Madhya Pradesh Special Establishment vs Prafulla Paranjpe

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
th
ON THE 16 OF OCTOBER, 2026
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 11148 of 2025
CNR No.: MPHC010807772025
MADHYA PRADESH SPECIAL ESTABLISHMENT
Versus
PRAFULLA PARANJPE
Appearance:
Shri Abhinav Shrivastava - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Sharad Verma - Advocate for respondent.
ORDER
This application for grant of leave to appeal against judgment of
acquittal under Section 419 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 by
Special Police Establishment (Lokayukta), Bhopal is filed feeling aggrieved
by the judgment of acquittal dated 29.08.2025 passed in Case No.SC/LOK-
07/2019 by the Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, District
Chhindwara whereby, the respondent/accused Prafulla Paranjpe was
acquitted from charge of offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1988’).
2. The exposition of facts giving rise to the present application for grant of
leave to appeal and the statutory appeal are as under :-
A. Complainant Jai Singh Mohne submitted a written complaint
(Exhibit-P/1) on 23.02.2018 to the Superintendent of Police, Special
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Police Establishment, Lokayukta, Jabalpur inter alia stating that he had

applied for loan under Acharya Vidya Sagar Go Samvardhan Yojna from
Madhya Pradesh Central Gramin Bank, Bisapur. Prafulla Paranjape, the
Branch Manager, has demanded Rs. 20,000/- as bribe money to sanction
his loan. He desires to trap him red handed.
B. The Superintendent of Police referred the written complaint (Ex. P-
1) for verification to Inspector Oskar Kindo. Inspector Oskar Kindo
provided a digital voice recorder to Jai Singh Mohne to record the
conversation regarding demand of bribe. Jai Singh Mohne remitted the
digital voice recorder and filed another complaint (Exhibit-P/7)
informing that Prafulla Paranjpe had demanded Rs.20,000/- as bribe
money to sanction the loan under the Acharya Vidya Sagar Go
Samvardhan Yojna.
C. A trap team comprising Dy. S.P. H.P. Choudhary, T.L.O Oskar
Kindo, Inspector Kamal Singh Uike, Driver Rakesh Vishwakarma,
Constable Dinesh and Head-Constable Sagar Sonkar was constituted.
The complainant furnished 10 currency notes of denomination of
Rs.2000/-, total amounting to Rs.20,000/-. The currency notes were
coated with phenolphthalein powder. Jai Singh Mohne was given
instructions. A preliminary proceeding panchnama (Exhibit-P/9) was
prepared. Jai Singh Mohne led the trap team to the chamber of Branch
Manager Prafulla Paranjape in Madhya Pradesh Central Gramin Bank,
Branch- Bisapur. Jai Singh Mohne offered bribe money to Prafulla
Paranjpe. Prafulla Paranjpe kept the phenolphthalein coated currency
notes on the table. Prafulla Paranjape was apprehended by the trap team
of Lokayukta. The tainted currency notes were recovered from the table
of accused Prafulla Paranjpe. His hands were dipped in sodium
carbonate solution which turned pink. Relevant seizures were made. The
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transcript of recorded conversation regarding demand of bribe was

prepared. On completion of investigation, final report was submitted
before the Special Judge, Chhindwara against Prafulla Paranjpe.
D. The Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Chhindwara
framed charges for offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
against respondent/ accused Prafulla Paranjpe. On completion of trial,
learned Special Judge acquitted Prafulla Paranjape from all the
charges vide impugned judgment dated 29.08.2025.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant/Special Police Establishment submitted
that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the respondent
Prafulla Paranjpe vide impugned judgment dated 29.08.2025 passed in
Special Case No. S.C. Loka/07/2019. Learned counsel further referring to the
transcript of recorded conversation between the complainant Jai Singh
Mohne and the respondent/accused contended Prafulla Paranjpe had
demanded illegal gratification to sanction loan under the Acharya Vidya
Sagar Go Samvardhan Yojna and KCC (Kisan Credit Card) scheme to the
complainant Jai Singh Mohne. There was specific demand of Rs.20,000/- as
alleged by complainant Jai Singh Mohne in his initial testimony which was
duly corroborated by the transcript of recorded conversation. Thus, the
prosecution had established the demand of illegal gratification and its
obtainment by respondent/accused Prafulla Paranjpe. The traces of
phenolphthalein on the hands of Prafulla Paranjpe and the recovery of tainted
currency notes from table in his possession clearly established the alleged
offence. In support of these submissions, learned counsel for the applicant
relies upon the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Neeraj
Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in (2023) 4 SCC 731.
4 . Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/ accused submits that
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prosecution had failed to establish that Prafulla Paranjape had voluntarily

accepted the bribe money. The prosecution had failed to establish the reason
or motive for demand of illegal gratification. The conclusion of the trial
Court is based on proper appreciation of material on record. The application,
being meritless, deserves to be dismissed.
5. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the application,
appeal memo and the record trial Court.
6. In case of State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar , reported
i n (2008) 9 SCC 475, following principles governing the grant of leave
against order of acquittal were laid down-
19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of appeal by the State in
case of acquittal. Sub-section (3) declares that no appeal “shall be entertained
except with the leave of the High Court”. It is, therefore, necessary for the
State where it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court of
Session to file an application for leave to appeal as required by sub-section (3)
of Section 378 of the Code. It is also true that an appeal can be registered and
heard on merits by the High Court only after the High Court grants leave by
allowing the application filed under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code.
20. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question whether requisite leave
should or should not be granted, the High Court must apply its mind, consider
whether a prima facie case has been made out or arguable points have been
raised and not whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside.
21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of law of universal
application that each and every petition seeking leave to prefer an appeal
against an order of acquittal recorded by a trial court must be allowed by the
appellate court and every appeal must be admitted and decided on merits. But
it also cannot be overlooked that at that stage, the court would not enter into
minute details of the prosecution evidence and refuse leave observing that the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court could not be said to be
“perverse” and, hence, no leave should be granted.
22. In Sita Ram v. State of U.P. [(1979) 2 SCC 656 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 576] this
Court held that: (SCC p. 669, para 31)
“31. … A single right of appeal is more or less a universal requirement
of the guarantee of life and liberty rooted in the [concept] that men are
fallible, that Judges are men and that making assurance doubly sure,
before irrevocable deprivation of life or liberty comes to pass, a full-
scale re-examination of the facts and the law is made an integral part of
fundamental fairness or procedure.”
We are aware and mindful that the above observations were made in
connection with an appeal at the instance of the accused. But the
principle underlying the above rule lies in the doctrine of human
fallibility that “Men are fallible” and “Judges are also men”.
It is keeping in view the said object that the principle has to be understood and
applied.
23. Now, every crime is considered as an offence against the society as a whole
and not only against an individual even though it is an individual who is the
ultimate sufferer. It is, therefore, the duty of the State to take appropriate steps
when an offence has been committed.
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24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not be understood to have laid down
an inviolable rule that no leave should be refused by the appellate court against
an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We only state that in such
cases, the appellate court must consider the relevant material, sworn
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and record reasons why leave sought by
the State should not be granted and the order of acquittal recorded by the trial
court should not be disturbed. Where there is application of mind by the
appellate court and reasons (may be in brief) in support of such view are
recorded, the order of the court may not be said to be illegal or objectionable.
At the same time, however, if arguable points have been raised, if the material
on record discloses deeper scrutiny and reappreciation, review or
reconsideration of evidence, the appellate court must grant leave as sought and
decide the appeal on merits. In the case on hand, the High Court, with respect,
did neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the case did not require grant of
leave. But it also failed to record reasons for refusal of such leave.
xxx xxx xxx
32. Now, so far as powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal
are concerned, no restrictions have been imposed by the Code on such powers
while dealing with an order against acquittal. In an appeal against acquittal, the
High Court has full power to reappreciate, review and reweigh at large the
evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own
conclusion on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to
determination by the appellate court.
33. It is no doubt true that in a case of acquittal, there is a double presumption
in favour of the respondent-accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that
every person should be presumed innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal,
the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced by the trial court (and
certainly not weakened). Nonetheless, it is not correct to say that unless the
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal under challenge is convinced that
the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court is “perverse”, it cannot
interfere. If the appellate court on reappreciation of evidence and keeping in
view well-established principles, comes to a contrary conclusion and records
conviction, such conviction cannot be said to be contrary to law.
34. Recently, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2
SCC (Cri) 325, after considering all leading decisions on the point, one of us
(C.K. Thakker, J.) laid down the following general principles regarding powers
of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal:

“(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction
or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the
evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of
fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’,
‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted
conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to
emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal
than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come
to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed
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to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of
his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
35. The High Court, in our judgment, was not right in rejecting the application
for leave on the ground that the judgment of the trial court could not be termed
as “perverse”. If, on the basis of the entire evidence on record, the order of
acquittal is illegal, unwarranted or contrary to law, such an order can be set
aside by an appellate court. Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, “judgment being perverse”, etc. are more in the nature of
“flourishes of language” than restricting ambit and scope of powers of the
appellate court. They do not curtail the authority of the appellate court in
interfering with an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. The judgment
of the High Court, with respect, falls short of the test laid down by this Court in
various cases referred to in Chandrappa [(2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC
(Cri) 325] . The order of the High Court, therefore, cannot stand and must be
set aside."
7. The governing consideration is, whether the application presents a prima

facie or arguable case requiring deeper scrutiny or reappreciation of the
evidence. Although, an appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate
and reconsider the evidence in an appeal against acquittal, the acquittal
reinforces the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. If two
reasonable views are possible, the view favouring the accused should,
ordinarily, not be disturbed. The interference by the Appellate Court is
warranted, where the findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong,
manifestly erroneous, demonstrably unsustainable, based on an erroneous
view of law or founded upon material misreading or omission of evidence.
The expressions such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and
sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”
and “glaring mistakes” do not curtail the appellate power; rather, they
emphasise the caution with which an acquittal is to be examined. (M.G.
Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, (1963) 2 SCR 405; Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC
450; and Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi), AIR 2010 SC 2352.
relied).
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8. In case of Satyavir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2010) 3

SCC 174, it was held that -
“In addition to the above re-statement of principles, the Court also referred to
what findings could be termed as ‘perverse’ so as to call for interference by the
higher court hearing the appeal against judgment of acquittal. ‘Perverse’ was
stated to be a behaviour which most of the people would take wrong,
unacceptable, unreasonable and a ‘perverse’ verdict may probably be defined
as one that is not only against the weight of the evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. Besides, a finding being ‘perverse’, it could also suffer
from the infirmity of distorted conclusions and glaring mistakes. In addition
thereto there can be cases where for substantial and compelling reasons, good
and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances and to avoid the ends of
justice being defeated, the higher courts have to interfere with the judgment of
acquittal recorded by the lower court.
9. In case of State of Kerala Vs. C.P. Rao reported in (2011) 6 SCC 450 ,
it was observed by the Supreme Court that in absence of any evidence to
prove the payment of bribe or to prove that accused has voluntarily accepted
the money knowing it to be bribe, mere recovery would not be sufficient to
prove the charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act, 1988.
10. In case of B.Jayaraj Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2014) 13
SCC 55, the complainant did not support the prosecution, therefore, declared
hostile. The prosecution did not examine any other witness present at the
time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the
complainant to prove that money was given pursuant to the demand made by
the accused. The Supreme Court held that when the complainant has
disowned the allegation made in the complaint and in absence of other
evidence with regard to proof of demand by the accused, the evidence of the
complainant and the complaint could not be relied upon as proof of demand
by the accused. It was further held that mere possession and recovery of
currency notes from the accused without any proof of demand would not
establish the offence punishable under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of
the Act, 1988. It was also held that the presumption under Section 20 of the
Act, 1988, could be drawn only if there was proof of "acceptance of illegal
gratification" for which proof of demand was a sine qua non.
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11. In case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh

reported in (2015) 10 SCC 152, the complainant died before the evidence.
The Supreme Court held that proof of demand of illegal gratification is
gravamen for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of
the Act, 1988. Mere acceptance of any amount by way of gratification or
recovery thereof de hors the proof of demand would not be sufficient to bring
home the charge under aforesaid sections of the Act, 1988. The proof of
demand is a sine qua non and in the absence of proof of demand, legal
presumption under Section 20 of the Act, 1988, cannot be raised.
12. In case of Hazari Lal Vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported in
(1980) 2 SCC 390, the Supreme Court observed that it is not necessary to
prove passing of money by direct evidence. The Court may presume the
existence of any fact which happened in any course of natural events, human
conduct and public business under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
The accused had taken the currency notes from his pocket and flung them
across the wall. It was proved that the currency notes were obtained from the
complainant a few minutes earlier. Considering the legal presumption,
accused was held guilty for the offence.
13. Relying on Hazari Lal (supra), the three Judge Bench of the Supreme
Court in case of N. Narsinga Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2001) 1 SCC
691 held that once it was established that there was a demand or acceptance
of illegal gratification and once the foundational facts were proved, the legal
presumption for payment or acceptance of illegal gratification for motive or
reward for doing or forbearing to do official act is applicable.
14. In case of Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2023) 4
SCC 731, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered all these
precedents to answer the reference:
"Question for consideration:
45. On consideration of the aforesaid cases, the question framed for
determination by the larger Bench is as under:
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“(1) Whether, in the absence of evidence of complainant/direct or primary
evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw an
inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section
7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 based on other evidence adduced by the
prosecution?”
The reference was answered by holding in following terms:-

88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a
public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in
order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7
and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.
88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution
has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent
acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by
direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or
documentary evidence.
88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial
evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.
88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following
aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being
any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the
offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance
as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior
demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the
bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded
gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a
case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for
illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an
offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver
and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved
by the prosecution as a fact in issue.
In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification
without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7
or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore,
under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there
must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is
accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence.
Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by
the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is
received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment
under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and
acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a
court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have
been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the
absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the
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discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact
of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a
presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence
of rebuttal presumption stands.
88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’ or has died or is
unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal
gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness
who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or
the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial
does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused
public servant.
88.7. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the
facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the
illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as
mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by
the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the
said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to
Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the
Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as
the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in
nature.
89. In view of the aforesaid discussion and conclusions, we find that there
is no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B. Jayaraj
and P. Satyanarayana Murthy with the three judge Bench decision in M.
Narasinga Rao, with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to
sustain a conviction for offences under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of
the Act, when the direct evidence of the complainant or “primary
evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to his death or any
other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution
witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above
would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In
view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that there is no conflict between
the judgments in the aforesaid three cases.
90. Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this
Constitution Bench is answered as under:

"In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary,
oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential
deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other
evidence adduced by the prosecution."
15. In case of Soundarajan v. State of Madras, reported in (2023) 16 SCC
141, it was observed that-
12. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow witness (PW 3). In the
examination-in-chief, he stated that the appellant asked PW 2 whether he
had brought the amount. PW 3 did not say that the appellant made a
specific demand of gratification in his presence to PW 2. To attract
Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to be proved by
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the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The word used in Section 7, as
it existed before 26-7-2018, is “gratification”. There has to be a demand
for gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it has to be a
demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of gratification and
acceptance thereof is proved, then the presumption under Section 20 can
be invoked, and the court can presume that the demand must be as a
motive or reward for doing any official act. This presumption can be
rebutted by the accused. (emphasis added)
16. The material on record is examined in the light of aforestated

propositions of law.
The Evidence of Complainant-
17. In a trap case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the
complainant occupies a peculiar evidentiary position. He is the person from
whom illegal gratification is said to have been demanded and he is also the
person who sets the trap proceeding in motion by approaching the
investigating agency and furnishing the money to lay the trap. Although,
complainant is not an accomplice as he does not participate in the crime but
is its victim. Still, he is an interested and partisan witness concerned with the
success of the trap laid at his instance so, his evidence need to be scrutinised
with the same caution applied to any other interested witness. Learned trial
Court appreciated the evidence of Jai Singh (P.W.-1) and his son Govind
Mohne (P.W.-3) to correctly conclude that they were nurturing grudge
against the accused for the reason that accused was consistently insisting for
recovery of loan amount by giving them notice threatening attachment of
property.
18. Jai Singh Mohne (P.W.-1) deposed that he went to Madhya Pradesh
Central Gramin Bank, Bisapur Kalan to withdraw the amount sanctioned
under the Acharya Vidya Sagar Go Samvardhan Yojna . He requested
Prafulla Paranjpe, the Branch Manager to permit him to withdraw the
amounts under the K.C.C. loan and the said scheme. Paranjpe did not permit
the withdrawal and demanded ₹ 30,000. He offered to pay ₹ 10,000 after the
amount was credited to his account and withdrawn but Paranjpe insisted on
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₹ 30,000. He discussed the matter with his son Govind and other family

members. He then approached the Lokayukta office and reported that
Manager Paranjpe was demanding ₹ 30,000 to permit withdrawal from the
K.C.C. loan account. His son Govind prepared the complaint (Exhibit P-1)
which he had signed. He was provided with a tape recorder by Lokayukta
officer. Accused Paranjpe demanded payment “hand to hand” for withdrawal
of the loan amount from his account. He remitted tape recorder containing
the recorded conversation to the Lokayukta official. Jai Singh identified his
own voice and voice of Prafulla Paranjpe in the conversation recorded on the
CD (M.O.-2) and verified its transcript (Exhibit P-2).
MOTIVE OR REASON FOR DEMAND OF ILLEGAL GRATIFICATION.
1 9 . Jai Singh Mohne (P.W.-1) deposed that he had approached Madhya
Pradesh Central Gramin Bank, Bisapur Kalan, to withdraw the amount
available under his K.C.C. loan account and the Acharya Vidya Sagar Go
Samvardhan Yojna laon. However, the written complaint (Exhibit P-1) states
that he had applied for a loan under the Acharya Vidya Sagar Go
Samvardhan Yojna and illegal gratification had been demanded in
connection with the sanction of that loan. Significantly, Exhibit P-1 contains
no reference to the K.C.C. loan. Even the preliminary panchnama (Exhibit P-
9) records that the alleged demand pertained to the sanction of a loan under
the Acharya Vidya Sagar Go Samvardhan Yojna . Thus, the subsequent
assertion that the alleged demand related also to withdrawal from the K.C.C.
loan account constitutes a material improvement and is inconsistent with, the
initial allegation recorded in Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit P-9.
20. Investigating Officer Oskar Kindo (P.W.-6), in paragraphs 24 and 26
of his cross-examination, admitted that the complaint (Exhibit P-1) pertained
exclusively to a loan under the Acharya Vidya Sagar Go Samvardhan Yojna .
However, he neither investigated the eligibility criteria or the procedure for
obtaining a loan under the scheme nor ascertained whether any such loan
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application had been submitted by Jai Singh Mohne or was pending before

the Bank of accused. He did not recover and seize the governing rules,
guidelines, procedural documents, or any relevant record of the Yojana from
the branch of the accused. Oskar Kindo (P.W.-9) in cross-examination
paragraph 39, admitted that the transcript of the recorded conversation
(Exhibit P-2) contains no reference to the Acharya Vidya Sagar Go
Samvardhan Yojna or to any other loan scheme. These material omissions
coupled with the absence of any reference to the alleged Yojana or loan
transaction in the recorded conversation, materially weaken the prosecution
case regarding the alleged reason for the demand of illegal gratification.
21. Mahesh Chourasia (P.W.-7), Branch Manager of the same branch from
April 2018 to September 2019, deposed that under Clause 2.3 of the
guidelines issued by the Animal Husbandry Department (Exhibit D-16), an
application under the Acharya Vidya Sagar Go Samvardhan Yojna had to be
submitted to the nearest Veterinary Authority and after approval by the Gram
Sabha, Janpad Panchayat and Zila Panchayat, forwarded to the concerned
bank. Such an application could not be submitted directly to the bank. He
further deposed that until 28 September 2019, no application forwarded by
the Deputy Director, Veterinary Services, Chhindwara, had been received at
the Bisapur branch, nor any application by Jai Singh Mohne was pending at
the branch. The communication issued by the Office of Veterinary Services,
Mohkhed (Exhibit D-19) also confirmed that no application by Jai Singh
Mohne had been forwarded to any bank, much less to the Bisapur branch.
This evidence remained unrebutted.
22. Jai Singh Mohne (P.W-1) and his son Govind Mohne (P.W.-3)
specifically admitted that they did not apply for loan under Acharya Vidya
Sagar Go Samvardhan Yojna , either at the office of Veterinary Services
or at the M.P. Central Gramin Bank, Bisapur. Thus, the prosecution had
miserably failed to establish the foundational fact, reason for demand of
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illegal gratification as alleged in the written complaint (Annexure P-1). The

learned trial Court, upon proper appreciation of the evidence in paragraphs
72 to 78 of the impugned judgment, rightly concluded in paragraphs 111 and
113 that the very foundation of allegations regarding demand of illegal
gratification is doubtful.
2 3 . Jai Singh Mohne (P.W.-1) stated that he had submitted second
complaint regarding demand of illegal gratification (Ex. P-7). The second
complaint (Ex. P-7) adds that the demand of illegal gratification relates to
"K.C.C and Acharya Vidya Sagar Go Samvardhan Yojna" . However, Jai
Singh Mohne (PW-1) and his son Govind Mohne (P.W.-3), specifically
denied demand of illegal gratification in relation to the K.C.C. loan. This
subsequent introduction of the K.C.C. loan in Exhibit P-7, unsupported by
their testimony and its absence from the initial complaint (Exhibit P-1),
constitutes a material improvement.
24. As regards the K.C.C. loan, Jai Singh Mohne (P.W.-1) admitted in
cross-examination paragraphs 22 to 29, that the accused had sanctioned a
loan of ₹ 5,82,000 in his favour on 17 February 2018, as reflected in Exhibits
D-2 to D-15 and that he had withdrawn ₹ 1,00,000 on the same day and
further amounts thereafter. He also admitted that he was aware of the
sanction of K.C.C. loan before submitting the complaint (Exhibit P-1).
Jitendra Kumar Tiwari (P.W.-5) and Mahesh Chourasia (P.W.-7), the Bank
Officers, corroborated aforesaid sanction and withdrawals and sated that only
₹ 1,169 remained in the K.C.C. loan account of Jai Singh on 21 February
2018, due to which the processing fee could not be recovered. Mahesh
Chourasia (P.W.-7) further deposed that the beneficiary is issued a Kisan
Credit Card upon sanction of K.C.C. loan and may withdraw funds from his
account through any ATM without requiring the Branch Manager’s
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permission. These facts belie the allegation that the accused demanded

illegal gratification for sanctioning or permitting withdrawal from the K.C.C.
loan account and explain the absence of any such allegation in initial
complaint (Exhibit P-1). Learned trial Court correctly appreciated the
evidence on record in paragraphs 68 and 71 of the impugned judgment and
rightly concluded in paragraphs 133 and 136 that rightly concluded that the
prosecution had failed to establish demand of illegal gratification in
connection with the K.C.C. loan.
DEMAND OF ILLEGAL GRATIFICATION-
2 5 . Jai Singh Mohne (P.W.-1), in his examination-in-chief, alleged that
the accused had demanded ₹ 30,000 in connection with the K.C.C. loan and
the Acharya Vidya Sagar Go Samvardhan Yojna . However, in paragraphs
29, 34 and 74 of his cross-examination, he resiled from that version and
denied any demand of illegal gratification. In paragraph 82, he even denied
the conversation recorded in the transcript (Exhibit P-2) and maintained the
same denial in re-examination. His testimony regarding the alleged demand
is, therefore, materially inconsistent and unreliable. Head Constable Sagar
Sonkar (PW-2), the shadow witness, neither witnessed nor overheard any
conversation between the complainant and the accused.
26. The trial Court, upon a proper appreciation of the admissibility and
evidentiary value of the recorded conversation in paragraphs 50 to 57 and 62
of the impugned judgment, rightly concluded in paragraphs 136 and 139 that
the prosecution had failed to prove the alleged demand of illegal
gratification. In view of the material inconsistencies discussed above and the
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absence of independent corroboration, the said finding is a plausible view of

the evidence.
VOLUNTARY RECEIPT OR OBTAINMENT OF ILLEGAL
GRATIFICATION-
2 7 . Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant forcefully contended the
phenolphthalein coated tainted currency notes were recovered from the table
of the accused kept in his cabin. Further, traces of phenolphthalein were
found on hands of accused. Therefore, in view of the law laid down in
Neeraj Dutta (supra) the obtainment of illegal gratification should be
inferred.
28. The Supreme Court in case of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 held as under:-
"152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would
like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof
required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone.
The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1952 SC 349). This case has been
uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later
decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v.
State of Uttar Pradesh (1969 (3) SCC 198) and Ramgopal v. State of
Maharashtra (1972 (4) SCC 625). It may be useful to extract what
Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant's case (supra):-
"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a
circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established
and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be
such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be
proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as
to show that within all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused."
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following
conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to
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be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this
Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should'
and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a
legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be
proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade &
Anr. v. State of Maharashtra where the following observations were
made:

"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be
and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and
the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and
divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."
(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to
be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the
panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence."
29. The evidence concerning the delivery and receipt of the tainted currency
notes is materially inconsistent. Jai Singh Mohne (P.W.-1) stated in his
examination-in-chief that he was seated outside the branch with his son
Govind, he handed the tainted currency notes to the accused, who counted
them and went inside his cabin. However, in paragraph 17, he stated that he
entered the cabin and handed over the notes which the accused placed on the
table. In cross examination paragraph 55, he presented a third version, that
he placed the currency notes on the table of accused, whereupon the accused
pushed them back and directed him to deposit them at the counter.
Thereafter, he handed over the notes to Govind, stating that the accused had
refused to accept them. Govind (PW-3) admitted that he entered the cabin of
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accused and placed the notes on the table while searching for papers.

Therefore, the possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out. These
admissions were made after both the witnesses were confronted with the
CCTV footage of the brach, which established Govind’s presence at the
relevant time. Although, the final panchnama records Head Constable Sagar
Sonkar and Oskar Kindo as witnesses to the transaction, Sagar Sonkar (PW-
2) did not depose that he had witnessed either the handing over of the notes
or voluntary receipt by the accused. The trial Court, upon considering this
evidence in paragraphs 86 to 89, 96, 97 and 118 to 128 of the impugned
judgment, rightly held that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused had voluntarily accepted the tainted
currency notes as illegal gratification.
30. The trial Court duly considered the incriminating and exculpatory
circumstances outlined in paragraph 134 of the impugned judgment. In view
of the inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence, the absence of reliable
proof of demand or voluntary acceptance and the reasonable possibility of
false implication, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of
circumstances pointing conclusively to the guilt of the accused.
Consequently, the view taken by the trial Court is plausible and warrants no
interference.
31. An acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused. In the present case, the findings of the trial Court constitute a
plausible view of the evidence and disclose no manifest error of law,
material misreading or omission of evidence or perversity warranting
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interference in appeal. Accordingly, the application filed by the Special

Police Establishment (Lokayukta), Bhopal under Section 419 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking leave to appeal is
dismissed and leave is declined.
32. Consequently, the criminal appeal stands disposed of.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
VKT

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