BINOD KUMAR SINGH vs DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT, RANCHI ZONAL OFFICE , RANCHI
- Court
- Jharkhand High Court
2026:JHHC:32303
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Revision No.812 of 2026
Binod Kumar Singh, aged about 50 years, Son of
Jagnarayan Singh, Resident of 64, Neelanchal Compound,
Piska More, Sarda Battey Gali, Ratu Road, P.O.-Hehal,
P.S.-Sukhdeonagar & District-Ranchi
… Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement, Ranchi Zonal Office, Ranchi.
… … Opp. Party / Respondent
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CORAM: HON’BLEMR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Adv
Mr. Abhishek Abhi, Adv
For the Respondent : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Sr. Adv
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Adv.
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CAV/Reserved on 07.10.2026 Pronounced on 04/11/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer:
1. The present criminal revision has been filed challenging
the legality, propriety, and correctness of the order dated
10.06.2026 passed in Miscellaneous Criminal Application
No. 2539/2025 (arising out of ECIR Case No. 06/2023) by
learned AJC-I cum Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi, whereby
and whereunder the learned trial court has rejected the
application of the petitioner filed under Section 250 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023/227 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, for discharge from the offences
defined under Section 3 and punishable under Section 4 of
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
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Factual Matrix
2. Genesis of the prosecution case is like that in the course
of investigation in ECIR/RNZO/18/2022, searches were
conducted on 13.04.2023 at several premises, including the
premises of Shri Bhanu Pratap Prasad, the then Revenue
Sub-Inspector, Circle Office, Baragain, Ranchi. The searches
resulted in the seizure of, inter alia, 17 original registers of
the Circle Office and 11 trunks containing voluminous
property documents, a large number of which were found to
be forged, tampered with and falsified.
3. The said information was shared with Jharkhand
Government under Section 66(2) Prevention of Money
Laundering Act 2002, consequent thereto an FIR bearing No.
Sadar PS case No. 272/2023 dated 01.06.2023 was
registered against one Bhanu Pratap Prasad, Revenue Sub-
Inspector under Sections 465/467/468/469/476/420/
379/474 of IPC on the written complaint of Manoj Kumar,
Circle Officer, Baragai Anchal.
4. Since Sections 467/476 and 420 of IPC out of Sections
465/467/468/469/476/420/379/474 of IPC in the FIR No.
272/2023 dated 01.06.2023 were the scheduled offences
under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Enforcement
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Directorate registered ECIR RNZO/25/2023 and conducted
investigation under PMLA, 2002.
5. The investigation culminated in the submission of
prosecution complaint under the PMLA, 2002 against the
accused persons namely Bhanu Pratap Prasad, Raj Kumar
Pahan, Hilariyas Kachhap, including the present petitioner
Binod Singh arraigned as accused A-5, which resulted in the
institution of ECIR Court Case No. 06/2023.
6. The background for sharing information u/s 66(2) of the
PMLA, 2002 was the investigation by Enforcement
Directorate in another case being ECIR RNZO/18/2022 into
the matter of fraudulent acquisition of land, which was in
possession of Ministry of Defence, Government of India,
having area 4.45 acres at Morabadi, Ranchi. During the
investigation of that case, it came to light that a group of
private persons in connivance with government officials
including the Ex-Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, and Bhanu
Pratap Prasad (Revenue Sub-Inspector, Circle Office,
Baragain, Ranchi) were part of land grabbing syndicate and
were involved in corrupt practices, which included acquiring
properties on the basis of false deeds, falsification of
Government records, tampering with original revenue
documents etc. in order to facilitate private persons to
acquire landed properties in a fraudulent manner.
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7. The investigation revealed the operation of an organised
land-grabbing syndicate which acquired valuable parcels of
land by fraudulent means, including by tampering with
original government registers, falsifying government revenue
records and manufacturing forged title documents. Among
the properties so identified is a parcel admeasuring 8.86
acres situated at Shanti Nagar, Baragain, Bariyatu Road,
Ranchi, in the locality commonly known and identified by
witnesses as "Lalu Khatal", which has been illegally acquired
and has remained in the continuous possession, control and
beneficial enjoyment of the accused No. 2 since the year
2010-11.
8. It is stated that during searches on 13.04.2023 in
connection with ECIR/RNZO/18/2022, handwritten diaries
were also seized from the possession of other persons
namely, Md. Saddam Hussain, Imtiaz Ahmad and others,
who were associates of Bhanu Pratap Prasad. In the diaries
cash payment to Bhanu Pratap Prasad was mentioned by
his associates and in the cash transactions details in respect
of property measuring 4.83 acres situated at Plot Nos. 31,
32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 72 and 73, Khata No. 53, Mouza Gari,
Baragain Anchal, Ranchi, two false deeds- one of the year
1940 and the other of the year 1974 were found to have
been prepared by the associates of Bhanu Pratap Prasad.
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9. It has been stated that the land measuring 4.83 acres is
a portion of 37.10 acres of land, which was purchased from
Catholic Credit Cooperative Society by Mangal Mahto and
Kaila Mahto in the year 1939 executed at the office of the
District Sub-Registrar, Ranchi. It was revealed during
investigation that the said properties are entered in Register-
II at Page No. 53 of Volume-I of Gari Mouza.
10. The land belongs to the Mahtos, which could not be
sold or transferred to the persons belonging to the General
Category. However, Bhanu Pratap Prasad in connivance with
his accomplices entered the property measuring 4.83 acres
in the name of Samrendra Chandra Ghoshal at Page no. 139
of Register-II, Volume I. This page was earlier opened in the
name of a raiyat, namely, Jitya Bhokta, Son of Tetar Bhokta.
The name of Jitya Bhokta as well as Tetar Bhokta were
encircled in red ink and the name of one Samrendra
Chandra Ghoshal and Jitendra Chandra Ghoshal were
written in place of Jitya Bhokta and Tetar Bhokta
respectively thereby making this property as a general
property which became saleable.
11. On being confronted with the said facts while
recording statement u/s 50 PMLA, 2002, Bhanu Pratap
Prasad had admitted about his involvement. The Circle
Officer, Baragain was requested to provide a fresh certified
copy of the concerned page but he, vide letter dated
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19.03.2024, informed that the said page was torn and
destroyed by someone, hence, the same could not be made
available. It was therefore, implied that the records and
evidence associated with the forgery committed by Bhanu
Pratap Prasad and others are being destroyed and there are
other persons involved, who is/are acting on behalf of
Bhanu Pratap Prasad and others.
12. It has been alleged that in the first survey
conducted u/s 16 of the PMLA, 2002 on 20.04.2023 in
respect of 8.86 acres of land in presence of the Circle Officer,
Circle Inspector, Circle Aamin, Baijnath Munda, Shyam Lal
Pahan, Bhanu Pratap Prasad and the officials of the
Directorate of Enforcement, Ranchi Zonal Office, it was seen
that there was a big chunk of land bounded by stone walls
with a temporary settlement in which a family consisting of
five persons were residing and on inquiry about the
ownership of the land, one lady residing and available there
stated that the owner of the said 8.86 acres of the land was
A-2.
13. In the course of inquiry, one Santosh Munda had
stated that the land belonged to Mantri Ji. On further
inquiry, Santosh Munda had stated that the land was in
custody of A-2, which was noted by all persons present
during the survey proceedings by putting their signatures on
the paper drawn for that purpose.
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14. In the second survey dated 10.02.2024, conducted
in the presence of the officials of the Circle Office, Baragain,
the Anchal Ameen, the Petitioner Binod Kumar Singh
himself and Shri Bhanu Pratap Prasad, it was confirmed and
recorded that the locality shown on the Banquet Hall plan
retrieved from the Petitioner's mobile phone is the same
locality in which the 8.86 acres of land is situated, and
further that no other parcel of comparable dimension was
available in that locality upon which a structure of the kind
proposed could be constructed. The said survey proceedings,
being records prepared and attested by competent public
officials.
15. During investigation it is revealed that the
Petitioner, Binod Kumar Singh, is a partner in M/s Grids
Consultants and is a very close associate of Accused No. 2.
In the course of investigation in ECIR/RNZO/07/2023, a
search under Section 17 of the PMLA, 2002 was conducted
on 03.01.2024 at the residential premises of the Petitioner,
in the course of which his mobile phone, his laptop and
unaccounted cash amounting to Rs. 23,74,000/- were
seized. Scrutiny of the seized mobile phone yielded highly
incriminating material, including WhatsApp
communications exchanged between the Petitioner (mobile
No. 983xxxxx76) and Accused No. 2 (mobile No.
94xxxxx949).
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16. It is further revealed that the said WhatsApp
communications establish that on 06.04.2021 the Petitioner
shared with Accused No. 2 the plan/layout of a proposed
Banquet Hall, prepared by his own firm M/s Grids
Consultants, bearing the name of the said firm upon its face
and describing the location of the proposed construction as
"Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi". The date borne on the
said site plan is 12.04.2018.
17. It is alleged that it has come during investigation
that the said plan was under continuous amendment and
active professional processing for a period of more than four
years. The WhatsApp communications between the
Petitioner and his own employee Shri Pranav Kumar Mandal
establish that on 10.09.2022 the Petitioner shared with the
said employee a file expressly titled "banquet
@bariyatul.pdf", in which the name of the project was
recorded as "Proposed Banquet Hall" and the address was
recorded as "Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi".
18. It has come in the investigation that the said Pranav
Kumar Mandal, in his statement recorded under Section 50
of the PMLA on 08.03.2024, has confirmed that the site plan
was shared with him by the Petitioner for the purpose of
carrying out edits to the parking area of the said plan, and
that after making the requisite edits he reverted the same to
the Petitioner. Conspicuously, the said site plan bears the
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name of M/s Grids Consultants but bears no client's name
whatsoever.
19. It is alleged that when Accused No. 2 was
confronted with the said WhatsApp chats in his statement
dated 05.02.2024 recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA,
he refused to append his signature upon the chats,
furnished false information in respect thereof, and declined
to produce his mobile phone for cross-verification. When
further confronted on 06.02.2024 with the construction plan
of the proposed Banquet Hall at Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road,
Ranchi, prepared on 12.04.2018 and shared by the
Petitioner on 06.04.2021, Accused No. 2 had stated that he
had no information whatsoever regarding the said property.
20. The investigation further revealed that after the first
summons was issued to Accused No. 2, an application was
immediately moved by his accomplice Shri Raj Kumar Pahan
before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, registered as SAR
Case No. 81/2023-24, and by order dated 29.01.2024 the
SAR Court cancelled the jamabandis of the earlier
occupants, thereby enabling Shri Raj Kumar Pahan to
acquire the property on paper and to distance Accused No. 2
from his illegal occupation and possession.
21. Upon completion of investigation, the Prosecution
Complaint dated 30.03.2024 was filed under Sections 44
and 45 of the PMLA, 2002 before the learned Special Court
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(PMLA), Ranchi, arraigning the Petitioner as Accused No. 5,
and cognizance was taken vide order dated 04.04.2024.
Supplementary Prosecution Complaints dated 07.06.2024
and 10.08.2024 were thereafter filed, the latter recording,
inter alia, the provisional attachment of the said 8.86 acres
of property at Shanti Nagar, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi.
22. It is alleged that the role attributed to the Petitioner
in the Prosecution Complaint is specific and he is directly a
party with Accused No. 2 in the concealment of proceeds of
crime and he prepared a plan of a Banquet Hall proposed
for construction upon the said 8.86 acres of property, the
said plan having been made in the year 2018 and having
remained under continuous amendment until 2022 and the
name of petitioner‘s firm M/s Grids Consultants was borne
upon the said plan and he transmitted the said plan to
Accused No. 2 over WhatsApp as such he was accordingly
well aware of the land upon which the said Banquet Hall
was proposed to be constructed and despite such knowledge
he gave a false statement under Section 50 of the PMLA in
order to assist Accused No. 2 in concealing the proceeds of
crime; and that he thereby knowingly became a party with
Accused No. 2 in the concealment of the true possession and
use of the said property.
23. It has come on record that Petitioner was not
arrested during investigation, no occasion for custodial
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interrogation having arisen. He furnished bonds under
Section 88 of the Cr.P.C. which were accepted by the learned
Special Court vide order dated 08.08.2024.
24. Thereafter the Petitioner's application for discharge,
was filed under Section 250 of the BNSS, 2023 and
registered as Miscellaneous Criminal Application No.
2539/2025, came to be rejected by the learned Special
Judge vide the impugned order dated 10.06.2026 against
which the present revision has been preferred.
Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner
25. While assailing the impugned order the learned
counsel for the petitioner has taken the following grounds:
(i) Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that the petitioner is innocent and
has been falsely implicated in the present case.
According to the petitioner, the allegations levelled
against him are wholly misconceived, baseless and
unsupported by any cogent material, and therefore no
case is made out warranting his prosecution under the
provisions of the PMLA.
(ii) It has been contended that the preparation of the
sketch map allegedly relied upon by the prosecution
falls squarely within the petitioner's professional
responsibilities as an architect and consultant. Even if
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the allegations contained in the Prosecution Complaint
are accepted in their entirety, the mere preparation or
transmission of a proposed architectural design
cannot, by itself, constitute any criminal offence or
establish complicity in money laundering.
(iii) It has further been argued that the so-called
incriminating map relating to the alleged proceeds of
crime, namely the 8.86 acres of land, was merely a
preliminary and proposed layout plan. The same was
neither a sanctioned building plan nor a construction
drawing. Admittedly, no construction was ever
undertaken on the said land and no further steps were
taken pursuant to the alleged proposal.
(iv) It has further been contended that the petitioner being
in the business of architectural consultancy, it is
implicit that materials such as architectural plans,
maps and designs would be communicated among
employees and clients/other persons for the purposes
of work/business in usual course of business and
nothing is of incriminating nature. The petitioner or his
firm being an Architectural Consultancy firm can be
approached by anyone who claims to be having plans
to construct any kinds of buildings or structures upon
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the lands owned/possessed or proposed to be acquired
by the them.
(v) It has been contended that while making primary
suggestions, the petitioner or his firm is naturally not
supposed to be concerned with the ownership or
possession of the landed properties as the properties
may be owned, rented or on lease or may be in
occupation of someone in some arrangement with the
real owners or lessees or the same may be on the basis
of future plans of acquisitions to be made by the
client/customer himself. The petitioner or his firm may
at best be said to be in knowledge of the title status of
the landed properties only if they are asked to prepare
the detailed plans with structural specifications and get
it filed and processed for its sanction by the competent
authority and further when they are engaged to
supervise the final constructions as per the plans.
However, no such sanction or further processes have
been done by the petitioner or his firm in this matter.
(vi) Further, as per the prosecution complaint, it would be
evident that in the said complaint nowhere mentioned
that the seized article contained any direct material or
any chit, deed, file, document or paper related to the
said land in question ad-measuring 8.86 acres which is
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said to be the proceeds of crime which only goes on to
show that the petitioner does not have any nexus with
the said proceed of crime and have not committed any
offence and allegation that the petitioner was in
knowledge of the said land in question and is a party to
other accused(s) cannot be prima facie established.
(vii) It has further been contended that it is only on vague
material of a sketch map with "Lalu Khatal" mentioned
on it and prepared in the year 2018, it is being said
that the map was of a Banquet Hall proposed to be
built in the said 8.86 Acres of land in question which is
said to be proceeds of crime, but however, it is clear
and evident that the said sketch map in question is
neither matching with the area and other details of the
disputed land in question nor even any final detailed
map has been said to have been prepared or sanctioned
and it is also an admitted fact that even as per the
enforcement directorate no constructions have been
made upon the land in question.
(viii) It has further been submitted that it is an established
legal principle that while considering a petition for
discharge, the Court must not act merely as a post
office or mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has the
power to consider the broad probabilities of the case,
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the total effect of the evidence and the documents
produced before the Court, any basic infirmities
appearing in the case and so on but the court
concerned has not taken into consideration the
aforesaid settled position of law.
(ix) Further it is a settled connotation of law that the core
purpose of a discharge petition is to prevent an accused
person from undergoing trial when there is no
reasonable basis to believe they committed the alleged
offence. The case of the prosecution contains several
deficiencies and the evidence presented does not
sufficiently support a criminal charge against the
accused. The evidentiary material on record, even if
generally accepted, would fail to reasonably connect the
petitioner with the proceeds of crime and/or money
laundering activity or any of its acts.
(x) It has been submitted that in the case of Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022 SCC
Online SC 929), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
consistently held that the existence of 'proceeds of
crime' is the core requirement for invoking the rigour of
the PMLA and in the absence of its existence, the
charge of money laundering cannot stand. It also laid
down those mere assumptions about the involvement of
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an accused person are insufficient and concrete
evidence is required to justify the framing of charges
and proceeding with the trial.
(xi) It has further been contended that in the present case
the maximum allegation against the petitioner is about
sending the preliminary sketch map (which however,
does not even match with the area and other details of
the disputed land) to accused and admittedly no
allegation is being made about preparation, sending of
or final sanction of the detailed building plan or
regarding indulging into any supervision for
construction of any kind of building or structures on
the basis of the alleged sketch map in question, thus
entire allegations are thoroughly unfounded and no
prima facie case against the petitioner under section 3
& 4 of the PMLA can be attributed against him.
Submission of the learned counsel for respondent ED
26. Per contra the learned counsel for respondent ED
while defending the impugned order has taken the following
ground:
(i) The filing of the present petition is flagrant abuse of the
process of law and the same has been filed with the
sole objective of delaying the trial and obstructing the
course of justice.
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(ii) The instant application is based on a selective
narration of facts characterizing petitioner‘s
involvement in alleged crime merely as professional
consultancy while conveniently ignoring the
incriminating digital evidence that establishes his role
as a key conspirator.
(iii) It is a well-settled proposition of criminal jurisprudence
that at the stage of framing charges, the Court is
required to exercise its judicial mind only to the limited
extent of determining whether a prima facie case exists
or whether there arises a grave suspicion against the
accused warranting a trial and the Court is not
expected to conduct a roving enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter or to meticulously weigh the
evidence as if conducting a mini-trial at this
preliminary stage.
(iv) The learned counsel while placing reliance upon the
judgment rendered by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the
case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4
SCC 39 , has submitted that at the initial stage, if there
is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think
that there is ground for presuming that the accused
has committed an offence, then it is not open to the
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Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(v) It has further been submitted that the argument made
on behalf of petitioner that he is an Architect/Partner
of M/s Grids Consultants and acted merely in his
professional capacity by preparing a sketch map, is
legally wrong because a professional qualification
cannot serve as a cloak for criminal conspiracy.
(vi) It has further been submitted that Section 3 of the
PMLA criminalizes any person who "knowingly assists"
or is "a party to" any process connected with proceeds
of crime. The investigation has established that the
present petitioner did not merely draw a generic map;
he prepared detailed plans for a "Proposed Banquet
Hall" specifically on the 8.86-acre land at Baragain,
fully aware that the said land was being illegally
acquired and possessed by the co-accused.
(vii) Further the nexus between the Applicant and the main
accused was not limited to client-architect interactions.
The recovery of WhatsApp chats involving the sharing
of confidential government files, transfer-posting lists of
officials, and sensitive administrative data proves that
the Applicant was a close confidant and an integral
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part of the syndicate, assisting in the management and
projection of the crime proceeds.
(viii) It has further been submitted that the
petitioner/Applicant has attempted to challenge the
validity of the digital evidence (Banquet Hall Plan) by
arguing that it was merely a "proposal" and "no
construction took place" but these contentions are
matters of trial and cannot be adjudicated at the
threshold stage of discharge.
(ix) It has further been contended that under Section 3 of
the PML Act 2002, the actual completion of a building
is not a prerequisite for the offence. The act of
planning, surveying, and designing a commercial
project on tainted land constitutes an attempt to use
and project the proceeds of crime as untainted
property. Whether the map was just a sketch or a
finalized plan for laundering money is a question of fact
that requires the leading of evidence and cross-
examination.
(x) It has been submitted that once the foundational facts
about involvement of the present petitioner are
established, the Court shall presume that the proceeds
of crime are involved in money laundering thereafter
the burden shifts entirely to the Applicant to rebut this
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presumption. This rebuttal can only happen during the
course of the trial through the leading of cogent
evidence, and not at the stage of discharge.
(xi) It has further been contended that the
Applicant/petitioner has raised the contention that he
is not named in the First Information Report (FIR No.
272/2023) of the Scheduled Offence. This argument is
legally untenable. It is settled law, as clarified by the
Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
v. Union of India (supra) , that a person need not be an
accused in the Scheduled Offence to be prosecuted
under the PMLA. The only legal requirement is the
person's involvement in any process or activity
connected with the Proceeds of Crime. Since the 8.86
acre land is derived from the criminal activity of forgery
(Scheduled Offence), the Applicant‘s involvement in
planning its development makes him liable under
PMLA independently, therefore the indulgence of
discharge cannot be granted lightly in such grave
matters where the accused/petitioner has allegedly
utilized his professional standing to mask the illegal
nature of the assets.
Analysis
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27. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the
parties at length and has also gone through the finding
recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned order as
also the counter affidavit.
28. It is evident that the prosecution case, as emerging
from the Prosecution Complaint, originates from searches
conducted by the Enforcement Directorate on 13.04.2023
during investigation of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 relating to
fraudulent acquisition of government and private lands in
Ranchi. During the searches at the premises of Bhanu
Pratap Prasad, then Revenue Sub-Inspector, Baragain Circle
Office, 17 original revenue registers and 11 trunks
containing voluminous property documents were seized,
many of which were found to be forged, tampered with and
falsified.
29. On the basis of information shared under Section
66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002,
Sadar P.S. Case No. 272/2023 dated 01.06.2023 was
registered against Bhanu Pratap Prasad under various
provisions of the IPC, including Sections 467 and 420 IPC,
which are scheduled offences under the PMLA.
Consequently, ECIR/RNZO/25/2023 was registered and
investigation under the PMLA commenced. The investigation
culminated in filing of a Prosecution Complaint against
Bhanu Pratap Prasad, Raj Kumar Pahan, Hilariyas Kachhap
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and others including the present petitioner Binod Kumar
Singh (A-5), leading to institution of ECIR Case No.
06/2023.
30. The investigation disclosed the existence of an
organised land-grabbing syndicate involving private
individuals and public officials, which allegedly acquired
valuable lands through forged title deeds, falsification of
revenue records, tampering of government registers and
illegal transfer of protected lands. Particular focus was
placed on a parcel measuring 8.86 acres situated at Shanti
Nagar, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi, locally known as "Lalu
Khatal", which was alleged to have been fraudulently
acquired and continuously possessed by accused no. 2 since
2010-11. Investigation further revealed manipulation of
revenue records relating to 4.83 acres of land forming part of
a larger 37.10 acres property originally belonging to
members of the Mahto community.
31. It has been alleged that Bhanu Pratap Prasad and
his associates fraudulently altered entries in Register-II by
replacing the names of tribal raiyats with those of
Samrendra Chandra Ghoshal and Jitendra Chandra
Ghoshal, thereby converting restricted land into transferable
general category land. Bhanu Pratap Prasad allegedly
admitted his involvement during his statement under
Section 50 of the PMLA. Subsequently, the concerned page
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of the revenue register was reported to have been torn and
destroyed, suggesting attempts to obliterate evidence.
32. During surveys conducted under Section 16 of the
PMLA on 20.04.2023 and 10.02.2024, statements of local
occupants and officials allegedly confirmed that the
aforesaid 8.86 acres land was under the possession and
control of accused no. 2. The second survey, attended by the
petitioner himself, Bhanu Pratap Prasad and revenue
officials, allegedly established that the locality depicted in a
Banquet Hall plan recovered from the petitioner's mobile
phone corresponded to the same "Lalu Khatal" property and
that no comparable plot existed in the vicinity.
33. Investigation revealed that the petitioner, a partner
of M/s Grids Consultants and a close associate of accused
no. 2, had shared with accused no. 2 through WhatsApp a
proposed Banquet Hall plan bearing the name of his firm
and showing the project location as "Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu
Road, Ranchi".
34. The records further indicated that the project
remained under active modification from 2018 to 2022. The
petitioner's employee, Pranav Kumar Mandal, in his
statement under Section 50 PMLA, confirmed having edited
the plan on the petitioner's instructions. It was also alleged
that accused no. 2, when confronted with these
communications, denied knowledge of the project, refused to
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authenticate the chats and withheld his mobile phone from
verification.
35. The prosecution case against the petitioner is that
despite being fully aware of the identity, location and
possession of the 8.86 acres property, he assisted accused
no. 2 in concealing the proceeds of crime. It is alleged that
the petitioner knowingly prepared and repeatedly modified
the Banquet Hall project plan concerning the said land and
transmitted it to accused no. 2, yet subsequently furnished
a false statement under Section 50 of the PMLA with a view
to conceal the true ownership, possession and intended
utilisation of the property.
36. Upon completion of investigation, the Prosecution
Complaint dated 30.03.2024 was filed under Sections 44
and 45 of the PMLA wherein present petitioner has been
arraigned as accused A-5. Thereafter cognizance was taken
on 04.04.2024 and supplementary complaints were
thereafter filed, including one recording provisional
attachment of the 8.86 acres land.
37. The petitioner was not arrested during investigation
and was allowed to furnish bonds under Section 88 Cr.P.C.
on 08.08.2024.
38. However, his application for discharge under
Section 250 BNSS, registered as Miscellaneous Criminal
Application No. 2539/2025, was rejected by the learned
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Special Judge on 10.06.2026, giving rise to the present
criminal revision.
39. It has come on record that during the pendency of
the present Criminal Revision, charge under Section 3 read
with Section 4 of the PMLA, 2002 has been framed against
the Petitioner by the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi
on 11.08.2026.
40. In the background of the factual aspect as referred
hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs, the issues which
require consideration are that:
(i) Whether the impugned order dated 10.06.2026 by
which discharge application has been rejected, can be
said to suffer from an error or perversity ?
(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been
collected in course of investigation, prima facie case
against the petitioner is made out or not?
41. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they
are taken up together.
42. This Court, before appreciating the argument
advanced on behalf of the parties and appreciating the said
issues, deems it fit and proper to discuss herein some of the
provisions of law as contained under the Act, 2002 with its
object and intent.
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43. The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent
need to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for
preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of
crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof including
vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of
agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for
combating money laundering and also to prosecute the
persons indulging in the process or activity connected with
the proceeds of crime.
44. It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in
order to answer the urgent requirement to have a
comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-
laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication
and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering
and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process
or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.
45. It needs to refer herein the definition of ―proceeds of
crime‖ as provided under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, 2002
which reads as under:
“2 (1) (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or
obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of
any such property 3[or where such property is taken or held
outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held
within the country] 4[or abroad]; [Explanation.—For the removal
of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include
property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled
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offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly
be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity
relatable to the scheduled offence;]”
46. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that
―proceeds of crime‖ means any property derived or obtained,
directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any
such property or where such property is taken or held
outside the country, then the property equivalent in value
held within the country or abroad.
47. In the explanation it has been referred that for
removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of
crime" include property not only derived or obtained from
the scheduled offence but also any property which may
directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any
criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The
aforesaid explanation has been inserted in the statute book
by way of Act 23 of 2019. It is, thus, evident that the reason
for giving explanation under Section 2(1)(u) is by way of
clarification to the effect that whether as per the substantive
provision of Section 2(1)(u), the property derived or obtained,
directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any
such property or where such property is taken or held
outside the country but by way of explanation the proceeds
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of crime has been given broader implication by including
property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled
offence but also any property which may directly or
indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal
activity relatable to the scheduled offence.
48. The ―property‖ has been defined under Section
2(1)(v) which means any property or assets of every
description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or
immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and
instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property
or assets, wherever located.
49. The schedule has been defined under Section 2(1)(x)
which means schedule to the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002. The ―scheduled offence‖ has been
defined under Section 2(1)(y) which reads as under: ―2(y)
―scheduled offence‖ means— (i) the offences specified under
Part A of the Schedule; or (ii) the offences specified under
Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such
offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or (iii) the offences
specified under Part C of the Schedule.‖
50. It is evident that the ―scheduled offence‖ means the
offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or the
offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total
value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more;
or the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.
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51. The offence of money laundering has been defined
under Section 3 of the Act, 2002, which reads as under:
“3. Offence of money-laundering.—Whosoever directly or
indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly
is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity
connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment,
possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as
untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-
laundering. [Explanation.— For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby clarified that,— (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of
money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or
indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or
knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of
the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of
crime, namely:— (a) concealment; or (b) possession; or (c)
acquisition; or (d) use; or (e) projecting as untainted property; or
(f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever;
(ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a
continuing activity and continues till such time a person is
directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its
concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it
as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in
any manner whatsoever.]”
52. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that
―offence of money laundering‖ means whosoever directly or
indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or
knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or
activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its
concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting
or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence
of money-laundering.
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53. It is further evident that the process or activity
connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity
and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly
enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or
possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted
property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner
whatsoever.
54. The punishment for money laundering has been
provided under Section 4 of the Act, 2002.
55. The various provisions of the Act, 2002 along with
interpretation of the definition of ―proceeds of crime‖ has
been dealt with by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India
and Ors., (supra) wherein the Bench comprising of three
Hon‘ble Judges of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court has decided
the issue by taking into consideration the object and intent
of the Act, 2002.
56. It is evident that the purposes and objects of the
2002 Act for which it has been enacted, is not limited to
punishment for offence of money laundering, but also to
provide measures for prevention of money laundering. It is
also to provide for attachment of proceeds of crime, which
are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any
manner which may result in frustrating any proceeding
relating to confiscation of such proceeds under the 2002 Act.
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This Act is also to compel the banking companies, financial
institutions and intermediaries to maintain records of the
transactions, to furnish information of such transactions
within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the
2002 Act.
57. The predicate offence has been considered in the
aforesaid judgment wherein by taking into consideration the
explanation as inserted by way of Act 23 of 2019 under the
definition of the ―proceeds of crime‖ as contained under
Section 2(1)(u), whereby and whereunder, it has been
clarified for the purpose of removal of doubts that, the
"proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or
obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property
which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a
result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled
offence, meaning thereby, the words ―any property which
may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result
of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence‖
will come under the fold of the proceeds of crime.
58. In the judgment rendered by the Hon‘ble Apex Court
in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of
India and Ors. (supra) it has been held that the Authority
under the 2002 Act, is to prosecute a person for offence of
money-laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is
required to be recorded in writing that the person is in
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possession of ―proceeds of crime‖. Only if that belief is
further supported by tangible and credible evidence
indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any
process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime,
action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment
and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting
thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated
would be a standalone process.
59. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed
by the Hon‘ble Apex Court on the issue of various provisions
of the Act, 2002, this Court, is now proceeding to discuss
the principle governing framing of charge.
60. But before discuss the principle related framing of
charge it would be apt to discuss herein principle of Section
250 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‗BNSS‘
for brevity) provides for discharge in sessions cases, because
framing of charge is the stage after rejection of discharge
application. The Section 250 of BNSS is being quoted herein
which reads as under:
“250.Discharge (1) The accused may prefer an application for
discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment
of the case under section 232 (BNSS). (2) If, upon consideration of the
record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after
hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this
behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and
record his reasons for doing so.”
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61. Section 227 of Code of Criminal Procedure (‗CrPC‘
for brevity) contemplates discharge by the Court of Session.
The trial Judge is required to discharge the accused if the
Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. Section 250(2) BNSS
corresponds to section 227 CrPC. Section 250(1) BNSS
stipulates a time limit of 60 days from the date of committal
of the case within which an application for discharge should
be filed by the accused.
62. Section 239 CrPC provides for discharge of accused
in warrant cases instituted upon a police report. The power
under section 239 Cr.P.C. is exercisable when Magistrate
considers the charge against the accused to be groundless.
Section 262(2) BNSS is similar to section 239 CrPC but
section 262 BNSS provides an opportunity to the learned
Magistrate to examine the accused either physically or
through audio – video electronic means. Section 262(1)
BNSS stipulates a time limit of 60 days from the date of
supply of documents under section 230 BNSS within which
an application should for discharge should be filed by the
accused.
63. Section 245 Cr.P.C. deals with warrant cases
instituted otherwise than on a police report. Section 245
CrPC corresponds to section 268 of BNSS. The power under
section 245 (1) Cr.P.C. is exercisable when the Magistrate
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considers that no case against the accused has been made
out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction. The
Magistrate has the power of discharging the accused at any
previous stage of the case under section 245 (2) Cr.P.C.
Sections 227 and 239 Cr.P.C. provide for discharge before
the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report,
the documents sent along with it and examination of the
accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be
heard. But the stage of discharge under section 245 Cr.P.C.,
on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence
referred in section 244 is taken. Despite the difference in the
language of the provisions of sections 227, 239 and 245
Cr.P.C. and whichever provision may be applicable, the
Court is required to see, at the time of framing of charge,
that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the
accused. The main intention of granting a chance to the
accused of making submissions as envisaged under sections
227 or 239 of Cr.P.C. is to assist the Court to determine
whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial.
64. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Tamilnadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and Anti-
Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709,
wherein, at paragraphs no.29, 32.4, 33 and 34, the Hon'ble
Apex Court has observed as under:—
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“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar
commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the
applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece
of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence
in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are
groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at
the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the
court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials
brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the
said materials and documents with a view to find out whether
the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose
the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be
gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the
matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a
conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is
whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has
been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the
accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court
thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the
basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can
frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to
the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The
law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.
32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v.
Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of
2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. Ponmudi,
(2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the materials
for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that
would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was
not the stage where the court should have appraised the
evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an
order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot
be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned
[N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case
(MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers
from grave error and calls for rectification.
33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the
purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing
on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear
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before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall
proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance
with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same
expeditiously.
34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the
order of discharge with the aforesaid observations.
65. It is further settled position of law that defence on
merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing
of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A
reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar
Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191 . For ready reference,
paragraph no. 11 of the said judgment is being quoted
hereinbelow: —
“11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment
[Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC
OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law
on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be
referred to.
11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC
398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to
consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at
the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the
discharge application has been considered elaborately in the
said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of
Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order
to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other
words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the
nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents
produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are
suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a
charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge
comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed,
he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will
discharge the accused. It is further observed that while
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exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the
prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the
pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of
evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the
court, after the trial starts.
11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath
[State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019)
3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y.
Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and
held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. The High Court
[M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to
have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing
with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section
239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this
jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this
Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of
considering an application for discharge the court must proceed
on the assumption that the material which has been brought on
the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material
in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the
material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the
ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N.
v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11
SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721],
adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held :
(SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)
„29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be
gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the
matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a
conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is
whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has
been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the
accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court
thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the
basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can
frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to
the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The
law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.”
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66. Further, it is pertinent to mention here that power
to discharge an accused was designed to prevent
harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or
the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be
achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power
has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to
bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials.
Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused
and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides
before framing any charge against the accused or for
discharging him.
67. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties
frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof,
the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-
restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule
unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in
the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending
upon the person who views it. There may be as many
opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is
no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would
be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed.
Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Stree Atyachar
Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1
SCC 715.
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68. Further, the difference between the approach with
which the Court should examine the matter in the discharge
has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , in the
following words: —
“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by
the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless
the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code.
Under both these provisions, the court is required to
consider the “record of the case” and documents submitted
therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either
discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and
in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the
charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section
exists, then the court would be right in presuming that
there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame
the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a
presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in
relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and
the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for
exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a
prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the
language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227
is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the
Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at
the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an
opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing
an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms
of Section 228 of the Code.
30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its
wisdom has used the expression “there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an offence”.
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69. This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the
ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations
made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of
the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash
the charge in haste. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659
referred to the meaning of the word ―presume‖ while relying
upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean ―to
believe or accept upon probable evidence‖; ―to take as proved
until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming‖. In other
words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the
prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-
examined by the defence, the incriminating material and
evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the
Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to
lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps
that the trial concludes with the court forming its final
opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there
was a civil transaction between the parties would not by
itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the
criminal offence.
70. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further dealt with the
proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar
Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) wherein, at
paragraphs 11, 12 and 14, it has been held as under:
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“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the
court is required to evaluate the material and documents
on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging
therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep
into the probative value of the material on record. What
needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for
presuming that the offence has been committed and not a
ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At
that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material
which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to
the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against
the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.
12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC
699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this
Court had observed that at the stage of framing the
charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question
whether or not there is any ground for presuming the
commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of
charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for
proper consideration of material warranting such order
was emphasised.
14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni
[(2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court,
referring to several previous decisions held that : (SCC p.
342, para 7)
“7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of
framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider
whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused. The court is not required to appreciate
evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are
sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh v.
Balvinder Singh, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 850 has been pleased
to hold that charges can also be framed on the basis of
strong suspicion. Marshaling and appreciation of the
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evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of
time. 52. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
court in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, reported in (2010)
9 SCC 368, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the
scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The principles which
emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as
under:
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case against the accused has been made out. The test to
determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of
each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained, the court will be fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the court,
any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there
cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the
matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a
trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could
form an opinion that the accused might have committed
offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the
conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative
value of the material on record cannot be gone into but
before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial
mind on the material placed on record and must be
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satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused
was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record
with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom
taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the
ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited
purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at
that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states
as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or
the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the
trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused
and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end
in conviction or acquittal.
71. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
court in the case of M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI,
reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768 , the above principles have
been reiterated in para 17, 18, 28 to 31 and the Hon'ble
supreme court has explained as to how the matters of grave
suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs are
being quoted as under:
“17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law.
We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the
earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and
discern the following principles:
17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise
to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion,
the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the
accused.
17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the
charge at the instance of the prosecution.
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17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to
find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements
recorded by the police or the documents produced before
the Court.
17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to
adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully
accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or
rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show
that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no
sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.
17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the
materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.
17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the
total effect of the evidence and the documents produced
before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the
case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court
to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.
17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative
value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and
the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to
be accepted as true.
17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the
strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up
a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.
18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at
the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under
Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan
Chakkar). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in
Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents
and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The
Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any
document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the
stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the
accused is to be confined to the material produced by the
police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).
28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we
remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under
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Section 227 CrPC. The principle established is to take the
materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of
oral statements and also documentary material, and act
upon it without it been subjected to questioning through
cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of
the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as
alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly,
would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the
trial court to discharge the accused.
29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by
way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him.
30. However, what is the meaning of the expression
“materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is
aroused in the mind of the court's”, which is not explained
away? Can the accused explain away the material only
with reference to the materials produced by the
prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he
chooses to produce at the stage?
31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused
can only rely on the materials which are produced by the
prosecution, it must be understood that the grave
suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be
explained away only in terms of the materials made
available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may
appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade
the court to discharge him.”
72. It has been further held in the case of Asim
Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC
148 , that mini trial is not expected by the trial court for the
purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of
framing of charge, wherein, it has been held at paragraph
no.18 of the said judgment as under: —
“18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid
down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while
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considering the question of framing charge under Section
227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239
CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted
power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited
purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case
against the accused has been made out; where the
material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion
against the accused which has not been properly
explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the
charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of
them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from
grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will
be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while
examining the discharge application filed under Section
227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its
judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial
has been made out or not. It is true that in such
proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial
by marshalling the evidence on record.”
73. In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (supra), it has
been held by the Hon‘ble Apex Court that the words ‗not
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused‘ clearly
show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the
charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise
his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the
prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the
court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a
weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which
is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of
Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in
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order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground
would take within its fold the nature of the evidence
recorded by the police or the documents produced before the
court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge
against him.
74. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be
safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the
case and the documents submitted therewith, and after
hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution
in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall
discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so
and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid,
the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the
trial Court shall frame the charge. However, the defence of
the accused cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge.
The accused has no right to produce any document at that
stage. The application for discharge has to be considered on
the premise that the materials brought on record by the
prosecution are true.
75. Thus, at the time of considering an application for
discharge, the Court is required to consider the limited
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extent to find out whether there is prima facie evidence
against the accused to believe that he has committed any
offence as alleged by the prosecution; if prima facie evidence
is available against the accused, then there cannot be an
order of discharge.
76. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to
framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the
discharge application, it would proceed to framing of charge.
At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and
weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and
in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within
its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the
prosecution or the documents produced before the court
which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge
against him and after that if the Judge comes to a
conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will
frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused.
77. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the
case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been
made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the
Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a
weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which
is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.
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78. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant
case, the court was only required to consider whether a
prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the
accused is required to be further tried or not because at the
stage of discharge or considering the discharge application
the mini trial is not permissible.
79. The test to determine a prima facie case against the
accused would naturally depend on the facts of each case
and it is difficult to lay down the rule of universal
application and if the material placed before the Court
discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has
not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified
in rejecting the discharge application and proceeding with
the trial.
80. Thus, from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements it
is evident that at the stage of considering discharge, trial
court is not to examine and assess in detail the material
placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to
consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the
offence alleged against the accused persons. Marshalling of
facts and appreciation of evidence at the time of considering
discharge is not in the domain of the court. Discharge
application can be rejected even on the basis of strong
suspicion founded upon materials before the court which
leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the
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existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence
alleged against the accused.
81. It needs to refer herein that ingredients of offences
should be seen in the material produced before the court
and duty of court at the stage of considering the discharge
is to see whether the ingredients of offences are available in
the material produced before the court. Contradictions in
the statements of witnesses or sufficiency or truthfulness of
the material placed before the court cannot be examined at
the stage of consideration of discharge. For this limited
purpose, the court may sift the evidence. Court has to
consider material only with a view to find out if there is
ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offense and not for the purpose of arriving at a definite
conclusion. "Presume ‟ means if on the basis of materials on
record, court can come to the conclusion that commission
of the offense is a probable consequence, then a case for
framing of charge exists.
82. Thus, it is well settled that at the time of
considering discharge meticulous examination of evidence
is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or
weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction
that a prima facie case is made out to proceed in the case.
Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the
evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the
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discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect
the application of judicial mind for finding that a prima-
facie case is made out against the petitioner.
83. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of
discharge the probable defence of the accused is not to be
considered and the materials, which are relevant for
consideration, are the allegations made in the First
Information Report/complaint, the statement of the
witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the
documents on which the prosecution relies and the report
of investigation submitted by the prosecuting agency. The
probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of
trial and not at the stage of discharge and at the stage of
considering discharge application minute scrutiny of the
evidence is not to be made.
84. Further it is settled position of law that at the stage
of discharge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously
examine and marshal the material available on record as to
whether there is sufficient material against the accused
which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is
prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient
material against the accused to presume the commission of
the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of
offence is sufficient for rejecting the discharge and the guilt
or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the
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time of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the
stage of consideration of discharge and, therefore, at the
stage of considering the discharge, the Court is not
required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose
of sifting and weighing the material.
85. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be
safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of
the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after
hearing the submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is
no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he
shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for
doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as
aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence,
the trial Court shall frame the charge.
86. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to
sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or
not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds
would take within its fold the nature of the evidence
recorded by the prosecution or the documents produced
before the court which ex facie disclose that there are
suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to
frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge
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comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to
proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will
discharge the accused.
87. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the
case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been
made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the
Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a
weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which
is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.
88. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant
case, the court was only required to consider whether a
prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the
accused is required to be further tried or not because at the
stage of considering the discharge application, the mini trial
is not permissible.
89. Further, while considering the question of
discharge, the Court has the undoubted power to sift and
weigh the materials for the limited purpose for finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has
been made out. In exercising the power, the Court cannot
act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the
prosecution.
90. The test to determine a prima facie case against the
accused would naturally depend on the facts of each case
and it is difficult to lay down the rule of universal
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application and if the material placed before the Court
discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has
not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified
in rejecting the discharge application and proceeding with
the trial.
91. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Golconda Linga
Swamy (2004) 6 SCC 522, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that at the stage of discharge, evidence cannot be gone
into meticulously. It was held that it is immaterial whether
the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence and a
charge can be framed if there are materials showing
possibility about commission of the offence by the accused
as against certainty.
92. Thus, from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements it
is evident that at the stage of discharge, trial court is not to
examine and assess in detail the material placed on record
by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the
sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged
against the accused persons. Marshalling of facts and
appreciation of evidence at the time of discharge is not in
the domain of the court. Discharge application can be
rejected even on the basis of strong suspicion founded
upon materials before the court which leads the court to
form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the
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factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against
the accused.
93. It needs to refer herein that duty of court at the
stage of discharge is to see whether the ingredients of
offences are available in the material produced before the
court. Contradictions in the statements of witnesses or
sufficiency or truthfulness of the material placed before the
court cannot be examined at the stage of discharge. For
this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence. Court
has to consider material only with a view to find out if there
is ground for presuming that the accused has committed
an offense and not for the purpose of arriving at a definite
conclusion.
94. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial
deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact
so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence
which has been collected in course of investigation and
brought on record, as would be available in the impugned
order, prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or
not?
95. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that
the investigation has not unearthed any material indicating
that the petitioner was ever in possession of the alleged
proceeds of crime or had derived any pecuniary benefit
therefrom. It has been contended that the sole allegation
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against the petitioner is that he prepared a proposed plan for
a Banquet Hall and shared the same through WhatsApp.
According to the petitioner, even if the said allegation is
accepted in its entirety, such an act by itself does not
constitute any process or activity connected with the
proceeds of crime so as to attract the provisions of Section 3
of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. It has
further been argued that there is no material on record to
suggest that the petitioner was a party to any conspiracy
concerning the disputed property, was involved in the
preparation of any forged document, had any role in the SAR
proceedings, or was aware of the alleged tainted character of
the property in question. On the aforesaid premises, it is
submitted that the continuation of the proceedings against
the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of
law.
96. Per contra the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of Enforcement Directorate submitted that the role
attributed to the petitioner cannot be examined in isolation
and is required to be appreciated in the backdrop of the
entire prosecution case. It has been contended that the
preparation and dissemination of the proposed plan was not
an independent or innocuous act, but formed part of a series
of activities undertaken for the development and utilization
of the disputed property. Learned counsel further submitted
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that the cumulative material and surrounding
circumstances collected during the course of investigation
disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding against the
petitioner in accordance with law.
97. In the context of the aforesaid contention of learned
Counsel for the parties, it also needs to refer herein the
specific role attributed against the petitioner as has been
referred in the prosecution complaint. For better
appreciation, the specific role of the petitioner in the
commission of offence under PMLA is being reproduced as
under:
“5.5 All the plots are located inside a common boundary which
shows the control and occupation of a single person.
B. Survey dated 10.02.2024-
5. This was conducted on 10.02.2024 under section 16 of the PMLA,
2002, on the above stated land admeasuring 8.86 acres approx. (RUD
No-11) It was confirmed by the officials of Circle Office, present there i.e.
Circle Inspector (Incharge), Revenue Sub Inspector, Anchal Amin and
others of the Circle Office, Baragain, that the said land (8.86 acres land)
is situated in the locality of Lalu Khatal. It is mentioned that an image of
a plan of banquet hall was retrieved from mobile phone of Binod Singh,
a very close accomplice of Hemant Soren in which the locality of the
proposed construction of banquet hall was mentioned as "Lalu Khatal,
Bariyatu Road, Ranchi". It was also checked during the survey that no
other big parcel of land was vacant in the vicinity (i.e Lalu Khatal,
Bariatu Road) where the proposed Banquet Hall could be constructed.
8.2 Statement of the accused person Hemant Soren –
V. In his statement dated 05.02.2024 (RUD No- 25), he was shown his
WhatsApp chats (with his mobile no. 9431106949) with the co-accused
person Binod Singh on his mobile number 9835156276. The chats of
both these persons contained sharing of information and conversation in
respect of various properties. The accused person however, refused to
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sign on the said chats and also submitted false statement in respect of
these chats. The accused person was also requested to furnish his
mobile phone for cross- verification of the chats made with his associate
Binod Singh. However, he did not furnish it and submitted false
information in respect to his mobile phone.
vi. In his statement dated 06.02.2024 (RUD No-26), he was asked about
the construction plan of a banquet hall proposed at Lalu Khatal,
Bariyatu Road, Ranchi, prepared on 12.04.2018 and shared by Binod
Singh (made by his firm Grids Consultants) with the accused person
Hemant Soren over WhatsApp on 06.04.2021. The accused person
furnished false information in respect of the property by stating that he
did not have any information in regard to the said property.
It is mentioned that a survey dated 10.02.2024 (RUD No-11) was
conducted in presence of the circle officer and other officials of the Circle
Office, Baragain, Ranchi. It was revealed that the locality mentioned in
the said plan of the banquet hall is same where the land admeasuring
8.86 acres, in possession of Hemant Soren is situated. Further, it was
also revealed that in the said locality, no such land exists on which such
big banquet hall could be constructed. It is also worth mentioning that
the accused person Hemant Soren has vested interest in banquet halls
as one of the prominent banquet halls of Ranchi namely Sohrai Bhawan
is being run by his wife Ms. Kalpana Soren. During course of
investigation, it also surfaced that cash worth crores of rupees has been
deposited in recent times in the bank accounts of Sohrai Bhawan and
its related entities. The co-accused Binod Singh also concealed
information with respect to the said banquet hall plan and gave false
statement when confronted during his statement under section 50 of
PMLA, 2002.
11.5 Details of Persons/entities involved in commissioning the
offence of Money laundering and role thereof:
Binod Kumar Singh - He is directly a party with Hemant Soren in
concealment of proceeds of crime. The accused person Binod Singh had
prepared a plan of a Banquet Hall proposed for construction on the said
8.86 acres property by the accused person Hemant Soren. The plan was
made in the year 2018 which was under continuous amendment till
2022.
The name of firm of Binod Singh i.e, Grid Consultant was also
mentioned over that banquet hall plan. However, despite having
knowledge about the possession of the said 8.86 acres land by the
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accused Hemant Soren and the fact that construction of a banquet hall
was being contemplated over the said 8.86 acres property, the accused
Binod Singh gave false statement under section 50 of PMLA, 2002 in
order to assist Hemant Soren in concealing the proceeds of crime
acquired by him. The accused person Binod Singh had sent a plan of
Banquet Hall to accused person Hemant Soren over Whatsapp in the
year 2021. The name of firm of Binod Singh i.e, Grid Consultant was
mentioned over that banquet hall. Therefore, the accused person was
well aware of the land on which the said Banquet Hall was to be
constructed, however the accused knowingly became a party with
Hemant Surin in concealment of the proceeds of Crime in form of a
landed property at Bariyatu Ranchi.
In view of the above, it is clear that, various processes and activities
connected with the offence of money laundering i.e. acquisition,
possession, concealment, use and projecting as well as claiming the
proceeds of crime as untainted property, were carried out by the
accused persons Bhanu Pratapa Prasad and Hemant Soren. Other co
accused persons namely Binod Kumar Singh, Raj Kumar Pahan and
Hilarious Kachhap were a party with the accused person namely
Hemant Soren in concealment of the true possession and use of the said
property. Hence, the offence of money laundering u/s 3 of PMLA, 2002,
is made out against the above stated accused persons as discussed in
this Prosecution Complaint.
98. Thus, from the aforesaid paragraph of the
prosecution complaint, it is evident that during the course of
investigation, the prosecution/Enforcement Directorate
found a WhatsApp communication between accused A-2,
using mobile No. 943xxxxxx9, and accused/petitioner Binod
Singh, using mobile No. 983xxxxx76, wherein a proposed
Banquet Hall plan was shared by Binod Singh with A-2. The
said plan bore the description ―Lalu Khatal‖.
99. According to the respondent, witnesses examined
during investigation have identified the disputed 8.86 acres
of land as ―Lalu Khatal land‖ or ―Lalu Khatal property‖, and
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the said property is commonly known by the aforesaid name.
The material collected during investigation is indicative of
the fact that the accused A-2 was aware of the proposed
project and, being interested in the property, was involved in
planning its development and exercising beneficial control
over the land. According to the prosecution, such
circumstances assume significance under Section 3 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, as possession,
use and enjoyment of the alleged proceeds of crime
constitute part of its case.
100. This court finds that the inference sought to be
drawn by the Enforcement Directorate possesses some
probative value, inasmuch as the expression ―Lalu Khatal‖
emerges from two independent sources, namely, (i) the
Banquet Hall plan shared by present petitioner Binod Singh
with A-2 through WhatsApp, and (ii) the statements of
witnesses who have consistently referred to the disputed
8.86 acres of land as ―Lalu Khatal land‖ or ―Lalu Khatal
property‖.
101. The Banquet Hall plan is, therefore, not being relied
upon in isolation. Rather, it constitutes one link in the chain
of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Enforcement
Directorate to establish that A-2 was in possession of the
disputed land and exercised control and supervision over the
same.
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102. At the stage of consideration of a discharge
application, the Court is not required to determine whether
such material conclusively establishes ownership or
possession; the relevant consideration is whether the
circumstance is capable of lending support to the
prosecution's case.
103. Viewed from the aforesaid limited perspective, the
sharing of the Banquet Hall plan between accused/petitioner
Binod Singh and A-2, coupled with the reference to ―Lalu
Khatal‖ in the plan and the identification of the disputed
property by the same name in the statements of witnesses,
constitutes a circumstance from which an inference may be
drawn that the said plan pertained to the property under
investigation.
104. The Banquet Hall map remains a relevant
circumstance which, when read in conjunction with the
other materials collected during investigation, contributes
towards a prima facie inference regarding the knowledge,
interest and possible beneficial enjoyment of the land by A-2.
Though the plan alone may not be insufficient to sustain a
prosecution, it is capable, when considered along with the
other evidence relied upon by the respondent Enforcement
Directorate, of contributing to a finding of grave suspicion.
105. Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid
considerable emphasis on the fact that while the ECIR refers
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to Shri Bhanu Pratap Prasad "and unknown others", it does
not specifically name the present petitioner. Therefore, it has
been argued that the trial being conducted against the
petitioner lacks legal foundation and is unsustainable in the
eyes of law.
106. But in the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein
that an ECIR is an internal departmental record and is not a
statutory document equivalent to an FIR, as has been
authoritatively held in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v.
Union of India (supra) . Investigation under the PMLA is a
progressive and dynamic exercise, and the arraignment of a
person whose complicity surfaces in the course of
investigation is not merely permissible but obligatory. As
reaffirmed in Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of
Enforcement 2023 INSC 1029 a person need not be named
in the predicate FIR, much less in the ECIR, to be
prosecuted under Section 3 of the PMLA.
107. It has further been contended on behalf of the
petitioner that the document recovered during the course of
investigation i.e. the alleged/incriminating map, was nothing
more than a ―rough conceptual sketch‖ which was never
acted upon or implemented. Therefore, according to the
petitioner, no inference regarding his involvement in the
alleged commission of the crime can be drawn solely on the
basis of the said map.
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108. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that
from the record it appears that the document was a site plan
dated 12.04.2018, bearing the imprimatur of M/s Grids
Consultants, bearing the specific project name "Proposed
Banquet Hall" and the specific address "Lalu Khatal,
Bariyatu Road, Ranchi", transmitted to Accused No. 2 on
06.04.2021, and thereafter transmitted on 10.09.2022 to the
Petitioner's own employee under the file name "banquet @
bariyatul.pdf" for the purpose of effecting edits to the
parking layout edits which were in fact carried out and
returned.
109. Thus, prima facie, it can be inferred that a drawing
which is site-specific, bears the name and branding of the
concerned architectural firm, and has undergone revisions
over a period of more than four and a half years, cannot
readily be characterized as a mere conceptual doodle or
rough sketch. Be that as it may, whether the document in
question constitutes only a preliminary sketch or a
developed architectural layout, and whether an architect is
professionally obligated to verify the title or ownership of the
land concerned, are essentially questions of fact as well as
matters of professional practice. Such issues can only be
adjudicated upon after appreciation of evidence during trial
and cannot be conclusively determined at this stage of the
proceedings.
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110. Further from record it is evident that a search
under Section 17 of the PMLA was conducted on 03.01.2024
at the residential premises of the Petitioner in the course of
investigation in ECIR/RNZO/07/2023, in which his mobile
phone, his laptop and unaccounted cash amounting to Rs.
23,74,000/- were seized. It is from that very mobile phone
that the incriminating WhatsApp communications between
the Petitioner and Accused No. 2, and the Banquet Hall plan
bearing the address "Lalu Khatal", were retrieved. However
the Petitioner is not charged with acquiring or holding the
8.86 acres and is charged with knowingly being a party to its
concealment.
111. Further the prosecution/ED relies upon the seized
mobile device and its contents, the plan of 12.04.2018
bearing the address "Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi";
the transmission of whatsapp made by petitioner on
06.04.2021 to Accused No. 2, the transmission of
10.09.2022 to Shri Pranav Kumar Mandal under the file
name "banquet @bariyatul.pdf"; the Section 50 statement of
Shri Pranav Kumar Mandal dated 08.03.2024; the survey
proceedings under Section 16 of the PMLA dated 20.04.2023
and 10.02.2024; the identification by witnesses of the
disputed parcel as "Lalu Khatal"; the statements of the
Petitioner under Section 50 of the PMLA; and the statements
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and refusal to co-operate of Accused No. 2 when confronted
with the very same chats.
112. Further, it is alleged by the ED that petitioner
concealed his knowledge of the Banquet Hall plan and of the
property. The falsity of his statement stands demonstrated
by the contents of his own seized device, by the survey
proceedings, by the statement of his own employee and by
the mutually corroborative statement of Accused No. 2 on
the very same subject.
113. It is the considered view of this Court that whether
the alleged falsity of the assertions or documents relied upon
by the prosecution is ultimately established beyond
reasonable doubt is a matter to be determined upon
appreciation of evidence during trial. At this stage, it would
not be proper for the Court to undertake a detailed
examination of the merits of the allegations or to record
findings on disputed questions of fact.
114. Further it is apparent from record that the
Petitioner is not alleged to have projected the property as
untainted in his own hands but he is alleged to have
knowingly assisted accused No. 2 in concealing the true
possession, control and beneficial enjoyment of the tainted
property.
115. It needs to refer herein that Clause (i) of the
Explanation to Section 3 of the Act 2002 enumerates
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concealment, possession, acquisition, use, projecting as
untainted property and claiming as untainted property as
six independent and severable processes or activities,
involvement in any one of which constitutes the offence.
Clause (ii) declares the offence to be a continuing one. The
Explanation to Section 2(1)(u), inserted by the Finance (No.
2) Act, 2019, expressly extends the definition of proceeds of
crime to property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly,
as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled
offence.
116. Further, the petitioner has placed his reliance upon
the case of Jafar Mohammed Hasanfatta v. Deputy
Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2017 SCC OnLine
Guj 2476 . In that case the impugned conduct of the
petitioners was the passive receipt of funds through regular
banking channels from a relative, and there was no material
of any description to impute knowledge.
117. In the present case the Petitioner as per allegation,
has affirmatively created, branded, transmitted and, over a
period of four and a half years, revised a development plan
for the very parcel constituting the proceeds of crime,
transmitted it directly to the person in illegal possession
thereof, and thereafter denied all knowledge of it upon oath.
Further, and decisively, Jafar Mohammed Hasanfatta
case was decided in the year 2017 and its observations upon
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the reach of Sections 3 and 24 of the PMLA must now be
read subject to the authoritative and binding exposition of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
(supra), decided in 2022. Accordingly, in the light of the
factual matrix and circumstances obtaining in the present
case, this Court finds that the ratio laid down in the
judgment relied upon by the petitioner doesn‘t lends support
to the petitioner's contention.
118. Further the reliance placed by the petitioner on the
case of Shyam Radhakrishna Malpani v. State of
Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2404 , is also
distinguishable upon its facts and affords the Petitioner no
assistance. The case concerned a statutory external auditor
prosecuted for a failure to detect sham transactions for an
omission amounting at highest to professional negligence, in
the discharge of a statutory audit function performed
transparently and on the record.
119. The present case concerns as per the prosecution
complaint, an act, performed off the record, for a client
whose name does not appear anywhere upon the document,
followed by an affirmative denial of that act upon oath. The
distinction between a professional who fails to detect
wrongdoing and a professional who conceals his own
participation is fundamental. It may further be noticed that
the Bombay High Court in the very passage extracted by the
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Petitioner reiterates that the Court must consider "the broad
probabilities of the case" and "the cumulative effect of the
documents produced" which is an exercise which the learned
Special Judge has performed in the impugned order.
120. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also
placed reliance upon the Deputy Director, Directorate of
Enforcement v. Murali Krishna Chakrala, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 878, wherein the judgment of the Madras High
Court dated 23.11.2022 in Murali Krishna Chakrala v.
Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement , has been
affirmed. In the said case Chartered Accountant was
discharged upon the specific reasoning that in issuing a
Form 15CB certificate he was required only to examine the
nature of the remittance and was not required to go behind
the genuineness of the documents furnished by his client.
But in the instant case three features distinguish the
present case decisively. First, the Petitioner acted for no
disclosed client at all: the site plan bears the name of M/s
Grids Consultants but bears no client's name whatsoever,
and no engagement letter, fee note, invoice, professional
register entry or any other contemporaneous professional
record has been produced by the Petitioner to evidence a
bona fide professional engagement. Secondly, the Chartered
Accountant in Chakrala performed a statutory function
transparently and never denied having performed it but
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herein as per allegation the Petitioner concealed the very
existence of the plan and gave a false statement under
Section 50 of the PMLA. Thirdly, here the Petitioner was, on
his own showing, professionally engaged with a site over four
and a half years, transmitted the plan directly to the person
in illegal possession, and had every means of knowing. The
Chakrala principle protects the professional who is
transparent; it does not protect the professional who
conceals. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the
petitioner is not applicable in the fact and circumstances of
the instant case.
121. Upon consideration of the rival submissions and the
materials placed on record, this Court is of the view that the
settled principles governing discharge favour continuation of
the prosecution where the circumstances, when
cumulatively assessed, give rise to a grave suspicion
regarding the involvement of the accused. At this stage, the
Enforcement Directorate is not required to establish actual
conspiracy, actual manipulation of records, or the ultimate
guilt of the accused beyond doubt. The requirement is only
to demonstrate the existence of material giving rise to a
reasonable prima facie inference warranting a trial.
122. The circumstances relied upon by the Enforcement
Directorate, including the disputed property under
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investigation, the emergence of the SAR proceedings, the
alleged unusual urgency surrounding the passing of the
order contemporaneous with the investigation being
conducted by the Enforcement Directorate, and the broader
materials linking A-2 with possession of the property and an
intention to develop and commercially exploit the same,
when viewed cumulatively, appear sufficient to justify the
continuation of the proceedings.
123. The contention of the petitioner that preparation of
a plan by itself does not establish the offence alleged cannot
be accepted as a ground for discharge at this stage. The
issue before this court is not whether the said circumstance
conclusively establishes guilt but whether it constitutes
relevant material requiring examination during trial.
124. The prosecution seeks to rely upon said document
as one link in a chain of circumstances and not as a sole
incriminating material whether the proposed Banquet Hall
plan actually relates to the disputed property, whether the
applicant prepared the same with knowledge of the alleged of
the property, and whether his acts amount to knowingly
giving assistance or participating in activities connected with
the proceeds of crime are all matters requiring evidence and
cross-examination. These issues cannot be conclusively
determined at the stage of discharge.
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125. Further, whether the Petitioner prepared the plan
with knowledge of the character of the property and whether
his acts amount to knowingly giving assistance in activities
connected with proceeds of crime are "all matters requiring
evidence and cross-examination" which "cannot be
conclusively determined at the stage of discharge".
126. Further, it is settled position of law that no
professional enjoys a status-based immunity under the
PMLA. The said protection attaches to the professional who
acts transparently within the four corners of a disclosed
engagement and does not conceal what he has done. But it
does not attach to a professional who acts for an undisclosed
client, whose drawing bears no client's name, who produces
no engagement letter, fee note or invoice, who transmits his
work directly and privately to a person in illegal possession
of the site, and who thereafter denies the whole transaction
upon oath in a proceeding deemed judicial by Section 50(4)
of the PMLA. Therefore, the question whether the Petitioner
falls in the former class or the latter is precisely what the
trial must determine.
127. It is settled position which has been settled in State
of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 ,
wherein it has been held that the requisite intention or
knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances proved
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and need not be established by direct evidence at the stage
of framing of charge.
128. The circumstances from which such knowledge is
prima facie inferable herein based upon the prosecution
complaint that the Petitioner is a close associate of Accused
No. 2, petitioner‘s firm carried the project on its books from
2018 to 2022, the plan bore the specific locality description
"Lalu Khatal‖, and witnesses identify the disputed 8.86 acres
by that very name. Further the survey dated 10.02.2024,
conducted in the Petitioner's own presence, confirmed the
identity of the locality and the plan bore no client's name;
and it is alleged that the Petitioner concealed the entire
transaction and gave a false statement under Section 50 of
the PMLA. Whether these aforesaid circumstances ultimately
sustain a finding of knowledge beyond reasonable doubt is a
question for the trial.
129. The petitioner is hereby charged under Section 3 of
the PMLA with allegation that he is knowingly being a party
to, and knowingly assisting in, a process or activity
connected with proceeds of crime. Further it alleged that he
assists to Accused no.2 in the concealment of the possession
and beneficial enjoyment of the 8.86 acres by Accused No. 2.
Thus, it is impossible at this stage to adjudicate the
Petitioner's participation in that concealment without
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examining what was being concealed, by whom and from
whom.
130. Having considered the prosecution complaint,
witnesses statements, documentary evidence relied upon by
the complainant/prosecution, digital evidence and the
surrounding circumstances relied upon by the prosecution,
this court is of the opinion that the material on record
cannot be said to be wholly insufficient or incapable of giving
rise to a prima facie inference against the petitioner. The
material rather raises issues requiring adjudication upon
evidence during the trial.
131. Furthermore, it is the settled position of law that in
the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, interference with an
order passed by a subordinate Court is permissible only if
such order suffers from perversity or patent error, thereby
occasioning a failure of justice.
132. At this juncture it needs to refer herein that the
word ‗perverse‘ has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex
Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous
consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public
Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately
discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt,
true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
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irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies
logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the
blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm
in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of
the said judgment reads as under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of
cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this
Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings
of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought
on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of
procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR
1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a
finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the
Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the
findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so
perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those
findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the
Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading
and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331]
the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined
as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court
defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from
the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct,
etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.
“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that
most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.
Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.
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3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the
direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or
opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.””
133. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if any
order made in conscious violation of pleading and law then it
will come under the purview of perverse order. Further
―perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not
only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against
the evidence.
134. Thus, ―perversity‖ refers to a finding or decision so
unreasonable or irrational that no reasonable person acting
judicially could have reached it. It signifies a gross and
unreasonable assessment of evidence or law by a court.
135. Further Perversity is a high threshold for
intervention, distinguishing it from a mere error of fact or
law. The "safest approach on perversity is the classic
approach on the reasonable man's inference on the facts but
inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is
not perversity, reference in this regard be made to the
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judgment rendered by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of
Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 14 SCC 197.
136. This Court, in order to examine whether the
impugned order dated 10.06.2026 suffers from perversity,
has perused the same.
137. From the impugned order it is evident that the
learned Special Judge has recorded satisfaction that there
exists sufficient material to proceed against the petitioner for
the offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002, punishable under Section 4 thereof.
138. Further it is also evident from impugned order that
the learned Special Judge sets out Section 250 of the BNSS
and its correspondence with Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. and
applies State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014)
11 SCC 709 and the allied line of authority. Further it is
evident from the impugned order that the learned special
Judge deals specifically and separately with the material
available against this Petitioner and identifies the
cumulative circumstances relied upon and records
conclusion with reasons.
139. Thus, it is evident from the impugned order that the
learned Special Court, PMLA, Ranchi, upon due
consideration of the materials available on record, confined
itself to the limited exercise of examining whether a prima
facie case existed against the petitioner warranting
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continuation of the proceedings. Having found sufficient
material for such purpose, the learned Special Court
proceeded to reject the discharge application. Therefore, the
impugned order cannot be said to suffer from any legal
infirmity, jurisdictional error, or perversity warranting
interference by this Court.
140. At this juncture, it needs to refer herein that the
Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Nirankarnath
Sharma Versus Directorate of Enforcement and
Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 560 has observed that as
established in multiple judicial pronouncements, cases
involving economic offences necessitate a thorough trial to
unearth the complete chain of events, financial transactions,
and culpability of the accused, therefore the material
submitted by the respondent, coupled with the broad
legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the necessity of
allowing the trial to proceed and not discharging the
appellant at the nascent stage of charge framing and
discharging the appellant at this stage would be premature
and contrary to the principles governing the prosecution in
money laundering cases, for ready reference the relevant
paragraphs are being quoted as under:
“30. The PMLA was enacted with the primary objective of preventing
money laundering and confiscating the proceeds of crime, thereby
ensuring that such illicit funds do not undermine the financial system.
Money laundering has far-reaching consequences, not only in terms of
individual acts of corruption but also in causing significant loss to the
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public exchequer. The laundering of proceeds of crime results in a
significant loss to the economy, disrupts lawful financial transactions,
and erodes public trust in the system. The alleged offences in the
present case have a direct bearing on the economy, as illicit financial
transactions deprive the state of legitimate revenue, distort market
integrity, and contribute to economic instability. Such acts, when
committed by persons in positions of power, erode public confidence in
governance and lead to systemic vulnerabilities within financial
institutions.
31. The illegal diversion and layering of funds have a cascading effect,
leading to revenue losses for the state and depriving legitimate sectors
of investment and financial resources. It is settled law that in cases
involving serious economic offences, judicial intervention at a
preliminary stage must be exercised with caution, and proceedings
should not be quashed in the absence of compelling legal grounds. The
respondent has rightly argued that in cases involving allegations of
such magnitude, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of
wrongdoing and to ensure accountability.
32. The PMLA was enacted to combat the menace of money laundering
and to curb the use of proceeds of crime in the formal economy. Given
the evolving complexity of financial crimes, courts must adopt a strict
approach in matters concerning economic offences to ensure that
perpetrators do not exploit procedural loopholes to evade justice.
33. The present case involves grave and serious allegations of financial
misconduct, misuse of position, and involvement in transactions
constituting money laundering. The appellant seeks an end to the
proceedings at a preliminary stage, effectively preventing the full
adjudication of facts and evidence before the competent forum.
However, as established in multiple judicial pronouncements, cases
involving economic offences necessitate a thorough trial to unearth the
complete chain of events, financial transactions, and culpability of the
accused.
34. The material submitted by the respondent, coupled with the broad
legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the necessity of allowing
the trial to proceed and not discharging the appellant at the nascent
stage of charge framing. The argument that the proceedings are
unwarranted is devoid of substance in light of the statutory objectives,
the continuing nature of the offence, and the significant financial
implications arising from the alleged acts. Discharging the appellant at
this stage would be premature and contrary to the principles governing
the prosecution in money laundering cases.”
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141. Thus, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove,
the materials available on record, including the statements
of witnesses and other documents collected during
investigation, and bearing in mind the principles laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is satisfied that a
prima facie case is made out against the present petitioner.
The contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner
essentially pertain to disputed questions of fact and matters
requiring appreciation of evidence, which can be adjudicated
only during trial. Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek
rebuttal of the prosecution allegations at this stage of the
proceedings.
142. Further, it needs to refer herein that the Hon‘ble
Apex Court in the case of Munna Devi v. State of
Rajasthan, (2001) 9 SCC 631 has observed that the
revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure
cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While
exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to
appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the
appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could
be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar
against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the
framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first
information report even if they are taken at the face value
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and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence
for which the accused has been charged.
143. Thus, it is evident that the revisional power can only
be exercised to correct patent error of law or procedure
which would occasion unfairness, if it is not corrected. The
revisional power cannot be compared with the appellate
power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous
examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by
the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be
exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the
proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are
taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused
has been charged.
144. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu, and Ors. , (2023) 6 SCC
768 has held at paragraphs-81 to 83 as under:
“81. The High Court has acted completely beyond the
settled parameters, as discussed above, which
govern the power to discharge the accused from the
prosecution. The High Court could be said to have
donned the role of a chartered accountant. This is
exactly what this Court observed in Thommandru
Hannah Vijayalakshmi [CBI v. Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi, (2021) 18 SCC 135]. The High Court
has completely ignored that it was not at the stage
of trial or considering an appeal against a verdict in
a trial . The High Court has enquired into the materials
produced by the accused persons, compared with the
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information compiled by the investigating agency and
pronounced a verdict saying that the explanation offered
by the accused persons deserves to be accepted applying
the doctrine of preponderance of probability. This entire
exercise has been justified on account of the investigating
officer not taking into consideration the explanation offered
by the public servant and also not taking into
consideration the lawful acquired assets of the wife of the
public servant i.e. Respondent 2 herein.
82. By accepting the entire evidence put forward by the
accused persons applying the doctrine of preponderance of
probability, the case put up by the prosecution cannot be
termed as “groundless”. As observed by this Court in
C.S.D. Swami [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] that
the accused might have made statements before the
investigating officer as to his alleged sources of income,
but the same, strictly, would not be evidence in the case.
83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a departure
from the principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden
will always lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients
of the offences charged and never shifts on the accused to
disprove the charge framed against him. The legal effect of
Section 13(1)(e) is that it is for the prosecution to establish
that the accused was in possession of properties
disproportionate to his known sources of income but the
term “known sources of income” would mean the sources
known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the
accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for
the accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets
in his hands. The onus in this regard is on the
accused to give satisfactory explanation. The
accused cannot make an attempt to discharge this
onus upon him at the stage of Section 239CrPC. At
the stage of Section 239CrPC, the court has to only
look into the prima facie case and decide whether
the case put up by the prosecution is groundless.”
Conclusion
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145. Thus, the ambit and scope of exercise of power of
discharge is fairly well settled which has been elaborately
discussed in the preceding paragraphs and as per settled
proposition of law, no comprehensive assessment of the
materials or meticulous consideration of the possible
defence need to be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise
of weighing materials in golden scales is to be undertaken at
this stage. The only deliberation at the stage of framing of
charge is “as to whether prima facie case was made out or
not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or
not”.
146. Further, it is well settled that the revisional power
cannot be parallelled with appellate power. The Revisional
Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the
material on record as is undertaken by the Trial Court or the
Appellate Court.
147. Further, it is evident from the impugned order that
the learned Special Court, PMLA, Ranchi, correctly applied
the settled principles governing consideration of a discharge
application and restricted its scrutiny to ascertaining
whether sufficient material existed on record to proceed
against the petitioner. Upon being satisfied that a prima
facie case was made out, the discharge application was
rejected. In such circumstances, this Court finds no error in
the approach adopted by the learned Special Court.
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148. Hence, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove
and taking into consideration the settled position of law as
discussed and referred hereinabove and further taking into
consideration the ratio of the judgment rendered by the
Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Nirankarnath
Sharma Versus Directorate of Enforcement and Another
(supra) , this court is of the considered view that there is no
illegality or perversity in the impugned dated 10.06.2026
passed in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No.
2539/2025 (arising out of ECIR Case No. 06/2023) by
learned AJC-I cum Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi, whereby
and whereunder the learned trial court has rejected the
application of the petitioner filed for discharge from the
offences defined under Section 3 and punishable under
Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
149. Accordingly, this Court does not find any justifiable
reason to interfere with the impugned order dated
10.06.2026.
150. In view thereof, the instant criminal revision
petition, is hereby, dismissed.
151. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, also
stand disposed of.
152. It is made clear that any observations made herein
are prima-facie for consideration of issue involved in the
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instant revision petition and view expressed herein shall not
be construed as an expression on the merits of the case. The
learned Trial Court shall proceed with the matter
uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court and
shall decide the case strictly in accordance with law.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
04/11/2026
Alankar /A.F.R.
Uploaded on 06.11.2026
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