AMAR KUMAR BEHERA vs STATE OF ODISHA(VIG.)
- Court
- Odisha High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLREV No.416 of 2026
[ CNR No.ODHC010404602026 ]
An application under Section 438 read with section 442 of the
BNSS, 2023 read with section 528 BNSS, 2023
Amar Kumar Behera
Petitioner
……….
-versus-
State of Odisha (Vigilance) Opposite Party
………
Advocates who has appeared in this case through Hybrid
Mode:
For Petitioner : Mr. Digambara Mishra, Advocate
For Opposite Party : Mr. Sangram Das, Standing Counsel
for Vigilance
CORAM:
THE HON’BLE MISS JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO
J U D G M E N T
……………………………………………………………………....
Date of Hearing :03.07.2026 and 15.10.2026
Date of Judgment :30.10.2026
……………………………………………………………………....
Savitri Ratho, J. This Criminal Revision has been filed challenging the
order dated 19.05.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Jeypore in V.G.R. Case No. 19 of 2014, refusing to
discharge the petitioner from the charge under Section 13(l)(c) read
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 1 of 42
with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in
Short “P.C. Act”) and the continuation of the proceeding against
him for the said offences.
2. By the same order, the learned Special Judge, Vigilance,
Jeypore, discharged the petitioner from offences punishable under
Sections 409 and 120-
B Indian Penal Code (in Short “IPC”) and
Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. Observing that it was a case of the
year 2014 and several adjournments had been granted to the
petitioner, the time petition filed on behalf of the petitioner was
rejected and NBW of arrest issued against him and notice was
issued to his bailors. Charge was framed against co-accused
Brundaban Majhi for commission of offence under Section – 13 (1)
(c) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and Section 406/109 of
the IPC; and under Section-13(1) (c) / 13(2) / 12 of the PC Act and
Section 406 of the IPC against co-accused Jagabandhu Bisoi.
3. As per the submissions of the learned counsel on
15.10.2026, V.G.R. Case No. 19 of 2014 is posted to 02.11.2026
for trial. On 15.10.2026, the Criminal Revision was posted for on
29.10.2026 and the execution of the NBW of arrest issued against
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 2 of 42
the petitioner was stayed till that date. On the same day, the
Registry was directed to obtain specific instructions regarding
status of the trial in VGR Case No 19 of 2014.
4. As per report dated 22.10.2026 of the learned Special
Judge, Vigilance, Jeypore, the split up case VGR Case No.19(A) of
2014 is posted to 02.11.2026 awaiting execution of NBW. VGR
Case No.19 of 2014 was earlier posted to 01.07.2026 and is now
posted to 12.11.2026 for hearing and no prosecution witnesses have
been examined.
PROSECUTION ALLEGATIONS
5. The Petitioner-Amar Kumar Behera was working as
Range Officer, Jeypore from 02.07.2007 to 01.02.2014. He was in
additional charge of Boriguma Range for the period from
08.02.2012 to 05.01.2014. Co accused Brundaban Majhi was
posted as Forester, B. Singpur Section since 03.01.2014. During the
year 2012, Govt. approved construction of Forest Guard Quarter
with built up area of 500 Sq.ft at the unit cost of Rs.4,20,000/-
under Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and
Planning Authority (CAMPA) APO-2011. In June, 2013 basing on
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 3 of 42
the requisition of the petitioner - Amar Kumar Behera, Range
Officer, Boriguma Range, Rs.35,22,000/- was released vide cheque
No.-12888 out of which Rs.4,20,000 was meant for construction of
the forest Guard quarter at Podapadar and Rs.25,00,000 for barren
hill plantation. On 26.6.2013 the petitioner transferred the amount
of Rs.29,20,000/- into A/C No.08651000006188 in Indian
Overseas Bank, Pujariput which stands in the name of Forester,
Singpur. This was credited into the account of the Forester on the
same day. On the next day, i.e 27.6.2013, Sri Brundaban Majhi,
Forester vide cheque No.581520 transferred Rs.4,20,000/- into the
A/C No.086501000006177 of IOB, Pujariput which stands in the
name of Sri Jagabandhu Bisoi of village Singhiguda under
Nabarangpur. Jagabandhu Bisoi belongs to Sindhiguda which is the
village of Sri Brundaban Majhi, Forester. He is a farmer by
profession and is no way concerned with the construction of Forest
Range Quarter at Podagada. On 28.06.2014, Rs.4,20,000/- was
withdrawn from his account in cash. Scrutiny of the vouchers
produced by Sri Brundaban Majhi - Forester towards construction
of Forest Guard quarter at Podagada revealed that Rs.4,20,000 has
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 4 of 42
been shown to be paid to Sri Bisoi vide Voucher No. 116 to 128 of
07/2013 and Sri Bisoi has given money receipts against each
voucher acknowledging receipt of amounts. Sri Majhi, the Forester
has shown measurement of work but there is no M.B. reference in
any voucher. Sri Majhi has shown payment of Rs.4,20,000/- for
completion of the Forest Guard Quarter building. But the
construction has not been completed. In order to assess the cost of
the building, technical inspection of the said building was taken up
on 22.09.2014 with the assistance of Sri Satyabrata Sethi, Asst.
Engineer, Boriguma Block in presence of Sri Amar Kumar Behera.
Forest Range Officer and present Forester of B. Singhpur Section.
During technical inspection the AE found civil works worth of
Rs.1,28,968/- only to have been executed. The remaining amount
of Rs.2,91,032/- has been misappropriated by the Forester Sri
Brundaban Majhi in connivance with Sri Amar Kumar Behera,
Forest Range Officer, Boriguma and Sri Jagabandhu Bisoi a co-
village of Forester Majhi. Hence Koraput Vigilance P.S. Case No.
47 of 2014 was registered against them for the offences punishable
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 5 of 42
under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) of the P.C. Act,
1988, and Sections 409 and 120-B of the IPC.
6. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet dated
30.06.2023.was submitted against Mara Kumar Behera, Brundaban
Majhi and Jagabandhu Bisoi under Section 13 (2) read with Section
13(1)(c) (d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 and, Section- 409/120-B IPC.
7. When the case was posted for framing of charge , an
application was filed by the petitioner on 11.05.2026 for discharge
stating that there was no material on record to indicate that he had
committed the offences under Section 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(c)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 or Section- 409/120-B IPC.
Relying on Rule -309(10) of the Forest Code, he submitted that the
officer responsible to prepare and render account is personally
responsible for completeness and strict accuracy of the same and
the petitioner was not at fault.
8. The Special P.P. objected to this application stating that
the materials collected during investigation prima facie indicated
involvement of the petitioner in commission of the offences.
IMPUGNED ORDER
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9.
The learned Special Judge Vigilance, Koraput, referring to
the statements of Sarat Chandra Sahu, Satyabrata Sethi and Ram
Chandra Nepak recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.,
observed that there is no specific material to suggest that the
petitioner conspired with Brundaban Majhi or the contractor
Jagabandhu Bisoi to facilitate misappropriation of the project
money and discharged him of the offences punishable under
Sections 409 and 120-B IPC. But referring to the provisions of
Rule 28 and Rule 309 (10) of the Orissa Forest Code observed
–
that the petitioner had not discharged his duty as per those
provisions and had allowed the co-accused persons to
misappropriate Government money and he did this either
dishonestly or fraudulently. Investigation revealed that the
contractor and forester prepared some false vouchers of different
dates, though the entire amount had been received by the contractor
on a single day. The construction work was not completed. The
partly constructed work was worth Rs 1,27,419/- and the work of
Rs.2,92,581/- was not executed and there was misappropriation of
this amount of Government money. The range Officer had a duty to
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 7 of 42
ensure proper execution of the project work and see that the work is
carried out as per the working plan or scheme, but failed to do so.
The justification for not doing so can be raised by the petitioner as
his defence during the trial. So prima facie materials were available
against him for commission of the offence defined in Section- 13
(1) (c) of the PC Act. At the time of framing of charge, it was not
necessary for the prosecution to establish the case beyond
reasonable doubt. A prima facie case was sufficient for framing of
charge. His case did not come with the principles of clauses (3) to
(7) framed in Ch. Bhajan Lal’s case as there was no express
prohibition to proceed against him and the allegations in the FIR
and the materials collected during investigation were neither absurd
nor inherently improbable so as to discharge him.
SUBMISSIONS
10. I have heard Mr. Digambara Mishra, learned counsel for
the Petitioner and Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel for
the Opposite party-Vigilance. Written note of submission has been
filed on behalf of the Petitioner on 10.07.2026. The written note
contains submissions which had not been made on 03.07.2026 and
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 8 of 42
some decisions which had not been relied on 03.07.2026 when the
matter was heard, but I have gone through the same.
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
11. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the Petitioner has
advanced the following contentions :-
i) The prosecution does not allege that the petitioner retained
Government money, misappropriated Government money,
fabricated vouchers, prepared false money receipts, withdrew
Government funds for his own benefit, or obtained any pecuniary
advantage. The prosecution attributes all such acts to the Forester,
who was entrusted with execution of the work, after release of
funds in accordance with departmental procedure.
ii) The sole allegation against the petitioner is that he failed
to supervise the execution of the work, forwarded the vouchers to
the Divisional Office, and thereby violated the supervisory
obligations cast upon him under the Odisha Forest Code.
iii) The learned Special Judge, while passing the impugned
order dated 19.05.2026, discharged the petitioner from the offences
punishable under Sections 409 and 120-B of the IPC and Section
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13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act with the following
categorical findings :
(a) after transfer of the sanctioned amount, the petitioner
had no dominion or control over the money;
(b) the transfer of funds by the petitioner to the Forester
was not shown to be wrongful in any manner; and
(c) there was no material suggesting conspiracy between
the petitioner, the Forester, and the contractor.
iv) The above findings completely negate the foundational
ingredients required to constitute an offence under Section
13(1)(c). But, despite recording these findings, the learned Court
retained the charge under Section 13(1)(c) for which the impugned
order suffers from an inherent legal contradiction.
v) The continuation of the prosecution against the petitioner
under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C Act is
unsustainable in law, as the essential ingredients of the offence are
conspicuously absent from the prosecution case itself.
vi) Section 13(1)(c) criminalizes only two categories of
conduct:-
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 10 of 42
(a) dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation or conversion
by the public servant of property entrusted to him or under
his control; or
(b) conscious permitting of another person to dishonestly
or fraudulently misappropriate or convert such property.
vii) Parliament has not criminalized the administrative
omission or lapse in supervision. The statute does not employ
expressions such as "failure to supervise", "negligent
supervision”,
“administrative lapse”, or “failure to detect irregularities” etc.
Those expressions occur neither expressly nor by necessary
implication within Section 13(1)(c). The language employed in the
penal statute cannot be imported or expanded to include what the
Legislature has deliberately omitted.
viii) That even assuming that Rule 28 imposed a duty of
supervision, breach of that duty cannot automatically constitute
criminal misconduct unless the statutory ingredients of Section
13(1)(c) are independently established by the materials on record.
ix) An alleged breach of the Odisha Forest Code is being used
to proceed against the petitioner for an offence of criminal
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misconduct under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Administrative
rules cannot enlarge the ingredients of a penal offence. Criminal
liability must arise exclusively from the statute creating the offence
and not from executive instructions prescribing departmental
procedure or administrative guidelines.
x) The charge-sheet attributes the preparation of false
vouchers, preparation of false money receipts, issuance of cheques,
and - to the Forester. There is no allegations
diversion of ₹4,20,000/
that the petitioner prepared any forged document, received any
portion of the alleged misappropriated amount, fabricated any
record, or derived any personal benefit. Hence criminal liability
cannot be fastened upon the petitioner merely because of his
supervisory position.
xi) The prosecution has failed to establish any of the essential
statutory requirements, namely: (a) entrustment of the property to
the petitioner or its continuance under his control; (b) dishonest or
fraudulent intention; (c) misappropriation (e) conversion for his
own use involving wrongful gain or personal benefit; or (f)
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 12 of 42
conscious permission enabling another person to dishonestly
misappropriate Government property.
(xii) The learned Special Judge has recorded findings which
completely negate the statutory ingredients of Section 13(1)(c) of
the PC Act and yet, in the same order, has directed that a charge
under that very provision be framed. The error is therefore one of
law and jurisdiction, warranting interference in revisional
jurisdiction.
In support of his submissions, he has relied on the
following decisions :-
i) M. Narayanan Nambiar vs State Of Kerala 1962
SCC OnLine SC 85
ii) C.K Jaffer Sharief vs State (Through CBI); (2013)
1 SCC 205
iii) Susanta Kumar Dalei @Susanta Kumar Dalai vs
.State of Odisha (Vigilance);2026 SCC OnLine SC 889
iv) Basudeb Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa; 1971 SCC
OnLine Ori 202
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 13 of 42
v) K.H. Kamaladini vs State; 2025 SCC OnLine SC
1176
vi) Sudarsan Sahu Vs. State;1978 CRI.LJ.(NOC)
52(ORI.)/ in Criminal Appeal No. 187 of 1974, Date of
Judgment- 11.05.1976
STANDING COUNSEL (VIGILANCE)
12. Mr. Sangram Das, learned counsel for the vigilance has
vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel
for the petitioner and submitted as follows :-
i) That the Divisional Forest Officer released a sum of
Rs.35,22,000/- in favour of the petitioner, Amar Kumar
Behera, the then Range Officer, Borigumma Range, vide
Cheque No.012888, pursuant to the administrative
approval accorded for execution of the project under the
CAMPA Scheme. The said amount included Rs.4,20,000/-
earmarked for construction of the Forest Guard Quarter at
Podapadar. On 26.06.2013, the petitioner transferred the
said amount to the account of the Forester, Brundaban
Majhi. On the very next day, i.e., 27.06.2013, the Forester
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 14 of 42
transferred the entire amount of Rs.4,20,000/- to the
account of the contractor, Jagabandhu Bisoi. During
investigation, it was found that the contractor and the
Forester prepared false vouchers of different dates,
although the entire amount had been received earlier by
the contractor on a single day.
ii) The technical inspection revealed that the value of
the work actually executed was only Rs.1,27,419/-,
whereas the remaining work valued at Rs.2,92,581/- was
not executed, resulting in misappropriation of Government
funds.
iii) The petitioner had transferred the entire amount to
the Forester and failed to ensure that the amount was
utilized for the purpose it was meant, i.e. construction of
the quarters and thereby facilitated its mis appropriation
by the co accused persons and thereby committed am
offence under Section 13 (1) (c) read with Section 13 (2)
–
of the PC Act.
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 15 of 42
iv) At the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not
required to determine whether the material is sufficient for
conviction. The limited consideration is whether there
exists a prima facie case requiring the accused to face trial.
The innocence or defence of the accused is to be
adjudicated during the course of trial, and not at the stage
of framing of charge. Therefore, the Court need not
undertake a detailed examination or appreciation of the
evidence at this stage.
v) The allegations in the FIR and the materials
collected during investigation cannot at this stage be said
to be baseless, absurd, or inherently improbable so as to
justify discharge of the petitioner from the alleged offence.
vi) That the allegations in the FIR and the materials
collected during investigation prima facie discloses the
involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence and he
has failed to demonstrate that his case falls within any of
the categories enumerated in Clauses (3) to (7) framed in
case
Bhajan Lal’s
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 16 of 42
vii) Discharge after framing of charge is not permissible
in criminal proceedings.
In support of his submissions he has relied on the
following decisions : –
(i) State of Haryana and others vs Bhajan Lal and
others reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
(ii) Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra;
(1979) 2 SCC 179
(iii) Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip
Nathumal Chordia; (1989) 1 SCC 715
(iv) Anil Kumar vs State of UP; 2023 AHC 164133.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
13. The relevant Clause in the Orissa Forest Code ix extracted
below for easy reference:-
Orissa Forest Code
Rule 28 28. Duties of Range Officers.
“
Range Officers are expected to carry out the
following duties to the best of their ability:
(i) He must know the nature, value and extent of the
forest property committed to his charge and must
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know the plan prescribed for the protection and
management of that property which not only consist
of natural forests and wild life but also plantations,
roads, buildings, wells, etc. He is responsible for the
protection of forests in his charge and should see
that the works are carried out as per the
prescriptions in the working plan or scheme or as
directed by his superior officers.
(ii) He is responsible for the discipline, conduct and
work of all his subordinates in the discharges of
their duties.
(iii) He is absolutely responsible for all cash
disbursement and expenditure within his Range, and
all payments of pay and labour must as far as
possible be done personally by him. He should see
that all forest revenue due from his Range is
collected and credited to Government.
(iv) He is to communicate all official orders and
instructions to his subordinates, and to see that they
understand them fully and carry them out.
(v) He is to check and control all work within his
Range and also to see that work is carried out as per
programme of work approved by the Divisional
Forest Officer and ensure that the Government funds
are used in the most economical and efficient way.
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(vi) He is to protect Government interests by
insisting upon the maximum of good work from all
subordinates and labour and producing the highest
revenue from his Range consistent with the highest
principles of forestry.
(vii) He is to collect, check and consolidate all
returns and registers and prepare the monthly range
account and to carry out all necessary office work
promptly and correctly.
(viii) He is to prevent to the best of his ability any
misuse of authority by subordinates. In the case of
compounding forest offences, he should see that
rules are strictly followed.
(ix) He is required to supervise thoroughly the work
of the forest contractors and agents appointed by
Government to deal with forest produce working
within his jurisdiction and see that they work
according to rules.
Note-The provisions of the above rules will apply
mutatis mutandis to all Divisional Forest Officers
and Assistant Conservators.”
Prevention of Corruption Act
Section 13 of the PC Act has been substituted by Act 16 of 2018
with effect from 26.07.2018. Section 13 (1) (c) and (d) and Section
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 19 of 42
13 (2) as they stood before the Amendment are extracted below :-
Section-13 Criminal misconduct by a public servant.- (1) A public
servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,:-
(a) xxx
(b) xxx
(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates
or otherwise converts for his own use any property
entrusted to him or under his control as a public
servant or allows any other person so to do; or
(d) if he ,
—
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or
for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant,
obtains for himself or for any other person any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains
for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage without any public interest; or
( e) xxx
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal
misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment
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for a term which shall be not less than four years but
which may extend to ten years and shall also be
liable to fine. ”
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
14. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the learned
trial court has not referred to existence / absence of materials for
framing charge against the petitioner for the offence under Section
13 (1) (d) of the PC Act. Even against the co accused, there is no
–
discussion regarding the said offence. This could be due to
oversight, which is a matter of the Court had referred to the said
offence in paragraph 1 of the impugned order.
15. In any view of the matter, as nothing has been brought to
the notice of the Court that the impugned order discharging the
petitioner from the offence under Section 409 / 120 B IPC or not
dealing with the offence under Section 13 ( 1) (d) of the PC Act
has been challenged by the prosecution this Court has to proceed
on the assumption that the petitioner has also been discharged
from the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) of the PC Act
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 21 of 42
M. Narayanan Nambiar
In the case of (supra), the Appellant had
challenged his conviction under Section 5 (1) (d) read with Section
5 (2) of the PC Act. Section 5 (1) (d) is similar to Section 13 (1) (d)
of the PC Act 1988. The Supreme Court found that the High Court
had relied upon a document filed by the Respondent without giving
an opportunity to the Appellant to file objection to contest its
reliability and remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh
consideration.
16. In the present case, it is presumed that the petitioner has
been discharged from the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) of the
PC Act ,as there is no observation or finding of the learned trial
court regarding existence of materials for framing of charge for the
said offence against him.
17. In the case of C.K Jaffer Sharief (supra), the appellant
had challenged the order of the Delhi High Court affirming the
order of trial court rejecting his application for discharge. The
allegations against the appellant was that while working as Union
Minister of Railways, he had dishonestly made the Managing
Directors of RITES (Rail India Technical & Economics Services
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 22 of 42
Ltd.) and IRCON (Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd.) to
approve the journeys of S/Shri B.N. Nagesh, the then Additional
PS to Railway Minister, S.M. Mastan and Murlidharan,
Stenographers in the railway cell and one Shri Samaullah (domestic
help of the appellant) to London in connection with his medical
treatment and thereby committed the offence of Section 13 (1) (d)
of the PCT Act. Sanction had not been granted for prosecution of
the Appellant and it had been mentioned in the chargesheet that the
proceedings against the Appellant be dropped. But the learned trial
court refused to accept the closure report and took cognizance of
the offence against him and thereafter rejected the application filed
for discharge. The Supreme Court discussed the provision of
Section 13 (1) (d) of the PC Act and held as follows : -
“It is difficult to visualise as to how in the light of the
above facts, demonstrated by the materials revealed in the
course of investigation, the appellant can be construed to
have adopted corrupt or illegal means or to have abused
his position as a public servant to obtain any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any
of the aforesaid four persons.
”
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 23 of 42
“ That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under
section 13(1)(d) is implicit in the words used i.e. corrupt
or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant.
A similar view has also been expressed by this Court in M.
Narayanan Nambiar vs. State of Kerala :
(1963) Supp. (2) SCR 724 , while considering the
provisions of section 5 of Act of 1947. If the totality of the
materials on record indicate the above position, we do not
find any reason to allow the prosecution to continue
against the appellant. Such continuance, in our view,
would be an abuse of the process of court and therefore it
will be the plain duty of the court to interdict the same.
”
18. In the present case, the offence involved is one under
Section – 13 (1) (c) of the PC Act and not under Section 13 (1) (d)
of the PC Act. The nature of allegations against the petitioner are
totally different. I am therefore of the view that this decision will
not come to the aid of the petitioner.
19. In the case of Susanta Kumar Dalei @Susanta Kumar
Dalai (supra), the allegations were that the appellant had
committed the offence under Section 13 (2) read with Section 13
(1) (d) of the PC Act and Section 471/477-A / 120-B of the IPC.
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 24 of 42
The prosecution alleged that a huge quantity of timber had been
felled illegally and transported by the contractor in the disguise of
fallen trees in connivance with the Forest and OFDC officials and
the Appellant who was working as a Forester along with other
accused committed the offence in order to derive pecuniary benefit
for themselves by abusing their official position and there was a
clandestine deal between them and the Government officials. The
application for discharge of the Appellant had been rejected by the
learned trial Court and the High Court. Two co accused (IFS
Officers) who were more prominently in charge of administrative
events had already been discharged by the High Court. The
Supreme Court found on a comparative assessment that there was
no distinguishing feature between the roles ascribed to them and
the appellant. While allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court has
held as follows : -
20. We are of the opinion that the presence of
“
general allegations, without any overt act or specific
imputations against the accused, cannot be sufficient
to proceed to trial. The law is well settled that at the
stage of consideration of discharge, though a
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 25 of 42
detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted,
the Court must be satisfied that there exists sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused. In this
case, even if the entirety of the material produced by
the prosecution is accepted as true, it does not
disclose the commission of any offence by the
Appellant. The allegations appear to be cast in a net
wide enough to implicate all, without regard to
individual acts or culpability. This is impermissible
under law.
21. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that two co-
accused, namely Indian Forest Service officers who
were similarly situated and even more prominently
placed in the administrative chain of events, have
already been discharged by the High Court. A
comparative examination of the roles ascribed to the
discharged co-accused and the present Appellant
shows no distinguishable basis that would justify
differential treatment. The principle of parity, which
is a fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence,
requires that similarly situated accused persons be
treated alike. When the allegations and evidence
against the Appellant are not even qualitatively
stronger than those against the discharged co-
accused, the continuation of proceedings against the
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 26 of 42
Appellant alone would be arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India .”
20 . The facts of the present case are distinguishable, In the
present case, there are specific allegations that the petitioner
transferred the entire amount for construction of quarters to the co
accused Forester Brundaban Majhi on one day and the latter
transferred the entire amount to the co accused Jagabandhu Bisoi
who is his co villager the next day and vouchers were submitted by
him subsequently. The construction was not completed and it was
found that only portion of the funds were utilized for construction
and the balance amount misappropriated by the two co accused .
The petitioner failed to ensure proper utilization of the Government
funds and had allowed misappropriation of a portion of it by the
accused and charge had already been framed against the two co
accused.
21. In the case of Basudeb Mohapatra (Supra), this Court
discharged the petitioner observing that there is no charge of
conspiracy and whether in view of the two reports, the prosecution
case had any basis or direct material to proceed against him for
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 27 of 42
commission of the offences under Section 5 (1) (c) and Section 5
(1) (d) of the PC Act. The two reports indicated gross negligence
by the accused but that did not amount to criminal liability. While
quashing the proceedings, this Court observed that there is no
direct material against the accused but the learned trial court is not
precluded from proceeding against him if further material is placed
before him.
22. In the present case, it is the case of the petitioner that he
has not discharged his duty in accordance with Clause 28 of the
Orissa Forest Code and has transferred the entire amount to the co
accused Forester in one day, who in turn he has transferred the
entire amount to the other co accused who is his co villager and has
passed bills without any verification of the work.
23. In the case of K.H. Kamaladini (Supra) , the allegation
against the appellant was that he was working as Executive
Engineer in the PWD and the allegations was that tender notices
were not published in the newspapers and some works were
unnecessarily split without any justification. His application for
discharge was rejected by the Sessions Judge and charges were
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 28 of 42
framed against the appellant for the offences under Sections 409
and 468 of the IPC and Section 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2)
of the PC Act. Criminal Revision filed by him was dismissed by
the High Court. Holding that there was no allegation that the
appellant had obtained for himself or any other person any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage, or had dishonestly misappropriated
or converted to his own use any property entrusted to him, the
Supreme Court held that the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) read
with Section 13 (2) of the PC Act is not made out against him.
While doing so, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
“14. There is no allegation made in the ch argesheet
that the appellant obtained for himself or for any
other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage. Therefore, on a plain reading, clause (d)
of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the PC Act will
not be attracted. In this case, there is no allegation
that the appellant agreed to accept or accepted any
gratification. There is no allegation that he had
agreed or accepted any valuable thing or had
dishonestly misappropriated or converted for his
own use any property entrusted to him. Therefore,
the „criminal misconduct‟ as provided in Section
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 29 of 42
13(1) is not attracted in this case. That is how even
the offence punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC
Act is not attracted. In short, there was no case
made out to proceed against the appellant for the
offences punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. To this extent, the
impugned orders will have to be modified.”
24. As stated earlier, in the present case, it is the case of the
prosecution that the co accused persons have misappropriated
portion of the amount which had been meant for construction of the
quarter and the petitioner has allowed this by passing the bills after
the entire amount had been transferred by him to the co accused.
25. In the case of Sudarsan Sahu (Supra) , conviction of the
appellant under Section 5(1)(c) read with Section 5 (2) of the PC
Act was set aside by this Court after considering the evidence on
record . While doing so, this Court has held as follows:-
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the reasonable
“
conclusion is that in order to establish a person to
be guilty for allowing another to misappropriate, his
failure to bring the offender to book or his gross
negligence in detecting the fraud that was committed
would not itself lead to the inference that he allowed
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 30 of 42
the fraud to be perpetrated. Taking into
consideration the action of the top-most authority
(P,W.I) and his conduct, prosecution, according to
me, has not been able to prove that appellant had
any intention or criminal animus or with knowledge
he allowed P.W.1 to misappropriate the G.C.I.
sheets, In view of these circumstances, I hold that
prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of
appellant for which he was charged,”
26.
In the present case, the petitioner is yet to face trial and
will get ample opportunity to prove his defence during the trial.
27. In the case of Bhajan Lal (Supra), the Supreme Court has
held as follows:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated
by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code which we have extracted and reproduced
above, we have given the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 31 of 42
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down
any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 32 of 42
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate
as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the
Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that
the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 33 of 42
and that too in the rarest of rare cases, that the court
will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as
to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and
that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act
according to its whim or caprice.”
28. Keeping in view the allegations against the petitioner, I am
not satisfied that his case comes under any of the categories
specified in the case of Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra) .
29. In Ratilal Bhanji Mithani (Supra), the Supreme Court
has held as follows:-
“28. Once a charge is framed, the Magistrate has no
power under Section 227 or any other provision of
the Code to cancel the charge, and reverse the
proceedings to the stage of Section 253 and
discharge the accused. The trial in a warrant case
starts with the framing of charge; prior to it, the
proceedings are only an inquiry. After the framing of
the charge if the accused pleads not guilty, the
Magistrate is required to proceed with the trial in
the manner provided in Sections 254 to 258 to a
logical end. Once a charge is framed in a warrant
case, instituted either on complaint or a police
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 34 of 42
report, the Magistrate has no power under the Code
to discharge the accused, and thereafter, he can
either acquit or convict the accused unless he
decides to proceed under Section 349 and 562 of the
Code of 1898 (which correspond to Sections 325 and
360 of the Code of 1973).”
30. In the case of Anil Kumar (Supra), the Allahabad High
Court has held as follows:
“11. In the present case, the order passed by learned
trial court dismissing application of the accused-
revisionist for discharge, has been assailed through
filing instant criminal revision, whereas the factual
position is that after dismissal of discharge
application on 07.12.2021, the trial court framed the
charges against the accused revisionist and evidence
has been recorded. In as much as three witnesses of
fact have already been examined in the case.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani
vs The State Of Maharashtra 1979 SC 94 , held
that after framing of charge, the question of
discharge does not arise. The same view was taken
in the case of Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad vs
Dilip Nathumal Chordia 1989 SCC (1715) . Once
the charges are framed, the accused is put to trial
and thereafter the accused may either be acquitted
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 35 of 42
or convicted, but he cannot be discharged.
Discharge post framing of charge is not recognized
in the Criminal Procedure Code. So far as the
electronic and documentary evidence propounded by
the revisionist in support of his claim of innocence
and false implication by the informant is concerned,
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Of Orissa vs
Debendra Nath Padhi AIR 2005 SC 359 , held that
defence of the accused is not looked into at the stage
when the accused seeks to be discharged under
Section 227 Cr.P.C. "The record of the case", used
in Section 227CrPC, is to be understood as the
documents and the articles, if any, produced by the
prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the
accused to produce any document at the stage of
framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the
charge, the submission of the accused is to be
confined to the material produced by the police.”
31. These two decisions are obviously not relevant for
deciding this Criminal Revision, as charge has not yet been framed
against the petitioner, for which the nature of allegations against
him have been examined in order to ascertain if charge should be
framed against him.
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 36 of 42
32. Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad
In the case of (Supra),
the Supreme Court has held as follows:
“14. These two decisions do not lay down different
principles. Prafulla Kumar case has only reiterated
what has been stated in Ramesh Singh case. In fact,
Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to
the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging
an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall
discharge when he considers that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused". The "ground" in the context is not a
ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the
accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the
innocence of the accused will be determined and not
at the time of framing of charge. The court,
therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry
in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it
necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that
the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary
material on record if generally accepted, would
reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No
more need be enquired into.”
33.
There can be no quarrel about the proposition of law
reiterated in this decision that at the time of framing of charge,
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 37 of 42
elaborate enquiry and sifting of materials is not required. The Court
has to consider whether materials sufficient for the accused to face
trial are available and is not required to consider if such material
will be sufficient to convict the accused.
34. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that
failure to supervise the execution of the work or negligence in
carrying out his duties, without any dishonest intention will not
make the petitioner liable for an offence under Section 13 (1) (c)
–
of the PC Act, is rejected as because he had transferred the entire
amount to the co-accused Forester and he passed the bills which
were submitted subsequently without verifying if the work had been
completed.
35. As per Rule 28 of the Orissa Forest Code, the petitioner
was responsible for proper utilization of the money. But in the
present case, the entire money allocated for building of the quarters
has been transferred to the account of the forester the very next day
and the forester has transferred the entire amount to the co accused
Jagabandhu Bisoi who is not even a contractor, but a co villager of
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 38 of 42
the Forester, in the absence of any voucher or bill. The vouchers
were submitted subsequently.
36. There may not be any allegation that the petitioner has
converted any amount transferred by him to the account of the
Forester for his own use. But from the sequence of events, a strong
suspicion arises that the petitioner by transferring the entire amount
to the account of the forester on one date and failing to ensure that
the entire money is utilized for construction of the quarter, has
permitted the two co accused persons to misappropriate a portion of
Government money for their own use.
37. I find substance in the contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioner regarding absence of allegations regarding receipt of
any pecuniary benefit by the petitioner. But this is not a necessary
ingredient for establishing the offence under Section 13 ( 1 ) ( d) of
the PC Act .
CONCLUSION
38. I am satisfied that the materials collected during
investigation prima facie indicate that the petitioner allowed the co
accused persons to misappropriate portion of the Government
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 39 of 42
money meant for construction of quarters by transferring the entire
amount to the Forester and after the entire amount had already been
transferred to the account of the co accused Jagabandu Bisoi, a co-
villager of the Forester Brundaban Majhi. passing vouchers without
ascertaining that the amount had been utilized for construction .
39. This is not the stage to decide whether this material is
sufficient to convict the petitioner for the offence under Section 13
(1) (c) of the PC Act. The material is sufficient to frame charge
against the petitioner, hence the impugned order does not call for
any interference.
40. The petitioner is therefore liable to be face trial for
commission of offence under Section – 13 (1) (c) read with Section
13 (2) of the PC Act and is not entitled to be discharged.
41. The Criminal Revision being devoid of merit stands
dismissed.
42. By order dated 15.10.2026, this Court had stayed execution
of the NBW issued against the petitioner, till 29.10.2026.
43. In order to afford one chance to the petitioner to participate
in the trial, and in order to save time and resources of the Court, it is
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 40 of 42
directed that if the petitioner surrenders in the learned trial Court on
or before 12.11.2026 in VGR Case No.19(A) of 2014, (the date to
which VGR Case No.19 of 2014 is posted for trial). The NBW of
arrest issued against him on 19.05.2026 shall be recalled and he
shall be allowed to continue on his previous bail. Charge shall be
framed against him on his appearance on that date so that the
petitioner and the two co accused are tried together.
44. For the above purpose:-
i) the learned trial Court shall post VGR Case No 19 (A) of 2014
which is presently posted to 02.11.2026 to 12.11.2026 ;
ii) the execution of NBW of arrest issued against the petitioner shall
remain stayed till 12.11.2026 ;
iii) the original trial ( VGR Case No 19 of 2014 ) shall thereafter
proceed against the co accused alongwith the petitioner; and
iv) necessary orders for joint trial be passed by the learned trial
court.
45. It is made clear that if the petitioner does not surrender on
or before 12.11.2026 before the learned trial Court, it is open to the
learned trial court to proceed against the petitioner in accordance
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 41 of 42
with law for ensuring his presence during trial, including execution
of the NBW of arrest.
46. Even if it is not possible to proceed against the petitioner
and the co accused persons in one trial, due to non co-operation of
the petitioner or any other reason, endeavour shall be made by the
learned trial Court to post the two cases - VGR Case No. 19 of 2014
and VGR Case No. 19 (A) of 2014 on the same dates.
47. Copy of this judgment be communicated to the learned
trial court - Special Judge (Vigilance), Jeypore, forthwith by the
Registry.
( Savitri Ratho)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
th
Dated, the 30 October , 2026 /RKS
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: RANJAN KUMAR SETHI
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:41:05
CRLREV No.416 of 2026 Page 42 of 42