Balar Marketing Private Limited vs Samsubramani Proprietor, Kalalakar Agencies
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Date of decision: 18 NOVEMBER, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
# CNR No. DLHC010469682026
+ FAO (COMM) 293/2026 & CM APPL. 67728/2026, CM APPL.
67729/2026, CM APPL. 67730/2026, CM APPL. 67731/2026
BALAR MARKETING PRIVATE LIMITED .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Neha Buttan, Mr. Suksham
Kwatra, Mr. Nadeem Malik and Mr.
Ritwik Singh, Advs.
versus
SAMSUBRAMANI PROPRIETOR, KALALAKAR AGENCIES
.....Respondent
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1. The present Appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts
Act, 2015 ( hereinafter referred to as „ Commercial Courts Act ‟) read with
Section 104(1) and Order XLIII Rule 1(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 ( hereinafter referred to as „ CPC ‟), against the Order dated
05.06.2026, passed by the learned District Judge, Commercial Court, East
District Karkardooma Courts, Delhi ( hereinafter referred to as
„ Commercial Court ‟), in CS (COMM.) 177/2026, titled as, “Balar
Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Samsubramani” (( hereinafter referred to as
„ Impugned Order ‟), whereby the learned Commercial Court, while
exercising power under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, directed the return of the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 1 of 15
Plaint filed by the Plaintiff, that is, the Appellant herein, for want of
territorial jurisdiction. The learned Commercial Court also directed the
Plaintiff/Appellant herein to present the same before the Court of
appropriate jurisdiction, either at Chennai or at the place where the entire
cause of action arose.
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts germane to the institution of
the present Appeal, as stated on behalf of the Appellant, are as follows:
a. The Appellant, being a company registered under the Companies
Act, 2013 ( hereinafter referred to as „ Companies Act ‟), has its
registered office at 217, Functional Industrial Estate, Patparganj,
New Delhi. The Appellant is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and wholesale distribution of household electrical
products, viz ., fans, wires, cables, switchgear and lighting, under
the brand name of “Fyrbos-Smart Electrical Creations”. The
Respondent, i.e., the Defendant in the original Suit, is the
proprietor of the proprietorship concern named “Kalalakar
st
Agencies”, having its registered office at 23, 1 Floor, Radha
Nagar, Chromepet Chennai, Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu. The
Respondent is engaged in the business of retail supply of
household electrical goods.
b. The Respondent approached the Appellant for the wholesale
purchase of household electrical goods. Thereafter, the
Respondent commenced purchasing the said goods from the
Appellant, and in view thereof, issued work orders for the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 2 of 15
purchase of the said goods from the Appellant during the period
from 2018 to 2024.
c. The goods were supplied by the Appellant to the Respondent from
the Appellant‟s regional warehouse situated in Chennai to the
Respondent‟s office situated in Chromepet, Chennai,
Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu.
d. Disputes arose between the parties as the Respondent allegedly
failed to make timely payments to the Appellant. Consequently,
the Appellant instituted pre-litigation mediation proceedings
before the Delhi Legal Services Authority, East District,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, seeking recovery of an outstanding
sum of Rs. 8,79,206/-, allegedly due and payable by the
Respondent towards the balance of sale consideration for the
goods supplied by the Appellant.
e. Upon the mediation proceedings being returned as non-starter, the
Appellant instituted a Commercial Suit, being CS (COMM.)
177/2026 before the Commercial Court, seeking recovery of the
said amount.
3. The learned Commercial Court, vide the Impugned Order, observed
that the Suit had been filed before the Courts at Delhi, despite the Parties
carrying on their respective businesses in Bangalore and Chennai. The
learned Commercial Court further observed that, apart from the Appellant
having its registered office and bank account in Delhi, and the Appellant‟s
contention that the part-payments had been made by the Respondent into the
Appellant‟s bank account maintained in Delhi, there is no other disclosure
made to establish the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 3 of 15
Accordingly, the learned Commercial Court, while recording that the mere
place of part payment of the outstanding amount does not confer territorial
jurisdiction upon a Court, exercised its powers under Order VII Rule 10 of
the CPC, and directed the return of the Plaint for want of territorial
jurisdiction.
4. In the captioned Appeal, the Appellant assails the Impugned Order on
the following grounds:
i. The Parties expressly agreed that the disputes arising between them
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi. This,
according to the Appellant, was reiterated by the Appellant as part of
printed Terms and Conditions accompanying each invoice.
ii. It is stated that the invoices raised by the Appellant reflected the
details of one of its bank accounts maintained with Kotak Mahindra
Bank, Sowcarpet, situated in Chennai. It is stated that the said bank
account was mentioned to facilitate remittance of payments by the
Respondent. It is, however, stated that during the course of the
business relationship, the parties mutually agreed that the payments
against the invoices raised by the Appellant would be remitted into
the Appellant‟s bank account maintained with Kotak Mahindra Bank,
Patparganj, New Delhi.
iii. It is further stated that the Respondent, after receiving the purchased
goods, kept on making payments to the Appellant‟s bank account
maintained with Kotak Mahindra Bank, Patparganj, New Delhi.
However, an outstanding amount totalling Rs.8,79,206/- was due and
payable by the Respondent. The last part-payment amounting to Rs.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 4 of 15
25,000/- was also made by the Respondent in the said bank account
maintained in Delhi.
iv. It is, therefore, the case of the Appellant that the Impugned Order is
erroneous, insofar as the learned Commercial Court failed to take into
consideration that the contractually agreed place of payment was
Delhi and that the payment liabilities were discharged by the
Respondent into the Appellant‟s bank account maintained in Delhi
and therefore, for the suit of recovery on account of non-payment of
outstanding dues, substantial cause of action also arose within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in Delhi.
v. It is also stated that, while exercising jurisdiction under Order VII
Rule 10 CPC, the learned Commercial Court was required to
undertake a prima facie consideration of the Plaint and therefore, any
conclusive determination of disputed question regarding the mutually
agreed place of payment and the performance without permitting the
parties to lead evidence was outside the confines of Order VII Rule 10
CPC.
5. Heard the learned Counsel for the Appellant and perused the material
on record.
6. The question to be determined in the instant Appeal is whether the
learned Commercial Court was correct in returning the Plaint for want of
territorial jurisdiction.
7. The learned Commercial Court, while returning the Plaint under
Order VII Rule 10 CPC, recorded that both the parties carry on their
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 5 of 15
businesses in Bangalore and Chennai and have no business connected to
Delhi, particularly East Delhi, except for the registered office and bank
account of the Plaintiff/Appellant herein maintained at Patparganj, Delhi.
Further, it was recorded that the goods were dispatched from Ambattur
Road, Puzhal, Chennai, Tamil Nadu to Chrompet, Radha Nagar, Chennai,
Tamil Nadu and that the mutually agreed place of payment was at Kotak
Mahindra Bank, Sowcarpet, Chennai, Tamil Nadu. Even the statement of
accounts/ledger of the Defendant/Respondent herein was held to be
maintained at Chennai. Therefore, in view of the fact that no part of cause of
action arose in Delhi, the Plaint was returned.
8. The Appellant primarily raises two grounds before this Court to
challenge the Impugned Order and to aver that the Courts at Delhi have the
jurisdiction: (i) Parties expressly agreed that Courts at Delhi will have the
jurisdiction and the same was specifically mentioned on the printed “Terms
and Conditions” accompanying each invoice raised by the Appellant. (ii)
The Respondent persistently made payments into the bank account of the
Appellant maintained with Kotak Mahindra Bank, Patparganj, New Delhi.
9. In so far as contention (i) is concerned, a perusal of the Plaint and the
Impugned Order reveals that this ground was never raised before the learned
Commercial Judge. It is well established that in an appeal, the Appellant is
precluded from raising a new ground which was never raised before the
Trial Court, and that Appellate Courts cannot create a new case at the
appellate stage for either of the parties. Such a contention which was not
raised, or pleaded or argued before the Commercial Court is, on the face of
it, inadmissible, unless the party shows sufficient reasons which prevented
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 6 of 15
them from raising it at the first instance. In the said respect, the Apex Court
in Rama Kt. Barman v. Mohd. Mahim Ali, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4083 ,
held that:
“12. As per Order XLI Rule 25, the appellate court
may, if necessary, frame issues and refer the same for
trial to the court whose decree is appealed from, and
direct such court to take additional evidence required.
Further, as per Rule-27 Order XLI, the Appellate
Court may allow evidence or document to be
produced or witness examined, in the circumstances
stated therein, after recording the reasons for such
admission of evidence. However, the Appellate Court
can not create a new case for the party, frame the
issues and decide the issues without following the
procedure contemplated under Order XLI of CPC.
13. In the instant case, the High Court in the
second appeal had framed one substantial question of
law on 16-3-2007, and framed two another
substantial questions of law on 5-2-2015 and one
more substantial question of law in 2015. Thus, in all
framed four additional questions of law.
14.Apart from the fact that none of the said
substantial questions of law formulated by the High
Court were either raised before the trial court or the
appellate court, none of parties was given any
opportunity of leading the evidence on the said
issues. It is well-settled principle of law that the
Court cannot create any new case at the appellate
stage for either of the parties, and the appellate court
is supposed to decide the issues involved in the suit
based on the pleadings of the parties.”
(emphasis supplied)
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 7 of 15
10. Accordingly, the Appellant‟s contention that jurisdiction of the Courts
at Delhi was decided as part of printed “Terms and Conditions” forming part
of each invoice is de hors any merit and does not warrant consideration of
this Court under Order XLIII of the CPC. Moreover, the invoices have not
been filed with the Appeal. It is also not stated whether the invoices have
been filed along with the documents filed before the learned Commercial
Court. In the absence thereof, the finding of the Commercial Court does not
warrant interference.
11. In any event, it is trite law that parties may, by mutual agreement,
confer exclusive jurisdiction upon one of the courts having jurisdiction to
entertain the dispute, while excluding the jurisdiction of other courts which
otherwise have concurrent jurisdiction. However, such an agreement cannot
confer jurisdiction upon a court which otherwise lacks jurisdiction under
Section 20 of the CPC.
12. So far as contention (ii) is concerned, the law as regards the territorial
jurisdiction in a suit for recovery of money is enumerated under Section 20
of the CPC. Section 20 of the CPC, particularly its sub-Section (c), accords
dominus litus to the Plaintiff to institute the Suit in the territorial limits of
the Court where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The moot
question before this Court, therefore, is whether, in a suit for recovery of
money, receipt of part payments in Delhi would lead to cause of action
arising from Delhi and consequently confer territorial jurisdiction upon the
Courts at Delhi.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 8 of 15
13. It is the case of the Appellant that a substantial cause of action arose
in Delhi as the Respondent, after receiving the goods, kept on making
payments, including the last part-payment, to the Appellant‟s bank account
maintained with Kotak Mahindra Bank at New Delhi. The Appellant
substantiates this claim by placing on record the bank statements of the said
Bank Account, which categorically show that substantial payments were
made by the Respondent into the Appellant‟s bank account maintained in
Delhi.
14. The Apex Court has time and again expounded the term “cause of
action” to mean a bundle of facts. It is pertinent to note that every case is
certainly a culmination of multiple facts. It, however, does not mean that any
and every fact will give rise to a cause of action. Cause of action, therefore,
is the particular bundle of facts which is relevant to determine the lis inter se
the parties. Accordingly, such facts which assist the Plaintiff to seek relief in
law give rise to the cause of action.
15. The Apex Court in the case of A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P.
Agencies, (1989) 2 SCC 163 held as under:
“11. The jurisdiction of the court in the matter of a
contract will depend on the situs of the contract and
the cause of action arising through connecting
factors.
12. A cause of action means every fact, which if
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to
prove in order to support his right to a judgment of
the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts
which taken with the law applicable to them gives
the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant.
It must include some act done by the defendant
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 9 of 15
since in the absence of such an act no cause of
action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the
actual infringement of the right sued on but
includes all the material facts on which it is
founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to
prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the
plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree.
Everything which if not proved would give the
defendant a right to immediate judgment must be
part of the cause of action . But it has no relation
whatever to the defence which may be set up by the
defendant nor does it depend upon the character of
the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.
13. Under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure subject to the limitation stated
theretofore, every suit shall be instituted in a court
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause
of action, wholly or in part arises. It may be
remembered that earlier Section 7 of Act 7 of 1888
added Explanation III as under :
“Explanation III.—In suits arising out of contract
the cause of action arises within the meaning of this
section at any of the following places, namely:
(1) the place where the contract was made;
(2) the place where the contract was to be performed
or performance thereof completed;
(3) the place where in performance of the contract
any money to which the suit relates was expressly
or impliedly payable.”
14.The above Explanation III has now been
omitted but nevertheless it may serve as a guide.
There must be a connecting factor .
15. In the matter of a contract there may arise
causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for
damages for breach of contract the cause of action
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 10 of 15
consists of the making of the contract, and of its
breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the
place where the contract was made or at the place
where it should have been performed and the breach
occurred. The making of the contract is part of the
cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can
be filed at the place where it was made. The
determination of the place where the contract was
made is part of the law of contract. But making of an
offer on a particular place does not form cause of
action in a suit for damages for breach of contract.
Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation
result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a
court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was
communicated. The performance of a contract is
part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the
breach can always be filed at the place where the
contract should have been performed or its
performance completed. If the contract is to be
performed at the place where it is made, the suit on
the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else . In
suits for agency actions the cause of action arises at
the place where the contract of agency was made or
the place where actions are to be rendered and
payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of
action arises where money is expressly or impliedly
payable under a contract. In cases of repudiation of
a contract, the place where repudiation is received is
the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is
pleaded as part of the cause of action giving
jurisdiction to the court where the suit is filed and
that contract is found to be invalid, such part of
cause of the action disappears. The above are some
of the connecting factors.”
(emphasis supplied)
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 11 of 15
16. A perusal of the aforementioned indicates that the cause of action,
within the meaning of Section 20( c ) of the CPC, arises at the following
places:
(i) The place where the contract was made;
(ii) The place where the contract was to be performed, which in such a
contract would mean the place where the goods were delivered to
the purchaser; and
(iii) The place where payment in performance of the contract was
payable, expressly or impliedly.
17. It is no longer res integra that, in contracts involving the sale and
purchase of goods or services, the place where money is payable may confer
territorial jurisdiction upon the Courts situated at such place, as a part of the
cause of action is considered to arise where the payment is required to be
made. However, in the present case, the parties categorically agreed to make
payments into the Appellant's bank account maintained in Chennai.
18. The Appellant, in their Appeal memorandum, categorically mentions
that the Parties decided to make payment at the bank account maintained in
Chennai:
“That it is submitted that the invoices raised by
the Appellant reflected particulars of one of the
Appellant's bank accounts maintained with
Kotak Mahindra Bank, Sowcarpet, Chennai,
mentioned only to facilitate remittance of
payment by the Respondent. However during
the course of the business relationship, the
parties mutually agreed that payments against
the invoices raised by the Appellant would be
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 12 of 15
remitted into the Appellant's bank account
maintained with Kotak Mahindra Bank,
Patparganj, New Delhi.”
19. According to A.B.C. Laminart ( supra ), the place where money is
payable either expressly or impliedly does lead to the place of cause of
action, thereby vesting the court concerned with territorial jurisdiction.
However, as per the Appellant‟s own case, the parties expressly agreed to
make payments in Chennai, as the invoice is also stated to mention the
account details of the Bank in Chennai. Insofar as payments made in Delhi
are concerned, mere account entries in the absence of express agreement, or
express stipulation that the parties agreed that the payments would be made
in Delhi, cannot confer territorial jurisdiction upon Courts at Delhi.
Accordingly, an express agreement for payments to be made in the
Appellant‟s bank account maintained at Chennai would prevail over a flimsy
averment of the Appellant that certain monies were paid in the bank account
maintained in Delhi. Additionally, entries of the bank account maintained in
Delhi cannot vest jurisdiction upon the Courts which otherwise have no
jurisdiction at all to entertain the matter since the Appellant has been unable
to show that the parties agreed for Delhi to be the place of payment.
Moreover, in the instant case, as rightly pointed out by the learned
Commercial Court, the contract was performed at Chennai. The goods were
dispatched from Ambattur Road, Puzhal, Chennai, Tamil Nadu to Chrompet,
Radha Nagar, Chennai, Tamil Nadu. Therefore, the cause of action
rightfully arose at Chennai.
20. Further, the reliance placed by the Appellant on Auto Movers v.
Luminous Power Technologies (P) Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4387, to
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 13 of 15
aver that cause of action arises at the place where partial payment is made,
this Court is of the opinion that the learned Commercial Court rightly held
that the said case is not applicable to the instant case, as in the instant case,
the parties decided that the place of payment would be Chennai. However,
in Auto Movers ( supra ), it was categorically recorded by this Court that the
cause of action arose in the place where partial payment was made by the
Defendant, as there was no place of payment fixed by the parties. In that
context, the place of payment was held to be the place where cause of action
also arose. The relevant paragraph of the said Judgment is reproduced as
under:
“22. When, in the present case, the part cause of
action has arisen also on account of the payments
made by the petitioner/defendant directly into the
bank account of the respondent/plaintiff, even if
these were not on regular basis, since there is
nothing to show that the place of payment had been
fixed, even without following the principle that the
„debtor must seek out the creditor‟, it is clear that
the Delhi Courts have jurisdiction to try the suit and
the invoice does not vest jurisdiction in a court
which had no jurisdiction at all.”
21. However, in the instant case, as per the Appellant‟s own case, the
place of payment, as per the invoice, was fixed at Chennai. In view of the
above, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Commercial Court rightly
concluded that both the Parties carried on their respective businesses in
Bangalore and Chennai and have no business in Delhi, except for the
registered office and bank account of the Plaintiff/Appellant herein
maintained at Patparganj, Delhi. The learned Commercial Court was also
right in holding that the Plaintiff‟s registered office cannot confer territorial
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 14 of 15
jurisdiction upon Courts at Delhi. Furthermore, the goods were dispatched
from Chennai to Chennai only and that the agreed place of payment was also
of Kotak Mahindra Bank, Sowcarpet, Chennai, Tamil Nadu. Therefore, it
was rightly concluded by the learned Commercial Court that no part of the
cause of action arose in Delhi. Accordingly, the Plaint was also rightly
returned under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC to be presented before the
appropriate juridical forum.
22. Justifiably so, this Court is also of the opinion that mere payment of
certain monies into the bank account of the Appellant in Delhi will not result
in conferring upon the Courts at Delhi the territorial jurisdiction in the
absence of any agreement inter se the parties. The position of the Appellant
as the dominus litus should not lead to unjustified harassment of the
Respondent by making them subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts which
were never agreed to by them.
23. Accordingly, this Court finds no infirmity with the Impugned Order.
The present Appeal, along with pending application(s), if any, is dismissed.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
RENU BHATNAGAR, J
NOVEMBER 18, 2026
km
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
FAO (COMM) 293/2026 Page 15 of 15