TIRUPATI PANIGRAHI vs TIRUPATI CHOUDHURY

CMP/235/2026
ODHC010060742026
2026:OHC:263
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CMP No.236 of 2026
CNR No-ODHC010060892026
Along with
CMP No.235 of 2026
CNR No- ODHC010060742026
(In the matter of Petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, 1950).



Tirupati Panigrahi
(In both the Petitions)
…. Petitioner (s)
-versus-

Tirupati Choudhury & Ors.
(In both the Petitions)
…. Opposite Party (s)




Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode :

For Petitioner (s) : Mr. Goutam Mukherji (Sr. Adv.)
along with
Mr. Abhishek Dash, Adv.

For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. S.P. Mishra, Sr. Adv.
along with
Mr. S. Sastry, Adv.




CORAM:
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI



DATE OF HEARING:-24.08.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-30.10.2026


Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1.
Since common questions of fact and law are involved in the above-
mentioned matters, the same were heard together and are being
disposed of by this common judgment. However, for the sake of
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Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09

convenience and proper adjudication, CMP No.236 of 2026 is treated as
the leading case
2. In CMP No.236 of 2026, the Petitioner/ Defendant No.1 challenges the
order dated 24.12.2025 passed in I.A. No.02 of 2025, arising out of C.S.
No.19 of 2025, by the learned District Judge, Bhubaneswar, Khordha
dismissing his petition for revocation of leave under Section 92 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to present the suit vide order dated
18.12.2025 passed in the aforesaid suit.

I. F ACTUAL M ATRIX OF THE C ASE :
3.
The brief facts of the case are as follows:

(i) Vigyan Bharati Charitable Trust (“Trust”) is a public trust for
educational purposes of public at large. It came to existence in the
year 2002 with an aim to establish healthcare institutions and
other educational institutions for public benefit. In all case, it will
not be gainsaid that the Petitioner since the inception has
assumed role of Chairman of the Trust and acting as the
Chairman with Suresh Kumar Panigrahi (Defendant No.2) as the
Managing Trustee.

(ii) The Opposite Party No.l and 2 in their unjust bid to overthrow
the Petitioner from the Trust's management and assume control
to siphon funds conspired and adopted fraudulent tactics. The
Opposite Party No.l (Plaintiff No.2) manipulated his daughter
Sabitri Panigrahi (who happens to be the daughter-in-law of the
Petitioner), Opposite Party No.7 to sign on blank papers in the
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garb of banking requirement. Thereby, using the signatures
fraudulently obtained and forging them to manufacture
resolutions.
(iii) One such fabricated resolution dated 24.02.2025 was moved
clandestinely concerning Trust administration, management as
well as amending the Trust Deed vide the Deed dated 09.05.2025
(Manufactured Trust Deed) showing removal of the Petitioner
from Chairmanship behind their back. On anvil of which, on
12.05.2025, the said Opposite Party in order to declare such
actions valid also filed a declaration suit before the learned Civil
Judge (Jr. Div.), Bhubaneswar in C.S. No.1193 of 2025 seeking
injunction against the Petitioner.

(iv) Trite at this juncture to state that the I.A. for ex parte ad-interim
reliefs under Order 39, Rule 3 filed in the First Suit i.e. in C.S. No.
1193 of 2025 was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Div).
Assailing the said dismissal, first appeal was filed before the
learned Dist. Judge in FAO No.71 of 2025. The learned Dist. Judge
vide judgment/order dated 19.07.2025 while holding the appeal
to be not maintainable being not prescribed under Order 43, Rule
1 of CPC directing analogous hearing of the matters considering
pendency of the two suits taking aid of Section 24 of CPC before
the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.).

(v) Upon learning of the fraudulent methods to oust the Petitioner
using forged signatures, the Opposite Party No.7 raised her
objection to sign on any such resolution and amended trust deed
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urging the Chairman, the Petitioner to take necessary action
against them. In such view of the matter. The Opposite Parties
Nos. l and 2 were disqualified from trusteeship with effect from
10.05.2025 in accordance with by-laws vide a Resolution.
Consequently, Trust Deed was amended vide registered Trust
Deed dated 15.05.2025, with signatures of all other Trustees.
Against this, the Opposite Party Nos. l and 2 filed another suit i.e.
C.S. No.1563 of 2025 before the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Div.),
Bhubaneswar.
(vi) A perusal of the order sheet would go to show in clear terms that
the suit was admitted vide Order dated 11.07.2025. Pursuant to
which, application under Order 7, Rule 11 was filed by the
Petitioner, Defendant No. l therein for rejection of the plaint. The
objection raised therein was attempted to be cured by presenting
a petition under Section 92 of CPC. Such a Petition seeking leave
of the Court under Section 92 of CPC read with Section 91 of CPC,
which is a mandatory condition precedent for instituting a suit
wherein charitable trust is made party.

(vii) The learned Civil Judge, however, vide order dated 16.08.2025
granted leave under Section 92 without authority of law being not
the competent Court to render such leave.
(viii) The Petitioner has, in the meantime, also filed its show cause to
interim application under Order 39 CPC.

(ix) Challenging the order granting leave by the learned Civil Judge
(Sr. Division), Bhubaneswar, the Petitioner had approached this
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Court in CMP No. 1912 of 2025. This Court vide order dated
04.12.2025 set-aside the order granting leave directing to proceed
under Order VII Rule 10 read with Rule 10-A of CPC.
(x) Accordingly, a fresh plaint was filed before the competent court
of District Judge, Khurda. The suit was registered as C.S. No.19
of 2025 with petition for leave. The present Petitioner as
Defendant filed his objection dated 18.12.2025 to the leave
petition.
(xi) The learned District Judge however, granted the leave vide order
dated 18.12.2025. being aggrieved, the Petitioner moved an
application for revocation of the said leave.

(xii) The learned District Judge vide order dated 24.12.2025, rejected
the revocation petition finding the dispute to be regarding
administration of the trust and management of its accounts held
that there is no circumstance existing to revoke the leave granted.
(xiii) Being aggrieved by the said impugned order rejecting leave
revocation and allowing the leave thereto, the Petitioner is
constrained to approach this Court by way of the present CMP.


II. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE P ETITIONER :
4. The learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) A close reading of the averments taken in the plaint would go to
show that the mandatory pre-requisite conditions for invocation
of the provision under Section 92 of the CPC which deals with
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public charities, in seeking the leave to institute the suits are not
satis ęed. The Plaint averments and the reliefs claimed therein are
not for vindication of any public rights. On the other hand, the
claims made and the dispute raised for adjudication are
essentially of private nature mainly concerning with the
constitution of trust revolving around the individual rights of the
trustees much less to say on the management and administration
of the trust.
(ii) The reliefs revolve round the declaration of individual and
personal rights; bereft of any allegation as to the breach of trust
necessitating a direction of the Court for administration of trust.
Reference may be made to Paragraphs 1 to 5 of the Petitions ęled
by the Plainti ěs seeking leave under Section 91 read with 92 of
the Code as also the plaint(s) averment(s) more particularly
Paragraphs 5, 6, 10 and 11.
(iii) It would be evident therefrom that neither there is anything
substantially pleaded as regards representing the public and
breach of trust of the public as the compelling situation for ęling
the suit, seeking declaration relating to management and
administration of the trust. The prayers made in the plaint being
appreciated in the backdrop of the plaint(s) averments, make it
clear that the declaration sought for as the principal reliefs are all
in assertions of their individual and personal rights. Therefore,
the suits do not fall within the purview of clauses (a) to (h) of
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Section 92 of CPC and for their institution as such by taking the
leave.
(iv) The fundamental position of law requiring that the suit must be
against a trust; is not the case here. The real test for applicability
of the Section 92 of the CPC that fundamentally the suit be on
behalf of public for public right concerning existence of a public
trust and its breach thereof necessitating the direction of the court
for proper administration are not at all ge Ĵing expressed in the
plaint averments. Rather, a careful reading reveals that the suits
by the Plainti ěs are to achieve the personal goal in gaining control
and run the Trust without active participation of the Defendant
Nos.1. 8.
1

(v) In Vidyodaya Trust vs. Mohan Prasad R. & others , the Supreme
Court at paragraphs 18 and 19 thereby held as under:
“18. Prior to legislative change made by the Code of
Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act (104 of 1976) the
expression used was "consent in writing of the Advocate
General". This expression has been substituted by the
words "leave of the Court". Sub-section (3(3) has also
been inserted by the Amendment Act. The object of
Section 92 CPC is to protect the public trust of a
charitable and religious nature from being subjected to
harassment by suits ęled against them. Public trusts for
charitable and religious purpose are run for the bene ęt
of the public. No individual should take bene ęt from
them. If the persons in management of the trusts are
subjected to multiplicity of legal proceedings, funds
which are to be used for charitable or religious purposes

1

(2008) 4 SCC 115
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would be wasted on litigation. The harassment might
dissuade respectable and honest people from becoming
trustees of pubic trusts. Thus, there is need for scrutiny.
19. In the suit against public trusts, if on analysis
of the averments contained in the plaint it
transpires that the primary object behind the suit
was the vindication of individual or personal
rights of some persons an action under the
provision does not lie. As noted in Swami
Paramatmanand case a suit under Section 92 CPC
is a suit of special nature, which presupposes the
existence of a public trust of religious or charitable
character. When the plainti ěs do not sue to
vindicate the right of the public but seek a
declaration of their individual or personal rights
or the individual or personal rights of any other
persons or persons in whom they are interested,
Section 92 has no application.:”
[Emphasis Supplied]
(vi) In the above case, their Lordships, on reading of the Plaint
averments have held that though the colour of legitimacy was
sought to be given by projecting as if the suit was for vindicating
public rights, the emphasis was on certain, purely private and
personal disputes. Further, the Supreme Court referred to the
2
decision in case of Sugra Bibi vs. Hazi Kummu Mia , wherein it
was held that the mere fact that the suit relates to public trust of
religious and charitable in nature and the reliefs claimed fall
within some of the clauses of Section 92(1), would not by itself
a Ĵract the operation of this Section, unless the suit is of a
representative character instituted in the interest of public and

2

AIR 1969 SC 884
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not merely for vindication of individual and personal rights of the
Plainti ě. Reiterating the same principle of law in paragraph 26 of
the Vidyodaya Trust (supra) , it has held that it is not every suit
claiming reliefs fs under Section 92 CPC that can be brought
under the said provision, but only the suits which besides
claiming any of the reliefs; are brought by individuals as
representatives of the public for vindication of public right.
(vii) In Ghat Talab Kaulan Wala vs. Gopal Dass Chela Shurti Das
3
(dead) by Legal Representative Ram Niwas , the Supreme Court
at Paragraph 12 has held as under:
“…12. We have heard the learned counsel for the
parties. We ęnd that the order passed by the High Court
in respect of ęrst substantial question of law is not
sustainable. Section 92 of the Code contemplates a suit
against a trust either for removing any trustee;
appointing new trustee; or vesting any property in a
trustee, etc. but the present suit itself is by a Trust
against a Sevadar, therefore, the procedure prescribed
under Section 92 of the Code would not be applicable in
a suit by a trust. Section 92 of the Code confers right on
a person in case of any alleged breach of any express or
constructive trust created for a public purpose of a
charitable or religious nature. Since the Trust itself was
the plainti ě, the ęnding of the High Court is clearly
erroneous and not sustainable.”
4
(viii) In Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra and Others , while stating the
object and purpose behind, Section 92 of the CPC, the Supreme
Court had the occasion to reiterate the pre-conditions for

3

(2020) 13 SCC 50
4

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1605
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a Ĵracting the provision under Section 92 of CPC so as to grant
leave for institution of the suit. Analyzing the object and purpose
behind Section 92 of CPC at Paragraph 33, their Lordships
observed as under:
“33. A suit under this provision can be termed as a
‘representative suit of a special nature’ since the object
behind the enactment of this provision is the protection
of public rights in the public trust. Therefore, the parties
ęling a suit by invoking this section are considered to be
representatives of the public.”


(ix) Further, referring to several earlier decisions of the Apex Court
including those referred to hereinabove have conclusively held:
“…137. For the sake of convenience, a conspectus of the
legal and factual discussion in the preceding paragraphs
is as follows:
i. A suit under Section 92 of the CPC is a
representative suit of a special nature since the
action is instituted on behalf of the public
bene ęciaries and in public interest. Obtaining a
'grant of leave' from the court before the suit can
be proceeded with, acts as a procedural and
legislative safeguard in order to prevent public
trusts from being subjected to undue harassment
through frivolous suits being ęled against them
and also to obviate a situation that would cause a
further wastage of resources which can otherwise
be put towards public charitable or religious aims.
However, at the stage of grant of leave, the court
neither adjudicates upon the merits of the dispute
nor confers any substantive rights upon the
parties.
ii. Several decisions of this Court have outlined
certain conditions or essential pre-requisites that
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need to be ful ęlled for a suit to be maintainable
under this provision. This Court in Ashok Kumar
Gupta (supra) delineated them as follows (a) the
trust in question must be created for public
purposes of a charitable or religious nature; (b)
there must exist a breach of trust or a direction of
the court must be necessary for the administration
of the trust; and (c) the relief claimed must be one
or other of the reliefs as enumerated under Section
92(1) of the CPC. In order to successfully establish
that a suit is not maintainable under Section 92, it
would be su Ĝcient to prove that any one of the
conditions enumerated above has not been met,
however, in order to assert its
maintainability, all the aforesaid conditions
need to be satis ęed .”

(x)
In the touchstone of the aforesaid se Ĵled legal principles, all
averments made in the plaint if read with special emphasis to
averment in paragraph 17 of the Plaint indicating the cause of
action for the suit, it becomes apparent that the bundle of facts
leading to the cause of action for the suit(s) are inter se personal
disputes between parties. The exact averment made in paragraph
17 of the Plaint is quoted hereunder:
“17. That the cause of action arose in the case within the
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court for the ęrst time, on
dated 27.09.2002, when the Plainti ě no.1 was instituted
for the ęrst time. Then all other subsequent dates, then
on dated 09.05.2025, when the amended trust deed has
been registered with the DSR, Khurdha, Bhubaneswar,
then on dt.10.05.2025, when the defendant No.2 has
issued an illegal le Ĵer stating that the plaintiěs No. 2 &
3 have been disquali ęed from the trust on vague
allegations having no iota of evidence, then on
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subsequent dates when the Defendants are trying to
create disturbance over the suit schedule properties.
Finally, the cause of action has aroused on dt.
02.07.2025 when the certi ęed copy of amended Trust
deed dt.15.05.2026 was obtained and on such other
dates as stated above.”


(xi) The Plainti ěs do not seek an adjudication by the Court under
Section 92 of CPC that a particular trustee be removed in the
interest of the Trust and another trustee be appointed for proper
administration. Rather, they seek a declaration that their own
resolutions are valid and the rival resolutions and Trust Deed are
invalid. Merely the Trust being a charitable one cannot cure the
dominant character of the suit, which in substance do not fall
within the mandatory statutory pre-conditions of Section 92 CPC.
(xii) In view of all the above, it is submi Ĵed that, the mandatory legal
requirements as provided under Section 92 of CPC are not
satis ęed and the suit(s) as laid although projects to be a suit for
vindicating public rights but in substance seeks adjudication of
disputes which are purely private and personal in nature, lest to
say for protection of the interests of the public.

III. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE OPPOSITE PARTY NOS .1 TO 5:

5. The learned counsel for the Opp. Party Nos.1 to 5 earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The Opposite Parties Nos.1 to 5 are the plaintiffs before the
learned trial court along with Vigyan Bharti Charitable Trust, a
public charitable trust founded in the year 2002 which runs
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Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09

among other institution, Hi-Tech Medical College and Hospital at
Bhubaneswar and at Rourkela, Hi-Tech College of Nursing, Hi-
Tech School of Nursing, Hi-Tech Dental College, Hi-Tech College
of Pharmacy, Hi-Tech +2 Science College and Hi-Tech Public
School. The dispute concerns the administration and
management of the said Trust and of its institutions after the
majority of the trustees removed the Petitioner from the office of
Chairman and the Defendant No. 2 from the office of Managing
Trustee by resolution dated 01.05.2025.
(ii) Section 92 of C.P.C. contemplates that:
“92. Public charities .-
(i) ln the case of any alleged breach of any express or
constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable
or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is
deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust and
having obtained the [leave of the Court, may institute a suit,
whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that
behalf by the State Government within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter
of the trust is situate to obtain a decree-
(a) removing any trustee;
(b) appointing a new trustee;
(c) vesting any property in a trustee;
(cc) [directing a trustee who has been removed or a person
who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any
trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the
possession of such property;] [inserted by Act 66 of 1956,
Section 9.]
(d) directing accounts and inquiries;
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(e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the
interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of
the trust;
(f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to
be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;
(g) settling a scheme; or
(h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the
case may require.”


(iii) In order to maintain a suit under Section 92 of the C.P.C., a leave
to file the suit from the Court is required to be obtained in order
to institute the suit. A leave under Section 92 of C.P.C. can be
granted by the Court either before notice to the Defendants or by

noticing the Defendants. In the event, leave is granted under
Section 92 of the C.P.C. before notice on appearance of the
Defendants, the Defendant may file an application to revoke the
leave granted in favour of the Plaintiff.
(iv) Normally, ex-parte leave is granted if the Plaintiff on the facts of
the case warrants an interim order to protect the interest of the
Trust and its objectives which requires to be protected
immediately. It is held as per law that a suit under Section 92 of
the C.P.C. is a suit of special nature which pre-supposes the
existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. In
order to apply that Section, the following conditions must be
satisfied:
“a) There must exist a trust for public purposes of charitable
or of a religious nature;
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b) The Plaintiff must allege that there is a breach of such trust
or that the direction of the Court is necessary for the
administration of the Trust;
c) The suit must be a representative one on behalf of the public
and not an individual for the own interest;
d) The relief claimed in the suit must be one of the reliefs
mentioned in the section.”

(v) The aforesaid view has been fortified in Kintali China
5
Jaganadham vs. K. Laxmi Naidu . In order to ascertain whether
the basic ingredient are fulfilled or satisfied in order to maintain
the suit/leave application, the Court is to examine the averments
made in the Plaint alone and not any other documents or the W.S.
6

(vi) In the case of Charan Singh and Anr. vs. Darshan Singh and Ors .
The Supreme Court has held the following:
“Reading the plaint as a whole it is not a suit where the
plaintiffs wanted a declaration of their right in the
religious institution in respect of the Granth Sahib. But it
was a suit where they wanted enforcement of due
performance of the duties of the trustee in relation to a
particular object of the trust. It is well-settled that the
maintainability of the suit under Section 92 of the Code
depends upon the allegations in the plaint and does not fall
for decision with reference to the averments in the written
statement.”
In the instant case, in C.S. No. 18 of 2025, on a bare reading of the
Plaint itself it would be evident that there is specific allegation in
Paragraph No. 5 regarding financial irregularities against the
Erstwhile Chairman i.e., Defendant Nos.1 and Defendant No. 2

5

AIR 1988 Ori 100
6

1975 (1) SCC 298
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another Trustee both being father and son. Allegation regarding
the mismanagement of the Trust which is meant for public
purpose in smooth running of the public institution, specifically,
mentioning in Paragraph No.6 of the Plaint and specific allegation
about non-cooperation of the Erstwhile Chairman i.e., Defendant
No.1 for not calling for trust meeting and not attending meetings
and non-cooperation which is contrary to the terms and condition
of the Trust Deed which resulted in removal of Defendant No.l
and Defendant No.2.
(vii) There is specific allegation in Paragraph No.9 of the Plaint
regarding fraud practice by Defendant Nos.1 and 2 to affect the
smooth management of the Trust affecting the public in general
because of their highhanded action. Similarly, in Paragraph
Nos.l0 and 1l of the Plaint, there is specific allegation about illegal
financial transaction of the Trust account and operating the banks
eve after their removal and creating fabricated and forged
backdated documents and amending the original trust deed
claiming to be the Chairman of the Trust.

(viii) In Paragraph No. 13 of the Plaint, it has been mentioned how
Defendant Nos.1 and 2 without any authority by a misconceived
resolution inducted one Rupesh Ku. Panigrahy who is a member
of Legislative Assembly from Paralakhemundi i.e., Parala
Constituency was not present on the day he was inducted.

(ix) In Paragraph No.15 of the Plaint, there is specific allegation that
Defendant Nos.1 and 2 are trying to completely change the nature
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and character of the Trust, its institutions, assets and liabilities,
staffs which otherwise going to affect the running educational as
well as institution and affect the public in general.
(x) On a close reading of the Plaint, it would be evident that there is
no personal animosity or rivalry but the existing Trustees wants
to preserve and protect the Trust, its properties and the fund that
is available which is meant to be utilized for public purpose. The
relief claimed involves removing any trustee, appointing a new
trustee and directing accounts and inquiries which comes within
the ambit of Section 92 of the C.P.C.

(xi) The suit has been filed by the Trust and the Trustees who are also
the public interested to safeguard the interest of the Trust vis-a-vis
the public interest. There is no prohibition under Section 92 of the
Code when there is allegation regarding mismanagement and
allegation of breach of trust and allegation of misappropriation of
Trust and, a suit by the Trust and its Trustees cannot file a suit for
vindicating the public grievance and protect the interest of the
Public against the Trustees who have committed the breach.

(xii) The decision referred to by the Petitioner in Ghat Talab Kaulan
Wala (supra) arises out of a suit for mandatory injunction
directing the Defendant a Sebadar without filing the suit invoking
Section 92 of the Code.

(xiii) The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it is not
maintainable as no leave has been obtained under Section 92 of
the Code. High Court confirmed the same as if suit of that nature
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comes within the purview of Section 92 of the Code. The Supreme
Court held that such a suit does not come within the purview of
Section 92 of the Code no leave is required to be obtained and
accordingly held the suit to be maintainable. The aforesaid
decision has got no application to the present case as relied upon
and cited by the Petitioner.

(xiv) In order to substantiate the case of the Plaintiff/Opp. Party the
following decisions are relied upon i.e., Sangram Mudali and Ors.
7
vs. Sukant Mohapatra and Ors. and Kintali China Jaganadham
(supra) . ln both the aforesaid decisions, the question of grant of
leave under Section 92 of the Code of the subject matter which
was dealt with in the context of the reliefs claimed in the suit
which comes within the relief of Section 92 of the CPC. So far as
the decision in Vidyodaya Trust (supra) relied upon by the
Petitioner is concerned, the aforesaid decision refers to a case
where the matter has been adjudicated in a suit and in the suit
one of the preliminary grounds taken was that whether the suit is
hit by Section92 of the CPC.

(xv) In the foresaid suit, the Supreme Court by referring to catena of
decisions on the subject specifically held in Paragraph No.24 that
on a close reading of the plaint averments it is clear that though
the color of legitimacy was sought to be given by projecting as if
the suit was for vindicating public rights the emphasis was on

7

2013 (I) OLR 983
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certain purely private and personal dispute and accordingly, the
Court held that suit in that case comes within the purview of
Section 92(l)of C.P.C. It is apt to mention here that as already
stated as per the settled position of law the averments of the Plaint
have to be gone into detail to find out whether there the suit has
been filed to protect the interest of the Trust and Trustees meant
for public purpose or merely vindication of individual personal
rights.
(xvi) Initially, the suit was filed without recourse to Section 92 that was
objected to by the Petitioners who were defendants. Section 92
permission was sought for after the objection. Trial court granted
the leave that was challenged before High Court on jurisdictional
issue as the suit was maintainable in District Judge Court. Before
the District Judge Court, the Petitioners as Defendants appeared
suo-moto and contested the leave application by filing objection.
Tial Court granted leave. Again, an application was filed for
revocation of the leave and against that order the CMPs are filed.

(xvii) In such view of the matter, it was contended that the impugned
order does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity or there is
jurisdictional error which warrants interference.

INDINGS OF THE LEARNED ISTRICT UDGE HURDA
IV. F D J , K :

6.
The learned District Judge, Khurda, while passing the impugned order
has observed that “ In terms of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in
case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public
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purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court
is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-
General, or two or more persons having interest in the trust after obtaining
leave of the Court, may institute a suit, if any of the circumstances enumerated
in Clause (a) to (h) exists to obtain a decree. The plaintiff Trust is undoubtedly
a Charitable Trust. From the pleadings of the plaintiffs, it appears, there is
dispute regarding administration of the Trust and management of its accounts.
Therefore, this Court after taking into consideration the nature of dispute
relating to the Trust and in particular having heard learned counsels for the
plaintiffs as well as the defendants, granted leave to the plaintiffs to present the
plaint. Therefore, in the aforesaid circumstances as well as the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Charan Singh and another (supra)
and in the case of R.M. Narayana Chettiar and another (supra), there is no
circumstances exists to remove or recall the leave already granted to the
plaintiffs to institute the suit. Hence, ordered .”
V. C OURT S R EASONING AND A NALYSIS :
’

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials
available on record.

8. Public trust is a solemn covenant between the generosity of the few and
the welfare of many and a promise dedicated to the common good shall
never become the private preserve of those entrusted with its care. It is
upon such a promise that the Trust in the present case was based. In
2002, the founders of the Vigyan Bharati Charitable Trust made such a
promise, and redeemed it in hospitals, colleges and a school that have
since served the sick and the youth of Odisha. Two decades on, the
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promise stands imperiled by those sworn to keep it. Trustees who once
shared a noble purpose now trade resolutions, rival deeds and lawsuits,
each camp crowning itself the rightful guardian. One camp now knocks
at the door of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the
Code”). The said door was built for the public’s champions and the law
bars it to those who seek only the keys of the house. Whether the
Plaintiffs come as champions of the charity or as claimants to its
command is the question this judgment shall endeavor resolve. The
instant controversy in C.S. No. 19 of 2025 is an endeavor to protect a
public trust, or an attempt to vindicate a private claim beneath the
mantle of public charity?

9. Before the merits are reached, the threshold must be crossed, and the
threshold here is the reach of this Court’s power under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India which is a power of superintendence, and its
virtue lies in its restraint. It does not make the High Court a court of
appeal over every order of a subordinate court. The Supreme Court in
8
Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil has drawn its
boundaries with precision. This Court may intervene where a
subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction it does not possess or has
refused a jurisdiction it does possess, or has acted in such flagrant
disregard of the law as to occasion manifest injustice. Errors of fact, and
the choice between two plausible views, lie beyond its province. Leave
under Section 92 is no routine procedural step rather it is the gateway
through which such a suit may enter the court. A suit admitted through

8

(2010) 8 SCC 329
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that gateway without the correct legal test being applied, is a suit
standing on a foundation the law has not laid. The Trust, its funds and
its institutions are then exposed to the very harassment the provision
was designed to prevent. An error at this threshold is an error that
touches the competence of the proceeding itself. Such an error invites,
and indeed demands, the corrective hand of this Court under Article
227. In Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) the Supreme Court has observed
that:
“42. Chief justice Harries in the Full Bench decision in
Dalmia (supra) stated the principles on which the High
Court can exercise its power under Article 227 very
succinctly which, we would better, quote:
"6. Though this Court has a right to interfere with
decisions of Courts and tribunals under its power of
superintendence, it appears to me that that right
must be exercised most sparingly and only in
appropriate cases. The matter was considered by a
Bench of this Court in Manmathanath v. Emperor,
AIR 1933 Cal 132. In that case a Bench over which
Sir George Rankin C. J. presided held that Section
107, Government of India Act (which roughly
corresponds to Article 227 of the Constitution), does
not vest the High Court with limitless power which
may be exercised at the Court's discretion to remove
the hardship of particular decisions. The power of
superintendence it confers is a power of a known and
well-recognised character and should be exercised on
those judicial principles which give it its character.
In general words, the High Court's power of
superintendence is a power to keep subordinate
Courts within the bounds of their authority, to see
that they do what their duty requires and that they
do it in a legal manner."
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43. In stating the aforesaid principles, Chief Justice
Harries relied on what was said by Chief Justice George
Rankin in Manmatha Nath Biswas vs. Emperor reported
in AIR 1933 Calcutta 132. At page 134, the learned Chief
Justice held:
“...superintendence is not a legal fiction whereby a
High Court Judge is vested with omnipotence but is
as Norman, J., had said a term having a legal force
and signification. The general superintendence
which this Court has over all jurisdiction subject to
appeal is a duty to keep them within the bounds of
their authority, to see that they do what their duty
requires and that they do it in a legal manner. It does
not involve responsibility for the correctness of their
decisions, either in fact or law.”
62 . On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court,
the following principles on the exercise of High Court's
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be
formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
is different from a petition under Article 227. The
mode of exercise of power by High Court under these
two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot
be called a writ petition. The history of the
conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is
substantially different from the history of
conferment of the power of Superintendence on the
High Courts under Article 227 and have been
discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in
exercise of its power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can
it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal
over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to
it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of
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redressal has been provided, that would also operate
as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High
Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in
exercise of its power of superintendence have been
repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the
High Court must be guided by the principles laid
down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in
Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly
followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and
various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra),
followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can
interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and
Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their
authority'.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such
tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction
which is vested in them and by not declining to
exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f),
High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of
superintendence when there has been a patent
perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts
subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and
manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of
natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High
Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law
or fact or just because another view than the one
taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is
a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has
to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court's power of superintendence under
Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has
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been declared a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of
India & others , reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and
therefore abridgement by a Constitutional
amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a
rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil
Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code
(Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut
down the ambit of High Court's power under Article
227. At the same time, it must be remembered that
such statutory amendment does not correspondingly
expand the High Court's jurisdiction of
superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised
on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the
power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and
unfettered power of the High Court under Article
227 , it transpires that the main object of this Article
is to keep strict administrative and judicial control
by the High Court on the administration of justice
within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both
administrative and judicial, is to maintain
efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the
entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does
not bring it into any disrepute. The power of
interference under this Article is to be kept to the
minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not
come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains
pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public
confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and
Courts subordinate to High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of
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relief in individual cases but should be directed for
promotion of public confidence in the administration
of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article
226 is meant for protection of individual grievance.
Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be
unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of
judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power
will be counter-productive and will divest this
extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.””


10. Likewise, Sub-section (1) of Section 92 provides that in the case of any
alleged breach of an express or constructive trust created for public
purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of
the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of such a trust,
the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the
trust and having obtained the leave of the Court, may institute a suit
for any of the reliefs set out in clauses (a) to (h). Sub-section (2) closes
every other avenue that is no suit claiming those reliefs in respect of
such a trust may be instituted except in conformity with sub-section (1).
11.
Before the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, the
gatekeeper was the Advocate-General, whose written consent was
required. Parliament replaced him with the Court. The guard has been
changed but the gate remained. The scrutiny check passed from an
executive officer to a judicial forum and while passing it acquired the
discipline of judicial reasoning.
12.
In fact, the purpose of that scrutiny was explained by the Supreme
Court in Vidyodaya Trust (supra) wherein it has been observed that a
public trust exists for the public. Its funds are meant for charity or
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worship in case of religious trust. Every rupee spent on litigation is a
rupee taken away from the sick, the student and the devotee. And if
trustees are dragged from court to court at the instance of every
disgruntled claimant, honest men and women will shrink from the
burden of trusteeship. Section 92 is the shield that protects the charity
from this attrition.

13. The true character of a legal proceeding is revealed not by the name it
bears, but by the purpose it seeks to serve. A suit under Section 92 of
the Code is no exception. It is a representative proceeding of a special
nature, instituted not to vindicate private rights, but to protect the
public interest in a charitable or religious trust. The plaintiffs approach
the Court as representatives of the public, not as individuals seeking
redress for personal grievances. In Mahant Pragdasji Guru
9
Bhagwandasji v. Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai , the Supreme Court
recognized this distinctive character of the provision. In Swami
10
Paramatmanand Saraswati v. Ramji Tripathi , it clarified that Section
92 has no application where the plaintiffs seek to enforce their own
individual rights or those of persons in whom they are personally
interested. The distinction was further explained in Sugra Bibi v. Hazi
11
Kummu Mia , wherein the Supreme Court has held that neither the
involvement of a public trust nor the mere inclusion of reliefs
enumerated under sub-section (1) is sufficient to attract the provision.

9
AIR 1952 SC 143
10
1974 AIR 2141
11
1969 AIR 884

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The decisive consideration is the object and substance of the suit. A
private dispute does not acquire the character of a public cause merely
because it is brought in the name of a charitable trust. It is this
distinction between the assertion of a private right and the protection
of a public interest that lies at the heart of Section 92.

14. The principles governing the application of Section 92 of the Code were
more focused by the Supreme Court in Operation Asha v. Shelly
12
Batra . Drawing upon the exposition in Ashok Kumar Gupta & Anr.
13
v. M/s Sitalaxmi Sahuwala Medical Trust & Ors ., the Court reiterated
three essential requirements: first, the trust must be one created for a
public purpose of a charitable or religious nature; secondly, there must
be an alleged breach of trust or a necessity for judicial intervention in
its administration; and thirdly, the relief sought must be one
contemplated under sub-section (1) of Section 92. These conditions are
cumulative, and the absence of any one of them renders the provision
inapplicable. The Opposite Parties, placing reliance on Kintali China
14
Jaganadham v. K. Laxmi Naidu invoke the same principles, with
particular emphasis on the representative character of the proceeding,
which must be instituted in the interest of the public rather than for the
vindication of private rights. Thus, the parties are not divided over the
law; they differ only in its application to the facts of the case. The
question, therefore, is whether the suit, judged by the substance of its
pleadings and the nature of the reliefs claimed, bears the character of a

12
2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775
13
(2020) 4 SCC 321
14

(1987) 2 ORISSA LR 262
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genuine representative action for the protection of a public trust or is,
in essence, a private dispute brought within the framework of Section
92.
15. Learned counsel for the Opposite Parties rightly reminds this Court
that the maintainability of a suit under Section 92 is to be judged on the
allegations in the plaint, and not on the defence set up in the written
15
statement which is resonated in Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh ,
which have been reaffirmed in Harendra Nath Bhattacharya v.
16
Kaliram Das . At the stage of leave, the Court does not try the truth of
the allegations. The rule in Charan Singh(supra) prescribes the Court as
to what to read, it does not tell the Court to read without discernment.
The true character of a suit must be gathered from the plaint read as a
whole, with particular regard to its dominant purpose and the nature
of the reliefs sought. It is the substance of the claim, rather than the form
in which it is presented, that determines whether the suit falls within
the ambit of Section 92 of the Code. It was upon such an examination
that the Supreme Court, in Charan Singh (supra ), found that the
plaintiffs were not seeking to enforce any personal right, but merely to
compel the trustees to discharge their obligations towards an object of
the trust. The suit was thus directed towards the fulfilment of a public
obligation rather than the vindication of a private grievance.





15

(1975) 1 SCC 298
16
1972 AIR 246

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16. In Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji v. Patel Ishwarlalbhai
Narsibhai (supra) , the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“A suit under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, is a suit
of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a
public trust of a religious or charitable character. Such
suit can proceed only on the allegation that there is a
breach of such trust or that directions from the court are
necessary for the administration thereof, and it must
pray for one or other of the reliefs that are specifically
men- tioned in the section. It is only when these
conditions are fulfilled that the suit has got to be
brought in conformity with the provision of section 92,
Civil Procedure Code. As was observed by the Privy
Council in Abdur Rahim v. Barkat Ali(1), a suit for a
declaration that certain property appertains to a
religious trust may lie under the general law but is
outside the scope of section 92, Civil Procedure Code. In
the case before us, the prayers made in the plaint are
undoubtedly appropriate to the terms of section 92 and
the suit proceeded on the footing that the defendant, who
was alleged to be the trustee in respect of a public trust,
was guilty of breach of trust. The defendant denied the
existence of the trust and denied further that he was
guilty of misconduct or breach of trust. The denial could
not certainly oust the jurisdiction of the court, but when
the courts found concurrently, on the evidence adduced
by the parties, that the allegations of breach of trust were
not made out, and as it was not the case of the plaintiffs,
that any direction of the court was necessary for proper
adminis- tration of the trust, the very foundation of a
suit under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, became
wanting and the plaintiffs had absolutely no cause of
action for the suit they instituted. In these
circumstances, the finding of the High Court about the
existence of a public trust was wholly inconsequential
and as it was (1) (1928) 55 I.A. 96, unconnected with
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the grounds upon which the case was actual- ly disposed
of, it could not be made a part of the decree or the final
order in the shape of a declaratory relief in favour of the
plaintiffs. It has been argued by the learned counsel for
the respondents that even if the plaintiffs failed to prove
the other allegations made in the plaint, they did succeed
in proving that the properties were public and charitable
trust properties--a fact which the defendant denied. In
these circumstances, there was nothing wrong for the
court to give the plaintiffs a lesser relief than what they
actually claimed. The reply to this is, that in a suit
framed under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code the
only reliefs which the plaintiff can Claim and the court
can grant are those enumerated specifically in the
different clauses of t, he section. A relief praying for a
declaration that the properties in suit are trust
properties does not come under any of these clauses.
When the defendant denies the existence of a trust, a
declaration that the trust does exist might be made as
ancillary to the main relief claimed under the section if
the plaintiff is held entitled to it; but when the case of
the plaintiff fails for want of a cause of action, there is
no warrant for giving him a declaratory relief under the
provision of section 92, Civil Procedure Code. The
finding as to the existence of a public trust in such
circumstances would be no more than an obiter dictum
and cannot constitute the final decision in the suit. The
result is that in our' opinion the decision of the High
Court should stand, but the decree and the concluding
por- tion, of the judgment passed by the trial court and
affirmed by the High Court on appeal shall direct a'
dismissal of the plaintiff's suit merely without its being
made subject to any declaration as to the character of the
properties.”


17. A similar examination of the plaint led the Supreme Court to a different
conclusion in Vidyodaya Trust(supra). The Court found that, although
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the suit was presented as one intended to protect public rights, its real
object was to pursue disputes of a private and personal nature. The
appearance of a public cause could not conceal the essentially private
character of the litigation. The suit was, therefore, held to fall outside
the ambit of Section 92 of the Code. In this light, the submission of
learned counsel for the Opposite Parties, in sub-paragraph (xxiii) of
their written submissions, that Vidyodaya Trust (supra) supports the
maintainability of the suit under Section 92, proceeds on a misreading
of the decision. The principle laid down therein is precisely to the
contrary. It is not enough that a suit professes to protect a public trust,
its true purpose must be the protection of a public interest. It is this
principle that bears directly upon the controversy presently before this
Court.

18. The principle that emerges is very clear as the language of public
interest, however carefully employed, cannot by itself bring a suit
within the ambit of Section 92 of the Code. Nor can mere allegations of
mismanagement or references to the statutory reliefs determine its
character. The Court must look beyond the form of the pleadings to
ascertain the real purpose of the litigation. Where the professed concern
for a public trust conceals a contest for personal rights or control over
its affairs, the suit cannot acquire a representative character merely by
invoking the cause of charity. The law looks to the substance of the
claim, not the clothing in which it is presented.

19. The Supreme Court has held in so many decisions that the grant of
leave is a judicial act, requiring the Court to apply its mind to whether
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a prima facie case for the reliefs under Section 92 is made out, and that
notice to the defendants before leave is granted, though not mandatory,
is desirable. Leave, then, is a considered judicial satisfaction that the
plaint discloses the statutory conditions. It is a safeguard to be exercised
with care, and never a rubber stamp affixed to a plaint at its registration.

20. Learned counsel for the Opposite Parties contends that the Petitioner,
having opposed the grant of leave, could not afterwards seek its
revocation. The contention cannot be accepted. First, the Petitioner’s
objection to the leave petition bears the date 18.12.2025, the very day on
which leave was granted, and nothing in the order dated 24.12.2025
shows that those objections were weighed against the governing tests.
Secondly, the question raised strikes at the competence of the suit itself
since Sub-section (2) of Section 92 forbids any suit for the enumerated
reliefs except in conformity with sub-section (1). If the plaint does not
disclose a representative suit for a public purpose, no order of leave can
clothe it with a character that the statute denies it. A defendant cannot
be barred from showing that the statutory foundation of the suit is
missing merely because an earlier objection was brushed aside without
reasons. Whether the challenge is aimed at the grant of leave or at the
refusal to revoke it, the question before this Court is the same that is
whether the plaint satisfy Section 92.
21. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of the
Supreme Court in R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan
17
Chettiar , wherein the Court, while examining the procedure

17
(1991) 1 SCC 48.
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governing the grant of leave under Section 92 of the Code and the
right of the proposed defendants to seek its revocation, observed as
follows:
“A plain reading of Section 92 of the Code indicates
that leave of the court is a pre-condition or a condition
precedent for the institution of a suit against a public
trust for the reliefs set out in the said section; unless all
the beneficiaries join in instituting the suit, if such a
suit is instituted without leave, it would not be
maintainable at all. Having in mind the objectives
underlying Section 92 and the language thereof, it
appears to us that, as a rule of caution, the court should
normally, unless it is impracticable or inconvenient to
do so, give a notice to the proposed defendants before
granting leave under Section 92 to institute a suit. The
defendants could bring to the notice of the court for
instance that the allegations made in the plaint are
frivolous or reckless. Apart from this, they could, in a
given case, point out that the persons who are applying
for leave under Section 92 are doing so merely with a
view to harass the trust or have such antecedents that
it would be undesirable to grant leave to such persons.
The desirability of such notice being given to the
defendants, however, cannot be regarded as a statutory
requirement to be complied with before leave under
Section 92 can be granted as that would lead to
unnecessary delay and, in a given case, cause
considerable loss to the public trust. Such a
construction of the provisions of Section 92 of the Code
would render it difficult for the beneficiaries of a public
trust to obtain urgent interim orders from the court
even though the circumstances might warrant such
relief being granted. Keeping in mind these
considerations, in our opinion, although, as a rule of
caution, court should normally give notice to the
defendants before granting leave under the said section
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to institute a suit, the court is not bound to do so. If a
suit is instituted on the basis of such leave, granted
without notice to the defendants, the suit would not
thereby be rendered bad in law or non-maintainable.
The grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or
even seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed
defendants because it is always open to them to file an
application for revocation of the leave which can be
considered on merits and according to law.”

22. The aforesaid observations clarify that the grant of leave under Section
92 of the Code does not preclude the proposed defendants from seeking
its revocation and that such an application is required to be considered
on its merits and in accordance with law.
23. (supra
This Court is equally mindful of the caution in Operation Asha )
that at the stage of leave the Court neither adjudicates merits nor
confers substantive rights. This Court therefore expresses no view on
the allegations of forgery, fabricated resolutions, financial irregularity
or wrongful disqualification which each side hurls at each other. Those
are matters for trial in a proper proceeding. The present case is confined
to one question only that is what is the true character of the suit as
pleaded.

24. Vigyan Bharati Charitable Trust is a public trust dedicated to charitable
and educational purposes which is beyond any dispute. The first
requirement of Section 92 of the Code thus stands satisfied. However,
the public character of a trust does not necessarily lend a public
character to every dispute concerning its affairs. The Court must,
therefore, look beyond the rival claims and ascertain the true purpose
of the suit. Is it a genuine endeavor to preserve the charity and protect
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the interests of those for whose benefit it was founded, or merely a
struggle between two rival groups of trustees for control over its
administration? The distinction is vital, since Section 92 is a safeguard
for public charity, not a weapon in private battle for ownership and
power. It is in this light that the plaint is required to be examined. If one
traces the background of the litigation, the history of the proceedings
tells its own story. The dispute sprang from rival resolutions and rival
amendments of the Trust Deed. The Plaintiffs rely on a resolution
removing the Petitioner as Chairman and Defendant No.2 as Managing
Trustee, and on the amended Trust Deed registered on 09.05.2025. The
Petitioner relies on the resolution disqualifying Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3
with effect from 10.05.2025, and on the registered Trust Deed dated
15.05.2025. The Plaintiffs first instituted C.S. No.1193 of 2025 and then
C.S. No.1563 of 2025 before the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Div.),
Bhubaneswar, as ordinary suits for declaration and injunction. Section
92 was invoked only after the Petitioner moved an application under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. Section 92 thus entered this litigation as
a patch for a defect pointed out by the adversary. It did not enter as the
voice of the beneficiaries.
25. Further, the paragraph 17 of the plaint, extracted earlier, sets out the
cause of action that is the registration of the amended Trust Deed on
09.05.2025, the letter dated 10.05.2025 disqualifying Plaintiff Nos.2 and
3, the alleged attempts to disturb the suit schedule property, and the
obtaining of a certified copy of the rival amended Trust Deed. Every
one of these events concerns the competing claims of the two camps to
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office and control. The disqualification of Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 is
pleaded as a principal cause of action. Behind every public trust stand
the hopes of those for whose benefit it was founded. Its classrooms
belong to the dreams of children, its healing hands to the suffering of
patients, and its charitable mission to the welfare of the community.
The trustees are the custodians of that larger promise and their office
owe a responsibility to the society being a public trust and not a
personal possession. A grievance over removal from trusteeship,
however deeply felt, remains essentially a dispute over an individual
right unless it reveals an injury to the charity itself. In the present case,
the plaint discloses no specific instance where a student has been
denied education, a patient deprived of care, or the public denied the
benefits for which the Trust exists. The grievance centres on the loss of
office, not the failure of charity. Section 92 of the Code is concerned with
the latter, not merely with the former.
26. A careful reading of the plaint reveals that the dispute essentially
concerns the rival claims of two groups to the management of the Trust.
The principal reliefs sought are declarations that the resolutions and
Trust Deed relied upon by the Plaintiffs are valid, while those of the
rival group, including the Trust Deed dated 15.05.2025, are invalid,
together with consequential injunctions. Learned counsel for the
Opposite Parties, however, submits that the suit also seeks removal and
appointment of trustees and rendition of accounts, being reliefs
expressly contemplated under clauses (a), (b) and (d) of Section 92(1) of
the Code. But the nature of a suit cannot be determined merely by the
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reliefs mentioned in the prayer. The Court must ascertain the purpose
for which those reliefs are sought. If the object is to protect the Trust
and the interests of its beneficiaries, Section 92 may be attracted. If,
however, the real object is to establish the authority of one group of
trustees over another, the dispute remains essentially private,
notwithstanding the form of the reliefs claimed. It is this distinction that
must guide the determination of the suit’s true character.
27. The submission, however, overlooks a fundamental distinction
between the reliefs contemplated under clauses (a) and (b) of Section
92(1) of the Code and those actually sought in the present suit. These
provisions empower the Court to remove or appoint trustees where
there is a breach of trust or the necessity of judicial intervention in its
administration so requires. The Plaintiffs, however, do not seek the
removal of the Petitioner and Defendant No. 2 by a decree of the Court
upon an examination of their conduct. Their case is that the removal
has already been effected by resolutions passed by them, and what they
seek is a judicial declaration affirming the validity of those resolutions.
At the same time, they seek to invalidate the resolutions by which they
themselves were disqualified. Thus, the controversy is not whether the
interests of the Trust require the removal or appointment of trustees
but which of the rival groups has lawfully exercised that authority. The
distinction is significant. A suit seeking judicial intervention for the
proper administration of a public trust is one thing; a suit seeking
judicial recognition of one group's authority over another is quite
another. The latter, when essentially directed towards vindicating
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personal rights to trusteeship or management, does not acquire the
character of a representative proceeding merely because the dispute
concerns a public trust. This is the principle underlying the decisions in
Swami Paramatmanand Saraswati (supra) and Vidyodaya Trust
(supra) . Nor, as explained in Sugra Bibi (supra), does the inclusion of
prayers resembling the reliefs enumerated in Section 92(1) alter the
essential character of the suit. The decisive consideration remains its
dominant purpose. Examined in that light, the present suit is, in
substance, a contest between rival groups for control over the
management of the Trust, rather than a proceeding instituted to protect
its charitable objects or the interests of its beneficiaries.

28. The allegations of mismanagement must now be examined in their
proper context. Learned counsel for the Opposite Parties has drawn the
attention of this Court to paragraphs 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the
plaint, wherein allegations have been made concerning financial
irregularities, refusal to convene meetings, operation of bank accounts
despite removal from office, fabrication of backdated documents,
irregular induction of a trustee and attempts to alter the character of the
Trust. These allegations, though serious in nature, must be understood
in the light of the dispute disclosed by the plaint as a whole. On a
careful reading, they appear principally to justify the resolutions by
which the Plaintiffs claim to have removed the rival trustees and to
challenge the authority thereafter exercised by them. Indeed,
allegations concerning the operation of bank accounts after removal, or
the continued assertion of authority as Chairman, necessarily proceed
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upon the assumption that the Plaintiffs’ resolutions were valid. Thus,
the alleged acts of mismanagement are closely intertwined with the
rival claims to trusteeship and control over the Trust. They are not
advanced as an independent foundation for seeking judicial
intervention in its administration for the benefit of the public. The
distinction is not between serious and trivial allegations, but between a
grievance concerning the administration of a public charity and one
concerning the right to administer it. In the present case, the allegations,
viewed alongside the principal reliefs sought, appear directed towards
establishing the authority of one group of trustees over another. This is
precisely the distinction emphasized by the Supreme Court in
Vidyodaya Trust (supra), where the language of public interest was
held insufficient to bring an essentially private dispute within the ambit
of Section 92 of the Code.
29. Another feature of the plaint assumes significance as the Trust itself has
been arrayed as Plaintiff No. 1, represented by the very group of
trustees whose authority to manage its affairs is in dispute. In Ghat
18
Talab Kaulan Wala v. Gopal Dass Chela Shurti Das , the Supreme
Court has explained that Section 92 of the Code contemplates a
representative suit instituted by persons interested in a public trust,
upon an alleged breach of trust or the necessity of judicial direction for
its administration, and that the procedure prescribed therein does not
govern a suit instituted by the trust itself.

18
AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 705

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30. Learned counsel for the Opposite Parties rightly points out that the
factual setting of that decision was different, the suit having been
instituted by a trust against a sevadar. That distinction, however, does
not diminish the relevance of the underlying principle. In the present
case, one group of trustees has instituted the suit in the name of the
Trust against another group, each asserting the lawful authority to
manage its affairs. The controversy, therefore, is not merely about the
administration of the Trust, but about who is entitled to represent and
control it. The Trust's presence as a plaintiff does not, by itself, give the
suit a representative character when the very authority to speak on its
behalf is the subject of dispute. Nor does it convert the Plaintiffs' claim
to trusteeship into a cause pursued on behalf of the beneficiaries.
Rather, the manner in which the suit has been instituted reinforces the
conclusion that its dominant object is to secure judicial recognition of
one group's authority over the other, and not to invoke the protective
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 92 for the benefit of the public.

31. The decisions in Sangram Mudali (supra) and Kintali China
Jaganadham (supra) restate the conditions for invoking Section 92 and
apply them to the reliefs in those cases. They do not touch the decisive
question here, which is whether the suit, read as a whole, is
representative in character. On that question, the binding
pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Sugra Bibi(supra), Swami
Paramatmanand(supra) and Vidyodaya Trust(supra) govern the field.

32. Having read the plaint as a whole, this Court is satisfied that the suit,
though it concerns a public charitable trust and speaks the language of
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Section 92, is in substance a contest between rival groups of trustees for
the management and control of the Trust, founded on competing
resolutions and competing amendments of the Trust Deed. The
indispensable requirement that the suit be representative in character,
instituted to vindicate the rights of the public, is absent. As Operation
Asha(supra) makes it clear that the failure of a single essential condition
is sufficient to take the suit outside scope of Section 92.
33. The reasoning of the learned District Judge, extracted at paragraph 6
above, rests on one finding that the pleadings reveal a dispute
regarding the administration of the Trust and the management of its
accounts. That finding answers a question that the law does not ask as
to every quarrel between rival trustees over who shall manage a trust
can be described as a dispute about its administration. If that
description were enough, the line drawn by the Supreme Court
between representative suits for public rights and suits for private
rights would be erased altogether. The learned District Judge did not
inquire as to whether the suit was representative in character. He did
not apply his mind to identify its dominant purpose and its causal link
with the present lis. He did not examine the cause of action pleaded in
paragraph 17 or the nature of the reliefs sought. The order invokes
Charan Singh(supra) and R.M. Narayana Chettiar (supra) but it neither
undertakes the reading of the plaint that the first demands nor displays
the application of mind that the second requires.

34. The impugned order thus fails to apply the governing legal test to the
plaint, and in consequence permits a suit lacking the essential character
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required by Section 92 to proceed under that provision. This is an error
that goes to the root of jurisdiction. It cannot be allowed to stand.
35. For the reasons recorded above, this Court holds that an order granting
leave, or refusing to revoke leave, under Section 92 of the Code is open
to correction under Article 227 of the Constitution where the Court
below has failed to apply the correct legal test, because leave is a
statutory condition precedent to the institution of the suit. The
maintainability of a suit under Section 92 is to be judged on the plaint
alone, read as a whole and in substance, to determine whether its
dominant purpose is the vindication of public rights in the trust. The
mere invocation of the enumerated reliefs does not suffice. Further, the
plaint in C.S. No.19 of 2025 discloses, in substance, a contest between
rival groups of trustees for the management and control of the Trust,
and does not disclose a suit of a representative character instituted to
vindicate the rights of the public. Accordingly, the order dated
18.12.2025 granting leave, and the order dated 24.12.2025 refusing to
revoke it, are unsustainable in law.
VI. CONCLUSION:

36. In view of the above discussion and analysis of law and fact, CMP
No.236 of 2026 is allowed, and it is ordered as follows:
(i) The order dated 24.12.2025 passed by the learned District
Judge, Bhubaneswar, Khordha in I.A. No.02 of 2025 arising out of
C.S. No.19 of 2025 is set aside, and I.A. No.02 of 2025 is allowed.
(ii) The leave granted under Section 92 of the Code by order dated
18.12.2025 in C.S. No.19 of 2025 is revoked.
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(iii) As a necessary consequence, C.S. No.19 of 2025, which was
instituted on the strength of that leave, is not maintainable as a
suit under Section 92 of the Code and stands dismissed on that
ground alone.
(iv) The dismissal of C.S. No.19 of 2025 shall not preclude the
Plaintiffs from pursuing, in accordance with law, such remedies
as are available to them for the adjudication of their individual
claims regarding the resolutions, the Trust Deeds and their status
as trustees. If they do so, it shall be open to them to claim the
benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, if available in
law.
(v) Nothing in this judgment shall be construed as an expression
of opinion on the validity of the rival resolutions or Trust Deeds,
the allegations of forgery, fraud or financial irregularity, or the
respective claims of the parties to office in the Trust. Any court or
forum seized of those questions shall decide them on their own
merits, uninfluenced by any observation made herein.
(vi) The connected CMPs, which arise out of the same impugned
order, are allowed in the same terms. There shall be no order as
to costs.
37. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.


(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
th
Dated the 30 October, 2026/-
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