Reliance Bp Mobility Limited vs B R L K Agency
- Court
- Bombay High Court
CNR No : HCBM020275982026
2026:BHC-OS:23529
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
COMM ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.27595 OF 2026
Reliance BP Mobility Limited
… Petitioner
Vs.
ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI
1. B.R.L.K. Agency
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.10.30
11:19:40 +0530
2. Hemamalini Paranthaman
3. Anand Paranthaman
4. E.V. Natarajan
… Respondents
Mr. Rohaan Cama with Mr. Manas Kotak i/by Veritas
Legal for the Petitioner.
Mr. R. Lakshmi Ratan with Mr. Rushikesh Desai for
Respondent Nos.1 to 3.
Mr. Nikhil N. Wadikar with Mr. Kastur P. Patil for
Respondent No.4.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : OCTOBER 28, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : OCTOBER 30, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. I have considered the pleadings, the documents placed on
record and the submissions made by the Petitioner and Respondent
Nos. 1 to 4. At this stage, the Petitioner is asking for only a limited
relief. It wants that Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 should not disturb its
possession of the retail outlet without following due process of law.
1
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
For deciding this request, this Court is not required to decide
whether the sub-lease should be renewed, whether the Petitioner
has any permanent right to remain on the property, or what
decision should be taken in the proceedings before the Petroleum
and Explosives Safety Organisation (PESO). These are separate
issues and have to be considered separately.
2. Protecting a person who is in possession and deciding
whether that person has a right to continue on the property are
not the same thing. A person may say that the agreement gives
him a right to remain in possession, while the other side may
dispute it. Such dispute has to be decided by the proper Court or
authority according to law. But only because there is a dispute
about the right to remain on the property, no party can take the
law into its own hands and remove the person in possession by
force. At the same time, an order protecting possession cannot
create a lease, renew a lease which has already expired, or stop the
lawful owner from taking steps which are permitted by law.
3. The documents on record show that the dispute has arisen
from the dealership agreement dated 3 August 2005, the sub-lease
executed on the same date and the termination of the dealership
agreement by the Petitioner on 16 July 2025. The Petitioner says
that Respondent No. 1 was not operating the retail outlet properly
and was not carrying on the work as required. The Petitioner relies
on its letters dated 18 July 2025 and 30 July 2025, by which it
asked for renewal of the sub-lease. According to the Petitioner,
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 did not take the required steps for renewal.
It is on this ground that the Petitioner asks for protection so that it
2
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
is not removed from possession without following the procedure
provided by law.
4. The mere existence of the dealership agreement and the sub-
lease does not mean that the Petitioner must succeed on every
issue raised in this application. The terms of both documents, the
capacity in which each respondent signed them and the rights
arising from them have to be considered separately. The Petitioner
cannot use the dealership agreement to put a duty on a person
who had not agreed to be bound by it. On the other hand, a
dispute about the rights of the parties does not give anyone a right
to forcibly remove a person who is actually in possession.
Therefore, for deciding the limited request made now, the main
question is whether there is sufficient ground to direct the parties
not to disturb the Petitioner’s possession without following due
process of law.
5. The earlier proceedings before the District Munsif Court,
Gudiyattam, are relevant. However, the effect of that order has to
be understood within its proper limits. In I.A. No. 4 of 2025 in O.S.
No. 90 of 2025, the District Munsif, by order dated 24 June 2026,
accepted the objection that there was no arbitration agreement
between the Petitioner and the owner of the property, who is
Respondent No. 4 in the present Petition. In paragraph 6.8 of that
order, the Court observed:
“There is no relationship between the petitioner and
respondent. There is no arbitration agreement between the
petitioner and respondent hence without executing any
agreement in respect of arbitration clause by the petitioner
3
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
he has no locus standi to file petition under Section 8 of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996.”
6. The order records that the objection was accepted and the
suit was dismissed without costs. This order cannot be ignored
while considering the claim against Respondent No. 4. At the same
time, the present application is filed under Section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the request now made
is only for protection against dispossession without following due
process of law. The earlier order has to be considered by looking at
the parties, the issue decided and the relief now asked for. This
Court cannot treat that order as deciding every question relating to
possession. But the finding about absence of an arbitration
agreement cannot be ignored.
7. Respondent No. 4 says that he is the owner of the suit
property and was only a confirming party to the sub-lease dated 3
August 2005. He says that he was not a party to the dealership
agreement and had not accepted any obligation under Clause 60 of
that agreement. He says that the sub-lease expired on 2 August
2025 and no renewed registered sub-lease has been executed.
According to him, the Petitioner cannot use these proceedings to
force him to renew the sub-lease or continue the relationship
against his wish. He points out that the Petitioner had asked for
specific performance in O.S. No. 90 of 2025 and that the suit was
dismissed by the order dated 24 June 2026.
8. The submissions of Respondent No. 4 have substance so far
as the Petitioner wants to enforce a obligation against him. The
material presently placed before this Court does not show that
4
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
Respondent No. 4 had agreed to refer disputes arising under the
dealership agreement to arbitration. Merely because he was a
confirming party to the sub-lease, it cannot automatically be said
that he became a party to every term of the separate dealership
agreement. Whether a person who has not signed an arbitration
agreement can still be bound by it in a proper case depends on the
facts and the legal principles relating to the consent and intention
of the parties. Such consent cannot be presumed only because the
transactions relate to the same property.
9. In ASF Buildtech (P) Ltd. v. Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. (P) Ltd. ,
(2025) 9 SCC 76, the Supreme Court, while considering the group
of companies doctrine as explained in Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP
(India) (P) Ltd. , (2024) 4 SCC 1, reproduced the following
observations from paragraph 153 of Cox & Kings :
“153. … The group of companies doctrine has important
utility in determining the mutual intention of the parties in
the context of complex transactions involving multiple
parties and multiple agreements. Moreover, the doctrine has
been substantively entrenched in the Indian arbitration
jurisprudence. We are aware of the fact that the group of
companies doctrine has not found favour in some other
jurisdictions, including in English law. However, we deem it
appropriate to retain the doctrine which has held the field in
Indian jurisprudence though by firmly establishing it within
the realm of the mutual consent or the mutual intent of the
parties to a commercial bargain. This will ensure on the one
hand that Indian arbitration law retains a sense of dynamism
so as to respond to contemporary challenges. At the same
time, structuring the doctrine in the manner suggested so as
to ground it in settled principles governing the elucidation of
5
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
mutual intent is necessary. This will ensure that the doctrine
has a jurisprudential foundation in party autonomy and
consent to arbitrate.”
10. This passage shows that the main thing to be considered is
the intention of the parties and their consent to arbitration. It does
not mean that every person connected with a property or
commercial transaction becomes bound by an arbitration clause. In
the present case, the material does not provide sufficient ground to
hold that Respondent No. 4 had agreed to refer the dispute
between the Petitioner and Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 under the
dealership agreement to arbitration. Therefore, the Petitioner
cannot use the present request for protection to force Respondent
No. 4 to renew the sub-lease or to restrain him on the ground that
he is bound by Clause 60 of the dealership agreement.
11. The case against Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 is different. The
Petitioner’s claim against these respondents arises from the
dealership arrangement and the dealings relating to the retail
outlet. The Petitioner says that it terminated the dealership
agreement on 16 July 2025 and thereafter took over the operation
of the outlet. It says that the complaints made by Respondent No.
3 to PESO resulted in show-cause proceedings which may affect
the continuation of the explosives licence required for the outlet.
The Petitioner apprehends that these steps may be used to disturb
its possession of the property.
12. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 dispute the Petitioner’s right to the
relief claimed. Their counsel says that they will act only according
to law and that there is no need to grant an injunction when no
6
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
actual threat has been established. This submission has to be
considered. An injunction cannot be granted only because a party
expresses fear, without any material to support it. But the Court
must look at the nature of the dispute, the steps already taken by
the parties and whether a limited order is needed so that the
dispute is dealt with according to law, and not by force or by
taking the law into their own hands.
13. The record shows that the dispute is not only about the
meaning of the agreement. The dealership agreement has been
terminated, there is a dispute about renewal of the sub-lease,
proceedings have taken place before the District Munsif Court, and
complaints have been made to PESO followed by show-cause
notices. These facts show that the parties are taking steps against
each other in relation to the retail outlet. They do not, by
themselves, prove that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have already
forcibly removed the Petitioner from possession. Still, for the
limited purpose of interim protection, the question is whether
there is reasonable ground to direct these respondents not to
disturb the Petitioner’s existing possession except by following due
process of law.
14. The order dated 24 June 2026 passed by the District Munsif
Court does not require this Court to refuse all protection against
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. That order was passed on an application
under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The
reasons recorded in paragraphs 6.6 to 6.8 deal, among other
things, with the nature of the suit, the dealership agreement and
the absence of an arbitration agreement between the Petitioner
7
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
and Respondent No. 4. The District Munsif noted that the
Petitioner was the landowner of the suit property in the context of
the dealership and sub-lease dispute and that there was no
relationship between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 4. But the
present application asks only for limited protection against
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The earlier order does not mean that these
respondents can remove the Petitioner from the property by force
or without following the procedure provided by law.
15. The Petitioner’s claim to continue in possession cannot be
decided in these proceedings only by looking at the termination
letter or the letters seeking renewal. Whether the sub-lease has
expired, whether there was a duty to renew it, whether any party
committed a breach and what follows from the termination of the
dealership agreement are matters which have to be decided in the
proper proceedings. Granting limited protection does not mean
that this Court is holding that the sub-lease has been renewed or
that the Petitioner has a permanent right to remain on the
property. It only means that, until the rights of the parties are
decided according to law, the Petitioner should not be removed
from its existing possession by force or by any method not
permitted by law.
16. The submission of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that they will act
only according to law is a relevant matter. If they follow what their
counsel has said, there should be no difficulty in granting the
limited protection sought by the Petitioner. The order will not stop
them from taking any action which they are legally entitled to
take. It will only require them to follow the procedure provided by
8
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
law before disturbing the Petitioner’s existing possession. If
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have a legal right to recover possession,
they may approach the competent forum and ask for the relief
available to them. They cannot use the dispute about the
dealership or sub-lease as a reason to take possession by force or
without lawful authority.
17. The Petitioner has relied on the proceedings before PESO.
The record refers to the show-cause notice dated 6 February 2026,
the reply filed by the Petitioner on 4 March 2026, the
communication dated 24 April 2026 advising the Petitioner to
submit documents before the Controller of Explosives, Vellore, and
the show-cause notice dated 27 July 2026. These proceedings
relate to the rules and requirements for the retail outlet and its
explosives licence. This Court cannot decide those proceedings in
the present application. An order under Section 9 cannot be used
to stop the competent statutory authority from exercising its
powers according to law.
18. Therefore, the position needs to be made clear. The
protection of possession being considered here will not stop
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 from placing their case before PESO or any
other competent authority. They may continue their complaints
and raise any objection available to them under law. In the same
way, the Petitioner may submit its reply and documents and defend
its rights before the competent authority. Nothing in this order
shall be treated as a finding about the validity of the explosives
licence, the legality of operating the retail outlet or the merits of
the pending PESO proceedings. Those matters must be considered
9
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
separately by the competent authority on the material before it
and according to law.
19. While granting interim relief, the Court has to consider
whether there is a prima facie case, where the balance of
convenience lies and whether irreparable injury may be caused. A
prima facie case does not mean that the Petitioner must prove its
entire claim at this stage. It means that the material should show a
real issue which needs protection until the rights of the parties are
decided. Here, the documents show a dispute arising from the
dealership agreement, the sub-lease, its alleged expiry and the
termination of the dealership. There are later proceedings and
complaints relating to the retail outlet. These circumstances give
sufficient ground to consider limited protection against forcible
dispossession by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. This finding does not
decide whether the termination was valid or whether the sub-lease
must be renewed.
20. The Court has considered whether the same order should be
passed against Respondent No. 4. His case is different from that of
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Respondent No. 4 claims to be the owner
of the property and disputes that he is bound by the dealership
agreement or its arbitration clause. The order dated 24 June 2026
of the District Munsif Court records the finding about the absence
of a relationship and an arbitration agreement between the
Petitioner and Respondent No. 4. The Petitioner has not placed
sufficient material before this Court to show that Respondent No. 4
consented to arbitration of disputes arising under the dealership
agreement or that the present interim relief can properly be
10
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
granted against him under Section 9.
21. The Petitioner’s request for protection against Respondent
No. 4 cannot be decided only because the Petitioner says that it is
in possession. The legal relationship between the parties and the
earlier finding about the arbitration agreement must be
considered. Respondent No. 4 says that the sub-lease has expired
and that no renewed registered document has been executed. The
Petitioner’s claim for renewal and its right to continue under the
sub-lease cannot be decided in this limited application. In these
circumstances, granting an injunction against Respondent No. 4
under Section 9 would go beyond what is supported by the
material presently available. The relief against him must,
therefore, be refused. This does not mean that Respondent No. 4
can take the law into his own hands. It means only that the
particular interim relief sought against him has not been
established in the present arbitration petition. Any remedy
available to the Petitioner before the competent forum according
to law is left open.
22. In view of the foregoing discussion, and upon overall
assessment of the material record, the following order is passed:
i) The Petition is partly allowed;
ii) Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are restrained from disturbing
the existing possession of the Petitioner over the retail outlet
otherwise than by following due process of law;
iii) The relief sought against Respondent No. 4 is refused;
11
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
carbpl-27595-2026-J.doc
iv) It is clarified that this order shall not be treated as
recognition of any right of renewal or extension of the sub-
lease in favour of the Petitioner, or as a final decision
regarding the contractual rights of the parties;
v) Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 shall remain at liberty to
pursue their remedies in accordance with law, including the
proceedings before PESO. The Petitioner shall also be at
liberty to defend its rights before the competent authority.
The proceedings before PESO shall be decided independently
in accordance with law and on their own merits;
vi) All other rights and contentions of the parties are kept
open;
vii) There shall be no order as to costs.
23. The Petition stands disposed off in above terms.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
12
Uploaded on - 30/10/2026 Downloaded on - 30/10/2026 11:50:51
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)