RATANJAY KUMAR @ RAJESH KUMAR vs THE STATE OF BIHAR

Court
Patna High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.68682 of 2023
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-24 Year-2022 Thana- MAHILA PS District- Jehanabad
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RATANJAY KUMAR @ RAJESH KUMAR S/O SRI RAMJEE YADAV
VILLAGE GHINA BIGHA, PS- MAKHDUMPUR, DIST- JEHANABAD
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. THE STATE OF BIHAR BIHAR
2. MUNMUN BHARTI @ MAMTA KUMARI D/O ARVIND KUMAR @
RAMPRAVESH YADAV VILLAGE MADARICHAK, PS-
MAKHDUMPUR, DIST- JEHANABAD
... ... Opposite Party/s
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Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Rohit Kumar, Adv.
Mr.manish Kumar No. 13. Adv.
Mrs. Nitu Kumari, Adv.
For the State : Mr.Madhuri Lata, APP
For the Informant : Mr.Amrendra Kumar, Adv.
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANSUL
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 12-05-2026
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.
2. Petitioner seeks quashing of the order of cognizance
dated 31.08.2022 passed in connection with Jehanabad Mahila P.S.
Case No. 24 of 2022, by which the learned S.D.J.M., Jehanabad
has taken cognizance of the offences under Sections 376 and 420
of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act.

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3. The complainant, aged about 30 years, lodged the
present case against the petitioner. The petitioner is aged about 36
years and is a teacher by profession. The complainant states that
she entered into a physical relationship with him on the assurance
of marriage. The F.I.R. was lodged on 06.07.2022, alleging that he
had refused to marry her despite having given such an assurance.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
relationship between the parties was wholly consensual and
between two adults, and that no illegality is made out. The
informant has herself accepted that the parties were known to each
other and that they continued to have physical relations for
approximately three years, which, it is submitted, is sufficient to
establish that the informant was a consenting party throughout.
5. Learned counsel for the informant submits that the
ingredients of the alleged offences are made out.
6. Learned counsel for the informant and the learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the State have vehemently
opposed quashing of the order of cognizance dated 31.08.2022.
7. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of
Maharashtra reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608 , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court summarised the legal position with regard to the "consent"
of a woman vis-à-vis "misconception of fact" arising out of a false

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promise to marry. Paragraphs 16,18,21 & 24 of the said judgment
are reproduced hereunder:
“16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker
at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the
woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a ‘misconception of
fact’ that vitiates the woman’s ‘consent’. On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the
promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it.
The ‘consent’ of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
‘misconception of fact’ where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to
engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013)
7 SCC 675] this Court observed:
‘21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and
not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made,
at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the
consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences
of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely
on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on
account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond
his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show
that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The failure to keep a promise

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made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In
order to come within the meaning of the term ‘misconception of fact’, the fact must
have an immediate relevance. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the
other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused
had never really intended to marry her.””
“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above
cases, the ‘consent’ of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active
and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the
‘consent’ was vitiated by a ‘misconception of fact’ arising out of a promise to marry,
two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a
false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time
it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a
direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.”
8. The records would show that there is nothing to
indicate that it was solely on account of a false promise to marry
that the informant entered into a physical relationship with the
petitioner. No material is placed before this Court to establish that
any such promise, if at all extended, bore a direct nexus to her
decision to engage in the sexual act. The twin conditions requisite
for vitiating consent under the principles laid down in Pramod
Suryabhan Pawar (supra) are not satisfied on the facts of this case.
9. The informant is a woman of 30 years of age. She
was, by any reckoning, capable of taking her own independent
decisions. The records would show that the physical relationship

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between the parties continued for approximately three years. There
is no allegation of force or coercion at any stage. The relationship
was, on the face of the material placed before this Court, entirely
voluntary throughout its duration. A criminal prosecution under
Section 376 IPC cannot be permitted to proceed merely because a
cordial and consensual relationship between two adults did not
culminate in marriage. This proposition is now well settled. In
Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2025) 5 SCC 764 ,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 19, held as follows:
“19. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet
as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC are
absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant’s statement under Section 164
CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the
outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution’s case is
accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a
sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of
marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and
also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting
couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual
relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of
criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship.”
10. The order of cognizance also covers Section 420
IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. So far as Section
420 IPC is concerned, the gravamen of the offence is dishonest
inducement causing delivery of property or damage to property.

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The FIR, read as a whole, discloses no such ingredient. The
allegations are confined to the promise of marriage and the failure
to honour it. No element of cheating within the meaning of Section
420 IPC is made out on the face of the material placed before this
Court. So far as Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is
concerned, that provision penalises the demand of dowry. The FIR
is wholly silent on any demand of dowry at any point of time.
Section 4 DPA has been invoked without any factual foundation
whatsoever.
11. In such view of the matter, the order of cognizance
dated 31.08.2022 passed in connection with Jehanabad Mahila P.S.
Case No. 24 of 2022 by the learned S.D.J.M., Jehanabad stands
quashed in its entirety so far as the petitioner is concerned.
12. Accordingly, the present petition stands allowed.
(Ansul, J)
abhishekkr/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 05.06.2026
Transmission Date