to resolve the matter amicably.
The endeavour, however, did not fructify. On
04.08.2026, this Court recorded that the
parties were unable to settle the matter.
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 2 of 29
Therefore, this Court proceeded to adjudicate
the appeal on its merits.
4. The present dispute concerns an agricultural
land bearing Survey No. 307, admeasuring
approximately 12.41 acres, situated at Village
Kanadia, Tehsil and District Indore
(hereinafter referred as "the suit property"),
together with a house standing thereon, which
was held by one Bhagwansingh. He had two
sons, namely, Ramprasad and respondent no.
1/Vasudev. On Bhagwansingh's death, the
suit property devolved on Ramprasad and
respondent no. 1/Vasudev, and revenue
mutation was admittedly, accordingly effected
in their joint names.
5. The case of the appellants is that Ramprasad
continued to have an equal proprietary interest
in the disputed property. Ramprasad suffered
from alcoholism and that respondent No.1
frequently subjected him to humiliation and
physical assault. According to the appellants,
appellant no. 1/Jamnabai, wife of Ramprasad,
thereafter took him to her parental village,
while the family continued to receive
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 3 of 29
agricultural produce from the disputed land.
The appellants asserted that their repeated
requests for partition were deferred by
respondent No.1 on one pretext or another.
6. The immediate occasion for institution of the
suit arose when a public notice dated
26.01.2008 was published in the Dainik
Bhaskar newspaper at Indore, indicating that
Respondent No.1 had entered into an
agreement to sell the portion of the suit
property recorded as Survey No. 307/02. Upon
obtaining certified copies of the revenue
records shortly thereafter, on 30.01.2008, the
appellants discovered for the first time that
Survey No. 307/01 stood mutated in the name
of Respondent No. 2/Jaswant son of
Respondent No.1 and Survey No. 307/02 in
the name of Respondent No.1, and that the
name of Ramprasad no longer appeared in the
revenue records at all. The appellants
thereupon instituted the suit on 13.02.2008,
seeking a declaration of the co-ownership of
Ramprasad and Vasudev in the suit property,
partition and separate possession of their
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 4 of 29
share, and a permanent injunction restraining
the respondents from alienating the property
pending partition.
7. The principal defense of Respondent Nos.1 and
2 was that Ramprasad had in fact been
adopted in his childhood by his maternal
grandmother, who had given him agricultural
land at Village Achlukhedi in Tehsil Dewas,
and that upon selling that land in 1980 he
used the proceeds, together with a further
contribution from Vasudev, to jointly purchase
land at Village Upadinatha. In 1981 the two
brothers effected a family partition of the suit
property itself, pursuant to which 1.927
hectares came to be mutated in the name of
Respondent No.2 Jaswant with the consent of
Ramprasad. It was further pleaded that in
1990, when Ramprasad wished to sell the
jointly held Upadinatha land, Vasudev
consented to the sale on the understanding
that Ramprasad would in turn give up
whatever remained of his interest in the suit
property at Kanadia. Towards this end, an
affidavit dated 11.04.1990 (Ex.D19) and a
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 5 of 29
statement recorded before the Naib Tehsildar
(Ex.D20) were said to have been furnished by
Ramprasad expressing no objection to the
mutation of the suit property in favour of
Vasudev, and on the strength of these and the
connected revenue proceedings the Naib
Tehsildar passed an order dated 24.04.1990 in
Revenue Case No. 3A/6A/1989/90 (Ex.D22)
directing that the names of Respondent Nos.1
and 2 be recorded in place of Ramprasad.
Some weeks later, on 17.06.1990, a further
written consent letter (Ex.D5) was said to have
been executed by Ramprasad reiterating his
relinquishment of interest in the suit property
in favour of Vasudev and Jaswant. The
respondents relied upon Ex.D5 together with
the revenue record comprising Ex.D17 to
Ex.D24 in support of their case that
Ramprasad had voluntarily and knowingly
divested himself of his share well before his
death in 1992.
8. The parties led evidence before the trial court.
On behalf of the appellants (plaintiffs),
Mangilal (PW-1)/appellant No.2, son of
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 6 of 29
Ramprasad, Takhat Singh (PW-2) and Vikram
Singh (PW-3) were examined. On behalf of the
respondents (defendants), Vasudev (DW-1),
Shankarlal (DW-2), Rajaram Patidar (DW-3)
and Ramchandra (DW-4) were examined, and
Exs.D-1 to D-16 were exhibited.
9. The trial court decreed the suit. It found the
plea of adoption unsupported by any
documentary proof or evidence of a legally
performed adoption, and considered the
defense evidence relating to the acquisition
and sale of the Upadinatha land to be
uncertain and inconsistent. As regards the
mutation in favour of Respondent No.2, it held
that the manner in which Ramprasad's name
came to be removed in 1990 had not been
shown to be in accordance with law, and that
his proprietary interest in the suit property
therefore stood unextinguished. It further
found Ex.D5 to be vague, since it did not
clearly identify the property to which it related,
and declined to infer that the appellants had
knowledge of the 1990 mutation merely from
the existence of that document, accepting
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 7 of 29
instead their case that such knowledge was
acquired only in 2008. While holding that
actual partition of the agricultural land by
metes and bounds would have to be
undertaken by the competent Revenue Court,
the trial court recognised the coownership of
the appellants and decreed that they were
entitled to a one tenth share each and to
separate possession following lawful partition.
10. Aggrieved respondents filed first appeal. The
first appellate court, being the final court of
fact, did not merely affirm the decree of the
trial court mechanically. Upon an application
under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code being
allowed, the revenue record comprising
Ex.D17 to Ex.D24 was brought on the record
and two additional witnesses were examined,
the evidence being transmitted to it for
consideration. On a comprehensive
reappreciation of this material it found that the
respondents had failed to explain why no
independent witness had been produced to
prove the execution of Ex.D5, that the stamp
papers on which the document was written
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 8 of 29
had been purchased in January 1990 although
the document itself was executed in June
1990, and that the evidence led on this aspect
was inconsistent. It also found that the
signatures attributed to Ramprasad on Ex.D17
to Ex.D21 had been specifically denied and
that no independent witnesses had been
produced to prove their execution either. On
this basis the first appellate court dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the decree of the trial
court in its entirety.
11. The High Court admitted the second appeal
filed by the respondents on two substantial
questions of law, namely whether the courts
below had erred in decreeing the suit without
considering the bar under Section 34 of the
Specific Relief Act 1963 arising from the failure
of the appellants to challenge the order at
Ex.D22, and whether their findings on
limitation were vitiated for want of
consideration of Articles 58 and 100 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963.
Answering both questions against the
appellants, the High Court held that the
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 9 of 29
consent reflected in Ex.D5 stood established
since DW3 had not been questioned about the
genuineness of the signature appearing on it,
that the mutation recorded pursuant to
Ex.D22 had gone unchallenged for about
eighteen years, and that the suit was
accordingly barred both by limitation and by
the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief
Act. In reaching this conclusion the High Court
treated the proof of Ramprasad's consent
under Ex.D5 as going hand in hand with the
validity of the mutation recorded under
Ex.D22, without separately examining whether
the document said to have originated the
mutation proceedings themselves stood
independently proved. On this reasoning the
High Court set aside the judgments of both
courts below and dismissed the suit in its
entirety.
12. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the mutation recorded under Ex.D22
traced its origin to Ex.D20, an undated
statement attributed to Ramprasad, on the
strength of which the Naib Tehsildar proceeded
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 10 of 29
to pass the order dated 24.04.1990 without
verifying either Ramprasad's presence before
him or the genuineness of that statement, and
that a mere revenue entry of this kind could
neither extinguish nor confer title. It was
further submitted that the High Court had
erroneously treated DW3, who was in fact the
purchaser of the Upadinatha land in an
entirely separate 1988 transaction, as an
attesting witness to Ex.D5, when PW1 had in
his deposition clearly denied that the signature
on Ex.D5 was that of Ramprasad, and that
neither Ramprasad during his lifetime nor the
appellants after his death had any knowledge
of the mutation proceedings of 1990. On this
basis it was submitted that the High Court,
while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100
of the Code, had exceeded the limits of that
jurisdiction by disturbing concurrent findings
of fact recorded by the trial court and the first
appellate court.
13. Reliance was placed upon Daya Singh and
Another v. Gurdev Singh (Dead) by LRs. and
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 11 of 29
1
Others , Mansoor Saheb (Dead) and Others
2
v. Salima (D) by LRs. and Others , P.
3
Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar ,
Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
4
and Others , Kale and Others v. Deputy
5
Director of Consolidation and Others and
Yellapu Uma Maheswari and Another v.
6
Buddha Jagadheeswararao and Others .
14. Learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that the revenue proceedings of
1990 were quasi judicial in character and
resulted in entries that formed part of the
public record, and that the order at Ex.D22
could not be assailed indirectly in a civil suit in
view of the bar contained in Section 257 of the
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959,
which required any challenge to that order to
be made in the manner provided under the
Code itself. It was further submitted that the
plea of ignorance taken by the appellants was
1
(2010) 2 SCC 194
2
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3809
3
(2024) 13 SCC 553
4
2021 SCC OnLine SC 802
5
(1976) 3 SCC 119
6
(2015) 16 SCC 787
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 12 of 29
untenable, particularly since Appellant No.1,
who was Ramprasad's widow and a material
witness to the events surrounding the revenue
proceedings, had not entered the witness box,
and that in the absence of any rebuttal an
adverse inference was liable to be drawn
against the appellants. Reliance in this behalf
was placed on the presumption of regularity
attaching to official acts under Section 114(e)
of the Evidence Act 1872, and it was
accordingly submitted that the findings
recorded by the High Court called for no
interference.
15. Having heard the learned Counsel for the
appellants and respondents, and considering
the written submissions filed by both the
parties as also the impugned judgment, we
find it apposite that prior to undertaking and
answering the aforementioned submissions as
raised, it is imperative to delve into the
statutory provisions as well as the existing
jurisprudence as developed by this Court while
dealing with such provisions relatable to:
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 13 of 29
(i) Whether the High Court, in the exercise of
its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code,
was justified in disturbing the concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the trial court and
the first appellate court.
(ii) Whether Ex.D5, read together with the
revenue proceedings culminating in Ex.D22,
established that Ramprasad had voluntarily
relinquished his proprietary interest in the suit
property, and whether the mutation recorded
thereunder had the effect of extinguishing that
interest.
(iii) Whether the suit instituted in 2008 was
barred by limitation under Article 58 or Article
100 of the Limitation Act 1963, and whether it
was further barred by the proviso to Section 34
of the Specific Relief Act 1963 for want of a
specific prayer for cancellation of Ex.D22.
(iv) Whether the appellants were entitled to the
relief granted by the trial court and affirmed by
the first appellate court.
16. The first question concerns the permissible
scope of the High Court's jurisdiction in a
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 14 of 29
second appeal.
17. As settled by this Court in catena of judgments
7
including, Bholaram v. Ameerchand ,
Kulwant Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh
8
Mann (Dead) by LRs. and Others and P.
Kishore Kumar (supra), Section 100 of the
CPC confers a restricted jurisdiction upon the
High Court, and that a second appeal can be
entertained only where it involves a substantial
question of law. Concurrent findings of fact
ordinarily cannot be disturbed in such an
appeal unless they are shown to be perverse or
vitiated by an error of law, and the existence of
a power to interfere where findings are
demonstrably perverse cannot become a
license to reappreciate the evidence merely
because another view of it is possible. A finding
is not rendered perverse simply because the
High Court, upon a fresh look at the evidence,
considers a different inference preferable.
Interference is warranted only where there is a
demonstrable error in the approach to the
7
(1981) 2 SCC 414
8
(2001) 4 SCC 262
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 15 of 29
evidence, reliance upon material that is
inadmissible, omission of evidence that is vital,
or a conclusion that no reasonable judicial
mind could have reached on the material
available. We propose to test the departure of
High Court from the concurrent findings of the
courts below against this standard while
examining each of the remaining points that
arise in the appeal.
18. The next question pertains to validity of
relinquishment deed purported to be executed
by Ramprasad and the revenue proceedings
that culminated into mutating the names of
respondents in revenue records.
19. The defense of respondents rests substantially
on the case that Ramprasad voluntarily gave
up his interest in the suit property, first
through the statement and affidavit furnished
before the Naib Tehsildar in April 1990 that
culminated in the mutation order at Ex.D22,
and subsequently through the written consent
recorded in Ex.D5 dated 17.06.1990. The
burden of establishing such a relinquishment
lay squarely on the respondents who asserted
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 16 of 29
it, and it was not for the appellants to disprove
it by having the document sent for expert
examination or otherwise. A right in
immovable property cannot be treated as
having been voluntarily abandoned merely
because a revenue entry subsequently appears
in favour of another person, and the
underlying transaction by which title is said to
have been surrendered must independently be
established by the party relying upon it.
20. On this aspect the trial court found Ex.D5 to
be vague, since it did not clearly identify the
property to which it related, did not specify any
consideration, and was not a registered
instrument, while the first appellate court,
upon examining the additional revenue record
brought on file under Order XLI Rule 27, found
that no independent witness had been
produced to prove its execution, that the stamp
papers on which it was written had been
purchased months before the date it bore, and
that the evidence led on the point was
inconsistent. The High Court, in reversing
these concurrent findings, proceeded on the
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 17 of 29
footing that Ex.D5 was an undisputed and
admitted document because no suggestion had
been put to DW3 denying the signature upon
it, but this does not withstand scrutiny, since
the testimony of DW3 concerned only the
separate 1988 transaction relating to the
Upadinatha land in which he was the alleged
purchaser, and made no reference at all to
Ex.D5, nor was he at any stage put forward on
the record as an attesting witness to that
document. The respondents, through the
evidence of DW1, did not otherwise establish
the existence of any registered deed of
relinquishment, and the material relied upon
did not, to the standard required in a civil
proceeding, establish that Ramprasad had
legally divested himself of his interest in the
suit property.
21. With regards to Ex D-22, the first appellate
court has categorically recorded that although
respondents No. 1 and 2 have tried to prove
through documents from Exhibit D-17 to Ex D-
22 that Ramprasad himself had relinquished
his title and had given his consent for removing
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 18 of 29
his own name from the disputed land and for
entering respondent no. 1/Vasudev's name,
the signature of Ramprasad on these
documents has been denied by appellant No.
2, and it has been stated that it is not his
father's signature. Respondents No. 1 and 2
have not produced any other document based
on which the court could presume that the
signature on Exhibits D-17 to D-21 is indeed
Ramprasad's. No other document has been
produced by respondents No. 1 and 2 bearing
Ramprasad's signature. Even if it is assumed
that the said signatures are Ramprasad's,
respondents No. 1 and 2 have not produced
any independent witness who was present at
the time of execution of the said exhibit and
Ex. D-5. Respondents No. 1 and 2 have failed
to clarify under what circumstances the
entries in the name of respondent no. 2 were
made on a part of the disputed land in 1980-
1981.
22. Equally, the mutation recorded pursuant to
Ex.D22 could not by itself extinguish
Ramprasad's title. It is settled law that an entry
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 19 of 29
in the revenue record neither creates nor
extinguishes title and exists essentially for
fiscal purposes, as held by this Court in
9
Sawarni v. Inder Kaur and Others . The
order of the Naib Tehsildar may regulate the
revenue record, but it cannot, merely by
recording one person's name in place of
another, operate as a conveyance or a
relinquishment of proprietary rights, and the
civil court remains fully competent to
determine the underlying title, which the
revenue entry follows rather than creates. The
statutory presumption of correctness
attaching to a revenue entry under Section 117
of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code
1959 is a rebuttable evidentiary presumption
and not a presumption of title, and it must be
weighed along with the rest of the evidence,
which the first appellate court did, finding it
displaced for the specific reasons recorded
above. For these reasons the High Court fell
into error in holding that Ex.D5, whether taken
alone or together with the revenue proceedings
9
(1996) 6 SCC 223
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 20 of 29
under Ex.D22, established that Ramprasad
had relinquished his proprietary interest in the
suit property.
23. The next question is whether the suit
instituted in 2008 was barred by limitation or
under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
24. The High Court held the suit to be barred by
limitation principally because it treated the
date of the mutation in 1990 as the point from
which the right of appellants to sue accrued,
and invoked Article 58 and Article 100 of the
Limitation Act 1963 on that basis, and it
further held the suit to be barred under the
proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act
1963 because the appellants had not
specifically prayed for cancellation of Ex.D22.
Both conclusions proceed from the same
premise, namely that the mutation itself was
the operative event displacing the appellants'
title, a premise we have already found to be on
unsound basis, and both accordingly call for
reconsideration together.
25. The starting point of limitation cannot be fixed
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 21 of 29
merely by identifying the date on which a
revenue entry happens to have been made.
What matters is when the right to sue actually
accrued, a question that has to be examined
on the facts of each case. Ramprasad and
Vasudev were co-owners of the suit property,
and in law the possession of one co-owner is
ordinarily treated as possession on behalf of
all, so that a co-owner in possession does not
acquire an adverse title merely by continuing
in possession. As held by this Court in P.
10
Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy , an
ouster between coheirs requires an open
assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive
possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of
the other coheir, and mere exclusive
possession is not sufficient. There is no finding
in the present case that Ramprasad was,
during his lifetime, openly and unequivocally
ousted from the property in a manner
sufficient to set limitation running against
him, nor is there any finding that the
10
(1956) 2 SCC 759
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 22 of 29
appellants had actual knowledge either of the
alleged relinquishment or of the revenue
proceedings of 1990.
26. The High Court drew an inference of such
knowledge principally from the statement of
PW1 that Ramprasad's name had been
removed from the records in 1990 and that no
appeal had been preferred against that
removal, but an isolated line of this kind
cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the
evidence, particularly when both courts below,
after considering the entire material including
the additional revenue documents brought on
record before the first appellate court, accepted
the case of appellants that knowledge was
acquired only upon the public notice of
26.01.2008 and the certified copies obtained
on 30.01.2008. Article 58 of the Limitation Act
applies to a suit for a declaration and begins to
run when the right to sue first accrues, while
Article 100 applies to a suit to set aside a
specified act or order of a civil court or of a
government officer. The present suit, however,
was essentially one for declaration of co-
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 23 of 29
ownership by succession and for
consequential relief, and was not founded
upon a challenge to the revenue order as the
source of the appellants' title. The mutation
was relied upon by the respondents only as a
defense to that title, and the fact that the
appellants did not separately seek its
cancellation cannot alter the true nature of the
relief that was in substance being sought. The
trial court was accordingly justified in holding
the suit to be within limitation, and the first
appellate court committed no error in affirming
that conclusion.
27. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act requires a
plaintiff seeking a declaration of legal
character or right to also seek further relief
where it is open to him to do so, and its object
is to prevent a litigant from obtaining a bare
declaration where consequential relief is both
necessary and available. The present case does
not fall within that mischief, since the
appellants did not seek a bare declaration but
sought, along with the declaration of
coownership, partition, possession and a
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 24 of 29
permanent injunction, and the trial court
granted the declaratory and protective relief
warranted by the evidence while leaving actual
partition of the agricultural land to the
competent Revenue Court. The relief of
cancellation of a revenue mutation entry is not
the same as a declaration of title, and once a
civil court has adjudicated that the mutation
did not extinguish the appellants' inherited
title, the entry itself cannot be allowed to stand
in the way of the title so declared. The High
Court accordingly erred in treating the absence
of a specific prayer for cancellation of Ex.D22
as an indispensable condition for the
maintainability of the suit.
28. We may also deal with the submission that the
non-examination of appellant no.1 ought to
have led to an adverse inference against the
appellants. Such an inference does not follow
automatically merely because an available
witness is not examined, and it must be
weighed against the evidence that was in fact
led, including the documentary trail of the
public notice dated 26.01.2008 and the
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 25 of 29
certified copies obtained on 30.01.2008, which
independently fix the date of discovery
regardless of what Appellant No.1 might
separately have known. The presumption of
regularity under Section 114(e) of the Evidence
Act extends to the regularity of official
procedure, but it does not extend to
conclusively proving the bona fides of the
underlying private transaction, which the first
appellate court examined and found wanting
for the specific reasons already noticed.
29. It follows from the foregoing that the reversal
by the High Court of the concurrent findings of
the courts below cannot be sustained. On the
question of Ex.D5, its conclusion rested on
treating DW3 as an attesting witness when he
was nothing of the sort, and on treating the
document as undisputed when its
genuineness had been squarely contested and
found wanting for specific and itemised
reasons that the impugned judgment does not
engage with. On the mutation, it proceeded on
the premise that a revenue entry can itself
extinguish title and that a separate prayer for
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 26 of 29
its cancellation was indispensable, a premise
unsupported by settled law as discussed
above. On limitation, it rested on an isolated
line of cross-examination read out of context,
treating a suit for declaration of title by
succession as though it were a direct challenge
to the revenue order itself. In each of these
respects, the departure by the High Court from
the concurrent findings reflects a
reappreciation of the same evidence to reach a
different conclusion, rather than the kind of
demonstrable perversity or error of law that
alone would justify interference under Section
100 of the Code, particularly when both courts
below had examined the very same question,
namely whether the respondents had
established the alleged relinquishment, and
the first appellate court had done so after the
additional revenue documents were
specifically brought on record and examined.
30. We are accordingly of the view that the High
Court exceeded the permissible limits of its
jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code,
and that the appellants were rightly held by the
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 27 of 29
courts below to be entitled to the co-ownership,
partition and consequential relief that had
been granted to them. The impugned judgment
cannot be sustained, and the appeal is
allowed.
31. The judgment and order dated 09.05.2025
passed by the High Court is set aside, and the
judgment and decree dated 02.05.2019 passed
by the first appellate court, affirming the
judgment and decree dated 04.05.2016 passed
by the trial court, stand restored.
32. The appellants and the other legal heirs of the
late Ramprasad shall accordingly be entitled to
the share declared in their favour, subject to
lawful partition in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Madhya Pradesh
Land Revenue Code. The respondents shall
remain restrained from alienating the disputed
property or from creating any third-party
rights therein contrary to the decree of the trial
court until such lawful partition takes place.
33. There shall be no order as to costs.
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 28 of 29
34. Pending interlocutory applications, if any,
shall stand disposed of.
…….……..………..………………..J.
[ SANJAY KAROL ]
…….……..………..………………..J.
[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 20, 2026.
C.A. @ SLP (C) No.39/2026 Page 29 of 29