Manoj Goyal vs Rajasthan High Court,
- Court
- Supreme Court
NON-REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 699
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 8142 OF 2018
MANOJ GOYAL ………APPELLANT(s)
Versus
RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT & ORS. …….RESPONDENT(s)
J U D G M E N T
.
PRASANNA B. VARALE J
1. This civil appeal, arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 19357 of 2018, is directed against the final judgment and order
dated 08.02.2018 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2302
of 2015.
2. The High Court chose not to intervene in the selection and
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHA SUNDRIYAL
Date: 2026.07.14
16:39:18 IST
Reason:
appointment process. It ruled that the appellant’s challenge to the
validity of Rule 41 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010, had
1
become purely academic following later legislative amendments, and it
declined to disrupt the appointments that were already finalized.
3. At the centre of the present lis lies the seminal question regarding
the validity and constitutional vires of Rule 41 of the Rajasthan Judicial
Service Rules, 2010. Specifically, the challenge is directed against the
proviso inserted vide the amendment notification dated 10.06.2011,
which mandated a minimum qualifying benchmark of 25% marks in
the viva-voce (interview) for candidates aspiring to be appointed to the
District Judge cadre.
BRIEF FACTS
4. The factual matrix that serves as the bedrock of the present
appellate proceedings is rooted in the recruitment process for the
Higher Judicial Service in the State of Rajasthan, specifically pertaining
to the appointment of Additional District Judges from the advocates’
quota. The appellant herein, an aspiring candidate for the judicial
service, has invoked the extraordinary appellate jurisdiction of this
Court to assail the impugned final judgment and order dated
08.02.2018 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2302
of 2015.
2
5. To appropriately appreciate the contours of this dispute, it is
necessary to traverse through the background of the recruitment
process for judicial officers. On 21.03.1996, the Government of India,
pursuant to the directions of this Court, constituted the First National
Judicial Pay Commission, widely known as the Shetty Commission,
under the Chairmanship of Hon’ble Justice K.J. Shetty. The mandate
of the Commission comprehensively encompassed examining the
conditions of service, age, and method of recruitment of judicial officers.
Submitting its detailed report, the Shetty Commission noted that it had
received innumerable complaints that the selection of candidates based
solely on a viva-voce examination had often led to arbitrariness,
whimsy, and unjust selections. To instill transparency and objectivity,
the Commission recommended a uniform procedure consisting of a
written examination carrying 200 marks, followed by a viva-voce test
carrying 50 marks. Crucially, the Commission explicitly and
emphatically recommended that there shall be no cut-off marks in the
viva-voce test, and the merit list ought to be prepared strictly on the
basis of the aggregate marks obtained in both the written examination
and the viva-voce. This Court, in its authoritative and binding
1
pronouncement in All India Judges Association vs. Union of India ,
1
(2002) 4 SCC 247
3
accepted these recommendations, directing all States and High Courts
to implement them and frame appropriate service rules accordingly.
6. In faithful consonance with this Court’s mandate, the State of
Rajasthan promulgated the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.
Pursuant to the Shetty Commission’s recommendations, Rule 41 of the
original 2010 Rules did not prescribe any minimum qualifying marks
for the viva-voce examination. Subsequently, on 15.04.2010, an
advertisement was issued notifying 36 vacancies for the post of
Additional District Judge under the advocates’ quota. Written
examinations were conducted and results were declared. However,
owing to widespread agitation and allegations of anomalies, the
Rajasthan High Court, acting on its administrative side, cancelled the
entire recruitment process on 22.09.2010, resolving to hold the
examinations afresh.
7. A pivotal juncture in this litigation arose thereafter when, on
10.06.2011, the State of Rajasthan amended Rule 41 and Schedule IX
of the 2010 Rules. Through this mid-stream amendment, a
controversial proviso was inserted into Rule 41, mandating that no
candidate shall be recommended for appointment who fails to obtain a
minimum of 25% marks in the interview. Consequently, a fresh
advertisement was issued on 19.07.2011 for 39 vacancies. The
appellant, harbouring legitimate aspirations for judicial service,
participated in this renewed selection process. The written
4
examinations were held in May 2012, and the appellant secured 161
marks out of 250 (i.e., 64.4%), and was thus declared successful and
eligible for the interview round.
8. However, when the final results were published on 25.05.2013,
the appellant was utterly dismayed to find his name excluded from the
final list of selected candidates recommended for appointment. The
appellant had secured an aggregate of 168 marks—placing him at the
th
11 rank purely on aggregate merit out of 39 total vacancies but he was
awarded 7 marks out of 30 in the viva-voce. Since the amended rules
necessitated a minimum of 25% marks in the interview, which
mathematically translates to 7.5 marks out of 30, the appellant fell
short of the threshold by a mere 0.50 marks. Consequently, despite
outperforming several selected candidates in the aggregate score
(including respondents who secured aggregate marks of 158.5 and 144
respectively), the appellant was disqualified from appointment solely
due to the viva-voce cut-off.
9. Aggrieved by this disqualification and the perceived arbitrariness
of the rule, the appellant, along with similarly situated individuals,
initially approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution by
filing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 595 of 2013, assailing the vires of the
amended Rule 41 and the select list. On 13.10.2014, a coordinate
Bench of this Court dismissed the writ petition insofar as it challenged
the select list and the consequent appointment orders, but specifically
5
kept the petition pending with respect to the challenge to the vires of
Rule 41 and Schedule IX. Subsequently, the matter was placed before
a larger Bench of this Court. Recognizing jurisdictional propriety, this
Court, vide order dated 03.12.2014, allowed the appellant to withdraw
the Article 32 petition with liberty to approach the High Court.
Crucially, this Court expressly directed that “All contentions of the
parties are kept open to be agitated before the High Court”.
10. Armed with this explicit liberty, the appellant instituted D.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 2302 of 2015 before the High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan. He prayed for a declaration that the amendment introducing
the cut-off marks in the viva-voce was unconstitutional, ultra vires, and
contrary to the binding dictum of this Court in the All India Judges
Association (supra) case, further seeking a mandamus for his
appointment based on his aggregate marks. Interestingly, during the
pendency of this writ petition before the High Court, the State of
Rajasthan once again amended the Judicial Service Rules on
28.11.2017, completely deleting the contentious proviso that had
mandated a minimum of 25% marks in the interview.
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Taking cognizance of this subsequent 2017 amendment, the
Division Bench of the High Court, vide the impugned judgment dated
08.02.2018, summarily dismissed the appellant’s writ petition. The
High Court reasoned that since the offending proviso had already been
6
deleted, adjudicating upon the vires of the amended Rule 41 had
become a mere academic exercise. Furthermore, the High Court
construed the earlier interim order of this Court dated 13.10.2014 as a
final and binding dismissal of the appellant’s challenge to the
appointments, holding that the subsequent withdrawal order dated
03.12.2014 did not resurrect the challenge against the selected
candidates. The High Court also noted that the appellant, having
participated in the selection process with his eyes open to the amended
rules, was estopped from challenging the same upon being declared
unsuccessful. The present appeal has been preferred against this
dismissal, raising profound questions regarding the sanctity of
Supreme Court directives, the retrospective effect of rules, and the
boundaries of administrative discretion in judicial appointments.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
12. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
vehemently argued the following contentions before this Court:
12.1 It was vehemently contended that the High Court committed a
grave error in law by relying on the earlier order dated 13.10.2014.
The appellant submitted that vide the subsequent order dated
03.12.2014, this Court had permitted the withdrawal of the
petition with liberty to approach the High Court, explicitly keeping
“all contentions open”. Relying on the settled legal principles
7
enunciated in Messer Holdings Ltd. vs. Shyam
2
Madanmohanruia & Ors. and St. John’s School vs. Asha
,
3
Bhan , the appellant argued that upon withdrawal of a petition,
all orders passed during its pendency automatically lapse and lose
legal efficacy, relegating the parties to the exact position they
occupied before the petition was filed.
12.2 The appellant argued that the High Court abdicated its
constitutional duty by labelling the challenge to the vires of Rule
41 as an “academic exercise” due to the 2017 amendment. It was
submitted that an unconstitutional act is not the law, and if the
2011 amendment is struck down, it remains void ab initio and
stillborn, as held in Behram Khurshid Pesikaka vs. State of
4 5
Bombay and Mahendra Lal Jaini vs. State of U.P. Declaring
the rule ultra vires would directly validate the appellant’s right to
th
appointment based on his 11 rank in the aggregate score.
12.3 The appellant contended that the introduction of a minimum cut-
off in the viva-voce is in direct conflict of the Shetty Commission
Report, which was accorded the sanction of this Court in All India
Judges Association case (supra) . This settled position was
6
further reaffirmed in Hemani Malhotra vs. High Court of Delhi ,
2
(2016) 11 SCC 484
3
2012 SCC OnLine Del 3769
4
(1954) 1 SCC 240
5
1962 SCC OnLine SC 55
6
(2008) 7 SCC 11
8
7
and Ramesh Kumar vs. Delhi High Court , which held that
there should be no cut-off marks in the viva-voce test.
12.4 It was argued that the rule-making authority cannot use its
legislative power to override a final judicial pronouncement. Citing
8
State of Tamil Nadu vs. K. Shyam Sunder , the appellant
maintained that enacting a provision that in substance overrules
a binding judgment of the Supreme Court amounts to encroaching
upon judicial power, and is thus ultra vires the Constitution.
12.5 The appellant emphasized that the 36 vacancies were initially
advertised in 2010 when the unamended rules (prescribing no
cut-off) were in force. Applying the 2011 amendment
retrospectively to these vacancies impaired the vested rights of the
9
candidates. Relying on P. Mahendran vs. State of Karnataka
10
and State of Rajasthan vs. R. Dayal , it was submitted that
vacancies must be governed by the rules prevalent at the time they
occurred, and amendments cannot be applied retrospectively
unless expressly stated.
12.6 The learned counsel for the appellant by way of an interim prayer
also submitted that the appellant in the meantime be appointed
as Additional District Judge. The learned counsel invited our
7
(2010) 3 SCC 104
8
(2011) 8 SCC 737
9
(1990) 1 SCC 411
10
(1997) 10 SCC 419
9
attention to Prayer clause B, made in the petition which reads as
under:
“Direct the respondents herein to appoint the petitioner on
the basis of aggregate marks with all consequential
benefits and seniority in their service from the date of the
announcement of the results for the selection of Additional
District Judges.”
12.7 Finally, it was contended that Rule 41 is wholly arbitrary and
violative of Article 14. It permits an absurd outcome where a
highly meritorious candidate (scoring 168 aggregate) is
disqualified, while a candidate with a significantly lower aggregate
score (like 144) is appointed merely by securing the cut-off marks
in the interview. Citing P.K. Ram Chandra Iyer vs. Union of
11
India , the appellant argued that such a mechanism makes the
subjective viva-voce the sole determining factor, rendering the
objective written examination nugatory.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
13. Per contra , the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents robustly defended the impugned judgment and the
selection process, advancing the following counter-contentions:
13.1 The respondents primarily contended that the appellant, having
participated in the written examination and the interview process
under the amended 2011 Rules with open eyes and without any
11
1984 (2) SCC 141
10
demur, is barred by the principle of estoppel. Once a candidate
accepts the terms of the advertisement and takes a calculated
chance in the selection process, he cannot be permitted to turn
around and assail the rules upon finding his name missing from
the successful list.
13.2 The respondents supported the High Court’s view that the
challenge to the 25% cut-off had indeed become academic. The
offending proviso in Rule 41, which prescribed the minimum
marks in the interview, was expressly deleted by a subsequent
amendment on 28.11.2017. Thus, the statutory requirement of a
minimum cut-off no longer existed on the statute books, making
any judicial declaration on its vires unnecessary.
13.3 It was strongly urged that the coordinate Bench of this Court, vide
its order dated 13.10.2014, had explicitly declined to examine the
challenge made to the select list dated 25.05.2013 and the
consequent appointment orders. The respondents argued that the
subsequent withdrawal order dated 03.12.2014 only left open the
challenge to the interpretation of Rule 41, and did not resurrect
the challenge to the finalized appointments which had attained
finality.
13.4 The respondents contended that the recommendations of the
Shetty Commission regarding the absence of a viva-voce cut-off
were not rigid statutory mandates. Relying heavily on this Court’s
11
decision in Mahinder Kumar vs. High Court of Madhya
12
Pradesh , it was argued that the Shetty Commission’s report
can at best be stated to be guidelines. Once statutory rules are
framed by the competent authority, the selection must strictly
follow those rules.
13.5 It was submitted that the High Court, as the competent recruiting
authority, possesses the absolute liberty and authority to specify
minimum benchmarks to maintain the efficiency of the service.
Citing Ramesh Kumar vs. High Court of Delhi (supra) and
13
Mehmood Alam Tariq vs. State of Rajasthan , the
respondents argued that unless expressly barred by a prevailing
statute, the recruiting authority can prescribe minimum
qualifying marks for the interview to adjudge suitability.
13.6 Finally, the respondents defended the necessity of the interview
cut-off, arguing that for a high judicial office such as an Additional
District Judge, the interview is the best mode of assessing a
candidate’s overall suitability. While a written test assesses
academic knowledge, the viva-voce discloses essential intellectual
and personal qualities such as alertness, resourcefulness,
capacity for discussion, and leadership traits, making a minimum
benchmark in the interview entirely rational and justified.
12
(2013) 11 SCC 87
13
(1988) 3 SCC 241
12
ANALYSIS
14. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments
advanced at the Bar and the material on record.
15. The Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court vide its final order and
judgment dated 08.02.2008 in DB Civil Writ Petition bearing No. 2302
of 2015 disposed of the petition and held as under:
7. “Before proceeding with the matter, it will not be out of
place to mention that the order of Supreme Court dated
13.10.2017 is very clear. Second order is very clear the
petition qua setting aside appointment and consideration of
petitioners’ case seeking relief to the petitioner was declined.
8. The contention that it was interim order in our considered
opinion is mis-conceived in as much as SLP was dismissed
and it was pending only for the interpretation of Rule 41. In
that view of matter, the interpretation of order of Supreme
Court canvassed by counsel for the petitioner. It will not be
open for the petitioners to contend that withdrawal of
petitions allow them to raise all contentions in these
petitioners since the contention which was pending in SLP
was interpretation of Rule 41.
9. In that view of matter, even if we accept the contention of
dismissal of interim order, it is a final order only permission
granted was challenge of Rule 41. In our considered opinion,
in view of subsequent developments we are not deciding the
legality of Rule 41. However, it is made clear that that same
issue is pending before the Supreme Court, the same shall be
subject to Supreme Court decision.”
Emphasis supplied .
13
16. We are entirely unable to find merit in the appellant’s case. The
order dated 13.10.2014 was not a mere interlocutory administrative
directive but it was a conscious, substantive judicial determination by
this Court declining to interfere with the finalized appointments. The
subsequent withdrawal permitted on 03.12.2014 pertained exclusively
to the surviving portion of the writ petition-the academic challenge to
the vires of Rule 41. The doctrine of withdrawal cannot be weaponized
to magically erase a final substantive dismissal of a specific prayer. The
High Court was perfectly justified in holding that the challenge to the
appointments had attained finality and could not be resurrected.
17. Turning to the substantive legal challenge, the appellant argues
that the introduction of a minimum cut-off in the interview violates the
recommendations of the Shetty Commission, which were approved by
this Court. However, this argument fundamentally misconstrues the
nature of the Commission’s report and the autonomy of the recruiting
authority. As rightly cited and forcefully argued by the learned counsel
for the respondents, this Court in Mahinder Kumar vs. High Court of
14
Madhya Pradesh , definitively clarified the legal status of these
recommendations. In Mahinder Kumar , this Court categorically
observed that the prescriptions contained in paragraph 10.97 of the
14
(2013) 11 SCC 87
14
Shetty Commission Report “can at best be stated to be a guideline,
which any High Court should keep in mind, while resorting to selection
for filling up the posts in the higher judicial service”. Once the
competent authority, in its wisdom and legislative competence, frames
statutory rules governing the recruitment, the selection must be strictly
tethered to those rules.
18. Furthermore, the respondents correctly place reliance on Syed
15
T.A. Naqshbandi vs. State of J&K , wherein this Court held that
conditions of service are governed by statutory rules, and it is entirely
futile to claim that existing statutory rules must yield to overarching
policy guidelines until they are formally amended in a manner known
to law. This principle was cemented in Malik Mazhar Sultan vs. UP
16
Public Services Commission , reiterating that selections must be
conducted in strict accordance with the existing statutory rules.
19. The rationale behind prescribing a minimum benchmark for the
viva-voce is neither arbitrary nor whimsical but it is rooted in profound
administrative necessity. We must remember that the recruitment in
question is for the post of Additional District Judge which is a highly
reputed and solemn judicial office. As highlighted by the respondents,
15
(2003) 9 SCC 592
16
(2008) 17 SCC 703
15
17
relying on Mehmood Alam Tariq vs. State of Rajasthan , both the
written examination
and the interview are absolutely essential to the selection process.
While a written examination objectively tests a candidate’s academic
legal knowledge, it is the viva-voce that brings out the essential
intellectual and personal qualities required of a judge such as alertness,
resourcefulness, dependability, capacity for discussion, and the ability
to take decisive action. To suggest that a candidate who fails to
demonstrate these minimum essential traits in an interview must
nonetheless be appointed merely because of a high aggregate score
would severely compromise the calibre of the higher judiciary. The 25%
cut-off was a rational, considered benchmark prescribed to preserve the
integrity and quality of judicial administration.
20. Moreover, the appellant’s entire claim is barred by the doctrine of
estoppel. It is a well-settled proposition of service jurisprudence that a
candidate who participates in a selection process with full knowledge
of the prevailing rules, takes a calculated chance, and appears for the
interview, cannot be permitted to turn around and assail the rules upon
finding his name absent from the successful list. The appellant
participated in the written examination and the interview under the
17
(1988) 3 SCC 241
16
amended 2011 Rules with his eyes wide open. Having failed to secure
the qualifying marks, he cannot now approbate and reprobate.
21. The Supreme Court in Om Prakash Shukla vs. Akhilesh Kumar
18
Shukla and Ors. has held that the person having appeared in the
examination and having failed to qualify cannot subsequently turn
around and question the same. Para 24 of the said judgment reads as
follows:
“Moreover, this is a case where the petitioner in the writ petition
should not have been granted any relief. He had appeared for the
examination without protest. He filed the petition only after he had
perhaps realised that he would not succeed in the examination.
The High Court itself has observed that the setting aside of the
results of examinations held in the other districts would cause
hardship to the candidates who had appeared there. The same
yardstick should have been applied to the candidates in the
District of Kanpur also. They were not responsible for the conduct
of the examination.”
19
22. In Madan Lal and Others vs. State of J & K and Ors , the
Supreme Court in para 10 relying upon the decision in the case of Om
Prakash Shukla (supra) has held as under:
“10. Therefore, 'the result of the interview test on merits cannot
be successfully challenged by a candidate who takes a chance
to get selected at the said interview and who ultimately finds
himself to be unsuccessful……”.
18
(1986) Supp SCC 285
19
(1995) 3 SCC 486
17
23. In Dhananjay Malik and Others Vs. State of Uttaranchal and
20
Ors. the Supreme Court has relied upon its earlier decision in the
case of Madan Lal (supra) has held in paragraphs 7 as under:
“7……..Having unsuccessfully participated in the process of
selection without any demur they are estopped from challenging
the selection criterion inter alia that the advertisement and
selection with regard to requisite educational qualifications were
contrary to the Rules.”
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIEF AND THE AVOIDANCE OF A
PANDORA’S BOX
24. We must emphasise the aspect of the practical difficulties and the
prejudice being caused to the respondent so as to grant any relief to the
appellant particularly on the backdrop of the rules which was under
challenge no more exists on the Rule book. The recruitment process
for the 2011 advertisement was finalized, and the selected candidates
were appointed and posted as Additional District Judges as far back as
July 2013. These judicial officers have been discharging their solemn
duties for over a decade. To appoint the appellant today, based on his
aggregate marks, and to grant him retrospective seniority and
consequential benefits, would violently disrupt the established seniority
matrix of the entire judicial cadre. It would allow the appellant to jump
ahead of dozens of currently serving judges who have earned their
20
(2008) 4 SCC 171
18
seniority through years of actual judicial service. Such an outcome
would be profoundly unjust to the State Government and the Rajasthan
High Court, who conducted the entire recruitment process
transparently and in strict adherence to the statutory rules validly in
force at that time.
25. It is also highly unjust to re-announce the result of a decade-old
selection process. Modifying the final select list today would inherently
threaten the vested rights of the candidates who were successfully
appointed (including Respondents 4 and 5).
26. Most crucially, granting relief to the appellant would be manifestly
unfair to similarly placed candidates. The appellant was not the only
candidate who might have secured high aggregate marks but failed to
meet the 25% interview cut-off. There are undoubtedly numerous other
candidates across the State who accepted their disqualification under
the rules and moved on with their lives. If this Court were to suddenly
declare the cut-off invalid and direct appointments based solely on
aggregate marks, it would fundamentally alter the rules of the game to
the detriment of all those who did not approach the courts.
27. Consequently, acceding to the appellant’s prayers would
effectively open a Pandora’s box. The judicial system would be
immediately flooded with these types of cases from every unsuccessful
candidate from the 2011-2013 batch and potentially other batches
demanding the recalculation of their scores, the restructuring of merit
19
lists, and the granting of retrospective appointments and back wages.
The administrative machinery of the High Court and the State would
be paralyzed by the need to unscramble a finalized recruitment egg. The
law places a high premium on certainty and finality in administrative
appointments, precisely to prevent such chaotic unravelling of settled
public services.
CONCLUSION
28. In light of the foregoing analysis, we find no infirmity whatsoever
in the impugned judgment of the High Court. The High Court correctly
concluded that the challenge to the vires of Rule 41 was rendered
academic by its subsequent deletion, and rightly recognized that the
finalized appointments could not be disturbed. The rule prescribing a
minimum cut-off in the interview was well within the legislative
competence of the State, was rationally connected to the objective of
selecting capable judicial officers and was binding upon all candidates
who willingly participated in the process.
29. The appellant, having failed to secure the minimum qualifying
marks in the viva-voce, has no vested right to appointment. The
overarching need to preserve administrative finality, protect the settled
seniority of serving officers, and prevent the opening of a floodgate of
retroactive litigation absolutely precludes the granting of the relief
sought.
20
30. There is also merit in the submissions of learned counsel for the
respondent that the appellant having participated in the written
examination and interview process under the Amended Rules of 2011
with open eyes, without raising any protest cannot turn his back to
challenge the rules of the game. We may make a reference to an oftenly
quoted judgment of this Court in the matter of Om Prakash Shukla
21
vs. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Ors.
31. Accordingly, the Civil Appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby
dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 08.02.2018
passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan is affirmed.
32. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. There shall
be no order as to costs.
........................................J.
[SANJAY KAROL]
.........................................J.
[PRASANNA B. VARALE]
NEW DELHI;
JULY 13, 2026.
21
(1986) Supp SCC 285
21
22