PRASANTA KUMAR PAHARI vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR

Court
Calcutta High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE


PRESENT:

THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

CRR 2747 of 2025

Prasanta Kumar Pahari
Vs.
The State of West Bengal


For the Petitioners : Mr. Jayanta Narayan Chatterjee, Sr. Adv
Ms. Moumita Pandit
Ms. Ritushree Banerjee



For the State : Mr. Dbajyoti Deb
Mr. Ayan Mitra




Heard on : 08.09.2026


Judgment on : 20.11.2026



Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.

1. The instant Application has been preferred with a prayer for invoking
the inherent jurisdiction of this court under section 528 of the BNSS for
quashment of the proceeding being Special Case no. 11 of 2021
corresponding to Gaighata Police Station Case no. 918 dated 23.11.20219
under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, presently pending before
rd
learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3 Special Court at Barasat.
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2. On the date of alleged occurrence, the petitioner was posted as
superintendent under the West Bengal State Warehousing Corporation and
was functioning as the officer in charge of the RIDF godown situated at
Gaighata, Debipur. The prosecution case arises out of an incident dated
23.11.2019 concerning despatch of rice from the said gowown. The de facto
complaint alleged that rice was being despatched against four delivery
orders and that in one particular truck, an excess quantity of 64 quintal
corresponding to approximately 128 bags of rice had been loaded illegally for
despatch without the knowledge or sanction of the competent authority and
such loading was made with mala fide intention to make personal gain by
the petitioner.
3. Mr. Jayanta Narayan Chatterjee learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioner submits that the said allegation of excess loading
constitutes the very substratum upon which the offence under section 409
IPC has been sought to be fastened upon the petitioner but the alleged
occurrence did not concern removal of rice from the private possession of
the petitioner or recovery of government property from petitioners personal
custody.

4. According to Mr. Chatterjee the entire incident arose during a routine
institutional despatch operation conducted within the RIDF godown, which
process involved several subordinate officials, godown employees, loading
personal, transporter/lorry personnel and mandatory weighment of the
consignment. Therefore, the rice was being dealt with in the course of an
organised official process and not by the petitioner in his individual
capacity. Every outgoing consignment is required to undergo mandatory
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weighment and if any discrepancy is detected the quantity is required to be
rectified by addition or deduction in the presence of the concerned officials.
Petitioner’s specific case is that upon detection of the alleged excess loading
during weighment he instructed that the excess bags be unloaded and
returned to the godown stock.
5. Learned counsel for petitioner therefore submits, even if the
allegations contained in the FIR and the charge sheet are accepted in their
entirety and taken at their highest, the essential ingredients constituting an
offence under section 409 IPC are conspicuously absent. Mere
administrative responsibility, supervisory control or an alleged irregularity
occurring within an establishment does not automatically constitute
criminal breach of trust. Prosecution has failed to identify the precise nature
of entrustment upon which the charge under section 409 is founded. The
fact that the petitioner was superintendent and officer-in charge of the
godown cannot by itself establish that the particular 128 bags allegedly
found in excess in the truck were entrusted to him in such a manner that
their subsequent dishonest conversion could be attributed to him. There is
no material showing that the petitioner personally received the said 128
bags or separately assumed custody thereof for a specified purpose and
thereafter dealt with the same dishonestly. In this context he relied upon the
judgment of The State of Gujarat Vs. Jaswant Lal Nathalal , reported in
AIR 1968 SC 700 which emphasised the necessity of establishing the
relationship, contemplated by section 405 IPC. The existence of dominion
over property cannot be presumed merely from status or office. The
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prosecution must establish the factual foundation from which entrustment
and subsequent dishonest dealing with the property can legally arise.
6. Mr. Chatterjee further argued that the second indispensable
ingredient to constitute offence under section 409 is dishonest
misappropriation or conversion of the entrusted property. In the present
case there is no allegation that the petitioner sold the alleged 128 bags of
rice nor it is the case of prosecution that there was any recovery of any sale
proceeds from him nor there is any bank transaction demonstrating receipt
of money showing wrongful enrichment. On the contrary the alleged rice
itself was detected during the operational process before any completed
dishonest diversion attributable to the petitioner.
7. He strenuously argued that even if alleged excess loading is accepted
as true, there remains a substantial and legally indispensable gap between
an “excess loading” and a “dishonest misappropriation”. He argued that
section 409 punishes the later and not the former and no offence could be
made under that provision unless the prosecution materials bridges this gap
by disclosing the petitioner’s own dishonest act and mens rea . The
prosecution materials also failed to disclose any motive or financial benefit
accruing to the petitioner.
8. He further submits that during investigation there was no seizure or
the production of relevant Stock Register, Despatch Register, Issue Register
or Weighment Log Book, which could objectively demonstrate that the
petitioner caused or authorized any dishonest diversion. In the absence of
contemporaneous documentary material, establishing the petitioner’s
personal involvement, the prosecution seeks to infer criminality only from
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his official designation and the oral allegation arising out of the incident,
which is insufficient to constitute a serious offence like 409 of the IPC.
9. He also argued that it is not the allegation of the prosecution that the
petitioner secretly removed government property and the same subsequently
disappeared. The alleged excess quantity was detected within the
operational environment of the godown. The vehicle remained there and the
dispute arose among the officials concerning its movement. Such
circumstances may conceivably give rise to question of administrative
conduct, insubordination, supervision or procedural irregularity but they
don’t without further materials establish dishonest conversion by the
petitioner. The materials also discloses that alleged excess rice was not
removed from the control premises pursuant to any direction of the
petitioner. On the contrary several persons including outsiders, political
persons, police personnel and members of the media reached the godown
shortly after the dispute arose and thereafter the situation escalated and the
criminal complaint came to be lodged in the background of such
confrontation.
10. He also argued that the investigation does not establish who
dishonestly caused such excess loading. The alleged recovery answers only
the question that the excess rice was found. It does not give answer to the
question whether the rice had been criminally entrusted to the petitioner, in
the manner contemplated by section 405 IPC and in the absence of such
materials the alleged seizure cannot attract the offence under section 409
IPC against the petitioner. He further argued that admittedly the petitioner
was functioning as public servant and the acts attributed to him have an
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inseparable nexus with the discharge of his official functions but the
petitioner had no independent or private role in relation to the stock and his
involvement arose solely by virtue of the office held by him and therefore,
trial court had erred in taking cognizance upon the offence without having
obtained any sanction by the prosecution under section 197 Cr.P.C. In this
context he relied upon the judgment of State of Orissa Vs. Gansh
Chandra Jeu reported in (2004) 8 SCC 40.

11. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner further argued that the
instant criminal proceeding has its genesis in an incident of 23.11.2019.
The petitioner was arrested on the very date of the occurrence and remained
incarcerated for more than one month, before being enlarged on bail by this
High Court. Thereafter charge sheet was submitted and cognizance was
taken in the year 2021 and charge was framed in February 2023. The
proceeding has thus, remained pending for several years notwithstanding
the fundamental deficiency concerning the ingredient of the sole offence
alleged against the petitioner. Therefore, prolonged continuation of a
foundationally defective prosecution would amount to abuse of process.
12. He therefore concluded that for this reasons, the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction under section 528 of BNSS is very much required in the present
case to prevent the criminal process from becoming an instrument of
oppression. Even if the entire prosecution case is accepted at its highest,
what may conceivably emerge in an allegation concerning an irregularity in
the process of loading, supervision or despatch, such an allegation may have
administrative consequences but administrative irregularity cannot be
transmuted into criminal breach of trust unless the statutory ingredients of
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entrustment and dishonest misappropriation are independently disclosed.
Therefore, relying upon the judgment passed in State of Haryana and Ors.
Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors. reported in 1992 Supp (1) 335 , he submits that
the present case attracts the parameters laid down in the said case as even
after accepting the allegation that 128 bags of rice were found loaded in
excess, the prosecution materials do not disclose the indispensable
ingredients of dishonest misappropriation or conversion attributable to the
petitioner.
13. Mr. Dev learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State placed the
Case Diary and submits that during investigation sufficient materials have
been collected against the petitioner. He further submits that the act of the
petitioner being criminal breach of trust is not part of his public work to get
protection under section 197 of the Cr.P.C. Furthermore it is well settled
that the necessity of sanction under section 197of Cr.P.C. for offences
Committed under the IPC can be raised at any stage of proceedings,
depending on trial evidence. He thereby relied upon the judgement of Ram
Sagar Vs. CBI reported in 2025 Supreme Online SC 11814 . He further
submits that the prosecution proposes to examine 8 witnesses, out of which
one witness has already been examined in part and it would not take much
time to conclude the trial. He further submits that departmental proceeding
is not a bar to draw criminal proceeding against the accused petitioner. He
further submits that in connection with the self-same incident one
Disciplinary proceeding was started against the petitioner which culminated
in an order dated 08.06.2022, imposing the penalty of withholding of two
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increments with cumulative effect, which was affirmed in appeal by an order
dated 29.09.2022.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner in reply submits that he challenged
the said order before this High Court in WPA 394 of 2023 and this court has
been pleased to keep the aforesaid penalty order in abeyance and therefore,
the disciplinary action has not attained its finality and the adverse order
arising therefrom are still sub-judice.
Decision
15. The prosecution case in a nutshell as appearing from the charge sheet
is that on 23.11.2019 at 19.05 Hrs., the instant case was started over the
written complaint made by one sub Inspector of Food and Supply
Department, West Bengal against the petitioner, who was then posted as
superintendent, West Bengal State warehousing corporation Devipur, to the
effect that on 16.11.2019 they received an order from DCFSS of North 24
PGS for supplying rice bag in total 04 Delivery order (in short D.O) being (i)
D.O. NO. 19BJ733-total quantity 499.62 quintal (ii) D.O. No. 19BJ792-total
quantity 179.15 quintals, (iii) D.O. No. 19BJ735-total quantity 710.90
quintals (iv) D.O. No. 19BJ793-total quantity 181.33 quintals, grand total
1571.00 quintals from Gaighata Thana Agri. Primary MKT Co-operative and
Gaighata Thana MKT. TA BCCMS. But, on 23.11.19 at 17.00 hrs he found
that, said petitioner Prashanta Kumar Pahari loaded extra 64 quintals rice
in truck for supplying without informing the Government Authority. Then,
he and one Sushanta Kumar Roy confined said truck with rice, which was
loaded by said Prashanta Kumar Pahari illegally.
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16. Before going further let me state the essential ingredients to constitute
offence under section 409 of the IPC
(1) Accused was a public servant.
(2) In such capacity accused was entrusted with certain property or he
gained domain over such property which was not his own;
(3) Accused committed criminal breach of trust with respect to such
property.

17. In the present case it is not in dispute that at the relevant point of
time the petitioner were serving as public servant being posted as
superintendent in the warehousing corporation and was functioning as the
officer in charge of the concerned godown and it is also not in dispute that
the seized subject matter property was not owned by the accused/petitioner.
Now the question posed by the petitioner in the instant proceeding is that
the seized property was never lawfully entrusted upon him, nor he
committed any criminal breach of trust to attract section 409 IPC
18. While dealt with the term entrustment in the context of section 405
read with section 409 of the IPC, the Apex Court held that the expression
has to be used in a wide sense. It was observed by the Apex Court in the
case of N. Bhargaran Pillai (dead) by Irs. and another Vs. State of
Kerala reported in (2004) 13 SCC 217 as follows:-
13. It is fairly well-settled position in law that actual mode of entrustment or
misappropriation is not to be proved by the prosecution. Once entrustment is proved,
it is for the accused to prove as to how the property entrusted was dealt with. In
Jiwan Dass case [(1999) 2 SCC 530 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 288] the factual position was
entirely different. It was held that the undertaking given in that case could not be
held to be confession or admission. In the present case, the factual scenario as
noticed by the trial court and the High Court is different. It was not only on the
basis of the undertaking that the conviction was recorded, but the other evidence on
record also unerringly proved entrustment. Therefore, it was for the accused to
prove as to how the property entrusted with him was dealt with. No material was
placed in that regard. Therefore, the courts below correctly held entrustment to have
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been proved. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below relating to
entrustment and misappropriation in our view are well merited and fully justified on
the basis of evidence on record and do not suffer from any perversity or patent error
of law to warrant interference.

19. Therefore, the expression “ entrusted with property ” and ‘ with any
dominion over property ’ includes all cases in which goods are entrusted i.e.
voluntarily handed over for a specific purpose and dishonestly disposed of in
violation of law or in violation of contract. The Apex Court in CBI Vs.
Dunkuns Agro Industries Ltd . reported in (1996) 5 SCC 591 held as
follows:-
27. In the instant case, a serious dispute has been raised by the learned
counsel appearing for the respective parties as to whether on the face of the
allegations, an offence of criminal breach of trust is constituted or not. In our
view, the expression “entrusted with property” or “with any dominion over
property” has been used in a wide sense in Section 405 IPC. Such expression
includes all cases in which goods are entrusted, that is, voluntarily handed
over for a specific purpose and dishonestly disposed of in violation of law or in
violation of contract. The expression ‘entrusted’ appearing in Section 405 IPC is
not necessarily a term of law. It has wide and different implications in different
contexts. It is, however, necessary that the ownership or beneficial interest in
the ownership of the property entrusted in respect of which offence is alleged to
have been committed must be in some person other than the accused and the
latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit.
The expression ‘trust’ in Section 405 IPC is a comprehensive expression and
has been used to denote various kinds of relationships like the relationship of
trustee and beneficiary, bailor and bailee, master and servant, pledger and
pledgee. When some goods are hypothecated by a person to another person,
the ownership of the goods still remains with the person who has hypothecated
such goods. The property in respect of which criminal breach of trust can be
committed must necessarily be the property of some person other than the
accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be in the other
person and the offender must hold such property in trust for such other person
or for his benefit. In a case of pledge, the pledged article belongs to some other
person but the same is kept in trust by the pledgee…..”


20. Therefore, though initial burden in on the prosecution to prove
entrustment of the property to the accused but actual manner of
misappropriation of the property by the accused need not be proved by the
prosecution. Once the initial burden is discharged by the prosecution, the
onus would be on the accused to prove, how the property entrusted to him
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was dealt with by him. In this context reliance has also been placed upon
the judgment of State Vs. Kamavir, (2006) 5 SCC 381.
21. In Indian Oil corporation Vs. NEPC reported in (2006) 6 SCC 736,
it was held that the expression ‘trust’ in section 405 IPC is comprehensive
expression and has been used to denote various kinds of relationships like
the relationship of trustee and beneficiary, balor and bailee, master and
servant, pledger and pledgee etc.

22. Looking at the complaint and the grievance made by the complainant
therein and having regard to the materials collected during the investigation
it appears that the petitioner was posted as superintendent who received
orders for supplying rice bag in total 4 D.O. on the alleged date of
occurrence. It was found that he allegedly loaded extra 64 quintal of rice in
truck for supplying without informing the government authority. The
witnesses who were examined during investigation have also supported
prosecution case that the petitioner has committed the mischief being in
charge of the said godown. In Jaswantari Manillal Akhnue Vs. State of
State of Bombay , reported in AIR 1956 SC 575 the supreme Court held
that the first ingredient to be proved in respect of a criminal breach of trust
is entrustment. However, it clarified the term as follows:-
“……But when Section 405 which defines “criminal breach of trust” speaks of a
person being in any manner entrusted with property, it does not contemplate
the creation of a trust with all the technicalities of the law of trust. It
contemplates the creation of a relationship whereby the owner of property
makes it over to another person to be retained by him until a certain
contingency arises or to be disposed of by him on the happening of a certain
event…..”


23. The other criteria to be fulfilled to constitute offence under section 409
is that accused committed criminal breach of trust with respect to such
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property. According to section 405 of IPC criminal breach of trust involved
following ingredients
(i) A person should have entrusted with property or entrusted with
dominion over property
(ii) That persons should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to
his own use that property or dishonestly use or disposed of that
property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so and

(iii) That such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should
be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in
which such trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract
which the person has made, touching the discharge of such
trust.
24. Therefore, there are two distinct part which involved in the
commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust. The first part consist
of the creation of an obligation in relation to the property over which
dominion or control is acquired by the accused and the second is the
misappropriation of dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to
the terms of the obligations created. The entrustment of the property creates
a trust which is only an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property
and arises out of a confidence reposed and accepted by the owner. I have
also quoted from the authorities that section 405 IPC does not contemplate
the creation of a trust with all the technicalities of the law of trust. It
contemplates the creation of a relationship whereby the owner of the
property makes it over to another person to be retained by him, until a
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certain contingency arises or to be disposed of by him on the happening of a
certain event.
25. In the instant cases the specific allegation against the petitioner in
respect of alleged criminal breach of trust is that the petitioner had made
the offence by loading extra 64 quintals rice in truck for supplying without
informing the government authority, when the complainant and one
Sushanta Kumar Roy confined said truck with rice which was loaded by the
petitioner illegally. Witnesses also stated that the petitioner was trying to
misappropriate a huge amount of rice violating government norms.
26. On the contrary the petitioners case is that the alleged occurrence did
not concern removal of rice from the private possession of the petitioner but
the entire incident arose during a routine institutional despatch operation
conducted within the godown through a process which involved several
subordinate officials, godown employees loading personal, transporter
personal and weighment of the consignment and an alleged irregularity
occurring within an establishment, does not give rice to offence under
section 409 IPC, on the basis of the mere fact that the petitioner was
superintendent and officer in charge of the godwon. However, all these are
the petitioners defence which he will certainly be at liberty to prove as to
how the property entrusted to him was dealt with by him but obviously such
defences cannot be taken as a ground for quashment of the proceeding.
27. No doubt gravamen of the offence under section 409 IPC is dishonest
intention on the part of the accused but to establish dishonest intention, it
is not necessary that the prosecution should establish an intention to retain
permanently the property misappropriated. An intention to wrongfully
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deprive the owner of the use of the property for a time and to secure the use
of that property for his own benefit for a time would be sufficient. It is
settled law that FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia, particularly in a
matter involving criminal breach of trust in the course of the administration
of a public service. Final report submitted by prosecution discloses
commission of offence.

28. The petitioner made an attempt to dilute the case that it was pre
planned which is evident from the fact that media person on the spot
appeared immediately and responded to that extent and it discloses
complainant’s malafide. I am not convinced with such argument made on
behalf of the petitioner. Law on the point of High Court’s inherent power is
well settled in view of State of Orissa and Ors Vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo
reported in 2005 13 SCC 540, which states as follow:-
11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482
CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution
in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be
exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest
court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a
case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their
true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule
can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata
Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] and Raghubir
Saran (Dr.)v. State of Bihar [(1964) 2 SCR 336 : AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ
1] .] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the
complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a
conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion
that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the
material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with.
When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered,
then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the
material collected during the investigation and evidence led in the court which
decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against
the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for
quashing the proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990
Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142] , State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp
(1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] , Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill
[(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059 : AIR 1996 SC 309] , State of Kerala v.
14

O.C. Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304] , State of U.P. v. O.P.
Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497 : AIR 1996 SC 2983] , Rashmi
Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 415] ,
Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC
(Cri) 1503] and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 401] .]

29. Therefore for the purpose of exercising of its power under section 482
Cr.P.C/section 528 BNSS, the High Court would have to proceed basically
on the allegations made in the complaint and the documents and evidence
collected during investigation and it has no jurisdiction to examine the
correctness or otherwise of the allegations.

30. In the instant case the sine qua non for attracting the offence is the
entrustment of the property to the accused which has been prima facie
shown. The provision would also be attracted if accused dishonestly used or
disposed of the property or made an attempt to dispose of the property in
violation of any direction of law or government rules. The parameters of
interference with a criminal proceeding at the trial stage by the High Court
in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 528 of the BNSS are well known.
The main ground on which such interference is permissible at this stage is
that the allegation made in the complaint and the materials collected during
investigation even if given face value and taken to be correct in their
entirety, commission of a cognizable offence is not disclosed.
31. On a careful reading of the materials available in the record I am of
the view that it cannot be said that the same does not disclose the
commission of an offence or that the ingredients of section 409 of the IPC is
totally absent in the materials available in the record including written
complaint. However, I must add that whether or not the allegations in the
complaint are otherwise correct or not has to be decided on the basis of the
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evidence to be led at the time of trial. While entertaining such application
under section 528 BNSS, the materials furnished by the defence cannot be
looked into unless they are unimpeachable in character and the defence
materials can be entertained only at the time of trial. It is well settled
position of law that when there are prima facie materials available and the
parties are facing trial, a petition for quashing the criminal proceeding
cannot be entertained. The defence case as pleaded by the petitioner can
certainly be raised during trial, when the trial court would have the
opportunity to analyse and scrutinize such evidence.
32. Having considered the overall facts and circumstances of the case
CRR 2747 of 2025 thus stands dismissed. However, the trial court is
directed to expedite the trial since the matter is pending since 2019 and he
is further requested to make every endeavour to conclude the trial preferably
within a period of six months from the next date of hearing. It is made clear
that the observations made herein are confined only for the purpose of
disposal of petitioner’s present prayer for quashment of the proceeding.
Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if applied for, be given
to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.

(DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)

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