STATE OF ORISSA vs MAHESWAR SAMANTARAY

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.64 of 2009

CNR No.ODHC010013072009
(In the matter of an application under Section 378(5) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Petitioner
Orissa (G.A. Department) …….

-Versus-
Maheswar Samantaray Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : Mr. H.K. Mund, Advocate along with
Ms. Anima Kumari Dei, Advocate

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 01.10.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
acquittal dated 02.04.2008 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Bhubaneswar in T.R. Case No.144 of 2006, arising out of
Vigilance P.S. Case No.45 of 2001, whereby the opposite party,

Maheswar Samantaray, was acquitted of the charge under Section 13(2)
read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner and Mr. H.K. Mund, learned counsel for the opposite-
party.
3. The prosecution case was that the opposite party, then serving as
an Executive Engineer, had acquired and was in possession of assets
disproportionate to his known sources of income. On receipt of reliable
information regarding accumulation of assets disproportionate to the
known sources of income of the opposite party, an enquiry was
undertaken in respect of his assets, income and expenditure. His
Government residential quarter at Unit-VI, Bhubaneswar, office,
paternal house at Gobardhan Prasad, the residential premises of his
brother and the office of one of his friends were searched on 10.08.2001
pursuant to a search warrant. The enquiry initially disclosed assets of
Rs.36,74,225/- against income of Rs.17,35,629/- and expenditure of
Rs.8,66,917/-. During investigation, however, the Investigating Officer
reassessed the assets at Rs.24,64,857/-, income at Rs.17,89,346.20 and

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expenditure at Rs.8,40,359.52, resulting in probable savings of
Rs.9,48,986.68 and disproportionate assets of Rs.15,15,870.30. The
sanctioning authority ultimately accorded sanction in respect of
disproportionate assets quantified at Rs.13,09,800/-.
4. The prosecution examined six witnesses and relied upon
documentary evidence. The defence did not examine any witness, but
relied upon documentary materials. The prosecution witnesses included
the officer who communicated the sanction order, the Building Inspector
who valued the immovable properties, the owner of one of the vehicles
seized during search, the Statistical Investigator who prepared the per
capita expenditure report, the officer who lodged the report after enquiry
and the Investigating Officer. The defence of the opposite party was one
of denial of possession of disproportionate assets.
5. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court accepted
several explanations offered by the accused concerning agricultural
income, income earned by his wife, a friendly loan, sale proceeds of a
two-wheeler, gold ornaments, rental income and other financial
resources. It also made adjustments to the valuation of certain properties

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and excluded some articles and vehicles from the assets attributable to
the accused. The learned trial court calculated the accused's total assets,
his income with expenditure and concluded that the accused had
sufficient income and savings to account for the assets in question. The
learned trial court also found fault with the sanction for prosecution,
inter alia, on the ground that the amount mentioned in the sanction
differed from the amount assessed by the Investigating Officer and that
the sanction order did not adequately demonstrate application of mind.
Holding that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge beyond
reasonable doubt, the learned trial court acquitted the accused under
Section 248(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant part of
the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein for ready reference:-
25. Point No. (vi): While considering the validity of sanction,
“
it may be stated that the Apex Court in the decision reported
in (1984) 2 Supreme Court Cases, 183, in the case of R.S.
Nayak.... Vrs. A.R. Antula have held that the authority entitled
to grant sanction must apply its mind to the facts and other
evidence before according sanction as grant of sanction is not
an idle formality, but a solemn and sacrosanct act, which
removes the umbrella of prosecution of Govt. servant against
frivolous prosecution and the aforesaid requirements must
therefore, be strictly complied with before any prosecution
could be launched against a public servant. It is found from
the sanction order vide Ext. 33 and corrigendum Ext. 34 that
sanction has been accorded for launching prosecution against
the accused for possession of disproportionate assets of an

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amount of Rs. 13,09,800/-. The sanction order vide Ext. 33
was signed by the Deputy Secretary to Govt. on 28.9.04. The
order indicates that the accused was in possession of the
above disproportionate assets to his known source of income.
But on 24.11.04 a corrigendum was issued to correct the
words “known sources of income” to “beyond his known
source of income”. On perusa l of the chargesheet I find that
the I.O. submitted charge-sheet showing disproportionate
assets to the tune of Rs. 15,15,870.30. But sanction was
accorded for Rs. 13,09,800/-. The sanction order does not
disclose as to how the same was reduced to Rs. 13 lakhs.
P.W.1, the Deputy Secretary who has communicated the
sanction order could not explain as to how the sanction is in
respect of the amount not shown by the I.O. The sanction
order does not disclose the value of the total assets, total
income and total expenditure of the accused during the check
period. It also does not disclose about the probable
savings/assets of the accused before the check period. It is
therefore patent that without application of mind a sanction
order has been forwarded to the Director-cum-Addl. D.G. of
Police, Vigilance from the Under Secretary to Govt. If the
above sanction order is tested with the touchstone of the legal
position as per the above reported decision of the Apex Court,
I find that the same is not a valid one. The learned Special
P.P., Vigilance appearing for the State could not support the
validity of the sanction order.
It is therefore held that without application of mind, a
sanction order has been mechanically sent to the Vigilance
Department. It is therefore invalid in law.
26. In the result, the prosecution has failed to establish the
charge U/S. 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 against the accused. Hence, the
accused is found not guilty U/S. 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and is
acquitted U/S. 248(1) Cr.P.C. and is set at liberty. His bail
bond is cancelled. ”

6. The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the
learned trial court committed serious errors in appreciating the

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evidence on record and in accepting the explanations advanced by
the accused without adequate scrutiny. It was contended that the
prosecution had undertaken an investigation into the assets, income
and expenditure of the accused during the check period and had
quantified the disproportionate assets at Rs.15,15,870.30. According
to the State, the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the
testimony of the Investigating Officer and the documentary materials
collected during investigation, established that the assets acquired by
the accused were disproportionate to his known sources of income.
The learned trial court, however, accepted several sources of income
claimed by the accused without insisting upon satisfactory and
reliable evidence to substantiate those claims.

7. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned trial court
erred in accepting the alleged agricultural income, the income
attributed to the accused's wife, the friendly loan of Rs.4,00,000/-
allegedly received from Gadadhar Mantri, and the rental income
claimed by the accused. It was argued that the mere production of
income-tax returns or the assertion of a particular source of income

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could not, by itself, establish the genuineness and availability of the
funds claimed to have been earned or received. The State contended
that the learned trial court also made unwarranted deductions and
adjustments while calculating the value of the assets and expenditure,
thereby materially affecting the ultimate computation of
disproportionate assets. The findings recorded by the learned trial
court, according to the State, were contrary to the evidence on record
and resulted in an erroneous conclusion that the accused's assets were
adequately explained.
8. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State as
well as the learned counsel for the respondent at length. The rival
submissions have been duly considered in the light of the materials
available on record.

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9. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is
clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
red by this
“29. From the aforesaid decisions rende
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the

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findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when

there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible.
”

Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets
strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against

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an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to
rebut the same in appeal.”


10. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi
@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is

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vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra) , the reinforced presumption of innocence
following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely
because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
11. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of

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justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 18 years, as he was acquitted
by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of
reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.
12. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra)
Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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