Raj Kumar Das (D) Thr. Lrs. vs National Insurance Co. Ltd.

2026 INSC 541
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 3585 OF 2023)

RAJ KUMAR DAS (D) THR. LRS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal arises out of the final judgment
and order passed by the High Court at Calcutta dated
27.09.2022, whereby the High Court affirmed the
dismissal of claim petition filed by the original
claimant, the injured, under Section 163A of Motor
1
Vehicles Act, 1988 seeking compensation for injuries
resulting in permanent disability allegedly sustained
in an accident dated 21.05.2004.

3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are as
follows:
3.1. On 21.05.2004, at 05:00 p.m., the original
Signature Not Verified
claimant-Raj Kumar Das after getting down from a
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2026.05.25
18:24:32 IST
Reason:

1
Hereinafter referred to as “ the Act”
C.A. @ SLP (CIVIL) NO. 3585 OF 2023 Page 1 of 14

rickshaw near Mondalpara Bus Stop, was allegedly
knocked down by a lorry bearing registration No.
WB-41-3999. He lost consciousness and sustained
injuries and thereafter underwent medical
treatment. He was ultimately diagnosed with
traumatic paraplegia, leading to permanent
disablement.
3.2. He instituted a claim case being MACC No.
49/2005 (subsequently renumbered as MACC
163/2007) seeking compensation to the tune of Rs.
3,50,000/- on 09.02.2005 under Section 163A of the
2
Act before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal .
3.3. The Tribunal, vide an order dated 11.09.2007,
dismissed the claim petition on the ground that he
had failed to prove that the injuries sustained were
a result of the alleged accident.
3.4. Aggrieved, the original claimant filed FMA No.
1056/2009 before the High Court assailing the
above order.
3.5. The High Court, vide the impugned order dated
27.09.2022, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
order of the Tribunal observing that the
discrepancies in the record were glaring, and factum
of the accident did not stand proved.

2
In short, “Tribunal”
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4. During the pendency of the proceedings, the original
claimant expired and is now represented by his legal
representatives.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. After
giving due consideration to the material placed on
record and submissions advanced on behalf of the
parties, this Court finds that the concurrent findings
of the courts below cannot be sustained and warrant
interference.
6. The Courts below have denied the claim of the original
claimant on the ground that the occurrence of
accident itself was not established. They relied on
certain discrepancies in the record to hold that the
involvement of the offending vehicle remained
unproved in the accident.
7. The question for consideration before us is not
whether every detail of the occurrence stands proved
with precision, but whether the material on record
reasonably establishes that the injuries sustained by
the original claimant arose out of the accident in
question.
8. At the outset, we would like to reiterate that the nature
of proceedings under the Act are summary in nature,
with an aim to provide expeditious justice. It is a
settled position of law that a claim petition is to be
decided on the touchstone of preponderance of
probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
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Further in a claim under Section 163A, the enquiry is
narrower still, for negligence is not required to be
proved, and it is sufficient that the injury is reasonably
connected with the motor vehicle in question.
9. It follows that discrepancies which do not go to the
root of the occurrence cannot defeat a claim. The
Court must differentiate between contradictions that
render the accident improbable and those that merely
reflect imperfections in documentation. It is in this
framework that the evidence needs to be appreciated.
10. This Court in Mathew Alexander v. Mohammed
3
Shafi & Anr . noted the following:
“12… A holistic view of the evidence has to
be taken into consideration by the Tribunal
and strict proof of an accident caused by a
particular vehicle in a particular manner
need not be established by the claimants.
The claimants have to establish their case on
the touchstone of preponderance of
probabilities. The standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt cannot be applied while
considering the petition seeking
compensation on account of death or injury in
a road traffic accident. To the same effect is
the observation made by this Court in
Dulcina Fernandes vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz,

3
(2023) 13 SCC 510.
C.A. @ SLP (CIVIL) NO. 3585 OF 2023 Page 4 of 14

(2013) 10 SCC 646 which has referred to the
aforesaid judgment in Bimla Devi.”
11. Both the High Court and the Tribunal have relied on
the MRI Report of the original claimant which records
an entry namely ‘fall from lorry’ to deny the factum of
the accident. The original claimant has consistently
deposed that it was after he got down from the
rickshaw and while he was paying the fare, the lorry
which was being driven in a negligent manner struck
him causing loss of consciousness. The FIR and the
chargesheet record the same. Even in the cross-
examination, he specifically denied having fallen from
the lorry.
12. It is a regular practice that medical history recorded at
the time of emergency treatment is ordinarily based on
information supplied by attendants and its only
function is to facilitate the diagnosis. Such a narration
of facts cannot be treated as a precise reconstruction
of the mechanics of the accident. The FIR, chargesheet
and the original claimant’s own testimony indicate
that he was hit by the lorry after he had got down from
the rickshaw. The isolated wording in the history
column cannot displace the cumulative evidentiary
record.
13. The delay in lodging the FIR was also relied upon by
the Courts to cast doubt on the claim. Even the
precedent relied upon by the High Court itself notes
C.A. @ SLP (CIVIL) NO. 3585 OF 2023 Page 5 of 14

that the delay in filing FIR cannot be a ground to doubt
4
the original claimant’s case. It is natural that in cases
involving grievous injuries, priority is given to securing
medical treatment rather than attending to legal
formalities. The record indicates that the original
claimant remained under continuous treatment and
was frequently hospitalised until 17.09.2004, whereas
the FIR came to be registered on 08.08.2004. In
circumstances such as this, delay in approaching the
police cannot by itself lead to an inference that the
accident did not occur, more so when the investigation
culminated in a chargesheet attributing negligent
driving to the lorry.
14. The High Court also noted the variation in the
registration number of the vehicle in original
claimant’s evidence. In his statement, he submitted
that the vehicle was bearing registration No. WB-41-
2999. On the other hand, in the FIR, the chargesheet,
and also in the claim petition, the vehicle registration
number was uniformly recorded as WB-41-3999. High
Court’s observation in this regard that the above
statements do not corroborate each other, is
unsustainable. An isolated error in the oral testimony,
particularly where the original claimant is asked to
recall events after having suffered serious injuries,

4
Ravi v. Badrinarayan, (2011) 4 SCC 693.
C.A. @ SLP (CIVIL) NO. 3585 OF 2023 Page 6 of 14

cannot outweigh contemporaneous documentary
consistency.
15. The High Court also observed that certain hospital
receipts did not fully correspond with the original
claimant’s narration of treatment. Such variations in
the sequence or particulars of medical bills cannot by
itself discredit the occurrence of the accident. Medical
documents primarily establish the fact and extent of
injury and the course of treatment and are not
expected to reproduce the original claimant’s
testimony in precise detail. So long as the records
consistently indicate hospitalisation and treatment for
traumatic paraplegia, minor inconsistencies in dates
or individual receipts do not render the claim
unreliable nor detract from the established disability.
The High Court was not justified in treating these
discrepancies as casting doubt on the occurrence of
the accident; at most, they relate to the course of
treatment.
16. Another issue for consideration was that no
independent witnesses were examined by the original
claimant to corroborate the accident. This being a case
where the original claimant has himself deposed to the
occurrence and his testimony has not been shaken in
cross-examination, his claim cannot be rejected solely
for want of additional evidence. This Court in Sunita
and others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport
C.A. @ SLP (CIVIL) NO. 3585 OF 2023 Page 7 of 14

5
Corporation and others made an observation in this
regard:
“34. …The approach in examining the evidence
in accident claim cases is not to find fault with
non-examination of some ‘best’ eyewitness in
the case but to analyse the evidence already on
record to ascertain whether that is sufficient to
answer the matters in issue on the touchstone
of preponderance of probability...”

17. Each of the above discussed discrepancies was treated
as fatal by the courts below. However, a claim under
the Act is to be assessed on cumulative probabilities.
When considered together with the police
investigation, medical evidence and consistent
narrative across documents, the irregularities relied
upon are not of material significance so as to
altogether render the occurrence improbable. In
treating these discrepancies as determinative, the
courts below applied a higher threshold of standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt rather than that of a
probability under this welfare legislation.
18. The Court cannot be unmindful to the situation that
the claimant was placed in after the accident. The
evidence shows that he was engaged as a labourer in
a brick field prior to the occurrence of the accident.

5
(2020) 13 SCC 486.
C.A. @ SLP (CIVIL) NO. 3585 OF 2023 Page 8 of 14

Upon suffering permanent paralysis, he was rendered
incapable of pursuing his occupation, resulting in a
complete loss of his earning capacity. In such
circumstances, denying his claim for compensation
despite the accident being established on a balance of
probabilities would undermine the very protective
purpose which the statute provides for.
19. Before moving to the question of compensation, it is
necessary to reiterate that adjudication under the Act
must not adopt a hyper-technical approach. While
procedural requirements and evidentiary rules serve
an important purpose, their application cannot be so
mechanical as to elevate minor inconsistencies into
major hurdles. Each claim must be examined in the
context of its own facts and surrounding
circumstances. When the overall material establishes
the accident and resulting injuries, trivial errors ought
not to defeat the substantive relief. The adjudicatory
process must remain sensitive to the practical realities
in which accident victims approach the Tribunal.
Victims of accidents are seldom in a position to
procure precise documents or give a coherent
narration of the events that led to the accident while
they are undergoing treatment. The absence of perfect
proof cannot be a ground to deny compensation under
a welfare statute.
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20. The accident is of the year 2004 and claim has
been pending for over two decades. The material
necessary for computation, namely the age, income and
extent of disability, is already available on record and
does require any further evidence. A remand at this
stage would only prolong the proceedings and defer the
relief to which the claimant’s legal representatives have
become entitled. In order to secure finality and avoid
further hardship, this Court considers it appropriate to
determine the compensation in these proceedings itself.
21. It is true that the claim petition was filed under
Section 163A of the Act, which at the relevant time
provided for a no-fault liability framework, with
compensation to be calculated as per the structured
formula provided in the Second Schedule of the Act.
However, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that
the amounts contemplated therein, particularly having
regard to the passage of time and subsequent evolution
of the law governing just compensation, would not
adequately recompense a victim who suffered 100%
permanent disability. This Court has repeatedly
noticed the inadequacies and defects in the said
Schedule. A three-judge bench of this Court in U.P.
State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok
6
Chandra , this Court observed that the calculation of

6
(1996) 4 SCC 362.
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compensation under the Second Schedule “ suffer[s]
from several defects ” and that the Table “ abounds in
such mistakes ”, and therefore could only be used as a
guide. Again in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
7
Pranay Sethi , it has been emphasized that the
compensation must remain fair, realistic and
commensurate with the actual loss suffered.
22. In the facts of the present case, negligence of the
offending vehicle also stands borne out from the
investigation on record as also the statement made by
the claimant himself. The claimant was a 37-year-old
brick-field labourer and the sole earning member of his
family. He suffered 100% permanent disability,
rendering him incapacitated for the rest of his life. He
finally passed away during the pendency of the
proceedings, leaving behind his wife and children. The
Court cannot ignore that the claimant may not have
invoked the provision best suited to the nature of the
claim. However, such lack of legal awareness cannot by
itself operate to deny them just compensation once the
foundational facts stand established.
23. The Court also cannot lose sight of the realities in
which such claims are pursued. Families of accident
victims often approach the legal process without
adequate legal assistance or awareness of the technical

7
(2017) 16 SCC 680
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distinctions between different provisions of the Act.
This Act being a welfare legislation, we have to look past
the technical requirements of the procedure.
24. After much deliberation, we have come to the
conclusion that strict confinement to Section 163A
(under the old provision) would not serve the interests
of justice. Therefore, in exercise of our jurisdiction
under Article 142 of the Constitution, we deem it
appropriate to determine compensation by drawing
guidance from the principles evolved by this Court in
claims arising under Section 166 of the Act.
25. We make it clear that the above course has been
adopted keeping in view the peculiar facts of the
present case and shall not be treated as a precedent.
26. The principles governing determination of
compensation are well settled. The claimant was aged
37 years at the time of the accident and suffered from
100% disability. Applying the principles laid down in
8 9
Sarla Verma and Pranay Sethi , the compensation
is calculated as follows:





8
Sarla Verma & Ors. v. DTC & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 121.
9
Supra note 7.
C.A. @ SLP (CIVIL) NO. 3585 OF 2023 Page 12 of 14

Head Calculation Amount
(in Rs.)
Income - 2,500
Future Prospects 40% of 2500 1,000
Annual income 3,500 X 12 42,000
Multiplier 42,000 X 15 6,30,000
Loss of Earning Capacity 6,30,000 X 100% 6,30,000
Mental agony, pain and
- 2,00,000
suffering
Loss of amenities - 1,00,000
Attendant charges - 3,60,000
Transportation and
- 2,00,000
Medical Expenses
(including future)
Total - 14,90,000

Accordingly, the compensation payable is assessed at
Rs. 14,90,000/- (Rupees Fourteen Lakhs Ninety
Thousand only).
27. The appellants have also placed on record a
computation claiming Rs.36,90,000/- as
compensation. The same is not adopted, and the
compensation is determined independently in
accordance with the settled principles governing such
assessment.
28. In view of the above discussion, the judgments of the
MACT and the High Court are set aside. The
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respondent–insurer shall deposit the sum of Rs.
14,90,000/- (Rupees Fourteen Lakhs Ninety
Thousand only) together with interest at the rate of 6%
from the date of filing the claim, within three months
from the date of this order before the MACT. Upon
such deposit, the amount shall be forthwith released
to the legal representatives of the original claimant in
accordance with law by the MACT.
29. The appeal stands allowed.
30. Pending application(s), if any shall stand disposed of.

……………………………..J.
[VIKRAM NATH]



……………………………..J.
[SANDEEP MEHTA]

NEW DELHI
MAY 25, 2026

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