The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Piyush Sharma
- Court
- Madhya Pradesh High Court
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:19784
1 WA-839-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
th
ON THE 6 OF JULY, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 839 of 2026
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
PIYUSH SHARMA
Appearance:
Shri S.S.Kushwah, Govt. Advocate for appellants/State.
Shri Sankalp Sharma, Advocate for respondent.
ORDER
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
This writ appeal, under section 2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand
Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been filed against the order dated
15/12/2025 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. No.27813/2021, by which the
satisfaction recorded by competent Authority for rejecting the candidature of
respondent was set aside and the competent Authority was directed to give
appointment to the respondent on the post of Sub Inspector (District Force).
2. Facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that
respondent had filed W.P.No.27813/2021 seeking the following reliefs:-
"i. That the respondents be directed to issue an appointment order of
petitioner-on the post of Sub-Inspector (District Force)
ii. That the cost be awarded to the petitioner.
Any other relief which ‘this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the facts and
circumstances of the case may also kindly be granted."
3. Appellants filed their reply submitting that by order dated 15/8/2018,
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candidature of respondent for the post of Sub Inspector (District Force) was
rejected on the ground that he was tried for offence under sections 327, 294, 323,
506B read with 34 of IPC on the basis of charge-sheet issued in Crime
No.434/2010. Although respondent was acquitted by judgment dated 20/8/2013,
but as the offence under section 327 of IPC involves moral turpitude, therefore,
his candidature was rejected. It appears that respondent, vide order dated
31/1/2018, was appointed on the post of Platoon Commander. The action of
appellants in rejecting the candidature of respondent for the post of Sub Inspector
(District Force) was challenged by counsel for respondent contending that once
the respondent was found fit with similar criminal antecedents for the post of
Platoon Commander, then appellants have committed material illegality by
adopting a different yardstick. The aforesaid submission made by counsel for
respondent found favour with the learned Single Judge and by the impugned order,
it was held that when appellants had found that respondent is fit for recruitment to
the post of Platoon Commander, then on the basis of same criminal antecedents
they should not have rejected his candidature for the post of Sub Inspector
(District Force). Thus, by the impugned order, learned Single Judge directed the
appellants to give appointment to respondent on the post of Sub Inspector
(District Force).
4. Challenging the order passed by learned Single Judge, it is submitted by
counsel for appellants that if learned Single Judge was of the view that subjective
satisfaction recorded by the competent Authority is not in accordance with law,
then instead of directing the appellants to issue order of appointment, should have
remanded the matter back to the competent Authority for reconsideration of the
case. However, it is submitted that learned Single Judge could have directed the
appellants to give appointment to respondent only when it was found that
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satisfaction recorded by competent Authority is illegal based on whims and
wishes of the Authority. However, in the present case, learned Single Judge has
allowed the writ petition merely on the ground that once respondent was found fit
for appointment on the post of Platoon Commander, then based on same criminal
antecedents different yardstick should not have been adopted for appointment on
the post of Sub Inspector (District Force). It is submitted by counsel for
appellants that analogy adopted by learned Single Judge is misconceived because
it has failed to take note of the fact that duties assigned to Platoon Commander
(Home Guards) are completely different from the duties which are discharged by
Sub Inspector (District Force).
5. Per contra it is submitted by counsel for respondent that in spite of clear
direction given by High Court by impugned order, appellants once again rejected
the candidature of respondent. Being aggrieved by the said order, respondent filed
W.P. No. 7153/2026 and the learned Single Judge, by order dated 25/2/2026 suo
motu issued notice to Shri Gopal Singh Dhakad, Assistant Director General of
Police, Police Headquarters, Bhopal to show cause as to why proceedings for
contempt of order dated 15/12/2025 passed in W.P. No.27813/2021 be not
initiated against him. Accordingly, appellants, now by order dated 17/3/2026 have
issued the appointment order to the respondent on the post of Sub Inspector
(District Force) and, under these circumstances, it is prayed that the writ appeal
filed by State has rendered infructuous.
6. In reply, it is submitted by counsel for appellants/State that so far as
order dated 17/3/2026 is concerned, it was issued under compulsion because High
Court had already suo motu initiated proceedings for contempt and in case if the
impugned order was not complied with, then the Officer was likely to be held
guilty. Since the order dated 17/3/2026 was not passed voluntarily but it was
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passed under compulsion, therefore, it cannot be said that present appeal has
rendered infructuous.
7. Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
8. Before considering the effect of order dated 17/3/2026 issued by
appellants by which respondent has been granted appointment on the post of Sub
Inspector (District Force), this Court would like to consider the challenge made to
the order passed by learned Single Judge.
9. From the impugned order, it is clear that learned Single Judge was
impressed by the fact that once respondent was found fit for appointment on the
post of Platoon Commander (Home Guards), then on the basis of same criminal
antecedents, appellants should not have rejected his candidature for the post of
Sub Inspector (District Force).
10. Now two questions arise in the present appeal for its adjudication i.e.
(i) Whether the learned Single Judge was right in holding that once
respondent was found fit for the post of Platoon Commander, then his candidature
for the post of Sub Inspector (District Force) should not have been rejected on the
basis of same criminal antecedents, or not?
(ii) Whether the learned Single Judge could have directed the Authorities to
issue order of appointment or should have remanded the matter back to the
competent Authority to reconsider the case ?
( i ) Whether the learned Single Judge was right in holding that once
respondent was found fit for the post of Platoon Commander, then his candidature
for the post of Sub Inspector (District Force) should not have been rejected on the
basis of same criminal antecedents, or not?
11. In order to hold that once the respondent was found fit for appointment
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to the post of Platoon Commander, learned Single Judge should have compared
the duties which are attached to the post of Platoon Commander and the duties
which are attached to the post of Sub Inspector (District Force). This aspect is
completely missing.
12. The Madhya Pradesh Home Guards Act, 1947 ( for short "the Act") was
enacted to create a body of volunteers to supplement the police force and to assist
in any general measure of public welfare in the State. Thus, it is clear that the post
of Home Guards or its officers is only to act as a body of volunteers to supplement
the police force and to assist in general measure of public welfare. Sections 7, 10
and 11 of the Act read as under:-
"7. Duties and training of Home Guards. —(1) Every Home Guard
shall, during the period of his training and service in the reserve be
bound to perform such duties as may be prescribed for the time being in
relation to the protection of the person, the security of the property and
the public safety and the assistance in any general measure of public
welfare.
(1-a) Subject to any rules made in this behalf it shall be the duty of
every Home Guard promptly to obey and execute all orders issued to
him by any competent authority, to collect and communicate to his
immediate superior intelligence affecting the public safety and to
prevent the commission of offences against person or property,
(2) Subject to any rules made in this behalf a Home Guard may be
required to undergo training for such period and in such manner as may
be prescribed after which he shall serve as a Home Guard for a period
of six months which period may be extended by the State Government
to a total period of not more than twelve months if the State
Government considers such extension necessary and shall thereafter
serve in the reserve for a period of three years and while in the reserve
shall be liable to be called out for duty at any time.
(2-A) The Commandant-General may with the written consent of a
Home Guard, extend from time to time the period of service of such
Home Guard in the reserve and thereupon such Home Guard shall serve
in the reserve for a further period of three years and while in the reserve
shall be liable to be called out for duty at any time.
10. Calling out Home Guards.—(1) The District Magistrate having
jurisdiction over any revenue district or part thereof in which Home
Guards are raised may by an order made in such manner as may be
prescribed call out any Home Guard for the discharge of any duty
assigned to the Home Guards in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and the rules made thereunder.
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(2) The District Magistrate may, in cases of emergency, by order in
writing, direct that the power of calling out any Home Guard under sub-
section (1) for the purpose of securing the public safety or preventing
the commission of offences against person or property shall, in such
circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in
that direction be exercised by any Magistrate not being a Magistrate of
the third class or a police officer not below the rank of a Sub -Inspector
of Police.
(3) The Commandant-General or such officer of the Home guards as
may be authorised by him in this behalf may call out the Home guards
in any area for the performance of any duty relating to any general
measure of public welfare and prescribed under sub-section (1) of
Section 7.
11. Control over Home Guards. —The Home Guards shall at all times
when undergoing training or when called out be under the control and
subject to the order of their officers, and shall when called out be
further subject to the general control of the District Magistrate and
where the Home Guard has been called out by an authority other than
District Magistrate, also such authority, in such manner and to such
extent as may be prescribed."
13. From plain reading of section 7, it is clear that every Home Guard is
bound to perform such duties as may be prescribed for the time being in relation to
protection of person, security of property and public safety and assistance in any
general measure of public welfare. Subject to any rules made in this behalf, it is
also the duty of Home Guards to collect and communicate to his immediate
superior intelligence affecting public safety and to prevent commission of offences
against person or property. Section 10 provides that the District Magistrate having
jurisdiction over any revenue district or part thereof in which Home Guards are
raised may by an order made in such manner as may be prescribed, call out any
Home Guard for discharge of any duty assigned to Home Guards in accordance
with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder and in case of
emergency, the District Magistrate, by order in writing, may direct that the power
of calling out any Home Guard under sub-section (1) for the purpose of securing
public safety or preventing the commission of offences against person or property
shall be exercised by any Magistrate not being a Magistrate of the third class or a
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Police Officer not below the rank of a Sub Inspector of Police. In view of S.12 it is
clear that when a Home Guard is called out under section 10, he shall have the
same powers, privileges and protection as an officer of police appointed under any
enactment for the time being in force.
14. From plain reading of provisions of the Act, it is clear that Home Guard
is not a regular police force and it is only a body of volunteers to supplement the
police force, whereas the District Force/Police Force has to perform multiple
duties as assigned to him under the provisions of Cr.P.C/BNSS or any other
statute. An Officer of Police Force has to investigate a matter. Not only he is
required to prevent the commission of offences, but he is also required to
prosecute the offender after following the procedure laid down in Cr.P.C/BNSS.
Thus, it is clear that duties attached to the post of Platoon Commander (Home
Guards) are much different from the duties which are attached to the post of Sub
Inspector (District Force). The aforesaid aspect has not been taken note of by
learned Single Judge. The suitability of a candidate has to be adjudged in the light
of duties attached to the post on which he has applied.
15. The Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and
Others, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471 has held as under:-
''37. The “McCarthyism” is antithesis to constitutional goal, chance of
reformation has to be afforded to young offenders in suitable cases,
interplay of reformative theory cannot be ruled out in toto nor can be
generally applied but is one of the factors to be taken into consideration
while exercising the power for cancelling candidature or discharging an
employee from service.
38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and
reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
we summarise our conclusion thus:
38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to
conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case,
whether before or after entering into service must be true and
there should be no suppression or false mention of required
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information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of services or
cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the
employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if
any, while giving such information.
38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government
orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time
of taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of
involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had
already been recorded before filling of the application/verification
form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of
the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted:
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had
been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for
a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered
an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may,
in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false
information by condoning the lapse.
38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is
not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or
terminate services of the employee.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case
involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious
nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean
acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the
employer may consider all relevant facts available as to
antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the
continuance of the employee.
38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration
truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the
right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint
the candidate.
38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character
verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial
nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its
discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such
case.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to
multiple pending cases such false information by itself will
assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order
cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a
person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may
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not be proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate
at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and
the appointing authority would take decision after considering the
seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding
departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of
termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or
submitting false information in verification form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false information
attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only
such information which was required to be specifically mentioned
has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant
comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered
in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness.
However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of
suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was
not even asked for.
38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or
suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.''
Thus, it has been held that in case where the employee has made declaration
truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has right to consider
antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Imran vs. State of
Maharashtra and Ors. [Civil Appeal No.10571 of 2018 arising out SLP(C) 6599 of
2018] decided on 12th October, 2018 has held as under:-
''6. Employment opportunities is a scarce commodity in our country.
Every advertisement invites a large number of aspirants for limited
number of vacancies.But that may not suffice to invoke sympathy for
grant of relief where the credentials of the candidate may raise serious
questions regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly,
judicial service is very different from other services and the yardstick of
suitability that may apply to other services, may not be the same for a
judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical
incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service
simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every individual
deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move
ahead in life by self-employment. To make past conduct, irrespective of
all considerations, an albatross around the neck of the candidate, may
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not always constitute justice. Much will, however depend on the fact
situation of a case.
7. That, the expression ''moral turpitude'' is not capable of precise
definition was considered in Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and
another, (1996) 4 SCC 17, opining:
''12. ''Moral turpitude'' is an expression which is used in
legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is
inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection
showing depravity....''
8. The appellant by dint of hard academic labour was successful at the
competitive examination held on 16.08.2009 and after viva voce was
selected and recommended for appointment by the Maharashtra Public
Service Commission on 14.10.2009. In his attestation form, he had
duly disclosed his prosecution and acquittal. Mere disclosure in an
appropriate case may not be sufficient to hold for suitability in
employment. Nonetheless the nature of allegations and the conduct in
the facts of a case would certainly be a relevant factor. While others so
recommended came to be appointed, the selection of the appellant was
annulled on 04.06.2010 in view of the character certification report of
the police.
9. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir Gulabrao Barde, who
had been acquitted on 24.11.2009 in Case No.3022 of 2007 under
Sections 294, 504, 34, IPC, has been appointed. We are not convinced,
that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant
could be discriminated and denied appointment arbitrarily when both
the appointments were in judicial service, by the same selection
procedure, of persons who faced criminal prosecutions and were
acquitted. The distinction sought to be drawn by the respondents, that
the former was not involved in a case of moral turpitude does not leave
us convinced. In Joginder Singh (supra), it was observed as follows:-
''25. Further, apart from a small dent in the name of this
criminal case in which he has been honourably acquitted,
there is no other material on record to indicate that the
antecedents or the conduct of the Appellant was not up to
the mark to appoint him to the post...''
10. In the present proceedings, on 23.03.2018, this Court had called for
a confidential report of the character verification as also the antecedents
of the appellant as on this date. The report received reveals that except
for the criminal case under reference in which he has been acquitted,
the appellant has a clean record and there is no adverse material against
him to deny him the fruits of his academic labour in a competitive
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selection for the post of judicial officer. In our opinion, no reasonable
person on the basis of the materials placed before us can come to
the conclusion that the antecedents and character of the appellant are
such that he is unfit to be appointed as a judicial officer. An alleged
single misadventure or misdemeanour of the present nature, if it can be
considered to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny appointment to the
appellant when he has on all other aspects and parameters been found
to be fit for appointment. The Law is well-settled in this regard in
Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471. If
empanelment creates no right to appointment, equally there can be no
arbitrary denial of appointment after empanelment.
11. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
the considered opinion that the consideration of the candidature of the
appellant and its rejection are afflicted by a myopic vision, blurred by
the spectacle of what has been described as moral turpitude, reflecting
inadequate appreciation and application of facts
also, as justice may demand.''
17. This Court in the case of Jitendra Kumar Gupta Vs. State of
M.P. decided on 28/02/2020 i n W.P. No.25262/2018 has held that Authority
should consider suitability of candidate in accordance with the post on which he is
seeking appointment and candidature cannot be rejected merely on the ground that
he was prosecuted.
18. Under these circumstances, when the duties assigned to the post of
Platoon Commander (Home Guards) are much lesser than the duties which are
assigned to the post of Sub Inspector (District Force) and being the Platoon
Commander (Home Guards), the Officer has to act as a volunteer to supplement
the police force and not to act as police force until and unless an order under
section 10 of the Act is passed by the District Magistrate, this Court is of
considered opinion that the observation made by learned Single Judge that since
respondent was found fit for recruitment to the post of Platoon Commander
therefore on the basis of same criminal antecedents appellants should not have
rejected his candidature for the post of Sub Inspector (District Force), is erroneous
and is hereby set aside.
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(ii) Whether the learned Single Judge could have directed the Authorities
to issue order of appointment or should have remanded the matter back to the
competent Authority to reconsider the case ?
19. The department is the best judge to assess the nature of duties and
suitability of a candidate. Unless and until it is found that rejection of candidature
was an outcome of whims and wishes of the competent Authority, the Court
should not have directed the Authorities to issue an order of appointment. At the
most, the Court should remand the matter back to the Authorities to reconsider the
case in the light of observations made in the order. However, in the present case,
learned Single Judge had directly issued a direction to the appellants to issue order
of appointment to respondent on the post of Sub Inspector (District Force) after
holding that once respondent was found fit for the post of Platoon Commander
then his candidature on the basis of same criminal antecedents should not have
been rejected. Once this Court has found that the comparison done by learned
Single Judge is not in accordance with law and the learned Single Judge has not
taken note of the duties which are assigned to the post of Platoon Commander and
the duties which are assigned to the post of Sub Inspector (District Force),
therefore, this Court is of considered opinion that learned Single should not have
directed the appellants to issue order of appointment. At the most, learned Single
Judge could have remanded the matter back to the Authorities for reconsideration
of suitability of respondent for the post of Sub Inspector (District Force). Under
these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that the impugned order
cannot be given the stamp of judicial approval.
Now, then next question or consideration is as to whether this writ appeal
has rendered infructuous in the light of appointment order dated 17/3/2026 or not
?
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20. It is the case of respondent himself that after the impugned order was
passed, his candidature was once again rejected by order dated 19/2/2026 in spite
of specific direction to give appointment to the respondent on the post of Sub
Inspector (Revenue). The order dated 19/2/2026 was assailed by respondent by
filing W.P. No.7153/2026 and on 25/2/2026, learned Single Judge, without
issuing notice in W.P. No.7153/2026, directly came to the conclusion that order
dated 19/2/2026 is contemptutous in nature and notice was issued to Shri Gopal
Singh Dhakad, Assistant Director General of Police, Police Headquarters, Bhopal
to show-cause as to why proceedings for contempt of order dated 15/12/2025
passed in W.P. No.27813/2021 (impugned order in the present appeal) should not
be initiated. It appears that only after contempt notice was issued, the competent
Authority issued order dated 17/3/2026 along with a short reply, which was
accepted by learned Single Judge by order dated 17/3/2026 passed in W.P.
No.7153/2026 and the said petition was disposed of. From the order-sheets in
W.P. No.7153/2026, it is clear that notices in said writ petition were never issued
and learned Single Judge suo motu initiated contempt proceedings by order dated
25/2/2026 which reads as under:-
"Dated : 25-02-2026
Mr. Abhinav Bhargav - Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Kaushlendra Singh Tomar - GA for the State.
Earlier, the petition filed by the petitioner, being
W.P.No.27813/2021, was allowed with the following directions :
"11. Considering the aforesaid, the stand taken by the
respondents in their return to deny the appointment to the
petitioner on the post of Sub-Inspector is found be arbitrary
and unsustainable in law. The justification given by the
respondents is not acceptable. Accordingly, the petition is
allowed. As no other reason is assigned by the respondents
to deny appointment to petitioner, they are directed to issue
appointment order to the petitioner on the post of Sub-
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Inspector pursuant to his selection on the post of Sub-
Inspector (District Force)."
Apparently, this Court allowed the petition and issued directions to
the respondent authorities to issue an appointment order in favour of
the petitioner on the post of Sub-Inspector. Surprisingly, the impugned
order has been passed by Mr. Gopal Singh Dhakad, Assistant Director
General of Police, Police Headquarters, Bhopal, on 19.02.2026, again
declaring the petitioner unsuitable for the said post.
In view of the specific direction issued by this Court, there was no
option available to the said authority, who has dealt with the matter
again on merits, except to issue the appointment order. The aforesaid
order passed in the writ petition has not been challenged so far.
This Court is of the prima facie opinion that the impugned order
dated 19.02.2026 is contemptuous in view of the specific direction
issued in paragraph - 11 of the order passed in the writ petition.
Accordingly, office is directed to issue notice to Mr. Gopal Singh
Dhakad, Assistant Director General of Police, Police Headquarters,
Bhopal, to show cause as to why proceedings for contempt of the order
dated 15.12.2025 passed in W.P.No.27813/2021, should not be
initiated against him.
List this case on 17.03.2026."
21. The order dated 17/3/2026 reads as under:-
"Appearance:
Shri Praditya Pal - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Vivek Khedkar- Additional Advocate General with Shri S.S.
Kushwah- GA for the respondents/State.
ORDER
Respondents have filed reply / clarification on behalf of Assistant
Inspector General of Police, Police Headquarters, Bhopal and a short
reply on behalf of respondents.
2. He submits that the order which is impugned in this petition has been
withdrawn by the said authority vide order dated 14/3/2026. Said
authority has also tendered unconditional apology with regard to
issuance of impugned order, which is found to be in conflict with the
order passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition.
3. Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the
appointment order in favour of petitioner has been issued today and a
copy of the same is also placed before this Court.
4. The apology tendered by the authority is accepted.
5. Accordingly, noting survives for adjudication in this petition, same
is accordingly disposed of in view of submissions made by the
Additional Advocate General."
22. Thus, it is clear that W.P. NO.7153/2026 was suo motu converted into
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SHRIVASTAVA
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contempt proceedings and even no notice of the writ petition was issued.
23. Be that whatever it may be.
24. Once this Court has already held that impugned order dated 15/12/2025
passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. No.27813/2021 cannot be given stamp of
judicial approval, then order passed in W.P. No.7153/2026 which was in fact
treated as contempt proceeding, cannot be approved. As order dated 17/3/2026
was passed by appellants under compulsion, therefore, it cannot be said to be a
voluntary act on the part of appellants. Furthermore, as direction to issue order of
appointment to respondent on the post of Sub Inspector (District Force) has also
not received the stamp of judicial approval, then any action taken subsequent
thereto will lose its efficacy. Therefore, order dated 17/3/2026 passed by
competent Authority thereby giving appointment to respondent on the post of Sub
Inspector (District Force) is hereby declared as nonest and it is held that merely
because order dated 17/3/2026 was passed by appellants under compulsion, it will
not make the present appeal as infructuous.
25. Accordingly, order dated 15/12/2025 passed by learned Single Judge
in W.P. No.27813/2021 is hereby set aside. As a consequence thereof, orders
dated 25/2/2026 and 17/3/2026 passed in W.P. No.7153/2026 which was tried by
learned Single Judge as contempt proceedings, are also hereby set aside in
exercise of suo motu powers under S.2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand
Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam.
26. Since the order dated 17/3/2026 passed by competent Authority has
already been declared as nonest, therefore, it is directed that respondent shall
immediately stop functioning on the post of Sub Inspector (District Force).
27. Before joining on the post of Sub Inspector (District Force),
respondent must have resigned from the post of Platoon Commander. Since his
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SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 09-07-2026
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:19784
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resignation from the post of Platoon Commander was in the light of his
appointment on the post of Sub Inspector (District Force) and as the order of
appointment dated 17/3/2026 has been declared nonest, therefore, the resignation
submitted by respondent from the post of Platoon Commander is also declared as
nonest. Respondent shall continue to work on the post of Platoon Commander.
Appellants are directed to permit the respondent to immediately join on the post
of Platoon Commander and he be posted at the same place from where he had
tendered his resignation.
28. The Director General of Police is directed to ensure compliance of this
order immediately.
29. With aforesaid observations, writ appeal is allowed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
(ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE
JUDGE
(and)
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Signed by: ANAND
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 09-07-2026
17:54:43