Mohd Iliyas And Ors vs Sh Ahmad Hasan

Court
Delhi High Court

$~62
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 25.08.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010145712026
+ RC.REV. 116/2026 & CM APPL. 57616/2026 (For
preponement of date of hearing on behalf of petitioner)

MOHD ILIYAS AND ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Anurag Bindal, Mr. Ankur
Gupta & Mr. Mohd.Uwaiz,
Advs.

versus

SH AHMAD HASAN .....Respondent
Through:

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)


1. The present Rent Control Revision Petition has been filed under
1
Section 25 B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , seeking to
2
assail the Eviction Order dated 05.02.2026 passed by learned
3
ARC, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in RC ARC No.
468/2023 titled as “Ahmad Hasan v. Mohd. Iliyas & Others.”.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners confines his
challenge to the judgment to two aspects.
3.
The first contention pertains to the issue of bona

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Judgement
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 1 of 16


fide requirement. Learned counsel submits that the Respondent has
failed to disclose any cogent or sufficient reason for shifting from the
considerably larger premises presently occupied by him, along with

his daughter, to the comparatively smaller subject premises.
4. Learned counsel further submits that the Respondent's daughter,
in any event, has independent accommodation available to her. It is,
therefore, contended that no justification has been shown for her to
shift along with the Respondent to the comparatively smaller subject
premises.
5. The second point that is sought to be raised relates to the
availability of suitable alternate accommodation.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that one of the main
issues is with respect to the property which is set out at Serial No. 7 of
the tabular column in the impugned order wherein it is stated that the
said property is another number for the property which is mentioned at
Serial No. 1 of the tabular column.
7. He would fairly submit that he does not assail the findings in
respect of the properties having been sold except to the extent that it
would require to be seen and proven as to when the properties were
actually sold, which raises a triable issue.
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioners also submits that the learned
ARC has wrongly shifted the onus to prove the various facts upon the
Petitioner despite having been able to make a prima facie case.
9. He therefore submits that there are triable issues and the
impugned order, having not dealt with the same, needs to be set aside
and the matter sent back.

3
Learned ARC
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 2 of 16


10. No other submissions were advanced by the learned counsel for
the Petitioner.
ANALYSIS:
11. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the
Petitioners and with his able assistance perused the material on record.
12. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
13. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in S arla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
4
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
5 6
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that thejurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
14. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
7
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
8
Grover .
15. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against

4
(1998) 8 SCC 119
5
(2014) 9 SCC 78
6
(2022) 6 SCC 30
7
2024:DHC:9322
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 3 of 16


an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

16. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an

8
2025:DHC:11285
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 4 of 16


absence of adjudication warranting interference.
17. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
18. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioner against the
Impugned Order are required to be examined.
19. This Court, having heard learned counsel for the Petitioner,
takes note of the consideration accorded by the learned ARC to the
exact points raised in oral submissions before this Court. The same
reads as follows:
“B. BONA FIDE NEED:-

13. The petition has been filed for the residential bona fide need of
the petitioner. The petitioner is stated to be currently residing at the
property situated at 840, Katra Hiddu, Farashkhana, Delhi-110006
with his sons' families, who are not providing proper care and
protection to the petitioner despite the petitioner suffering from
heart related health issues and breathing problems.

14. It has been specifically mentioned in the petition that the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 5 of 16


petitioner wishes to now shift, along-with his daughter's family, to
the tenanted premises so that he can be looked after by his daughter
for the rest of his life. It has been further submitted that the
petitioner's daughter is living with her husband and three minor
sons in a rented accommodation nearby, which is stated to be a one
room accommodation. It has been further averred that the sons of
the petitioner and their family do not have cordial relations with the
petitioner as well as the petitioner's daughter, and there have been
confrontations between them whenever the petitioner's daughter
visits him for his daily care and needs.

15. It has been further averred that the daughter of petitioner visits
the petitioner for few hours on a daily basis to take care of the
petitioner and accordingly, the petitioner now wishes to shift with
her in the tenanted premises in question to avoid any daily
confrontation between him and his sons' families.

16. In respect of the question of bona fide requirement, it is a
settled law that the court must presume the bona fide requirement
of the landlord and that the burden to refute the said presumption
squarely lies on the tenant. A mere assertion on the part of the
tenant is insufficient. It was held in Sarla Ahuja v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 that:

when a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his
own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on
the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide.
When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when
the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the
Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the
requirement of the landlord is bona fide."

17. Similar observations made in case of Baldev Singh Bajwa v.
Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778 are as under:

A heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the
requirement is not genuine. The tenant is required to give
all the necessary facts and particulars supported by
documentary evidence if available to prove his plea in the
affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to
adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide
requirement of the landlord; a mere assertion on the part of
the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong
presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement
of occupation of the premises is real and genuine.

18. On the aspect of bona fide requirement, the respondents have
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 6 of 16


averred in the leave to defend application that the petitioner has
only filed medical papers pertaining to the year 2019 and 2020, and
no further medical treatment papers have been brought on record.
Further, it has been submitted that as per the prescription, the
petitioner has Asthma for 25 years and it does not mention any
alarming health situation. Further, it has been submitted that it has
been wrongly averred that the daughter of the petitioner has left her
job to take care of the petitioner and that the daughter of the
petitioner is carrying on her profession as a clinical nutritionist at
Gagan Vihar, Delhi and also at Hauz Khas, New Delhi. Further, it
has been submitted that the daughter of the petitioner is residing
with her husband at 1969, Gali Wali Baig, Mohalla Qabristan,
Turkman Gate, Delhi-110006, which is a three floor built up
structure. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the daughter is
not dependent upon the petitioner and a false story has been
concocted to grab the tenanted premises in question. Lastly, it has
been submitted that the tenanted premises is only a one room
premises which is in dilapidated condition, and it is highly unlikely
that the petitioner, who is used to living in a huge area of 200 sq.
yds. will shift to the tenanted premises.

19. The law in relation to 'dependents' is well settled. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5
SCC 397, has clarified that the expression "for his own use" under
section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act must receive a liberal construction
to include a wife, husband, children, married sons and daughters,
widowed daughter, sister, nephew and other kith and kin of the
landlord, provided two tests are satisfied: (i) whether the
requirement of such person can be considered to be the
requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there exists a close
inter-relation or identity nexus with the landlord. Furthermore, it is
settled law that in the context of the DRC Act, dependency is not
financial but for accommodation (see Labhu Lal v. Sandhya Gupta
(2010) 119 DRJ 599; Bhupinder Singh Bawa v. Asha Devi (2016)
10 SCC 209). Thus, merely because a family member may be
financially independent does not prevent any other family member
from seeking eviction of the tenant for the requirement of such a
financially independent member of the family (see Hari Shanker
Rastogi v. Allahabad Bank, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11158).

20. Based on the aforesaid position of law, it is evident that the
petitioner can maintain an eviction petition to live with his
daughter as long as the said daughter is dependent upon the
petitioner for the purpose of accommodation, and her financial
dependence is not relevant. Therefore, in order to show that the
daughter of the petitioner is not dependent upon the petitioner, the
respondents were required to show that she has independent
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 7 of 16


residential accommodation in her name. However, it has been
specifically pleaded by the petitioner that his daughter is currently
living in a rented accommodation with her husband. The
respondents have not filed any documents to show that the current
residential premises of the daughter of the petitioner is owned by
the petitioner/his daughter/daughter's husband. Therefore, there is
no cogent material to show that the daughter of the petitioner is not
dependent upon the petitioner for the purpose of residential
accommodation. Further, in any case, it is not the case of the
petitioner that he needs the tenanted premises only for his daughter.
In fact, the petitioner wishes to shift to thes tenanted premises
himself and reside there with his daughters that she can take care of
his health. Therefore, the bona fide residential need is of the
petitioner as well as his daughter.
Therefore, the ground regarding dependency raised by the
respondents is not tenable.

21. Secondly, the vocation of the daughter of the petitioner is also
not relevant since the need is residential, and her commercia!
endeavours have nothing to do with the residential need of the
petitioner. In any case, even if the requirement would have been
commercial, the mere factum of her being gainfully employed
would not affect the bona fide nature of the petition. In this regard,
it is a settled position of law that the petitioner/his dependent is not
required to sit idle while the eviction petition drags on for years.
The law is well settled that the present occupation or business
activity of the landlord does not disentitle them from seeking
eviction for establishing a separate and independent verture. In
Raghunath G. Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co., (1999) 8
SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically observed:

“Joblessness is_not a condition precedent for seeking to
get back one's premises. For that matter assuming the
landlord was in a job and had not resigned it or assuming
that pending the long-drawn litigation he started some
other temporary water business to sustain himself, that
would not be an indication that the need for establishing a
grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable
requirement or that it was motivateć or was a mere design
to evict the tenant.”

22. Next, no triable issue can be raised on the basis that the
petitioner is unlikely to shift to the tenanted premises, which is
dilapidated and cramped for room, since the petitioner is used to
living in huge spaces. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the landlord is the best judge of the nature, extent and
manner of their requirement, and that they cannot be thrusted with
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 8 of 16


the opinion of the tenant or the Court (see Prativa Devi v. T.V.
Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353, Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh
Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222, Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem
Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679 and Siddalingamma v.
Mamtha Shenoy (2001) 8 SCC 561). The principles established in
the aforesaid judgments were succinctly summarized in Dharampal
v. Chaudhary Ram Chander, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12980, in the
following manner:

(a) the landlord is the best judge of his requirement; (b) he
has complete freedom in the matter, (c) it is no concern of
the Courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what
manner he should use his property or to prescribe a
standard therefor; (d) there is no law which deprives a
landlord of beneficial enjoy- ment of his preperty; (e) the
Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need
by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels
would be most suited for the purpose; (f) the Court will
not thrust its own wisdom upon the choice by the landlord
by holding that not one but the other accommoda- tion
must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his need; (g)
the Jucge, should place himself in the place of the landlord
and then answer whether the bona fide requirement is
outcome of a sincere, honest desire, instructed by realities
of life; and, (h) the law does not command or compel the
landlord to squeeze himself and dwell in lesser premises
so as to protect the ten- ant's continued occupation.

23. Accordingly, the bona fide need of the petitioner cannot be
doubted on this apprehension of the respondents. In any case,
Section 19 of the DRC Act empowers the tenant to seek re-entry it,
after eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, the landlord
does not occupy the premises or uses it for a different purpose
within the statutory period. If the landlord fails to occupy the
premises, the tenant is not without remedy
24. Lastly, no triable issue can be raised on the ground that the
petitioner has been unable to show any health emergency because
of which he needs to shift to the tenanted premises along-with his
daughter. As noted above, landlord is the best judge of his own
requirement. In any case, once the petitioner has pleaded on oath
his bona fide need, a presumption of genuineness arises and it is for
the respondents to show that the bona fide need is not genuine.
Apart from a bald assertion that the petitioner is not seriously ill,
the respondents have not furnished any material to refute the bona
fide need of the petitioner. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner
is almost 85 years old and he wishes to reside with his daughter so
that she can take care of his health. Leave to defend application
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 9 of 16


cannot be granted on a vague ground that the petitioner ought to
have furnished medical documents to show any health emergency.
25. Therefore, the respondents have not been able to raise any
tenable objection with respect to the bona fide need of the
petitioner. Therefore, no triable issue is raised with respect to the
aspect of bona fide requirement.”
(emphasis supplied)

20.
Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the
Petitioners and the reasoning contained in the Impugned Judgment,
this Court finds no ground warranting interference in exercise of its
limited revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of
the DRC Act.
21. Insofar as the first contention concerning the bona
fide requirement of the Respondent is concerned, the learned ARC has
considered each of the objections raised by the Petitioners. The case of
the Respondent, as pleaded in the eviction petition, is that he is an
elderly person suffering from certain health ailments and presently
resides with the families of his sons, with whom he does not enjoy
cordial relations. The Respondent has expressed his desire to reside
with his daughter and her family so as to enable her to look after him
during his old age.
22. The submission of the Petitioners that the Respondent presently
resides in a comparatively larger accommodation and, therefore, his
expressed desire to shift to the subject premises, which are
comparatively smaller, cannot be accepted as giving rise to a triable
issue. The suitability of an accommodation and the manner in which a
landlord proposes to organise his residential life cannot ordinarily be
dictated by a tenant. The law is well settled that the landlord is the best
judge of his residential requirements and of the manner in which such
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 10 of 16


requirements are to be fulfilled. Merely because the Petitioners
perceive the existing accommodation of the Respondent to be larger or
more spacious does not render the Respondent's decision to reside in
his own premises along with his daughter and her family lacking
in bona fides .
23. Significantly, the requirement asserted by the Respondent is not
merely for occupation of the subject premises as an alternative
residence. The requirement is founded upon his desire to reside in the
company and care of his daughter and to avoid the difficulties arising
from the existing living arrangement with the families of his sons.
Such a requirement is inherently a matter concerning the personal
comfort, convenience and residential choice of the landlord. It is not
for the tenant or the Court to determine that the Respondent should
continue residing in his existing accommodation merely because, in
the opinion of the Petitioners, the same is more spacious.

24. The contention that the Respondent has failed to establish any
immediate medical emergency is equally misconceived. A landlord
seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement is not
required to establish the existence of a medical emergency before he
can seek to reside in his own premises. The Respondent is not
required to wait for his health condition to deteriorate to an extent
constituting an emergency before making appropriate residential
arrangements for his comfort and care. The learned ARC has rightly
taken into consideration the age of the Respondent and his expressed
desire to reside with his daughter so as to receive her care and
assistance.
25. The objection concerning the alleged availability of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 11 of 16


independent accommodation to the Respondent's daughter has also
been duly considered by the learned ARC. The learned ARC has noted
that the Petitioners failed to place any cogent material on record
demonstrating that the premises presently occupied by the daughter of
the Respondent are owned by her or by her husband. On the contrary,
the case of the Respondent is that his daughter presently resides with
her family in rented accommodation.
26. In any event, the requirement projected in the present case is not
exclusively that of the daughter. The Respondent himself seeks to
occupy the subject premises and proposes to reside therein with his
daughter and her family. Therefore, even assuming that the daughter is
financially independent or engaged in her own vocation, the same
would not, by itself, discredit the bona fide residential requirement of
the Respondent. As rightly observed by the learned ARC, dependency
in the context of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act cannot be examined
solely through the prism of financial dependence.
27. The submission that the Respondent's daughter has an
independent accommodation available to her is, therefore, of no
assistance to the Petitioners in the absence of any material establishing
such independent ownership or availability. A bald assertion in this
regard, without supporting material, could not have constituted a
triable issue warranting the grant of leave to defend.
28. This Court further finds that the learned ARC has not accepted
the case of the Respondent merely on the basis of a bare assertion. The
Impugned Judgment records the specific circumstances pleaded by the
Respondent, including his age, his existing residential arrangement,
the asserted lack of cordial relations with the families of his sons, and
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 12 of 16


his desire to reside with his daughter so that she may take care of him.
The learned ARC thereafter examined the objections raised by the
Petitioners and found that the same were either unsupported by
material or did not, in law, detract from the genuineness of the
requirement asserted.
29. The Petitioners' second submission relates to the alleged
availability of suitable alternative accommodation, particularly the
assertion that even though certain properties have been stated to be
sold, the same have to be verified, which, according to the Petitioners,
is an aspect requiring further examination and raises a triable issue.
30. This submission also does not persuade this Court to interfere
with the Impugned Judgment. The learned counsel for the Petitioners
has fairly stated that the findings of the learned ARC concerning the
properties which had already been sold are not being substantively
assailed, except on the limited ground that the precise time when such
properties were sold required to be established. However, the mere
assertion that further inquiry may be required as to the date of sale of
certain properties cannot, by itself, constitute a triable issue. The
Petitioners were required to place before the learned ARC specific and
cogent material demonstrating that any particular property was
available to the Respondent as suitable alternative accommodation at
the relevant time.
31. The grant of leave to defend cannot be founded upon a
speculative possibility that, upon a further inquiry, some material may
emerge which could potentially support the defence of the tenant. The
burden upon the tenant is to disclose such facts as would, if
established, disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order. A
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 13 of 16


vague assertion regarding the necessity of further verification, without
any substantive material indicating the availability of a suitable
alternative accommodation, does not satisfy this requirement.
32. Further, the submission that the learned ARC wrongly shifted
the burden upon the Petitioners is also without merit. Once the
Respondent had disclosed the circumstances constituting his
asserted bona fide requirement and had explained the position
concerning the properties attributed to him, it was incumbent upon the
Petitioners to substantiate their contrary assertions with some cogent
material. The learned ARC has merely assessed whether the facts
disclosed by the Petitioners were sufficient to raise a triable issue and
has found that the assertions concerning alternative accommodation
remained unsupported by material capable of displacing the prima
facie case established by the Respondent.
33. It is well settled that the requirement of raising a triable issue
does not mean that every assertion made by a tenant in an application
seeking leave to defend must necessarily result in the grant of leave.
The issue raised must be real, substantial and supported by such
material as would, if established, disentitle the landlord from
obtaining an eviction order. The learned ARC was, therefore, justified
in declining leave where the assertions of the Petitioners were found to
be unsupported, vague or legally inconsequential.
34. This Court also finds that the objections raised before this Court
substantially traverse the very grounds which were specifically
considered and dealt with by the learned ARC in the Impugned
Judgment. The learned ARC has undertaken a detailed consideration
of the Respondent's bona fide requirement, the alleged dependency
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 14 of 16


and accommodation of his daughter, the objection concerning the size
and condition of the subject premises, and the allegations regarding
the availability of alternative accommodation. The reasoning cannot
be said to suffer from any non-consideration of a material plea or from
any error apparent on the face of the record.
35. The endeavour of the Petitioners, in substance, is to invite this
Court to re-appreciate the material on record and arrive at a conclusion
different from that reached by the learned ARC. Such an exercise
would clearly travel beyond the limited scope of the jurisdiction
vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC
Act. Merely because another view may possibly be taken on the
material placed on record would not justify interference in revisional
jurisdiction.
36. No jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity or
manifest illegality in the decision-making process of the learned ARC
has been demonstrated before this Court. Nor has it been shown that
any material contention of the Petitioners was left unadjudicated. The
conclusions arrived at by the learned ARC are based upon a
consideration of the pleadings and material placed on record and
cannot be characterised as unreasonable or unsupported by law.
37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no merit in
either of the grounds urged by the Petitioners. The Petitioners have
failed to demonstrate the existence of any triable issue which was
wrongly rejected by the learned ARC or any error in the Impugned
Judgment warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8)
of the DRC Act. The Impugned Judgment, therefore, calls for no
interference.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 15 of 16


38. In view thereof, the present Petition alongwith all pending
application(s), if any, stands dismissed.

39. The next date of hearing i.e., 05.10.2026 stands cancelled.



HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 25, 2026/ v/va



Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.08.2026
16:10:43
RC.REV. 116/2026 Page 16 of 16